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ABSTRACT 
Literature on Anglo-Irish relations in the Second World War has suggested that in 
British popular and political discourse the neutral Irish were felt complacent, short-
sighted, stubborn, stupid, and cowardly. Extreme opinion held them treacherous. 
However, there was significant Anglo-Irish intelligence collaboration, many Irish served 
in the British Forces and a significant contribution was made by Irish immigrant labour 
during the war. Yet ambivalent and dismissive perceptions of the Irish continued and 
grew during World War Two. This thesis will examine the ways in which contemporary 
popular perceptions of “Irishness” were affected by cultural antipathy, the actions of the 
Irish state, the influx of immigrant Irish workers and the recruitment of Irish volunteers 
into the British Armed Forces, during the years of 1939-1945. Key questions that appear 
here are whether the shifting circumstances of war changed attitudes to the Irish, and 
further if, at time of extreme threat to Britain and her Empire, was Ireland, though 
neutral, considered an enemy.  
Concentrating on the public discourse on the Irish states conduct during the war, 
attitudes towards Irish people and British experiences of Irish immigrant workers and 
Irish people in the British Forces, this survey will illuminate the depth and breadth of 
ambivalence towards Eire and its people. It is found that the key to British understanding 
was acquiescence to British influence, even if this was against the wishes of the Irish 
people. It is the main contention of this thesis that, because of non-acquiescence, the 
Second World War was the point when Britain psychically ejected ‘Irishness’ from its 
national identity, casting the Irish as irredeemably ‘other’, even before Ireland seceded 
from the Commonwealth. It is also concluded that due to influence of this ejection, for 
many Eire, though neutral, was perceived as if she were an enemy to Britain. 
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A NOTE ON NATIONAL TERMS 
 
Throughout this thesis when referring to Ireland in periods before 1922 ‘Ireland’ refers to the 
whole island of Ireland. 
Thereafter ‘Ireland’, the ‘Irish Free State’, the ‘South’ and ‘Eire’ refer to the twenty-six counties 
that now comprise the Republic of Ireland. 
The six county statelet of Northern Ireland is referred to in its shortened form as NI, and is 
occasionally referred to as ‘Ulster’, as this is commonly used by its inhabitants. 
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1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Research on British perceptions of the Irish has concentrated on the period of the largest 
influx of Irish immigration to Britain, and the most expedient political and economic reforms in 
Ireland; that is, roughly, the Victorian Age. These studies acknowledge a huge social, economic, 
and political impact on Britain. The works of Ned Lebow (Lebow, 1973; 1976), L P Curtis (Curtis, 
1968, 1971), Michael de Nie (de Nie, 2004), Edward Lengel (Lengel, 2002), Don MacRaild 
(MacRaild, 1995), Colin Holmes (Holmes, 1988) and Sheridan Gilley (Gilley, 1978) have studied 
a rich vein of Victorian anti-Irish prejudice and disaffection, and Mary Hickman & Bronwen 
Walter (Hickman, 1995a, 1995b; Hickman & Walter, 1997; Walter, 2000) have argued this 
antipathy continued into the late twentieth century. However, a discussion on perceptions of 
Ireland and the Irish during the Second World War is almost totally absent. There has been no 
detailed research on British popular opinion or how these attitudes were affected by Irish 
neutrality and wartime insecurities. It has been generally proposed that this period did not feature 
a growth in cultural conflict partly because Eire never became strategically vital, but this does not 
mean there was no Anglo-Irish friction in this period. This thesis will explore in detail 
contemporary British perceptions of Ireland and the Irish from the beginning of 1939 until the 
end of 1945, and chart changes in these perceptions, and the consequences of these on Anglo-
Irish relations.  
The shortfall in research is partly due to differing views of the Irish experience of the war; 
one of resistance to war, and one of absence from war. The first being non-belligerent experience 
of war and the second being absence of conflict, from foreign affairs, and absence from the major 
historical narrative of the period. A recent trend towards historical enquiry into the Irish 
experience of ‘the Emergency’, which stresses the constructive and formative effects of the period 
on the Irish State and national identity, has partially changed these analyses. However, analysis 
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of the effect of Ireland on British popular opinion is still absent from the historical record, though 
there were many transnational ties at involved.  
Nevertheless, some histories have suggested that Ireland was not as unimportant to Britain 
in wartime as it appears from the historiography. Kenneth Lunn urged research in this to reveal if 
this ‘hidden history’ can be quantified, arguing that what has already been found may represent 
either ‘the tip of the iceberg or its entirety’ (Lunn, 1993, p. 107). This thesis will examine 
contemporary sources and analyse the ways in which popular perceptions of ‘Irishness’ were 
affected by long established cultural antipathy, the actions of the neutral Irish state, the influx of 
immigrant Irish workers and the recruitment of Irish volunteers into the British Armed Forces, 
during the years of 1939-1945. This survey will show how acquiescence to British influence was 
the key to understanding of Ireland and the Irish from the British public, even if this was against 
the wishes of the Irish people. It is the main contention of this thesis that there is sufficient 
evidence to argue that many British people felt Ireland acted as an enemy toward Britain and, 
because of her non-acquiescence, the Second World War was when Britain ejected previously 
held belief that ‘Irishness’ was a part of British national identity, casting the Irish as culturally, 
politically and socially ‘other’, and set the stage for Eire to painlessly leave the Commonwealth. 
Finally, this was the breaking point for Britain long after the divorce had happened in Eire. 
1.2 CONTEXT  
 
It is important to note that while Ireland was rarely seen one of the most important problems 
of the war by the public, and that its perceived importance fluctuated, however the tone of the 
discourse is one of the most derogatory. A BIPO poll in November 1940 indicated that only 1.05% 
of respondents held Ireland to be the most important problem facing Britain at the time, and this 
number fell to 0.27% in March 1941 (Liddell, Hinton, & Thompson, 1996). In January 1943 the 
most urgent problem was considered to be ‘maintaining supplies from abroad’, that is the battle 
of the Atlantic, argued by 30.35% of correspondents (Liddell et al., 1996) and this issue was most 
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associated with troublesome Ireland, simultaneously a lasting problem for Britain yet one often 
ignored. 
The role of Ireland is a curious lacuna in Britain’s World War Two history. This absence 
appears alongside a recognition that there were dismissive attitudes Ireland and the Irish. Due to 
academic dispute over characterisations of Irish ‘benevolent neutrality’ and its morality, or by 
excluding Eire due to her non-combatant status, most historical accounts of the Britain and Second 
World War period mention Ireland in passing, if at all. Some argue the problems created by Irish 
neutrality proved to be easily avoided and produced no occurrence more problematic than a short-
lived umbrage at the loss of the treaty ports. One of the harshest summations of Eire during World 
War Two is Roy Foster’s contention that, in the end, ‘Much of Eire’s wartime experience simply 
provides harmless diversion for counter-factual speculation (or the writers of might-have-been 
thrillers)’ (Foster, 1988, p. 561). However, such conclusions are coloured by hindsight; though 
Eire did prove to be no serious consideration in Hitler’s plans for war, contemporaneously this 
was by no means certain, and a substantial public discourse, based on a cultural expectation of 
‘disloyalty’ from Ireland. 
Some historical works have been more charitable than Foster’s assessment, but not much 
less invested in assessing the impact of Eire on Britain’s war. Angus Calder’s ‘The Peoples War’ 
(Calder, 1969) only mentions Irish neutrality and continued unemployment in Ulster, while Juliet 
Gardiner’s ‘Wartime Britain’ (Gardiner, 2004) analyses the IRA campaign of 1939, the 
incompetence of German intelligence in Eire, the bombing of North and South and the importance 
of Irish contributions to the British armed forces but does not reflect on how these affected public 
opinion or perceptions. Even biographies of the Churchill, the most outspoken opponent of Irish 
neutrality, provide little detail or analysis of his attitude to Ireland. Geoffrey Best’s Churchill: A 
Study in Greatness solely notes he ‘much resented’ Irish neutrality (Best, 2001), and his Churchill 
and War argues that it infuriated him, but goes no further (Best, 2005). Martin Gilbert’s 
monumental biography mentions Eire only twice in relation to the loss of the treaty ports, and a 
solitary footnote in volume VI relates Churchill’s post-war bitter recollection of Chatfield’s 
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failure ‘to state the naval case against his giving away the Irish bases’ (Martin Gilbert, 1983, p. 
1122 footnote). Alternatively, Ireland has also been a problem too alien or large to be considered 
in this period. Mark Connelly sees Ireland as ‘the exception to every rule in this book’ (Connelly, 
2004, p. 21), and Sonya Rose also ignores Northern Ireland stating, ‘to have included Ulster in 
this study… (of the Celtic nations of Britain) would have meant adding considerable length to an 
already long and complex chapter’ (Rose, 2004, pp. 218-219). Ireland, in this period, it seems, is 
too anomalous, and so much out of step with the rest of the contemporary world.  
Influential in the creation of a history simplified into becoming a story of what did not 
happen, rather than what did, was FSL Lyons ‘Plato’s Cave’ analogy (Lyons, 1971), which 
reflects a dismissal of the formative effect of the war on the Irish Republic and its foreign 
relations. This theory of Ireland’s turning its back on the world can be traced to contemporary 
discourse during the war and conceptually excuses the absence of the Irish wartime experience 
from the British historical narrative. But this absence is also partly due to the processes by which 
transnational ties have become invisible and ignored. Two of these processes are cultural 
phenomena; a long history of shifting and dismissive historical attitudes to the Irish, and the 
mythology surrounding of Britain in World War Two. The first is characterised by a longstanding 
cultural, economic, and political, if often dysfunctional, symbiosis between the two nations of 
Britain and Ireland, and the second by the almost complete rejection of this symbiosis and an 
ejection of the Irish element in British culture. A third process is a political one; the formation of 
an Irish nationality in relation to Britain. 
1.3 HISTORICAL ATTITUDES TO IRELAND  
 
Any discussion of perceptions of the Irish must acknowledge that certain stereotypes, and 
concepts of ‘Irishness’, have a long, varied, and controversial history. The formation of ‘Irishness’ 
in British eyes has been ‘processual’ and historical (Garner, 2004, p. 80) and relates to the 
concurrent formation of ‘Britishness’, which Linda Colley argues defined itself in reaction to the 
‘other’ beyond (Colley, 1992, pp. 6,8-9). Leerssen further argues that because any individual has 
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multiple concentric social identities, the formation of a group identity must concentrate on 
common criteria, whilst willingly disregarding certain differences. Further, the choice of which 
differences to ignore ‘is essentially random, or at least a free one’, so that that they may be affected 
by circumstance, as and when required (Leerssen, 1996, pp. 22-23). An adaptable identity is 
therefore required to retain some essential continuity, and this was the process by which Ireland 
was occasionally useful to Ireland while at the same time being derided for its religion and culture.  
Writing of the nineteenth centuries racialization of Irishness, Steve Garner sees ‘(T)here 
is no anti-Irish racism in the singular … but a number of climaxes in which specific configurations 
come to the fore, around the Irish as an underclass, as Catholics in a Protestant state and as 
racialized Celts in an Anglo-Saxon dominated polity’ (Garner, 2004, p. 2). This process is based 
wholly on the needs of the subjectifying identity; as Leerssen states ‘the characterisation of the 
native Irish was utterly heedless of the attitudes and self-image of the native Irish themselves’ 
(Leerssen, 1996, p. 380). Declan Kiberd has gone so far as to argue that ‘the notion of ‘Ireland’ 
is largely a fiction created by the rulers of England in response to specific needs at a precise 
moment in British History’ (Kiberd, 1985, p. 85). Thus, reconfiguring and combining of 
prejudices and stereotypes related to any given situation occurs throughout Anglo-Irish relations. 
Following this logic, the creation of a truly independent foreign policy, that is neutrality, and the 
formation of a recognisably Irish State, created by Irish people, proved the Irish had diverged 
from the path laid out for them by the British, becoming recognisably, uniquely, Irish. This point, 
for Britain, was reached, not at Irish independence, but by the end of World War Two, and resulted 
in a rejection of ‘Irishness’ as part of ‘Britishness’.  
However, this divergence was preceded by centuries of overlordship whose political 
justification was buoyed by cultural domination. …. Medieval Papal dispensation to force the 
Irish Church, which had adapted some elements of faith to win over the Irish, back under the total 
control of Rome, brought Norman invaders. For Lebow the historical narrative extolling of the 
civilising virtues of the invaders, together with dismissal of the Irish claim to Christianity, 
substantiate the dominant British thinking on the Irish and their religion until the middle years of 
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the nineteenth century (Lebow, 1973, p. 24). For most of the history of Anglo-Irish relations, 
British political and educated classes thought the Irish, their culture and religion inferior, 
disingenuous, and suspect. With the reformation and enlightenment there was an additional 
cultural justification to the religious one, seeing the popular adherence to Catholicism as 
backward and unthinking. As Bruce Nelson argues ‘from the sixteenth century…one comes face 
to face with a process of racialization rooted in conquest, colonization, and Anglicization’ 
(Nelson, 2012, p. 44), even before concepts Social Darwinian concepts of ‘race’ had fully 
emerged. However, the Irish were not yet seen as irredeemable; as Steve Garner points out that 
the Gaelic Irish were accepted as landholders within the pale as long as they adhered to Anglo-
Norman customs (Garner, 2004, p. 76), or displayed a relationship to Protestantism, the 
benchmark of ‘civilisation’ (Garner, 2004, p. 75). However, the continuity of Irish culture, and of 
the Catholicism in Ireland, came to symbolise resistance and exemplify the failure of the new 
order.  
By the end of eighteenth-century popular culture had created stage archetypes which 
emphasised British contempt for, and the harmlessness of, all things Irish (Hayton, 1988, p. 11), 
with two distinct types: the violent, treacherous alien ‘other’ and the contemptible, stupid, inferior 
‘other’ (Hickman, 1995b, p. 26). Such dualistic attitudes allowed the colonizers to disengage from 
the causes of cultural antithesis and provided explanation and justification for repressive action. 
However, this created a dichotomy where Ireland was ‘too distant to be understood, too close to 
be ignored’ (Lyons, 1982, p. 12). However, the greatest change in perceptions of the Irish 
occurred ‘…in the nineteenth century…at a juncture in which processes of class formation and 
nationalisation ensured that they would be a very visible minority’ (Hickman, 1995b, p. 80).  
The Industrial revolution caused deep disruption to the British working classes at the time 
famine and the economic collapse of Irish industries made it imperative for Irish workers to leave 
their home country. For Victorian Irish migrants, their ‘otherness’ had already been established, 
but they were now stigmatised as a threat to British employment and welfare. For Garner 
contemporary views posited the Irish were treated as ‘simultaneously a substitute workforce 
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capable of cutting wages and strikebreaking, and inveterately indolent claimants of poor law 
funds’ (Garner, 2004, p. 118). National and local government commissions confirmed a 
conception that the Irish were often content to live in very basic and debased conditions 
(Hickman, 1995b, pp. 72-73), and police, poor law guardians and politicians worked within a 
discourse where migrant characteristics, rather than industrialisation, created their poor living 
conditions. Such perceptions justified Victorian scientific theories of racial difference and social 
Darwinism combining to portray Irish migrants as a race of uncivilised animals, simultaneously 
the Fenian ‘Celtic Caliban’, and the child-like innocent female Erin, in need of protection from 
her ‘brother’ John Bull’1. The Irish were now, by reason of birth, irredeemably ‘other’. The 
Manchester and Clerkenwell attacks were thus downplayed in favour of purely criminal 
motivation (de Nie, 2004, p. 162), encouraging the perceptions of Irish nationalists as animalistic 
thugs.  
Nevertheless, for Britain, Irish migration had its utility in getting unpalatable work done 
and in fighting for the Empire, and those who worked in these interests were lionised, as a ‘martial 
race’. The removal of prohibition on Catholic recruits resulted in the transfer of Catholic 
recruitment from the armies of the continent to the British army (Bartlett & Jeffery, 1996, p. 11). 
By 1830 42% of the British army were Irish born (Spiers, 1996, p. 337), as were 40% of British 
soldiers in India by the 1850’s (Bielenberg, 2000, p. 223). However, thereafter Irish recruitment 
progressively dropped until in 1913 when only 9.6% of the Army were Irish (Jeffery, 1985, p. 
219), but scions of the Protestant landed class formed an estimated 16% of the officer class in 
1914 (Spiers, 1996, p. 341), once more showing religion and class were still important in 
distinguishing the most useful Irish from the rest. Yet persistent assumptions of untrustworthiness 
meant the likelihood of a man from an Irish regiment in World War One being sentenced to death 
by Court Martial was four times that of any other British soldier (Oram, 1998, p. 59). Indeed, the 
proportion of Irish death sentences was actually higher before the 1916 Rising than after it (Oram, 
1998, p. 69), which testifies to the persistence of the Irish stereotype rather than reflecting Irish 
                                                          
1 See (Curtis, 1968, 1971), (Lebow, 1976) and (de Nie, 2004) 
8 
 
‘treachery’. As Bartlett & Jeffrey concur ‘it was the attitudes and expectations of others that 
defined the battlefield behaviour of Irish soldiers’ (Bartlett & Jeffery, 1996, p. 18).  
Some have doubted the effect of such divisive stereotypes (Foster, 1995; Peatling, 2005) 
and Curtis argues that British prejudices had always involved elements of class, religion, and race 
but the dominance of racialized views, after 1860, did not amount to any significant change in 
overall attitude of Irish inferiority (Curtis, 1968, p. 16). But the sheer volume of prejudicial 
material found in the Victorian era in political discourse and popular culture cannot be 
underestimated in its cumulative effect; class, race and religion are parallel discourses, taking on 
contextually different emphases, each mutually re-enforcing the other (McVeigh, 2002, p. 151). 
It is implausible that with the growth of popular entertainments, literacy, population, industry, 
and urbanisation, combined with a huge influx of Irish migrants, the volume and scope of cultural 
stereotypes did not have cultural, if not political, influence.  
Though the Irish ‘character’ was of conditional utility to Britain, deeper cultural 
differences have been suggested as irreconcilable, because Irish culture persisted. De Nie argues 
the British developed over time a dialogue where, in order to come to terms with a history of 
coercion and conflict, it is insisted that ‘any debt owed to the Irish had long since been repaid and 
all misdeeds committed by Britain were the responsibility of previous generations’ (de Nie, 2004, 
p. 176). This leads to a corollary that the Irish cherish hatreds that are hundreds of years old, with 
the effect that ‘the English do not remember any history, the Irish forget none’ (MacDonagh, 
1992, p. 1). Oliver MacDonagh sees the English view as one of ‘Whig history’, sequential, 
developmental, objective and where the past should be forgotten in order to reach the ideal future, 
whereas the Irish view sees morality outside of time, where a wrong is a wrong no matter when 
it occurred, forgiven yet not forgotten (MacDonagh, 1992, p. 6). Additionally, Irish culture still 
held different native conceptions of property, more communal and self-regulating (MacDonagh, 
1992, pp. 45-46) rather than individual ownership, remained, and a new politics, one more based 
on identity, culture, and nationalism, rather than on than on ideology and party allegiance, 
emerged (MacDonagh, 1992, pp. 66-67). Yet British popular opinion often did not accept that 
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Irish cultural differences meant Ireland was a separate nation. This resulted in ill-fated policies 
such as ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, which saw attempts to win independence as reaction 
to bad governance rather than a desire for self-government (Boyce, 1991, p. 281). However, by 
the twentieth century the effects of only partial ‘Anglicisation’ meant a substantial Irish culture 
remained and British eyes saw Ireland as culturally foreign, yet occasionally of utility, somewhere 
between colonized and integrated, barbarian and scholar, pagan and Christian, under-developed, 
yet hardworking and lazy, faithful soldiers but mercenary, cunning yet stupid, comical yet 
criminal, loyal yet treacherous, and unwanted migrant yet necessary labour, as British necessity 
dictated. The context of historical popular attitudes to the Irish is vital to understanding British 
perceptions of the Irish in any historical context, and especially while the ‘popular memory’ of 
Britain and World War Two was being forged. 
1.4 THE PEOPLE’S WAR AND ‘POPULAR MEMORY’ 
 
The second cultural phenomena contextually important to this thesis is the emergence, 
contemporaneously, of the ‘People’s War’ mythology. This is based on the concept that, when 
Britain was at its most vulnerable, the whole nation, united, fought alone for the values of 
freedom, democracy, the rule of law and decency. This cultural memory of World War Two is 
best conceptualised by Foucault’s definition of ‘Popular Memory’ (Foucault, 1975), which holds 
that even individual private memories are affected by the dominant political discourses of their 
time, and that, with further retelling, over time conflict over that memory intensifies, such that 
there is never unanimity of interpretation. This type of memory is affected most deeply by the 
passage of time, making contemporary feelings likely to change due to reflection and the influence 
of other interpretations, and even by subsequent events. The development of ‘People’s War’ 
mythology began during the war but has grown since to simplify of complex and multi-faceted 
events and motivations, reducing the Second World War to ‘the Good War’, one which had to be 
fought in the face of evil, for the good of mankind. The mythology also connects the sacrifices of 
war, and the showing that the people ‘could take it’, with an inevitability that ‘they were already 
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on the way to winning the war’ (Taylor, 1965, pp. 502-503), while the people ‘remained a peaceful 
and civilized people, tolerant, patient and generous’ (Taylor, 1965, p. 600). A recent, notable 
exception to the historical lacuna has been Alan Allport’s ‘Britain at Bay’, which admirably 
argues the sectarian government of Northern Ireland was an example of both Britain’s wilful 
myopia on Ireland and also undermines the myth that Britain was the tolerant, peace-loving ‘Little 
Man of Europe’, pushed too far by the Nazi’s until going to war (Allport, 2020).  
While the mythology is not wholly untrue or untrue, it helped explain post-war political 
events and create a new British identity by which its people to come to terms with the barbarity 
of the war, and the loss of life, the deprivation and fear of the war years. Here is a triumph of the 
‘British way of life’, where a previously divided people ‘came together as one metaphysical 
entity’, one that overcame divisions of class, religion, and self-interest, and ended in a ‘national 
change of heart that marked the Summer of 1940’ (Harris, 1992, pp. 17-18), which engendered a 
diminished but proud nationhood renewed in sacrifice. Leaving aside the question of the veracity 
of the myth, it is clear it served a cultural purpose, implicitly believed and offering a popular 
memory which also explains the present, and moulds expectations of the future (M. Smith, 2000, 
p. 2). The myth has endured, yet many aspects of life during the war do not fit this mythology, 
and have tended to be thus absent or ejected, such as blackout crime, wartime anti-Semitism and 
racism, industrial unrest, the role of British Fascism, and the experience of children and 
minorities, including Irish immigrants and Irish Forces personnel. Such absence ‘suggests a 
collective cultural amnesia’, and in the specific remit of this study, especially regarding ‘Irish 
people’s role in a war which was not their ‘people’s war’’ (Redmond, 2016a, p. 295).  
The ‘People’s War’ mythology was under construction from the start of the war, with 
neutrality being characterised as a delusion that Europe could survive without a victory over 
Nazism. The British stance was viewed as a ‘plain spoken recognition that everyone was in the 
same boat and there were no real alternatives to the course Churchill has set’ (Mackay, 2013, p. 
254). There was no other course. Morale was buoyed by Churchill’s characterisation of the war 
as ‘Britain standing between civilization and barbarism’ encouraging feeling that, with the stakes 
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being so high, only full participation on the British side could be considered a positive 
contribution. As a result, the growing philosophy of the war held that Britain was stoically 
choosing to make a stand, alone, if necessary, as neutrality had failed across Western Europe. In 
contrast Eire had chosen a third course, taking no action, choosing neutrality; a course deemed 
invalid in the new British mythology. Also interpreted as an easy route, relying on others to 
protect them and cowardly avoidance of responsibility, Eire was becoming seen as progressively 
oppositional by detaching itself from the standpoint of Britain and negating British national 
interest.  
As the war proceeded, the accumulated shared experience of life on the Home Front, 
together with the public discourse about what it meant to be British, served to reinforce people’s 
sense of being part of a national community’ (Mackay, 2013, p. 255). To some extent, the home 
front had united Britons in a time of trial (Mackay, 2013, p. 258) and the rhetoric of all people 
‘being in the same boat’ led to its corollary that the Irish could not be as united when not enduring 
the same trials that Britons endured. Those Irish who joined the armed forces could be co-opted 
when sharing the trials and unifying effects of the war, whilst others who did not were 
oppositional ‘outsiders. Thus, the Irish who stayed at home were oppositional to Britain by being 
disunited by the war, and the Irish contribution could be conceptually minimised. This process, I 
argue led to the ejection of ‘Irishness’ from Britishness, making it finally alien, and this process 
was gradual, progressing with every victory, which proved the British stance correct. 
1.5 IRISH NATIONALITY 
 
The 1921 Anglo-Irish settlement encouraged historians to bypass continuing constitutional, 
trade, cultural and transnational links, and like successive British governments, historians have 
often seen British involvement with Ireland to be only playing a mediatory role between North 
and South. However, transnational ties remained, not least due to the processual severance of ties 
to the British Commonwealth. Irish citizens remained British citizens in British law until 1949, 
and the Common Travel Area (CTA), and special position in British law, has meant that Irish 
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people have most of the privileges of British citizenship while in Britain. This special position 
has encouraged the assumption that the Irish have some residual British identity. Additionally, 
Irish nationality was contested as the Anglo-Irish treaty of in 1921 did little to define Irish 
nationality, with Irish persons born before this date either repudiating or clinging to their British 
nationality according to their preference. Between 1937 and 1949 Britain regarded the Irish as 
British citizens while the Irish government repudiated this creating a period where the Irish could 
be ‘British’ or not as circumstance dictated.  
For Marella Hoffman historical and contemporary factors enables Irishness to be supressed 
within the British political subconscious and simultaneously stand out by its absence (Hoffman 
nee Buckley, 1997, p. 98). Further, Irish immigrants are anomalous by their ‘whiteness’, 
European-ness and use of the English language, and Louise Ryan goes so far as to suggest these 
similarities have singled out the Irish as an inevitable immigrant, with a simplified migration 
process and acculturation taken for granted (Ryan, 2004, p. 354). However, even today the Irish 
are not British, but still citizens of the Irish Republic have special status; outside of UK and 
Commonwealth citizenship, yet not foreign in the eyes of the law (Meehan, 2000, p. 19). 
The question of Irish identity is further problematic when considering the Irish in the 
British armed forces. Historically Irish people in Britain have denounced violent and terrorist 
activity committed in Britain in the name of Ireland, and have served in the British forces, 
swearing allegiance to the British King, yet also defended the Irish right to self-determination. As 
Wendy Webster points out all nationalities in the British armed forces, including the Irish, swore 
an oath to ‘King and Country’ but retained transnational ties (Webster, 2014, p. 81). Irish men 
and women in the British forces in wartime professed that in the event of Irish invasion, by allies 
or axis, they would have deserted and gone to fight for Ireland. This dualistic attitude echoes the 
popular acceptance of emigration from a homeland that was, despite being unable to support its 
own population, still ‘home’. Such complex identities were often misunderstood in Britain and 
were often simplified for ease of understanding, leading to the impression that the Irish were still 
‘British’ in loyalty and law. Even as the UK left the European Union, Irish people will still have 
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rights to work, live and vote in Britain, and will continue to avail of rights, granted by British law, 
equal to that of a British citizen. That these issues surrounding historical Irish nationality and the 
effects of the Common Travel Area, are still not widely known, or understood in Britain, has also 
given the impression to many Britons that citizens of Ireland are still somehow ‘British’.  
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
Several historical works on this period have suggested some specific areas of British concern 
over Ireland in this period that have been under researched. These have influenced the structure 
of this thesis by suggesting broad themes that require elaboration. Additionally, these areas of 
concern tend to coincide with distinctive periods of the war. For example, fear of IRA action was 
at its height as Britain came to terms with the Fall of her ally France, and the height of reaction 
against Irish immigrant workers in 1944 when the highest level of production, and immigrant 
workers, was required. This thesis is structured thematically, but also roughly chronologically, 
where the various themes of popular opinion on the Irish change with the exigencies of the war.  
The period of the ‘Phoney / Bore War’, September 1939 until May 1940, coincides with 
reaction to the 1939 IRA ‘S-Plan’ campaign and the threat of IRA activity in Britain, where 
assumptions about Ireland were fuelled by memories and impressions of the Anglo-Irish War. 
Marella Buckley has argued that, in the twentieth century in general, ignorance of Ireland and 
Irishness amongst the British, and the legacy of the Irish Revolutionary period, contributed to a 
perception that Irishness nationalism and ethnicity are inherently dangerous (Hoffman nee 
Buckley, 1997, pp. 96-97). Local histories also cite Anti-Irish behaviour in Coventry related to 
the 1939 IRA ‘S-Plan’ bombing campaign (Richardson & Harris, 1972, p. 97), as part of evidence 
of similar incidents throughout Britain. Kenneth Lunn further argues reaction to the S-Plan 
requires more study as it clearly elicited social tensions and cast suspicion over the Irish in Britain 
when Britain was at its most threatened (Lunn, 1993). Moran, however, while noting an Anti-
Irish backlash in Birmingham, dismisses any political impact concluding that the war quickly 
became the cities dominant worry (Moran, 2010, pp. 155-162). Chapter two is intended to go 
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some way towards Lunn’s suggestion that the Anti-Irish backlash over IRA activity was more 
influential on British public opinion than previously supposed. It also provides a framework 
around which to assess early opinion and note how opinion of Ireland changed across the period 
of the war.  
Some histories have suggested Irishness was also cast as dangerous in a new way. Coinciding 
with the Fall of France in 1940, danger was considered as residing not only by action of the IRA, 
but also by omission of action or stubbornness by the Irish State. The main danger was 
increasingly seen as the likelihood of a successful Irish invasion by the Nazi’s, thus encircling 
Britain. Clair Wills argues, because ‘Many Britons were simply unable to absorb the fact that the 
country was no longer a part of the United Kingdom’ (Wills, 2008, p. 5), and a former constituent 
country pursuing an independent nation so close to Britain pursuing an independent foreign policy 
was seen as needlessly inviting German aggression. It was also felt that concessions to Irish 
independence, in the face of growing danger from the continent, were at least ill-advised and at 
most negligent. Indeed, many began to ask if Irish independence should be allowed to continue.  
Differing characterisations of Irish neutrality were to be expected, not least because the rights 
and responsibilities surrounding the state of neutrality were still contentious. In this context, and 
with the threat of Nazi domination of Europe, Irish neutrality had to be adapted to Irish 
circumstance. Some writing from a political science aspect have argued that Irish neutrality was 
neither neutral, legitimate, or appropriate. Trevor Salmon’s ‘Unneutral Ireland’ (Salmon, 1989) 
argues Irish neutrality in the Second World War was ‘not so much principled neutrality as 
unprincipled non-belligerency’ determined to assert Irish sovereignty without ‘upholding of 
neutral rights or the fulfilling of neutral duties’ by circumventing international legal precedent 
(Salmon, 1989, p.5). Karen Devine disagrees arguing that Salmon’s ‘legalistic, prescriptive and 
sortal definition has effectively defined neutrality out of existence’ because neutrality in practice 
has always differed from theoretical definition (Devine, 2008, p.96).  
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Salmon’s argument serves to bolster the argument of those that argue Irish neutrality was 
illegitimate, by arguing it was incompatible with legal precedents, when, as Devine argues, the 
‘rules’ of neutrality cannot be ignorant of context as they were designed as a reflection of the 
realities of their time. For Devine any differences in the conduct of neutrality are ‘explainable in 
the context of state interests’, and further argues that the Irish practice of neutrality was as clear, 
legal and credible as any other during the war ‘if not more so’ (Devine, 2008, p.96), and I would 
argue de Valera’s consistency added to the clarity of Ireland’s position. Salmon’s denial of a 
neutrality formed in an Irish context is uncomfortably close to many British opinions that Ireland 
had no right to adapt her neutrality to her context during the war. It is arguable that British opinion 
on how Irish neutrality was conducted was deeply affected not only by a sense that Ireland had 
no right to her independence at British expense but also fear that her independence, and neutrality, 
could also be harmful. Donal O’Drisceoil characterises ‘the double game’, played by the Irish 
government as a tightrope walk between ‘a certain consideration for Britain’ (MacCartney, 1961, 
p. 471), and the need to project strict neutrality towards Germany (O'Drisceoil, 1996, p. 292) as 
a manifestation of Irish attempts to mollify British opinion. However, allowing as much secret 
cooperation as it was possible to keep hidden, and upheld by rigid censorship and draconian 
judicial measures, this ensured that secrecy was vital, leaving the door open to misunderstanding 
or misinterpretation. A British press campaign was able to focus on the issue of the treaty ports, 
attacking neutrality based on the ethics of reliance upon Royal Naval protection whilst denying 
British warships a harbour. Edward Corse sees British Newspapers following Churchill’s 
rhetorical lead (Corse, 2008, p. 167) in suggesting that this caused lives to be lost in the Atlantic, 
repeating, and embellishing suggestions that U-boats could be, or were being, refuelled and 
resupplied on the Irish West coast (Wills, 2008, p. 116). Corse also argues that the newspapers 
had the backing of Churchill and printed articles and cartoons ‘designed to make the Irish feel 
ashamed of their neutrality’, though he doubts that that many were persuaded by their patronising 
tone (Corse, 2008, p. 168). Whether working at government behest or not, the newspapers 
attitudes both reflected and augmented a growing public displeasure at Eire, yet served to 
strengthen the resolve to retain neutrality. Fisk argues this campaign eventually became an 
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embarrassment for the British Government, and they urged it be toned down (R Fisk, 1985, p. 
287) in the interests of continued co-operation. But, despite evidence to the contrary, and the 
protestations of those in the know, popular opinion in Britain, in general, followed the simple 
narrative based on expectation rather than evidence.  
Wendy Webster argues because of historical violence enacted by the IRA the neutral Irish 
‘attracted hostility and suspicion as Fifth Columnists and spies’ (Webster, 2014, p. 63), and were 
considered ‘somewhere at the ‘enemy’ end of the enemy-ally spectrum – a quasi-enemy’ 
(Webster, 2018, p. 70). However, Calder’s ‘Myth of the Blitz’ acknowledges that ‘danger from 
Ireland seem to have occurred to people in Britain, at all levels, during the paranoid summer of 
1940’, but argues the Irish Taoiseach de Valera’s ‘benevolent neutrality, dispelled threats to 
Britain’ (Calder, 1991, p. 66) to the British government. These arguments have informed my 
enquiry into how Eire was considered as inviting invasion, as a back door into Britain. Though 
there were secret plans to defend Ireland, with the help of British Forces after a German invasion, 
fear of encirclement was so great that even a pre-emptive British invasion of Ireland was publicly 
considered a possibility. There were occasional voices urging calm, but the secretive nature of 
Anglo-Irish co-operation precluded official comment on such expectations. It also suited the 
British government that pressure from public and media sources was brought to bear in Ireland. 
Thus, the public, and most politicians, unknowing or unwilling to believe in Ireland’s stance, saw 
Ireland as an ungrateful potential threat to Britain’s safety. Chapter three traces the discourse of 
Eire representing a danger to the UK.  
Influential in the creation of a history simplified was FSL Lyons ‘Plato’s Cave’ analogy, 
which reflects a dismissal of the formative effect of the war on the Irish State and its foreign 
relations. The ‘Plato’s Cave’ (Lyons, 1971) theory proposed that the Irish had lived the war ‘with 
their backs to the fire of life and deriving their only knowledge of what went on outside from the 
flickering shadows thrown on the wall before their eyes by the men and women who passed to 
and fro behind them’ (Lyons, 1971, pp. 557-558) … ‘almost totally isolated from the rest of 
mankind’ (Lyons, 1971, p. 557). Further, Lyons argued, ‘when …they emerged, dazzled, from 
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the cave into the light of day, it was to a new and vastly different world’ (Lyons, 1971, p. 558). 
This belittles the experience of Ireland, the Irish, and the Irish diaspora. The ‘Plato’s Cave’ 
interpretation has endured, but more recent interpretations argue this period a formative process 
which constructed a truly independent Ireland at a time when most eventualities were outside of 
Irish control (J. J. Lee, 1989, p. 221). For Eire, risking her independence when this could be 
avoided, was pointless. This was not turning her back on the outside world, but ensuring that the 
hard-won independence, and control they had, was preserved. In the terms of the ‘Plato’s Cave’ 
analogy, for the Irish were protected while the significance of world events could be interpreted. 
As Clair Wills states, though ‘there was no Home Front in Ireland (Eire), …the country was 
nonetheless shaped by the war’ (Wills, 2008, p. 10) and Diarmaid Ferriter argues that ‘Despite 
neutrality, the years of the war have rightly been recognised as something of a watershed in Irish 
life’ (D Ferriter, 2004, p. 358).  
Yet between the end of the Battle of Britain and D-Day, Eire was regarded in Britain as out 
of step with the rest of the world, willingly and deliberately isolationist, to their own detriment. 
Clair Wills acknowledges a rumbling resentment that ‘(Ireland’s)…neutral stance was (seen as) 
negative: defensive, distrustful and inward-looking’ (Wills, 2008, p. 5). This resentment saw Eire 
as a place of mystery, alien and no longer sharing the ideals of Britain; a place apart from that 
seen just six years earlier. But this research of contemporary attitudes shows that British popular 
opinion was much more invested in Ireland’s stance during the war than post-war historical 
consensus may suggest. Chapter four will assess characterisations of the Irish and the perception 
that Ireland was becoming a place cut off from the world, becoming more totally ‘foreign’, 
backward, and anti-British, and how the British felt about Eire charting a vastly different course 
than Britain. 
Several historians have written of the Irish diaspora in Britain, and many have sought to 
update the histories of the Victorian period into the post-war world. However, none have explored 
in detail British perceptions of Irish immigrant workers in World War Two. Lunn (Lunn, 1993), 
Holmes (Holmes, 1988) and Douglas (Douglas, 2002) have argued this period should be 
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considered alongside lobbying for the restriction of Irish immigrants in the inter-war years, and it 
would be a fruitless exercise to consider attitudes towards Irish workers in isolation from the long 
history of preconceptions and stereotypes projected onto their forebears. Enda Delaney argues 
Irish migration has been caused by many different factors, not merely economic ones, and argues 
emigration to Britain was qualitatively different than to other countries but argues more research 
is required to establish how Irish immigrants were received in wartime Britain (Delaney, 2000, 
p.139). Mary Daly has argued that the Irish government wanted to continue to use migration to 
Britain as a safety valve against high unemployment in Eire but insisted on governmental 
oversight and a preference that migrants move to Britain due to considerable ill feeling in NI 
against them (Daly, 2006, p. 147). The Irish government also supported Catholic Church agencies 
operating in Britain to ensure migrants spiritual welfare, acted to prevent conscription of Irish 
citizens, and provided assurances of the character migrants to the British Police, all implying that 
the Irish Government considered the possibility of harmful and prejudicial attitudes to be of some 
danger to its citizens.  
Unfortunately, official histories of the management of Labour (Parker, 1957), and the 
munitions industries (Inman, 1957), concentrated on government efforts at the best utilisation of 
available resources, rather than the social effects of such an influx. Though Inman notes difficulty 
finding billets for immigrant Irish workers (Inman, 1957, p. 160), and that though the numbers of 
Irish workers in the munitions industry was low, roughly thirty thousand out of a total of two 
million, they were ‘valuable to the Ministry of Supply production out of all proportion to its 
numbers’ (Inman, 1957, p. 174). Both Inman and Parker commodify Irish labour and are only 
tangentially concerned with public perceptions. Others have referred to discrimination against 
women, and older Irish women in particular, in WW2 machine-tool industries and shipyards 
(Summerfield, 2013, p. 58), and Delaney (Delaney, 1999), Holmes and Croucher (Croucher, 
1982) cite ‘the usual complaints’ (Delaney, 2000, p. 139) of drunken and disorderly behaviour, 
general distrust and hostility, lack of assimilation and a particular prejudice against Irish women, 
who were deemed particularly resistant to work discipline (Croucher, 1982, pp. 256,281). These 
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‘usual complaints’ echo Victorian prejudices, but the addition of Irish people taking the jobs of 
British men compelled into the armed forces is a new wartime slant on the perception that Irish 
workers represented a threat to wages and competition for jobs. Delaney and Lunn argue that any 
prejudice that did occur had little effect because British people understood that Irish help was 
necessary, and confrontation would be disruptive in a time of great uncertainty. Delaney further 
argues that despite there being only little overt prejudice, this was fuelled by Irish neutrality, but 
should also be considered within the wider context of society in war (Delaney, 1999), while Lunn 
has urged research in this subject to reveal if this ‘hidden history’, can be quantified, arguing this 
subject produces the dilemma of never knowing whether what ‘evidence that is uncovered is 
merely the tip of the iceberg or its entirety’ (Lunn, 1993, p. 107). Though prejudice may be an 
expected, if not justified, constituent of war, and although it may not have been overt, it was 
nonetheless insidious and influential. 
The large number of Irish immigrant workers in Britain was widely known but officially 
unacknowledged for fear that recruiting programmes could be considered a breach of neutrality 
(Lunn, 1993, p. 102), which would have ended a much-needed labour supply. Thus, it was to 
Britain’s advantage to downplay the contribution and story of Irish immigrant workers during the 
war. This furtiveness continued post-war and is reflected by a preface to a specially commissioned 
1948 report, Irish Labour in Great Britain, 1939-1945, which warns that no use should be made 
of its contents ‘without first consulting the Manpower section’ (TNA, LAB 8/152). The report 
itself illuminates the burdensome bureaucratic and diplomatic exigencies the British government 
were forced to tolerate, and which operated alongside significant fears of possible espionage and 
sabotage but concludes that Irish labour fulfilled distinct purpose and helped correct a distinct 
insufficiency in manpower. Chapter five aims to assess the depth of prejudice felt against Irish 
immigrant workers, and the reasons for any antipathy and how this affected industrial and 
diplomatic relations.  
Chapter six will look at contemporary perceptions of Irish volunteers in the British Forces. 
There has recently been an upsurge in academic interest in Irish volunteers in this subject, yet 
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these have not concentrated on contemporary sources or gauged British public opinion of their 
contribution. Yvonne McEwen noted in 2004 the comparative disinterest of historians in 
establishing the precise number of Irish volunteers in the British forces (McEwen, 2004, p. 82), 
but by looking at recorded deaths in the British Army has extrapolated a reliable figure for Irish 
volunteers who served (McEwen, 2004, p. 83). Jenkins has recorded many reasons why Irish men 
and women volunteered for the British Forces and notes ‘the existence of a strong national identity 
that superseded the British uniform’ (Jenkins, 2012, p. 430), and Myles Dungan insists the large 
number of Irish men joining the British Army should not be seen as an indictment on Neutrality, 
pointing out that those who disagreed with neutrality were not stopped from joining the British 
Forces (Dungan, 1993, p. 145). The popular histories of Richard Doherty record the experiences 
of Irish men and women in the World War Two British armed forces (Doherty, 1993, 1999, 2004, 
2010), but the military focus of these books mostly precludes any discussion perceptions of these 
volunteers. Indeed, the foreword to Doherty’s Ireland’s Generals in the Second World War, by 
Major-General The O’Morchoe, praises Doherty’s decision to leave issues of Irish identity for 
another book in the future (Doherty, 2004, p. 11). However, these books include intermittent 
anecdotes describing occurrences where Irishness was problematic, and these have served as 
partial inspiration for some of the research in this thesis.  
Until the work of Steven O’Connor, there had been little research on Irish identity or 
stereotyping in the British Forces in World War Two. O’Connor emphasises that the British 
Forces of the era were multinational, multi-ethnic and multi-faith, encompassing persons from 
the dominions and empire alongside volunteers from the exiled and defeated governments from 
across Europe, ‘therefore, an understanding of identity and integration…. (was) essential to any 
assessment of its military effectiveness’ (O'Connor, 2015, p. 419). Citing examples of Army 
accommodation of Catholic soldiers’ religious duties, the formation of an Irish Brigade in 1942 
and the unofficial changing of short-leave regulations to allow Irish soldiers home leave 
(O'Connor, 2015, pp. 422-423), O’Connor argues that there was no structural, institutionalized 
anti-Irish bigotry in Army procedure, but there were occasions of prejudicial attitudes, often at 
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the point of ill-discipline or potential trouble. This indicates the existence of underlying prejudice, 
and the acceptance of stereotypes which the strictures of military discipline which the power of 
comradeship could not totally preclude. Additionally, O’Connor relies somewhat on oral 
testimony, which, he acknowledges, has its limitations, but argues other contemporary military 
records reinforce this conclusion (O'Connor, 2014, p. 114). The restriction of his work to Irish 
officers is problematic in that many Irish officers came from the Protestant landed classes and 
were thus of a group less targeted by prejudice. He argues that Army training instilled regimental 
identity yet still allowed for retention of national identity and pride. If this were the case other 
soldiers may equally have been said to retain previously formed prejudices, but this possibility is 
unexplored. Additionally, Cormac Kavanagh analyses the skilful diplomatic and governmental 
handling, by Ireland and Britain, between the concept of Irish neutrality and its pragmatic 
application regarding Irish citizens in the British Armed Forces (Kavanagh, 2000). He concludes 
that with unprecedented co-operation between Britain and the Free State, both governments were 
committed to preserving the appearance of strict and unyielding neutrality (Kavanagh, 2000, p. 
80). This thesis will assess public perceptions of those who volunteered for the British Forces, 
and how the British made sense of the apparent contradiction of soldiers of a neutral nation, one 
that had just violently seceded from the Union, in the Forces of the United Kingdom, assess how 
these volunteers were affected by stereotypes, with their motivations and actions being explained 
by being part of a ‘martial race’, by being loyal to the British connection, being anti-neutral or 
anti-de Valera, and persistently, paradoxical.  Chapter six will illuminate how British soldiers felt 
about their Irish comrades and how the Army felt about their Irish volunteers, alongside the views 
of those who supported the cause of the volunteers.  
 Eunan O’Halpin has written extensively, and persuasively, on Anglo-Irish intelligence 
co-operation in this period, and acknowledges that various British intelligence agencies reacted 
somewhat mercurially to the threat of Nazi espionage in Eire, being torn ‘between two contrasting 
assumptions: that of Irish co-operation, and that of Irish hostility’ (O'Halpin, 1999, p. 173). 
McMahon similarly argues dualistic attitudes in the British Intelligence communities which 
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required the goodwill of the Irish state in preventing Ireland being used as a base to attack Britain, 
while the perceived need for the use of the Irish treaty ports necessitated pressure on the Irish 
government (McMahon, 2008, p. 284). Christopher Andrew argues that this situation led to 
British agents being ‘in the position of searching in the dark for something that did not exist’ 
(Andrew, 1986, pp. 155-156), with wild and often mischievous rumour often taken at face value, 
especially during the phoney war period (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 51-52). McMahon also argues that 
to the assumption of Irish hostility was added the effect of Blitzkrieg in the West, where, searching 
for explanation of its success, British intelligence concluded that fifth columns had been 
instrumental in German conquest and that this pattern would be followed in the future. It not until 
1942 was the Abwehr’s capability, or rather lack thereof 2, was understood and the threat in both 
countries was put into perspective (McMahon, 2008, p. 393). Not only do these intelligence 
services assumptions display an element of scepticism, one that is the raison d’etre of intelligence, 
but also assumption of Irish perfidy despite evidence to the contrary.  
In reality, as O’Halpin points out, the menace to British safety that Eire represented was 
offset by valuable intelligence co-operation which allowed for the British Forces in Northern 
Ireland to jointly plan with their Southern counterparts to plan the defence of Ireland in the event 
of German invasion (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 53-54). Yet the discovery of ‘Plan Kathleen’, not a 
military blueprint but rather a list of questions to be considered before a plan was created, ‘raised 
grave questions about German intentions’ (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 244). As Eunan O’Halpin has 
shown, G2 had been monitoring the activities of pro-German organisations since early 1938, even 
before MI5 had any knowledge the Fichte Bund in Eire (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 41-42), but also 
argues ‘that there were gaps in Anglo-Irish security sharing’ in the early war years, before the 
mechanics of the Intelligence collaboration had been settled3 (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 6). But these 
                                                          
2 By 1944 it was clear that, as in Britain, German Intelligence agents in Eire, their numbers, their efforts, 
their training, and equipment, were greatly overestimated and the execution of their purposes woefully 
inept. In April, Guy Liddell noted Radio sets dropped in Ireland ‘were of a very high grade’ but their voltage 
and crystals were incorrect for use in Britain or Eire (West, 2005a, p. 185). In the face of such ineptitude, 
it is hard to objectively understand how British Intelligence captured all German Spies in Britain 
(Masterman, 1973) and yet considered it impossible for the Irish Intelligence services to do the same. 
3 American Intelligence did not share its knowledge with Eire and guarded the ULTRA codes ‘jealously’ 
(O'Halpin, 2003, p. 6). 
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mechanics were settled early on, though some intelligence agencies were sceptical, notably those 
associated with the admiralty. However, Cecil Liddell, MI5 officer with responsibility for Ireland, 
was so happy with Anglo-Irish intelligence cooperation that by early 1940 he urged admiralty 
intelligence to direct all their questions to Col. Archer at G2 in Eire for his input (West, 2005b, p. 
37). By 1942 MI5 had become so comfortable in its relationship with G2 that it allowed a 
suspected spy to visit Ireland after capture (West, 2005a, p. 46)4. In general, the British 
intelligence agencies were forced to rely on Irish aid but did not totally dispel doubts at its 
reliability. Only after the war did British Intelligences conclude that in Eire ‘Everything humanly 
possible was done to take steps to ensure that Eire should not be a base of for the operations of 
enemy secret agents against this country and to safeguard vital allied operations’ (Petrie, quoted 
in O'Halpin, 2003, p. 15). 
British popular opinion was unknowing of intelligence cooperation and was fixated on 
the continuing presence of the German Legation in Dublin. It was well known that it had a radio 
transmitter but disbelieved that though messages from Germany are of almost daily occurrence, 
messages to Germany are only very occasional’ (West, 2005a, p. 228). These were also monitored 
and shared with MI5. This disbelief reached a high point at the ‘American Note’ crisis of 1944, 
which was designed to goad Eire into an official refusal to close the Axis legations as the Allies 
prepared to liberate Europe. Refusal to remove the legations resulted in the Notes validation, as 
Roy Foster argues, of the ‘Conception that neutral Ireland was a viperous nest of German agents 
(which) outlived the second world war – German spies in Ireland· entered the folklore’ (Foster, 
1988, p. 560). Chapter seven will elucidate how the myth of spies in Eire came to be and the 
extent to which it was believed for years afterward, and especially how British popular feeling 
towards Eire became entrenched at the end of the war. 
                                                          
4 Joseph Lenihan had been apprehended after being sent to Ireland by Nazi Intelligence after his capture in 
the Channel Islands. He had offered to become part of the ‘Double Cross’ scheme but was deemed too 
unreliable. He was considered, like several other captured spies, to have used the Abwehr only to gain free 





While recognising that perceptions, attitudes, and popular memory are not easy to 
conceptualize, determine or measure, this thesis will rely on the use of contemporary sources 
which indicate subjective opinion which, using Foucault’s concept of ‘popular memory, would 
contribute to a British popular memory of Eire’s war, alongside the similar formation of memory 
of the British war. To mitigate the effects of time in the distortion of popular memory, only 
contemporary sources are used in this thesis.  
1.7.1 Hindsight 
 
Historians mining a rich vein of oral history have uncovered stories of some of the Irish 
people in Britain who experienced this period, but these often do not reflect the tone of 
contemporary evidence. Works anthologising this experience by O’Grady (O'Grady, 1988), 
Lennon et al (Lennon, McAdam, & O'Brien, 1988) and Mary Muldowney (Muldowney, 2007) 
concentrate more on the effects of dislocation in the emigrant experience or tend to only mention 
examples of discrimination with distaste, on which they do not wish to elaborate. The emigrant 
tends to evade these memories which are uncomfortable and do not conform to the story they are 
trying to tell; that is their own story rather than those of others. As Redmond has pointed out in 
oral histories there is a lack of emphasis on ‘their awareness and views of public commentary on 
emigration issues’ and notes the disconnect between remembered oral histories and contemporary 
evidence of public feeling (Redmond, 2018, p.7). The teller of the story may also see the events 
of the past through rose-tinted spectacles and, as result, there is a clear disconnect between 
contemporary feelings and reminiscence, and this thesis uses only contemporary sources to 
mitigate the effects of the passage of time. 
Additionally, historical interpretations have often been coloured by hindsight. Brian 
Girvin (Girvin, 2006, p. 322) has argued that Ireland should have joined the conflict in 1942 when 
it was clear the time of possible invasion had passed. Irish government Minister Alan Shatter 
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controversially interpreted the Irish wartime stance as morally bankrupt (Moran, L, 2012) and at 
least one British historian has suggested Ireland should apologise for her actions (Ben MacIntyre, 
2013), proving the continued relevance of the moral debate. Diarmaid Ferriter sees these opinions 
as being a simplification of extremely complex motivations and arguing that they derive from 
‘reading history backwards’ and ‘simplifying the past to satisfy present-day political sensibilities’ 
(Diarmaid Ferriter, 2012). Such simplifications in effect, justify Ferriter’s point. These arguments 
are based on conceptions of the war as being justified and fought, by the Allies, at least for the 
greater good, if not for democracy and freedom, conceptions which were not universally 
contemporaneously accepted.  
Opinions holding that Eire was ignoring the war and standing aside from taking a moral 
stance can only have been strengthened as evidence of the Holocaust emerged, and World War 
Two continued to be cast as was the ‘good war’. These events were, of course, in the future when 
the policy of neutrality was confirmed. Retrospectively, standing aside in such a war could easily 
be cast as immoral, and the ‘cowardice’ of neutrality neatly segues into common historical 
assertions of Irish ‘cowardly’ terroristic violence and an inability to see ‘what was good for them’. 
Additionally, the secret assistance given to the allies, still not widely known today, adds weight 
to such assertions. However, even if the moral stance of neutrality is judged as complacent, Irish 
‘complacency’ could have taken a worse form than a belief that this war was to be fought for the 
same reasons as the last. Hindsight that makes suggestions of immorality easier to argue. 
To contain the influence of the mythology of the ‘People’s War’, this thesis has used only 
contemporary sources, where the holder can only express his opinion as he saw it then. All 
sources, excepting a few on the post-war Irish government’s attitudes towards Irish ex-servicemen 
in the British Forces, are confined between the beginning of the year 1939 and the end of 1945. 
Though some relevant autobiographies, memoirs, oral histories, and documents have been read 
in preparation for this work, these have generally only served to highlight the shortcomings of 
popular opinion, which is often subject to the filter of subsequent events. In these it is clear the 
writer has preferred to concentrate of the more positive aspects of their experience, and any less 
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positive experiences are almost invariably characterised as being no more than ‘water under the 
bridge’. It is hoped that contemporary sources remain as close to what people living then may 
have felt, read, seen, or heard through the available contemporary public culture and discourse, 
rather than through post-war reconstructions of their experiences or a sense of nostalgia. These 
sources are unchanged by a knowledge of the future, of how things ‘turned out in the end’, and 
do not represent any amalgam of opinions or post-war consensus arrived at with the addition of 
hindsight. In contemporary opinion we are also much more likely to find perceptions which relate 
to individual hopes and fears, paranoias, and assumptions, as well as considered opinions and ill-
informed judgements, which show a broader truth than opinions sanitised by time. Contemporary 
opinion is also more likely to show the effect of attitudes in the raw. While my own experience 
of the ‘People’s War’ mythology is informed by countless media reconstructions, and by the 
reminiscence of my parents and family members who lived through the period in question, I have 
tried to remain an objective interpreter of the evidence. 
These contemporary sources reveal a different perspective in comparison to the 
remembered histories used by many researchers which often display a sense of acceptance of 
British disdain, caused either by ancient prejudices or by Irish neutrality, as either to be expected 
or no more than a minor inconvenience in their context, that it was better not remember. A memoir 
of some of the London Irish elders of 1991 recounts memories of prejudice in gaining work and 
accommodation for some yet also acceptance, alongside feelings that they were lucky to ‘get a 
living’ in Britain and concentrating on being ‘young and enjoying themselves’ (Schweitzer, 1991, 
pp. 35,38,71,97,131,137). Mary Muldowney’s oral history does not include insights into how 
Irish women felt themselves perceived by British people (Muldowney, 2007), and Lennon, 
McAdam and O’Brien’s collection only mentions two incidents of positive welcome and aid from 
British people (Lennon et al., 1988, pp. 53,173). Though attitudes were not the focus of these 
books the latter recounts one emigrant acknowledging that worse was to come as the ‘Troubles’ 
in NI exploded, perhaps explaining why many felt the poor attitudes of wartime less dangerous if 
not less offensive (Lennon et al., 1988, p. 175). It seems that, as Delaney has argued, based on 
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oral available testimonies, Irish migrants in general were not subject to ‘overt hostility’ (Delaney, 
2000, p. 145). However, perceptions and attitudes are not always overt, and can underpin 
decisions made on a prejudicial basis, or where anger or ignorance frustrates reason. On this basis 
perceptions and attitudes do not need to be felt by Irish people to be hostile, and the expression 
of perceptions is evidence of their existence and power to be more believable than fact or even 
possibility. On this basis contemporary sources bring emotive and subjective issues into focus 
and reflect the perceptions as they were rather than what they were to become after timely 
reflection. 
Contemporary sources require patience to find because Eire’s role in the war was small 
and her non-involvement raised less pressing urgency than that of most other powers in Europe. 
However, the volubility, animus, repugnance, and accusations of stupidity that characterised these 
opinions make them stand-out. Public opinion was often grotesquely offensive in its 
dismissiveness and disdain for Irish sensibility. The effect of this undoubtedly made it less likely 
that Irish people in Britain would advertise their nationality or experience, so the voices of these 
are conspicuous by their absence. The reflections of Irish people on how they were perceived are 
limited to few protestations of Eire governmental policy and denouncements of IRA activity in 
the public sphere, whereas private communications reveal, through postal and telephone 
censorship reports, that they predominantly supported Irish policy. By contrast many British 
opinions appear to be regulated only by reluctance to utter, and record, profanities.  
Such contemporary opinion can only be recorded and assessed, with any hope of 
accuracy, by strict design. Luckily in the period in question the British government was keen to 
assess public attitudes and how these might affect morale. Two major sources used here, Mass 
Observation and Home Intelligence, often measure direct subjective arguments connected with 
how the war was being interpreted and were used to suggest how these could be used to 
manipulate civilian morale. Specifically, they recorded attitudes and feelings that might affect 
behaviour. These sources were designed to gauge public attitudes where many others are only 
tangentially interested in subjectivity. Where opinions are widely held and repeated it is more 
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likely that these may have contributed to, or distorted ‘popular memory’, and those that do not fit 
developing narratives, are more likely to be ejected as false or unfounded. However, it is still 
important to note that each source type has its own disadvantages as well as utility.  
1.7.2 Mass Observation 
 
Mass Observation (MO) has been interpreted variously as a social movement used by its 
volunteers to better understand current events and become ‘of some use in the fight against 
Fascism’ (Summerfield, 1985, p. 442) and as a movement recognising the need for political 
change (Calder, 1985, p. 130). Lucy Noakes argues that ‘the dominant public picture of the nation 
at war, an image of the nation bonded together by its experiences, is also present in the responses 
of the MO panellists’ (Noakes, 1998, pp. 85,97). Searching for attitudes about Ireland and the war 
in a repository of information with the objective of ‘nothing less than to achieve a complete 
understanding of modern society, neglecting nothing as unimportant’ (Calder, 1985, p. 124), 
should elicit a picture of changing public opinion on a former constituent part of the UK. 
Additionally, because the initially politically independent body was co-opted by the MOI 
(ministry of Information) to become a means by which engagement of citizenship for the purposes 
of wartime morale, this means MO research on popular attitudes ‘focused on whether (these 
opinions) represented a current or future threat to British Society and Politics’ (Kushner, 2004, p. 
139), as well as how people felt about the war and their changing society. As Ireland was 
considered strategically vital, obstinately obstructive and a less defended ‘backdoor’ to Britain at 
various points during the war, MO could be expected to evidence popular attitudes on Eire. 
Indeed, MO once offered its services in interpreting Irish public opinion before any potential 
‘forcing assistance upon Ireland’ for her own defence (MO File Report 225 - Immediate 
International Uses of Mass-Observation, 1/6/1940), proving that even ‘objective’ report writers 
could not resist some subjectivity. 
However, that is not to say that, as a historical source, MO does not have its drawbacks. 
During the war MO suffered from a lack of overall co-ordination and policy, and active hostility 
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from various quarters. Members of government were often unwilling to accept morale reports as 
indicative of actual public opinion (McLaine, 1979, p.52), whilst the furtive collection of opinion 
by non-governmental agencies predisposed many to accept the newspapers characterization of 
observers as ‘Coopers Snoopers’ (Summerfield, 1985, pp. 446-447). Due to such controversy, the 
perceived importance of its work fluctuated wildly, but its survival throughout the entire war 
years, and the combination of war-specific reports, general questionnaires and personal diaries 
makes MO a unique historical source, providing a wealth of detail within a huge number and a 
wide range of responses. Due to digitisation the scale and catholicity of information is a less 
daunting hurdle, but methodological problems remain, especially a lack of qualitative distinction 
between publicly expressed opinion and private conviction. Though MO recognised this (Madge 
& Harrisson, 1937, p. 29), and prioritised private opinion to evaluate public morale, the charge 
remains that the subjectivity of the observer may be injected into reports. File reports may have 
paraphrased responses or misinterpreted or ignored the tone of the response and can only truly 
reflect what is heard rather than what is said. Additionally, one of the founders of MO, Tom 
Harrisson displayed his own shortcomings when writing of Ulster’s ‘Chronic Christianity’, 
notably asserting ‘The Irish took to Christianity with record speed, and are certainly still the most 
religious English-speaking, - if not "civilised", - people on our earth’ (MO File Report 2101 - 
Ulster Outlooks, 1944). Such subjectivity, of course, often betrays attitudes in the writer, as well 
as the subject, and it is this that makes MO a vital source for the purposes of this thesis.  
Mark Abrams has gone so far as to argue that MO’s ‘methods are inchoate and 
uncontrolled’ and ‘contributed nothing that can be called a scientific method of content analysis’ 
(Abrams, 1951, p. 112), and indeed the use of sometimes untrained observers, and the inability 
of the project to deliver a finished product, an actual ‘science of ourselves’ (Madge & Harrisson, 
1939, p. 9), suggests that MO was a heroic failure. Yet, the snapshot technique often used was 
subverted by respondents to give a freer range of expression, and volunteer diarists gave opinions 
unfettered by pre-set questions or topics of disinterest to the writer. It also provided an unusually 
broad spectrum of contributors for the time. Indeed, MO diaries were often the only important 
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space for expression for female, working class, less educated and unknown writers, expressing 
the conscious and unconscious thought, and giving insight into why people thought as they did. 
However, the self-selection of contributors, most often, though not exclusively, male, educated 
and middle-class (Calder, 1985, p. 132; Summerfield, 1985, pp. 441-442), has led to suggestion 
that the ‘project was shot through with an intentionality informed by particular class and gender 
assumptions’ (Gurney, 1997, p. 259). However, as Penny Summerfield has noted, this does not 
always produce banal narrative (Summerfield, 1985, p. 442), and Angus Calder sees contributors 
as ‘commonly active, sociable people, and …cranks were, if anything, under-represented’, Tony 
Kushner sees the diaries scope as ‘testimony to their richness and complexity, not their failure’ 
(Kushner, 2004, p. 239). Most importantly the combination of MO fieldwork, directives, diaries, 
and file reports creates an archive of invaluable first-hand accounts and opinions, where otherwise 
the focus of historians would have limited only to the study of the political and military elites. For 
this writer MO provides a mine of opinions and reflections unparalleled in its scope and depth, 
which represents a window into the lives of the literate classes of the British population, who 
appreciated MO and wartime objectives, and felt they had a contribution to make. 
1.7.3 Home Intelligence 
 
Home Intelligence reports were created by the Wartime Social Survey unit working 
alongside MO, under governmental control but with a far more defined remit, being concerned 
only in interpreting public perceptions related to the War and its effects on society for the MOI. 
The aim of this intelligence was to help ‘assess morale generally, discover how people reacted 
and adapted to bombings, and to bring to the relevant government departments shortcomings in 
their relief services’ (McLaine, 1979, p. 109). Initially issuing daily reports on morale from spring 
1940, HI reports were issued weekly from October, when it became clear that there was no 
immediate danger of a collapse in public morale. HI reports are a series of ‘invariably 
impressionistic’ (Addison & Crang, 2010, p. xvi) syntheses of what the HI observers heard, read, 
or discussed concerning the war in everyday life, including people’s concerns, fears, attitudes, 
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and opinions on all matters related to themselves and the wider events around them. Constructed 
as they were, HI reports were best placed to report contemporary attitudes, whether well informed, 
reactive to events, idiosyncratic or based on barely credible rumour. The importance of morale 
for the purposes of government was weekly stressed by a prefacing weekly note reminding readers 
of the confidential nature of the reports, and explaining it was not a report of fact but a ‘reflection 
of the public’s views and feelings about the war in general’ (TNA, INF 1/292), to be used for 
purposes of planning and mitigation where necessary.  
HI reports were aggregated by three MOI Regional Officers in thirteen regional units who 
collected impressions from a sample of a minimum of 30 contacts per officer, each week. Each 
officer rotated between two to three hundred regular contacts to avoid asking the same people 
repeatedly. Opinions gathered were cross-checked to remove opinions not widely held at regional 
level, and reports are again cross-checked, amalgamated, and re-checked at national level before 
issue. The unit officers were given short training stressing the essential need for objectivity, with 
the aim of becoming ‘impartial recording and assessing machines’ (TNA, INF 1/282). Each officer 
built a panel of voluntary contacts of which each contact must be known to the officer ‘as a 
sensible, level-headed person’ to whom the object of the work was to be ‘adequately explained’ 
to engage their sympathy with the projects aims. The contacts were suggested as ‘doctors, parsons, 
shopkeepers, trade union officials, bank managers, …. businessmen, local journalists, factory 
managers, newsagents, licensed victuallers, librarians etc.’ (TNA, INF 1/282). Hardly rigorous in 
social scientific terms these reports nonetheless represented genuine attempt to gauge public 
opinion by synthesising the best available sources, one with an impressive range and quantity, 
and deemed ‘unlikely to be very far from the truth’ (Mackay, 2013, p. 10). Though the collection 
process was designed to be impartial, it was also reliant on what observers judged a ‘sensible, 
level-headed person’, a definition open to wide interpretation. It was clear that assumptions and 
opinions would not be totally excluded from the preparation of the reports, and it was clear that 
the contributors used were unrepresentative of some social classes. Unlike MO contributors, who 
were often self-selected, the HI officer’s panel was selected by officers who were themselves 
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most likely to be well educated and middle-class likely to be from the same background. Though 
the panellists collected ‘what people said about the war’, they themselves may not have been as 
objective as it was hoped.  
Even at the beginning subjectivity is plain in a report explaining to users ‘How the Weekly 
Report is made’ (TNA, INF 1/282). This assumes and excuses the British publics supposed 
reluctance to voice praise or satisfaction, arguing it was to be expected that comment would most 
often be critical. Yet the writer attempts to assure readers that, despite the risk that ‘in the process 
of converting ill-formulated ideas (of the public) into words, distortion may sometimes occur’, 
each point in the report ‘represents more than any one individual is likely to be thinking or feeling’ 
(TNA, INF 1/282). Such assumptions often led to denial of the values of the information gathered, 
with notable opposition from the press, who ran a campaign suggesting that the ‘silent column’ 
of Home Intelligence officers were behind an increase in convictions for ‘spreading alarm and 
despondency’ and defeatist talk (Addison & Crang, 2010, p. xv). Undoubtedly newspapers felt 
their own journalistic methods were the best way to discern public opinion, as did government 
departments and MP’s, who felt and public requests of MP’s were more reliable evidence of 
public concerns. These doubts never really disappeared as by 1944 a circular to those who 
received the report, asking about its usefulness, reveals that by then they were felt repetitive, too 
long, not directed towards the specific departments who received it and hardly essential. However, 
some felt it the only comprehensive view on the state of public opinion available to policy makers 
(TNA, INF 1/285), and its reports have been invaluable to as such to historians of the Home Front. 
However, the range of opinion is larger than found in MO. Opinions are more mixed and 
portray the effect of rumour more strongly than MO reports, with the occasional rumour at the 
extremes of possibility, which suggests both a wider range of respondents and a set of responses 
less mediated by the subjectivity of the collector. Information was also gathered from 
questionnaires, BBC Listener Research, postal censorship, and Local committees. HI recognised 
the limitations of local information committees, noting that the effect of speaking in a group 
mediated many responses, and prioritised these responses below those of the officers collecting 
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from panels. Postal censorship reports were, for them, even less valuable, having been written by 
predominantly Irish immigrants, and ‘these writers are not necessarily representative of the 
British working classes. For HI, the Irish contained ‘an unduly high proportion of lower-class 
writers’ and because of their affinity’s questions like that ‘of the Irish ports continued to be an 
important topic in postal censorship long after it ceased to be of interest to the average 
Englishman’ (TNA, INF 1/282). The perceptions of Irish immigrants were 
thus deemed immaterial to the study, despite what their experience of British people’s opinions 
might have been. This not only shows a dismissiveness on grounds of nationality, but also 
perceived class and educational achievement. It also most succinctly and directly shows that the 
writer, and by extension the opinions he collects, feels Irish opinion of the British completely 
irrelevant. Though there was still a lower level, continuing resentment of Irish behaviour between 
the heights of anti-Irish feeling5, by 1942 HI reports became redolent of their writers boredom 
where the reports ‘Eire’ column became repetitive, hackneyed, and trite, before the column 
became routinely empty. Evidently Ireland was of no concern and opinions had developed into 
truisms for even those reporting on public concerns. However, HI reports were seen as valuable 
in other areas. 
HI reports were evidently valued according to their achievement of what was expected of 
them by each recipient. A justificatory circular from the MOI notes that ‘Perhaps the most 
convincing evidence of the validity of the report is the high degree of agreement which is usually 
found between the thirteen different regional intelligence reports’ used to make up the main report 
(TNA, INF 1/282). Indeed, the main lesson taken from HI reports was that pre-war assumptions 
that a breakdown in morale would lead to mass panic and riot were proved unfounded (M. Smith, 
2000, p. 71), and HI reports generally confirmed that the state of public morale was less affected 
by the short-term shock of air-raids, but more by longer-term issues, which enabled people to get 
                                                          
5 There is some evidence of a temporary heightening of anxiety about Eire around the time of the Dieppe 
raid in August 1942. This is especially prevalent in HI where the occurrence of public rumour is easier to 
ascertain. Here there is said to be anxiety that ‘careless talk’ cost lives and continued fear of information 
leakage is shown to rise before resurfacing in 1944 as proof of espionage in the Dublin legation.  
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on with their lives. They also evidence a strong belief in final victory, the growing importance of 
the Home Front to that victory, pressure for a more efficient prosecution of the war and a strong 
growth in national identity, and a suspicion of those who did not share their view of the 
war (Addison & Crang, 2010, p. xvii). For the purposes of this research, they provide a wide-
ranging insight into how the British middle class reacted to the war contemporaneously, and 




Newspapers and periodicals have had a long and rarely positive association with the subject 
of Ireland. Curtis (Curtis, 1968, 1971), de Nie (de Nie, 2004), and Lebow 
(Lebow,1976) have written extensively on Victorian media representations of the 
Irish, noting the influence of Social Darwinism and pseudo-sciences on public perceptions. These 
works note Victorian newspapers and magazines both influencing and reflecting public opinion 
as the only contemporary news media available. The portrayal of the ‘Irish character’ they often 
assumed was influenced by well-established theatre and popular entertainment ‘stock characters’ 
prevalent from the time of the Restoration. Hayton does rightfully point out that such stereotyping 
via stock characters and ‘bulls’ was not only applied to the Irish (Hayton, 1988), but their 
influence on perceptions is clear. For such portrayals to be accepted they must be familiar and 
anticipated by the audience, and thus reflect the political and social factors affecting the object 
and the audience. Newspapers, similarly, being in the business of making money, fail when 
representing that which is alien to their readership, and it is this mechanic that makes newspapers 
a good measure of opinion.  
In 1938 MO concluded that 35% of those interviewed relied on newspapers for information 
on which to base their opinion. The same poll revealed that information from friends was second 
at 17% and Radio third at 13% (Madge & Harrisson, 1939, p. 30), clearly emphasising the scale 
of newspapers influence on public opinion. Many newspapers were still using embedded cultural 
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shorthand during World War Two to simplify complex information and motivations to their 
readers, and, even outside of wartime, newspapers sources cannot be regarded as impartial. 
Though the British wartime press was not censored it was still controlled by mutual agreement 
that censorship would be imposed if the newspapers did not regulate themselves. Information 
obviously of use to the enemy was suppressed but opinion that endangered relations with other 
countries had to be treated with caution. Even the Ministry of Information struggled with defining 
what was the truth and what truth should be told, initially suggesting a policy of limited truth-
telling if it was justified, on the basis that ‘It is simpler to tell the truth, and, if a sufficient 
emergency arises, to tell one big, thumping lie that will then be believed’ (TNA, HO 199/434). 
Later realising that the public could, in general handle harsh truths (M. Smith, 2000, p. 71) 
newspapers were allowed by the MOI to effectively control themselves, though the government 
retained the policy that the Press ‘must either be humoured or completely quashed’ (17/7/1940, 
TNA, PREM 4/66/2). This policy did not curb all excesses relating to opinions on Eire. 
Additionally, the newspapers, unknowing of the extent of intelligence cooperation with Eire, 
could not be too tightly controlled on their opinions of the Irish because this control could be 
interpreted as a sign that collaboration was occurring, which would be an abrogation of neutrality. 
To this extent it was harder to regulate newspaper opinion about Ireland than on opinion expressed 
on almost any other subject. Press impartiality was a near impossibility when discussing Eire. 
However, it should be conceded that there are no documentary sources that can be 
considered totally impartial; no documents are free of distortion of some kind for they are 
inevitably produced with a purpose in mind. So, newspapers selectively describe and interpret an 
event for the reader, and because of this interpretation are a valuable source. However, to use 
sources more closely displaying a strand of public opinion, this thesis uses only public letters to 
the editor, opinion pieces and editorials; news reports are intentionally side-lined, unless they 
spark opinions found in other sources. These sources are representative of newspaper readers, and 
of course each newspaper type has its own class of readership. Notwithstanding, it is possible to 
gauge the audience some newspapers aim for, because all have a market in mind and write for 
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that part of the market. Typically, National broadsheets, such as The Times, The Telegraph, The 
Scotsman, and others, aimed at a middle to upper class market, were less likely to express 
derogatory opinions, and were often understanding of Irish motivations, but rarely argued that 
Irish actions were correct. Letters to the editor were usually from MP’s, ex-politicians, academics, 
or ex-military officers with experience of the issues at question or of Ireland, offering differing 
interpretations the issues. Circulation for these, in 1939, was under 800,000 sales, making them 
influential in only the most politically informed classes. National middle brow papers such as the 
Daily Mail, Daily Express and News Chronicle were aimed at a middle- class audience, with more 
simplified copy and an emphasis on support of public morale and British war aims. With 
circulation in the in the low millions, less detailed, less nuanced, more simply written stories, and 
opinions both reflected and influenced public opinion for their readers. Tabloids such as The Daily 
Herald, The Daily Mirror, and The Daily Record, were image and opinion led interpreting the 
news plainly for the reader. With circulation in the low millions these were massively influential 
among the working classes, and often reflect some of the more strident views found in the HI and 
MO sources. Regional Papers, generally with a circulation up to 50,000, were generally middle 
brow and often used syndicated articles and columns but added locally important slants on their 
stories. Indeed, letters to the editor are often unrepresentative of the newspaper readers as only a 
minority, able and willing to share their opinions. However, letters and editorials preserve a 
discourse of the time and an insight into what was of concern to a section of the public, including 
how they interpreted current events.  
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The experience of Anglo-Irish relations in World War Two may be best summed up by 
Dermot Keogh; ‘A Modus Vivendi had been worked out between the Allies and de Valera. That 
was not sufficient to overcome the sense that British and American sailors had died unnecessarily 
in the Atlantic war owing to the fact that the Irish ports were not open to the Allies….’ (Keogh, 
1994, p. 156). However, how this ‘sense’ emerged, how this is related to a long history of 
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antipathy between the nations and how this problem is still a bone of contention today, needs 
careful exploration, and placing in historical context. Anne O’Grady cites her interviews of Irish 
World War Two immigrants who believed their treatment in official capacity was good, and that 
pay, and conditions were fair, but also that they were sometimes challenged over their state’s 
neutrality (O'Grady, 1988, p. 11). These interviews were conducted in the 1980’s and indicate an 
amount of hindsight and distance from the raw emotions felt at the time.  
Previously some works have uncovered British opinions and perceptions on the Irish in 
studies focussed on other aspects of this period, such as demography, economy and ergonomics, 
social history, the general experience and motivation of immigrants, the British Home Front, 
diplomacy, and politics, but there has been no study specifically designed to assess and analyse 
the depth, scope, volume, dimensions, and bias of contemporary opinion. It has been argued that 
such attitudes can be difficult to discern. Kenneth Lunn suggests that standard social histories 
tend to emphasise the integrative effects of working together in the war effort and ignore evidence 
to the contrary (Lunn, 1993, p. 106), and as Enda Delaney notes ‘the problem of interpreting 
isolated outward manifestations of prejudice or hostility as indicative of a widespread attitude is 
obvious’ (Delaney, 2000, p. 139). Yet despite the difficulties of discovering such a ‘hidden 
history’, one can establish some indication of the attitude of those concerned by comparing the 
predominance of reported negative, ill-informed, or prejudicial attitudes to those that were 
positive, accepting or understanding. As sources such as MO and HI were designed to elicit 
popular opinion, as far as was possible, and notwithstanding methodological and interpretational 
problems, represent the best available sources to find popular opinion held outside the classes 
which make history and diplomacy. Ministerial and governmental files held at the National 
Archives also elicit a mine of attitudes, perceptions, and prejudices about Ireland, not least 
because of British frustration at the obstinacy and obtuse character of de Valera, which often led 
to similar feelings amongst his political allies6. Newspaper sources not only reflect the views of 
                                                          
6 See McCullagh’s two-part biography (2017-19) which elucidates the frustrations of being de Valera’s 
friend or foe.  
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correspondents but also reflect, and create, changing opinion as it occurs, within contemporary 
context, and without historical re-interpretation. Surveying wide scope of contemporary media 
and official records, specifically mining these contemporary sources for subjective attitudes and 
perceptions will elucidate, using the best possible resources, how British people related to Ireland 
and the Irish, beginning to finally acknowledge the cultural differences between Ireland and 
Britain, how British and Irish identities grew, changed and diverged, and if this meant that Ireland 
was considered, in effect, an enemy rather than a neutral, or a friend. 
There is room in the literature to explore conditional acceptance, and toleration, at one less 
remove by studying contemporary sources and specifically seeking examples of opinion, 
subjectivity, and perception. This study will show the raw feelings of people unaffected by the 
type of sober reflection time can elicit, and is expected to expose evidence of anger, 
disillusionment, fear, and resentment, that does not appear in oral histories. Thus, this thesis is 
situated as a counterbalance to arguments based on non-contemporary sources, or on sources not 
designed, or indicative, of public opinion, and shows the course of the final acceptance in Britain 
that Ireland was culturally as well as politically divorced from the remaining nations of the UK. 
The differing reactions of these cultures to the upheaval of the Second World War, crystallised 
into a recognition that Ireland was cast as ‘other’ from the rest of the UK and was considered by 





2 THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE IRA  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 By the outbreak of the Second World War Britain already had much experience of violent 
Irish Nationalism. At this time represented by the IRA, ‘physical force’ Irish Nationalism had 
been popularly interpreted, in general, as nothing more than criminal, dismissing all political 
motivation. However, there had been no coordinated campaign in Britain since the 1922 Anglo-
Irish Treaty had achieved Dominion status for the Irish Free State, contributing to a British belief 
that the ‘Irish Question’ had been limited to adjudication between the two Irish states. However, 
in 1939 the S-Plan, bombing returned the IRA to British soil in a campaign sabotage against the 
civil, economic, and military infrastructure. After issuing the British government with an 
ultimatum to remove British forces from the island of Ireland, the IRA campaign did not target 
civilians, but nevertheless on the 25th of August five people were killed and seventy injured by a 
bomb on a busy Coventry street. Smith has argued that the bombings did not produce panic but 
‘merely aroused anti-Irish feeling in Britain’ (M. L. R. Smith, 1997, p. 63), however, despite the 
relatively slight economic impact and death toll, the cultural impact, at least in the short term, was 
extensive, with ‘an IRA bomb incident in or around a major British city almost every other day 
in the first nine months of 1939’ (Tony Craig Quoted in Evans, 2012). The campaign not only 
served to remind public opinion that the ‘Irish Question’ was still unsolved, but also convinced it 
that the Irish government either could not, or would not, effectively control the IRA. The violence 
combined with the prospect of imminent war also helped create an emotional environment where 
the combination of two enemies was deemed at least possible if not likely.  
2.2 BOMBS BACKLASH 
 
The S-Plan campaign should be seen in the context of the 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement, 
which returned the Treaty Ports to Irish sovereignty, settled the question of Land annuities, and 
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led to opinion that the IRA had little left of which to complain. The initially bloodless campaign 
elicited anger but also some attempts at conciliation, with some presenting de Valera as a force 
for peaceful change. A Lincolnshire MP was reported as suggesting that despite the recent 
campaign the people should continue to support the spirit of the 1938 agreement because de 
Valera ‘has been a different man these last few years’ willing to engage with the UK government 
and argued ‘it is the wish of the majority of the Irish that the agreement should stand’ 
(Lincolnshire Echo, 02/04/1939, p.4). Despite such optimism, and in the face of imminent war, 
most still suspected ‘England's danger is once again Ireland's opportunity’ (18/11/1939, MO 
Diarist 5039.1), and newspapers reported many incidents of anti-Irish feeling. The bombings 
were often violations of public space, especially the cinema explosions in Liverpool, London, and 
Birmingham, where local opinion held that ‘It was well known the assailants were from Ireland’ 
(Moran, 2010, p. 155). Irishness itself had become suspect in the Liverpool ‘Case of the Mystery 
Irishman’, where a man, described by police as ‘obviously Irish’, was searched and found to be 
carrying £12, considered a suspiciously high sum for someone ‘of his means’. Claiming he was 
unfairly targeted he was eventually found innocent of any crime but refusing to give his name to 
a police officer (Liverpool Echo, 10-24/4/1939). Irish people were suspected of being terrorists 
on the flimsiest of precepts with one Irish man in Liverpool being beaten by a mob shouting ‘he’s 
IRA’ and ‘lynch the bastard’ after lighting a match in a cinema. The incident, which could only 
be described as out of place in a smoke-filled auditorium due to the presence of an Irish accent, 
nevertheless resulted in the man being charged with public mischief by causing a panic (Liverpool 
Echo, 28/07/1939, p.12). Public reaction demanded severe repercussions even before the deaths 
caused in Coventry with letters to the press suggesting harsh sentences because ‘there is nothing 
that that class of criminal dreads so much as the lash’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 08/05/1939, 
p.13). A particularly venomous editorial suggested that ‘Many consider that convicted bombing 
conspirators should be flogged and, in some cases, hanged for murder’ adding that such men 
‘revive the old, suggested remedy for Irish grievances; tow Ireland out to Mid Atlantic, sink it for 
an hour…’ and provide lifeboats for ‘reasonable survivors' (Cornishman and Cornish Telegraph, 
10/08/1939, p.5). Days before the Coventry bombing a Daily Herald article admitted a ‘wave of 
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anti-Irish feeling in England’ suggesting ‘a lot of English people believe that Irish sympathy is 
with the IRA…(and) that Eire is in spirit an enemy country’ yet argued that that this was not the 
case. The writer, a frequent visitor, and the papers diplomatic correspondent noted ‘the great 
majority certainly do not approve the outrages’ and was shocked to ‘find that Irish men and 
women here are liable to find insult rather instead of friendliness’ adding ‘it makes me rather 
ashamed of my own people’ (Daily Herald, 08/08/1939, p.5). However, public letters to the press 
invariably considered the IRA campaign as nothing more than a ‘criminal and callous conspiracy’ 
(The Times, 28/07/1939, p.15). A number agreed with the sentiment of a letter to The Times which 
argued the organization should not be termed an army because the campaign should not be 
‘dignified’ by being accepted as a ‘war’ (The Times, 28/07/1939, p. 15). The governmental 
response to the campaign, the Prevention of Violence Act 1939, which for the first time in law 
provided for prevention of crime and exclusion from British soil to British citizens, did not 
prevent the deaths a month later in Coventry but effectively accepted that an implicit state of war 
with the IRA existed. The Act still posed, as The Times warned, a remote ‘possibility of mistaken 
identity’ which required ‘the most scrupulous caution in avoiding it’ (The Times, 20/07/1939, 
p.15), but such reservations did not impact on an ingrained cultural antipathy often openly 
expressed. 
The Coventry bombing itself further heightened anger in ‘many who knew little of Irish 
political problems and cared less’ (Moran, 2010, p. 159). In Coventry 3,000 marching angry 
aircraft builders and anti-IRA protesters seized upon a bystander presumed to be Irish, only being 
pacified by a policeman assuring them that he 'was not an Irishman and had never been to Ireland' 
(Birmingham Gazette 29th August 1939 Quoted in Moran, 2010, p. 159). Moran also notes, at 
least in Birmingham, employers being prejudiced against applicants with Irish names, and that 
newspapers reported a man with an Irish accent 'almost lynched' when he attempted to buy a 
balloon for his landlady's child7 (Moran, 2010, p. 158).  
                                                          




Figure 1: A Kindly Britain stops the IRA (Punch, 1939) 
 
Strikes were threatened against the employment of Irish people in Coventry factories, and 
many left the city for a time, although some may have done so due to imminent war (Richardson 
& Harris, 1972, p. 97). Even before the Coventry bomb, Irish organisations in Britain quickly 
disassociated themselves from the violence emphasising their policy had been ‘to try to make 
non-Irishmen conscious of the innate good that there is in the Irish race’ (Coventry Evening 
Telegraph, 09/01/1939, p.7). Two days after the bomb it was reported a proposal to form an ‘Irish 
Union’ that would consist of ‘loyal Irish people’, members being issued with a badge and 
certificate of membership, from which ‘IRA members would be debarred by means best known 
to Irishmen themselves’. Raising the prospect of ‘licensed Irishness’, local papers appear to agree 
that any ‘Irishman who refused to join this anti-IRA clan might have some explaining to do - 
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particularly after what occurred in Coventry last Friday’ (Coventry Evening Telegraph, 
30/08/1939, p.5). Letters to the Editor in the same edition stress local Irish peoples wish to 
disassociate themselves from ‘the scum of that fair isle’, ‘a group of gun bullies and terrorists’, 
yet feel apprehensive about being identified as Irish for fear of reprisal. Some admitted to being 
‘ashamed of being Irish’ and that ‘now the English people are classing all Irishmen alike’, 
pleading with influential Irish locals to ‘show that we are not connected with the IRA’ (Coventry 
Evening Telegraph, 30/08/1939, p.5). This initial reaction to the backlash was forceful enough to 
cause fear and distrust among the British and Irish communities in Britain but was quickly 
overshadowed by the declaration of war one week later. However, the damage to the Irish 
reputation had already been done; now Irishness became an indicator of IRA sympathies and the 
execution of those convicted of the Coventry bombing briefly brought fear of the IRA to a 
renewed higher level. 
2.3 MO 1939 RACE SURVEY  
 
Bombings, taken before the worst of the 1939 bombings, a survey by MO in June 1939 
reflects a blurred distinction between the motivations of the IRA, the Irish people, and the Irish 
Government. An MO directive questionnaire on race included questions on the Irish, de Valera 
as a leader, and the IRA, which gives some indication of public opinion on Ireland. Though this 
included questions that were conceptually chaotic, conflating race and nationality (MO Race 
Directive Questionnaire, 1939), with some respondents commenting on their poor definition (MO 
Directive Respondent 1143, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 1318, 1939; MO Directive 
Respondent 1326, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 2104, 1939), a sizeable number of unsolicited 
additional subjective remarks are recorded. Unfortunately, the question relating to the IRA is a 
closed question, asking ‘Have the recent activities of the IRA influenced your attitude to the Irish 
as a Race?’, mostly soliciting the useless answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. However, the additional comments 
reveal attitudes. The most noticeable of these is that IRA activity tended to strengthen existing 
prejudices, such as that it had ‘Confirmed my low opinion of their mentality’ (MO Directive 
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Respondent 1108, 1939), and had ‘strengthen[ed] my conviction as to their worthlessness as a 
race’ (MO Directive Respondent 1599, 1939). Further comments indicated an increased dislike 
(MO Directive Respondent 1616, 1939), increased belief in Irish ‘stupidity’ (MO Directive 
Respondent 1335, 1939) and continued distrust (MO Directive Respondent 1286, 1939). 
Additional comments also betray a belief that Irish people were, by their nature, predisposed to 
carry out an illogical and violent anti-British campaign, citing Irish ‘characteristics’ of  
untrustworthiness (MO Directive Respondent 1286, 1939), poor intelligence (MO Directive 
Respondent 2091, 1939), paranoia (MO Directive Respondent 1577, 1939), irresponsibility (MO 
Directive Respondent 1289, 1939), hooliganism (MO Directive Respondent 1272, 1939), 
disloyalty (MO Directive Respondent 1452, 1939), or fanaticism (MO Directive Respondent 1178, 
1939) as causes of the IRA campaign. Additionally, some felt the Irish easily ‘worked up’ as a 
group (MO Directive Respondent 1980, 1939), gullible and implying they lacked ability to initiate 
the bombing campaign themselves. Indeed, four respondents suspected German involvement (MO 
Directive Respondent 1206, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 1563, 1939; MO Directive 
Respondent 1980, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 2090, 1939), a theme that would recur 
throughout the war. Religious feeling also influenced attitudes, with a respondent deploring the 
inability of the Catholic Church to denounce the IRA (MO Directive Respondent 1975, 1939), 
and another noted she had ‘always found the Irish wanting in a sense of reality…although I have 
good friends who are Irish. These latter are...Protestants, which in my opinion, means greater 
intelligence’ (MO Directive Respondent 1577, 1939). The survey evidences opinion that historical 
arguments about Ireland were being recycled, suggesting an expectation that history would repeat 
itself, and Ireland would cause Britain harm when at her weakest8. 
Nevertheless, the survey reveals some comments that indicate Irish people were not seen 
as a monolithic ‘type’, but as a group composed of individuals. One such response notes 
succinctly ‘No – similarly Hitler does not change my regard for the German people’ (MO 
                                                          
8 The ultimate manifestation of this belief in Irish perfidy was the 1916 Easter Rising, and the attempts to 




Directive Respondent 1298, 1939), and another concludes ‘I don’t think the IRA represents the 
views of the average Irish man’ (MO Directive Respondent 1057, 1939). Others sympathised with 
the IRA cause but not their methods (MO Directive Respondent 1608, 1939), but only three 
indicated some curiosity as to motivation for the campaign (MO Directive Respondent 1151, 
1939; MO Directive Respondent 1287, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 1493, 1939). A lone voice 
noted ‘Greater sympathy’ (MO Directive Respondent 1431, 1939). Additional comments also 
betrayed antipathy unrelated to the IRA, combining with other prejudices to form tropes of 
Irishness. Comments on the IRA combine with abhorrence of Irish labour ‘here while their 
country maintains its present awkward attitude’ (MO Directive Respondent 1433, 1939), while 
another combines antipathy towards the IRA with the ‘official Irish attitude towards conscription’ 
adding ‘I would turn every Irishman out of Great Britain…and out of the colonies too, until they 
chose to become, officially, loyal and friendly members of the empire’ (MO Directive Respondent 
1452, 1939). Most additional comments indicate a distinct, sometimes violent, antipathy toward 
the IRA, an almost total disregard for its political motivation, and a distinct linkage between the 
IRA, the Irish population, and the Irish government. It appears that, for these respondents, Irish 
immigrants, the Irish government, and the IRA were all linked facets of a problematic ‘race’. 
2.4 EXECUTIONS 
 
Ultimately Peter Barnes and James McCormack were executed for the Coventry 
bombing. Neither made or planted the bomb, though McCormack had been present when the 
bicycle to which the bomb was attached was bought, and Barnes had transported the explosives 
to Coventry9. British law convicted both men based on the concept of ‘common enterprise’ with 
the unknown bomber, and mastermind, yet no sources found in this survey mention this important 
concept or admit their minor roles, preferring to condemn those that were caught. MO reveals that 
                                                          
9 It has been suggested that Dominic Adams, father of Gerry, organised the bombing but managed to 
escape to Northern Ireland, afterwards being no longer trusted by the IRA Council. The same writer 
argues the device was intended to damage a nearby substation but was left in Coventry centre by a 
panicked volunteer who later spent many years in the Irish Asylum system after being ejected from the 
IRA (McKenna, 2016) 
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their execution in February 1940, was the stuff of public conversation, though opinions on the 
IRA had hardly changed since the 1939 survey. MO Diarist #5039.9 recounts ‘according to 
friends there have been many suggestions of torture, starving and lynching’ (7/2/1940, MO Diarist 
5039.9). Another diarist recalls a fellow worker remarked ‘Good job too!’ at the executions but 
regretted that there were ‘six victims and only two swinging for it’, at which his co-workers 
judged him ‘a bloodthirsty devil’ (2/2/1940, MO Diarist 5032). A more sympathetic opinion is 
shared by Diarist #5102, a student from Armagh studying in Dublin, who regretted the impact 
this would have on Anglo-Irish relations and argued the executed men would become martyrs to 
Irish Nationalists (06/02/1940, MO Diarist 5102). However, an editorial neatly states public 
opinion on this matter by suggesting that, like the British people, the Irish should ‘by now, surely, 
ought to be getting rather tired of the doctrine that any sort of ruffianism is justifiable in the name 
of politics’ (Birmingham Post, 10/02/1940, p.4) betraying ignorance of the Irish States continual 
attempts at suppression of the IRA since independence. Sir John Maffey, British Representative 
to Eire, noted that after the executions ‘the congenital anti-English complex was inflamed…But 
‘second thoughts’ have been very powerful and salutary in many places’, implying that the 
executions may have been, at some level, used to show de Valera the dissatisfaction of Britain 
over neutrality (TNA, DO 35/1107/1). However, Maffey was right in suggesting the impact of the 
executions would be short-lived and they would be quickly forgotten 10 in the context of war.  
2.5 HISTORICAL ANTIPATHY 
 
British Intelligence made consistent effort to evaluate Irish opinion on the war both to 
pre-empt any unhelpful action that the Irish government might undertake, and to assure itself of 
the ‘loyalty’ of those Irish involved in the Forces and Industry in Britain. Frank Pakenham at the 
MOI ‘estimated that eight out of ten people supported neutrality and were ‘mildly sympathetic’ 
                                                          
10 Brendan Behan was an IRA inmate at Winson Green prison when Barnes and MacCormack were hanged. 
When "The Quare Fellow", his play based on his experiences around the executions, was staged in 
Birmingham in 1964, the city's theatre critics had forgotten the hangings which had influenced Behan's 
work (Moran, 2010, pp. 161-162). 
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to the Allies (23/10/1939, TNA, DO 35/1005/10). This analysis was supported by Sir John Maffey 
and, then Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain (22/4/1940, TNA, DO 130/12), and was broadly 
reassuring, as it indicated the majority favoured an Allied victory (McMahon, 2008, p. 371), but 
such assurance was unable to overcome the effects of a deep cultural and historical animosity 
between the two nations. Despite little evidence of current IRA activity, historical, cultural, and 
religious tropes of ‘Irishness’ re-emerged suggesting the IRA would once again ‘rebel’ at time of 
British trial, echoing the feelings of the MO 1939 Race Survey contributors. HI reported 
suspicions that 'another Casement plot is being hatched' (24/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) and a 
newspaper, reporting the landing of surviving Greek sailors by a U-boat at Ventry harbour, 
recalled the landing of Sir Roger Casement at nearby Banna Strand in 1916, not once, but twice 
in the same article (Coventry Midland Daily Telegraph, 05/10/1939, p.1). At a time when public 
opinion castigated the Irish for holding grudges over past grievances, The Sphere magazine, 
despite arguing that ‘Ireland on the war on our side would be no more useful than it is now, except 
for those bases at Berehaven and Buncrana’, reminded its readers of Irish perfidy in an even older 
rebellion, where ‘Irish volunteers’ had invited French invasion in 1798 (Grey, 18/01/1941). 
Clearly neither side could help but be influenced by the past.  
An Admiralty Intelligence report from Eire in 1941 similarly displays continued distrust 
of the Irish government based on events and allegiances in the Irish revolution twenty years 
before. A report, titled ‘Irish Affairs – ‘Quislings in Eire’, reports on Irish politicians who were 
still assumed, by British Intelligence, to owe some vestigial allegiance to Britain, an assumption 
becoming progressively less true as the Irish Constitution and law had developed since 1922. The 
report suggested which Irish politicians were anti-British based on their revolutionary past, rather 
than their politics in the succeeding eighteen years. With definite undertones of disrespect, if not 
contempt, Irish government Ministers and senior politicians are accused of being pro-German 
even to the point of betraying de Valera if they had the chance, or of gaining their position by 
pure luck (TNA, ADM 22/3486). The historical influence of religious feeling also recurs 
denouncing the Roman Catholic Church for failing to ‘instruct every congregation in the duty to 
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renounce this infamous association and to give all aid to the civil power to detect and suppress it’ 
(The Times, 30/03/1939, p.10), despite the pronounced antipathy between the IRA and the 
Catholic Church since the Church excommunicated the Fenians alongside all members of secret 
societies. These attitudes existed alongside more measured, and informed, attitudes in MI5 and 
MI6, and those less intransigent politicians such as Eden, Attlee, MacDonald and Cranborne. 
The perceived problem of the IRA was also linked to another trope of Irishness, that is 
damaging immigration. A pre-war letter to the Dominions Office, from a Provincial secretary of 
the Primrose League, suggests action to stop Irishmen in England ‘obtaining controlling positions 
in our country’ such as the Civil Service and the Police forces, and asserting that the question of 
Irish immigration was ‘a much more important subject than the average Englishman imagines’ 
(5/5/1939, TNA, DO 35/721/1). Several newspapers published further letters suggesting 
immigration from Ireland should be curbed to stop IRA infiltration and Irish assistance from 
public funds, especially since de Valera had declared ‘that citizens of Eire are not British subjects’ 
(Falkirk Herald, 26/04/1939, p. 2). One editorial also urged deportation of ‘known sympathisers’ 
who he noted ‘boast themselves citizens of a hostile republic. Yet they enjoy the privileges of 
British citizenship’ (Dundee Courier, 26/06/1939, p.6). The characterization of a ‘hostile 
republic’ within the empire, and with its people holding British citizenship, was one frequently 
noted throughout the war, recurring more often as the war progressed, and reaching a climax with 
public reaction to de Valera’s offering condolences to the German legation on Hitler’s death. This 
feeling also gave rise to opinion that Eire was availing of all the benefits of belonging to the 
empire while contributing nothing to it, or even sympathizing with the Empire’s enemies.  
2.6 FEAR & U-BOATS 
 
During the early ‘phoney’ or ‘bore war’ many were convinced of potential perfidy and 
MO records suspicion of IRA activity, in the form of suspicious bomb alerts (7/2/1940, MO 
Diarist 5341; 5/2/1940, MO Diarist 5352), and protest at a perceived lack of adequate security 
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against the IRA threat. One day before the declaration of war a solicitor in local government 
volunteered to be doorkeeper at his Town Hall, feeling that ‘Any ill-disposed IRA man could 
have blown the place to bits with impunity’(2/9/1939, MO Diarist 5012) and a year later MO 
Diarist Margaret Kornitzer noted no one guarding the gangway of two Royal Navy ships ‘against 
Mosely or the IRA’ (14/11/1940, MO Diarist 5349), indicating that, at times, levels of public 
apprehension outstripped those of the authorities. Opinion bordering on paranoia is recorded in 
1939 with an overhead conversation about IRA men in the Army, from which the writer deduces 
that news of IRA activity may have been censored by the British government (5/11/1939, MO 
Diarist 5406). A similar conclusion was suspected by another doubting the fate of the Athenia, 
who is ‘surprised, after the loud denunciation of this on press and radio, to find Churchill leaving 
some doubt as to whether it might have been an IRA time bomb’ (9/9/1939, MO Diarist 5080). 
One noted suspicion betrays either the gullibility or ironic intent of the writer, as a diarist relates 
a ‘Sensational new tale! The IRA has been trying to poison our new waterworks…The boy who 
told me knows it is true because the boy who told him has a brother in the army and he knows for 
certain’ (10/3/1940, MO Diarist 5323). Of course, belief in a ‘fifth column’ is impossible to deny 
when it was a popular opinion that ‘the first job of the fifth column is to make people think that 
is does not exist’ (McLaine, 1979, p.75), providing justification for believing even the most 
unlikely rumour. A ‘fifth column’ panic, coupled with a fear of invasion, created a hysteria which 
was to drive British policy, at least in the first years of the war, and have a deep effect on Anglo-
Irish relations. Newspapers reflected and influenced public fears by publishing stories, based on 
very little evidence, of German U-Boats using the Irish West Coast as safe harbor, trading with 
locals, refueling and even building submarine bases, with the aid of the IRA. Belief that such was 
within the realms of IRA ability, when they could hardly sustain the S-Plan campaign, was an 
indicator of a certain level of ignorance, if not gullibility, regarding the political situation in Eire. 
A typical editorial typifies the level of distrust by asserting ‘The Irish countryside has always 
abounded with secret stores of firearms…’ which could enable the Nazi’s and IRA to overthrow 
de Valera’, invade Ulster or ‘establish submarine bases on the more deserted parts of the Eire 
coast’ (The Scotsman, 23/05/1940, p.4). 
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Similarly, because of initial distrust of Irish intelligence and an inability to assess the 
veracity of rumour and scaremongering, British governmental sources were similarly affected by 
a fear of IRA and German perfidy combined. Within days of the start of the war Churchill had 
worried of the ‘so-called neutrality of the so-called Eire’ and the IRA’s ‘possible succouring of 
U-boats by Irish malcontents in the West of Ireland inlets’, arguing that ‘If they throw bombs in 
London, why should they not supply petrol to U-boats?’ (Gilbert, 1993a, p.28). On the 5th of 
September 1939 the First Lord asked Admiral Pound for a report by naval intelligence on this 
possibility and the effects of the loss of the Treaty Ports. By the 24th he insisted ‘There seems to 
be a good deal of evidence, or at any rate suspicion, that U-boats being succoured from west of 
Ireland ports by the malignant section with whom de Valera dare not interfere’ (Gilbert, 1993a, 
p.143)11, despite equating suspicion and evidence as one and the same. Churchill also equated the 
treachery of the IRA with the immorality of the Nazi’s comparing, in Parliament, the U-boat use 
of torpedo’s, ‘the lowest form of warfare that can be imagined’, with ‘the warfare of the IRA, 
leaving the bomb in the parcel office at the railway station’ (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 472). The vitriol 
of Churchill’s statements was, in the end, tempered, in policy, by more grounded consideration 
of those in the War Cabinet. Additionally, the specially created Leakage of Information 
Committee, under Lord Hankey, concluded ‘that on the evidence so far available, there was no 
justification for going beyond the statement that Eire might be presumed to be one of several 
sources of leakage of information to Germany’ and recommended an increased effort to cooperate 
with Irish Intelligence (1/11/1939, TNA, CAB 76/14). At times these more diplomatic voices 
convinced Churchill that the best policy was to cooperate with the Irish to obtain the most 
benevolent neutrality possible, unless the situation demanded otherwise. This did not, however, 
preclude Churchill from repeatedly charging that Nationalist Ireland was a potential enemy, and 
venting his frustrations in his victory speech of 1945.  
                                                          
11 This opinion was based on some of the raw intelligence reports coming through Eire, one of which told 
of U-boat prisoners being found in possession of Irish cigarettes (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 96). Subsequently the 
cigarettes in question were found to be German, marked ‘Nord-Stadt’ somehow being interpreted as 
meaning ‘Northern Ireland’ (Baker, 2005, pp. 365, Footnote 333) 
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Churchill’s fears were driven by intelligence that someone of his experience of Ireland 
should have treated more sceptically. The level of rumour and credulity surrounding the strength 
of the IRA in Eire was caused by a longstanding lack of intelligence coverage and liaison, with 
no diplomatic representatives or military attaches appointed to Eire since the Free State formation 
in 1922. Though MI5 and NID set up intelligence liaisons, and, in the case of NID, its own secret 
network, they had, in the first years of the war, no way of knowing if the information they found 
was reliable, and often reported it without evaluation. By January 1940 SIS reported ‘a submarine 
base is said to exist (in)… south-west Clare. A submarine comes in three times a week and is 
camouflaged with a canvas screen’ with the local coast-watch being run by ‘an IRA deportee’ and 
the local constabulary ‘terrorised’ (West, 2005b, p. 58). It was also charged that ‘German 
submarines have brought in cargoes of rifles at various points on the Southern and Western coast, 
and these have been widely distributed…’ (TNA, DO 35/1107/1). The most notorious report of 
this type by Sir Charles Tegart12, working for SIS in the spring of 1940, reported ‘a shadow 
government’ of Germans and IRA ready to overthrow de Valera’s government at signal from 
Berlin, that consisted of 2,000 German ‘gauleiters’ landed in Eire by U-Boat since the start of the 
war. Local Irish coast dwellers were said to accept U-boat visits as ‘commonplace’ (McMahon, 
2008, pp. 316-317), in opposition to the findings of the HMS Tamura expedition in October 1939 
(TNA, ADM 199/1829). Similar reports connect the IRA and U-boats in 1944, at the height of the 
‘American Note’ controversy, however most reports of this type are concentrated mostly in its 
first year of the war, before MI5 and SIS began to assess the veracity of wild rumour more 
correctly. However, unknowing of these developments newspaper and public opinion remained 
convinced of a continuation of Irish perfidy as had been seen in the First World War.  
After the war Kriegsmarine Chief of Staff Eberhard Gott told British Intelligence that U-
boats ‘were able to surface, rest and repair in Irish territorial waters throughout the war’, at times 
when they were ‘dead ground’ (22/08/1945, TNA, ADM 116/5631), and were aware of the location 
                                                          
12 An Irish former, well-respected, Police commissioner in India and Palestine well acquainted with 
nationalist revolutionaries and Ireland, from the War of Independence, though less so after that period. 
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minefields placed outside Irish waters by the Royal Navy via German Intelligence (Bew, 2016, 
p. 142). He also articulated that Eire ‘offered a definite base for the German Intelligence service’ 
(22/08/1945, TNA, ADM 116/5631) and appeared to argue that this was an opportunity wasted. 
Paul Bew also argues ‘much was owed to German incompetence’ in ensuring British safety (Bew, 
2016, p. 153), but does not acknowledge the greater weight of contemporary British and Irish 
intelligence that found no evidence of U-Boat activity in Irish waters. While Bew ultimately 
argues that ‘by the end of 1943 the level of cooperation (with Eire) was high’ (Bew, 2016, p. 154), 
British public opinion tended to believe the threat of U-Boat subversion continued until the 
German surrender.  
2.7 HUMOUR 
 
There is also evidence IRA activity in Britain had become seen as commonplace, 
irritating and, at times, the subject of levity. The Times took the opportunity, after the Metropolitan 
Water board banned fishing in its waters for fear that the IRA might sabotage the water supply, 
to joke, bizarrely, that any angler killed by his own bombs while playing a big fish would die a 
'glorious and enviable' death (The Times, 26/05/1939, p.15). There were even some newspaper 
cartoons making fun of the effect of unfounded IRA scares (Evening Standard, 30/08/1940, 
LHMA). Some levity was even in evidence four days after the fatal Coventry bombing where an 
MO diarist complained of an Irish domestic leaving the families employment on bad terms and 
threatening ‘proceedings’, with a joke that her mother was still expecting ‘a bomb through the 
letterbox’ (29/8/1939, MO Diarist 5422). Some even felt a sense of excitement as a welcome 
relief from the monotony of the ‘bore war’, with an MO Diarist relating a search for explosives 
at their university but regretting that ‘as there were no bombs found, there were no heroes. What 
a shame!’ (5/2/1940, MO Diarist 5352). A Royal Mail worker related explosions in his sorting 
office but was only concerned with wondering if he could sell his story to the newspapers 
(12/12/1939, MO Diarist 5089). It seems that even those caught up in IRA activity were 
remarkably unfazed, because the IRA, in the face of Hitler, had faded in its significance. Resorting 
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to bickering and name-calling, by March 1940, a Picture Post writer on Belfast felt able to 
characterize Southern Ireland as ‘the spoiled child of the British Commonwealth’ and the IRA 
behaving ‘like overgrown infants’ (Ervine, 02/03/1940), to which a reader factually replied that 
most IRA members actually hailed from Belfast not Dublin (C. Lee, 23/03/1940). In general, 
however, the argument over the IRA reflected the  
 
Figure 2: Reaction to Early IRA Attacks (Evening News, 13/02/1939) 
 
perceived seriousness of the IRA threat as a fifth column, and mostly exaggerated its 
effectiveness.  
By June 1940, the anti-Irish backlash receded and mutated after the fall of France brought 
the full Nazi threat into stark contrast with the disorganised S-Plan campaign, which had already 
stagnated due to a combination of lack of funds, and the public safety controls that were enacted 
in Eire, Northern Ireland, and Britain. Concerted intelligence efforts in Eire to ensure neither the 
IRA nor the Abwehr used Ireland as a base from which to attack Britain also struck IRA 
organisation at its root, stifling its ability to operate. As the History of MI5 and Ireland during the 
'... and he was merely taking an 




War confirms, after June 1940 ‘no single case of…sabotage by the IRA…is known to have 
occurred’ (Cecil Lidell, Quoted in O'Halpin, 2003, p. 56), and doubtless the IRA campaign had 
little effect on the question of partition just when the position of Northern Ireland became of vital 
importance to Britain at war. The bombings had only served to alienate Irish people living in 
Britain from Republicanism as the Second World War became the people’s dominant worry 
(Moran, 2010, p. 162). The threat of the IRA, influenced by changing events, evolved into a 
mostly fantastical supposed conspiracy with the Nazi’s. Despite the IRA becoming a spent force 
in Eire newspapers continued to insist that the threat of IRA activity was a problem for the Eire 
government, and occasionally hinting that forcing Eire to further repression still was not beyond 
Britain’s scope of action (Daily Gazette for Middlesborough, 24/05/1940, p. 4). Newspapers 
continued to suggest that the Eire governments actions were ineffective, unenforced, or 
obstructive to the requirements of the Imperial government. However, in fact, IRA activity in 
Britain ceased and that which occurred in Ireland was ended before anything was achieved, 
leaving the stories of IRA activity, from 1940, to be more suggestive of public fears than fact. 
2.8 ALTERNATIVE VOICES 
 
In 1940 the Irish Censorship department felt there was a concerted effort in British 
newspapers to ‘spread the idea that Eire was a centre of information being made available to the 
German’s’ and to cause bad blood between Britain and Eire (O'Drisceoil, 1996, p. 192). However, 
despite continued public distrust, and fear, of IRA activity, there were some who attempted to 
explain the continued grievances of the armed Republicans and the position of the Irish 
Government. These urged understanding of the question of partition and civil rights in Ulster, 
though this subject was ignored by newspapers who were more convinced that Ulster had proved 
its loyalty and importance to the UK by joining the war. A letter to The Times by Frank Pakenham, 
later the 7th Earl of Longford, argued that British proposed anti-Terrorist legislation constituted 
only half a policy while the minority Catholic population of Ulster was denied ‘full freedom of 
expression for the purpose of propagating their cause’. While deploring the IRA’s activities, but 
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understanding their political motivations, he could ‘feel no surprise that young men, seething with 
political indignation, should …reach the conclusion that force is the only remedy’ (The Times, 
24/07/1939, p.8). Similarly, another reader’s letter suggests the ‘only radical solution of the 
deplorable terrorism of the IRA is the abolition of …the present partition of Ireland’, agreeing 
with Lord Halifax’s argument that ‘our safety is not diminished, but immeasurably increased, by 
a free and friendly Ireland’ (The Scotsman, 29/07/1939, p. 15). Others assured the public that the 
IRA was not as great a threat as imagined and was being effectively suppressed in Eire. The 
Yorkshire Post argued ‘There is no fifth column here…the IRA are an insignificant body in Irish 
public life…They would not be able to get 200 men out for an act of force’ (Yorkshire Post, 
12/02/1941, p. 2); an accurate assessment, but a rare opinion. Occasionally Irish voices were heard 
with some papers printing the arguments of leading Irish figures, including de Valera, but a few 
confused the public by publishing the opinions of more controversial figures such as Eoin 
O’Duffy (Leicester Mercury, 08/07/1939, p.17) and Jim Phelan, both of whom had been out of 
touch with IRA affairs for some time, and were not, to say the least, typical of Irish opinion13. 
However, playwright Sean O’Casey made a valid point rarely made, in the Picture Post, that 
violence had brought about Irish independence when all else had failed (O'Casey, 1939)14. 
Nevertheless, most comment on IRA motives was based on contempt or dismissal of their actions 
as purely criminal. Predictably, many of these comments emanate from Ulster, long associated 
with the most virulent opinions on, and most affected by the activities of, the IRA. A letter in The 
Times, titled Ulster & Eire, denies all political motive for these actions, suggesting that an offer 
of military assistance from Britain in dealing with the threat amounted to glorifying ‘Criminal 
outrages, …matters primarily for the civil authority responsible for law and order’ into 'a state of 
war' (The Times, 09/10/1942, p.7). Another showed contempt noting ‘The most effective way of 
                                                          
13 Eoin O’Duffy had been Chief of Staff of the IRA but his support of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and his 
roles in Free State government had divorced him from the IRA, later becoming leader of the quasi-Fascist 
‘Blueshirts’. Jim Phelan had supported the Anti-Treaty IRA and was imprisoned between 1924 and 1937 
as an accessory to murder. After release he became a successful writer. His view of Irish neutrality was 
expressed in a bizarre essay titled ‘Churchill can unite Ireland’ (1940, Gollancz) and he later advocated that 
Eire should lease the Treaty Ports to the US (Dundee Evening Telegraph, 06/09/1941, p. 20).  
14 But he suffered the paper labelling him a British Writer.  
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dealing with the Irish is to make them look ridiculous...they cannot bear ridicule’. Suggesting the 
Home Office should imprison IRA members on prison hulks in rough seas ‘where the little 
courage of these cowards would be vomited up for the rest of their lives within 24 hours’ the 
writer argues the IRA men would thus look fools and their movement collapse’ (The Times, 
27/071939, p. 5). Ridiculously simple solutions such as these were frequently suggested that the 
Irish question would be resolved had the British Government the will to do so. Of course, the fine 
balance required of Anglo-Irish relations at this time was unknown to most.  
2.9 GERMAN INFLUENCE 
 
As we have already seen, even before the outbreak of war the twin threats of the IRA and 
the Nazi’s were being conflated in public opinion, and the lessons of the German involvement in 
the 1916 rebellion were recalled all too easily as war became inevitable. The public linked the 
IRA and the Germans consistently throughout the war with HI reporting news of Ireland 
immediately interpreted as evidence of complicity, with ‘strong feeling against IRA and 
Communists following finding of a parachute in Dublin’ despite the urging against panic in the 
same report (28/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). Letters to newspapers suggested ‘money is coming to 
these extremists from continental sources hostile to Britain' (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 
09/02/1939, p.3) and these included Nazi, Fascist and Communist funding (Daily Mirror, 
23/02/1939, p.14). In early 1939 it was well known that the IRA was funded through subscription 
in Ireland, Britain, and the United States, yet ‘blaming German Gold’ (Leicester Mercury, 
08/07/1939, p.17) was a frequent, and erroneous, explanation of the IRA finances. Newspapers 
ran speculative stories along this theme with the Daily Mirror suggesting that ‘Goebbels…is now 
working on ex-IRA officers and men in Ireland…to enlist their support for German aims’, after 
ex-IRA men had reportedly received German propaganda leaflets by post (Daily Mirror, 
12/05/1939, p.36). It was even reported that while the IRA leader Sean Russell was raising 
$600,000 from a tour of Irish American organisations, that ‘a number of German American Nazi's 
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were…present and that they contributed generously’ (Sunday Express, 30/07/1939, p.10)15. Such 
arguments had helped cement opinion such as that found in the MO 1939 ‘Race survey’, which 
held that ‘Obviously someone is behind the Irish - they'd never think of things like acid in balloons 
by themselves’ (MO Directive Respondent 1206, 1939). In fact, Sean Russell had made 
unsuccessful overtures to the Nazi’s in 1938, and Irish Intelligence (G2) were unaware of this 
until tipped off by the British (O'Halpin, 1999, pp. 128-129, 131), but thereafter the IRA were 
under close, effective surveillance by G2 throughout the war.  
In July 1939 the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, had confirmed in parliament that it was 
now ‘a matter of evidence and not of suspicion, that foreign organizations were fomenting the 
plot’ (The Times, 27/07/1939, p.5), yet the evidence of this collaboration was not as significant as 
was, and still is, commonly suggested. The most offered proof, ‘Plan Kathleen’, a document 
captured from Nazi spy Stephen Held shared with British Intelligence by G2, is often upheld as 
evidence of a plan to invade Ulster, but this in fact consisted of preparatory questions which 
needed researching before any military plan could be put into place. Admiralty Intelligence 
suggested these questions pointed towards a plan to invade Northern Ireland, with questions 
‘including disposition of own forces, number and equipment required’, but it was admitted ‘no 
actual plan was found in the documents’ (24/5/1940, TNA, ADM 22/3486). Additionally, a Garda 
source confirmed ‘it was American dollars found in the Held case’ alongside Plan Kathleen (TNA, 
PREM 3/129/2). Though these details were not known to the public continued exaggerated 
suggestions of IRA collaboration with the Nazi’s, made their mark. Reports from HI noted 
‘Anxiety about Ireland’, ‘Opinion expressed that the IRA would give active support to Germany’ 
(11/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264), and newspapers suggested the German legation in Dublin was 
especially expected to have ‘cultivated close relations with the IRA’ (Dundee Courier, 
25/05/1940, p.2).  
                                                          
15 Several Nazi spies landing in Eire brought small amounts of money and radio sets, but these were either 
lost through their own ineptitude or confiscated after capture (Hull, 2004) 
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Some newspapers accepted that the IRA had been rounded up by the Irish government, 
yet one indicated how fear of Irish treachery would mutate in the future by asking the question ‘I 
wonder is that why Dr Carl Petersen, press attaché at the German Legation in Dublin, tends to 
sniff at the IRA in Eire?’ (Daily Express, 25/06/1940, p.4), implying that the Germans in Eire did 
not need IRA help to damage Britain. Another suggested that the IRA was so controlled that ‘The 
real fifth Column danger in Eire comes from the Right. The former Blueshirts…even support a 
'Friends of Germany’ movement’ (Sunday Pictorial, 07/07/1940, LHMA). By June 1940 even the 
popular dailies occasionally wondered what had happened to the IRA, with one letter to the 
Mirror asking, ‘Have we really jugged them all, or did they shoot off back to peaceful Eire?’ and 
venturing the suspects were now ‘working as a fifth column in Eire for the Nazi's’. The paper 
replied that the IRA had joined ‘a large movement in Eire which has already made arrangements 
to welcome possible invaders’ and that ‘two thousand parachute troops have been studying Erse, 
the official language of Eire, for some months’ taught by five of the IRA leaders. The paper asserts 
the pro-German stance of some had split the IRA, but that what would re-unite them was ‘the 
landing of English troops in Eire - the same old story!’ (Daily Mirror, 24/07/1940, p.5). Even the 
absence of IRA activity was thus interpreted as proof of worsening anti-British feeling in Eire. 
For many it was easier to believe in a continuing ‘Fifth Column’ than that the crackdown in Eire 
could have yielded the required results. Inability to believe the Irish government could control the 
IRA led to continued distrust of Irish motives beyond a time when the IRA was considered a 
threat by British and Irish Intelligence. Despite all evidence there was still public opinion that ‘the 
IRA is condemned as a purely and senselessly terrorist organisation, completely in the pay of the 
Germans’ (MO File Report 569 - Airmen, 1941).  
Ironically, the Germans had, by 1941, also concluded that the IRA was a spent force. The 
only partly successful spy in Eire, Hermann Goertz, reported to the Abwehr that the IRA was 
useless for their purposes and wished to be return to Germany to relay the true situation ‘about 
which there seemed to exist definite misconceptions’ (R Fisk, 1985, p. 357). It was also 
subsequently found that although ‘Case Green’ had been prepared it was concluded that a feigned 
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invasion of Ulster at the same time as the invasion of England, was unfeasible and unnecessary 
(McMahon, 2008, p. 310). Indeed, Admiral Godfrey, head of SIS, after the war conceded that 
‘Germany never seriously considered invading Ireland (Quoted in McMahon, 2008, p. 310). 
However, in the heady atmosphere of invasion fears and spy scares, British Intelligence was so 
agitated by Ireland that they investigated rumour that ‘Germans had bought estates on the Cork 
and Kerry coast’ and were later assured by the Garda that this was only true in one case (TNA, 
PREM 3/129/2). 
2.10 DISTRUST OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
 
Though the Irish state had given Britain assurance that Eire would not be used as a base 
from which to attack Britain, the public were unconvinced by the more sober news reports that 
told of the Irish suppression of the IRA, and MO reports show that, after the fall of France, spy 
scares were ‘reaching hysterical dimensions’ (MO File Report 172 - Morale 3rd June (Misnamed 
'Pilot Study on ARP Preparedness'), 1940). An MO report reflects this disbelief in studying the 
possible leakage of information in the Eire cattle trade. The report concludes ‘we are far from 
satisfied that it would not be simple to introduce and interchange people between the shore and 
these ships’, and for information to be passed to the Axis legations in Dublin, recommending ‘this 
is a subject which, like the Irish, requires a special and intensive study’ (MO File Report 1245 - 
Merseyside Shipping Situation, 1942). Similar concerns are evident in a report on Ulster shipping, 
noting the large number of Eire citizens working in the ports of Londonderry and Belfast, and 
their regular crossing of the border. The report insists ‘It is not suggested, of course, that these 
men do deliberately carry information. But …tongues automatically loosen in the neutral 
atmosphere of Eire’. The report further suggests the Ulster Irish contribute to the danger by 
fostering poor industrial relations (MO File Report 1309 - Ulster Shipping Situation, 1942). It 
seems to be expected that shared ‘Irishness’, even in loyal Northern Ireland, was enough to create 
an environment in which espionage and treachery could thrive.  
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The refusal of the Irish Government to accept the secret offer of a united Ireland ‘in 
principle’ to be decided after the war, also led the British government to suspect their intentions. 
This suspicion was particularly directed against the Irish army, which had grown out of the IRA 
in 1922, and whose senior officers had distinguished themselves in the War of Independence. As 
a result, the British services were reluctant to share intelligence and the RAF considered the ‘they 
would give it to the Boche’ and thus must fight a large portion of the Irish Army as well as the 
German Armies if Ireland were invaded (McMahon, 2008, p. 179). The same attitude was 
expressed by the Foreign office who stopped the Americans from supplying Ireland with weapons 
because they felt the Eire army had ‘I.R.A. tendencies and there was a risk that these weapons 
may be used against us’ (McMahon, 2008, p. 323). Governmental sources indicate that British 
Naval Intelligence in early 1940 were convinced the Irish ‘government’s efforts at suppressing 
the IRA do not seem to be bearing much fruit’ (TNA, DO 35/1107/1), despite the introduction of 
draconian Emergency measures to destroy the IRA. Initial British reactions to the Irish Public 
Safety Bill, which provided military tribunals to try IRA suspects, considered the legislation too 
little and too late and concentrated on the paradox of former rebel de Valera working against those 
who still adhered to the means of ‘physical force’ to achieve shared aims. A Coventry paper noted 
that outlawing the IRA was ‘wise government' but qualified its support by emphasizing that de 
Valera ‘does not deprecate violent methods because they are violent, his objection to it is that it 
cannot succeed’ (Coventry Evening Telegraph, 10/02/1939, p.6). Several letters to the editor make 
this same point, with one adding that this was reason enough to treat Eire as an ‘open enemy’ 
(Aberdeen Press & Journal, 08/05/1939, p. 13). While Irish journalist Patrick Campbell held that 
the Public Safety Bill was the best solution for a people ‘sick of the rule of the gun…’ (Daily 
Express, 09/02/1939, p.4), most opinion in Britain maintained ‘Mr. de Valera has all along been 
timorous in his confrontation of the IRA conspiracy…which ought to have been smothered at its 
source’ (Daily Record, 04/01/1940, p.6; Dundee Courier, 28/12/1939, p.4). A section of British 
opinion was convinced these measures would not be effective and one writer, unimpressed by the 
Public Safety Bill, suggested that Eire should pay damages to the UK because ‘It is an elementary 
principle that a country shall take effective steps to prevent its nationals using its territory as a 
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basis of preparations for attack on another country’ (The Scotsman, 06/01/1940, p. 11). Further 
the Irish governments petition for mercy to be shown to the Coventry bombers was interpreted by 
some as evidence that in Ireland ‘violence organized upon political grounds is still condemned 
with reservations’ (Birmingham Post, 08/01/1940, p. 4).  
However, by July 1940 a ‘General Report on the Position in Eire’ concluded ‘the 
Germans do not control or communicate with the IRA in Northern Ireland in any way, and it is 
considered to be very doubtful that they have control over the IRA in Eire except in respect of a 
small body’ (TNA, PREM 3/129/2). A 1947 post-war report from Admiralty Intelligence noted 
the most successful spy in Eire, Hermann Goertz, had remained at large16 long enough to contact 
the IRA and discuss ‘Plan Kathleen’, but found ‘little active co-operation, from the IRA, and is 
believed to have devoted most of his energies to planning a return to Germany’. This report 
concludes the measures taken in Eire were ‘strenuous and efficient’ with ‘close watch kept on the 
German Legation by the civic guard’ and a still redacted section after this admission suggests 
more controversial surveillance than is publicly acceptable in one or both countries may have 
been used. The same report in 1947 admitted ‘As we know from German records, no naval 
activities favourable to the Germans took place in Eirean (sic) waters, and there is no evidence of 
the Eirean (sic) coast being used for U-boat, or supply bases’ (Aug 1947, TNA, ADM 22/3486). 
Newspapers however, still believed the Irish government ineffective against the IRA arguing that 
‘Many of the leaders, we are told, have been imprisoned, but those left would offer a more 
powerful and ruthless gang as a spearhead for Hitler's internal disruptive warfare than he has yet 
had in any country’ (News Chronicle, 01/07/1940, LHMA). This newspaper discourse remained 
until the tide of the war had firmly swung towards the Allies, with the same argument, that ‘it is 
clear that despite all precautions it (the IRA) is far from having been effectively suppressed’ 
(Dundee Courier, 26/04/1943, p. 2), despite there being no evidence of continued IRA attacks. 
However, when suppression of the IRA was accepted, and the Allies were winning the war, the 
                                                          
16 But under surveillance by G2, to flush out the remaining IRA leaders. 
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threat from Ireland evolved from insidious IRA activity to that of the Axis powers representatives 
in Eire. 
2.11 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Fear of potential IRA activity in, and against, Britain during the war had far greater effect 
on public opinion of Ireland and the Irish, than the IRA campaign destructively achieved. 
Eventually the 1939 campaign became ‘owned by the British wartime experience, a disregarded 
prelude to ‘the real thing’’ (Evans, 2012), yet its contemporary significance should not be ignored. 
A sizeable backlash against Irish people in Britain served to alienate the Irish in Britain from their 
British neighbours, as Irishness became analogous to violence and the threat of danger. ‘Irishness’ 
had become politicised as a threat to the nation at a particularly threatening time and as a result 
the Irish in Britain, in fear of this backlash felt pressure to denounce the IRA, and elements of 
Irishness, to feel safe. It is a marker of the significance of this backlash that Irish organisations in 
Britain sought immediately to distance themselves from the IRA. The level of violence and 
threatened potential violence unleashed by this backlash indicates that British public opinion 
could easily support punitive measures against Eire, and that they were predisposed to believe the 
worst about Irish motivations, intentions and actions relating to the impending war.  
In general, the campaign served to re-enforce opinions already held by many, and to 
bolster a distinct cultural antipathy towards the Irish based on previous Anglo-Irish history. The 
Irish were perceived as having supported the IRA in the past, at a time of British weakness, and 
the IRA campaign served to prove, for most, that they would do so again. With the outbreak of 
war, the IRA campaign was not forgotten, but became secondary to the threat of the Nazi’s, and 
was occasionally treated with triviality, however, the duration of concern at IRA activity, long 
past the time that such activity was possible, indicates a high level of apprehension caused by 
these misgivings. As the threat of the Nazi’s loomed larger, and especially after the Fall of France, 
expectation that the IRA would combine with Germany to attack British interests was at its height, 
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despite evidence that this period coincided with the effective suppression of the IRA in Eire, and 
the beginning of Nazi intelligence’s disinterest in the amateurish IRA17. After 1940 there was no 
real evidence of any IRA activity, in either Eire or in Britain, yet the expectation of IRA activity 
lingered with many believing the Germans were funding them. This perception continued despite 
the historical and continued funding of the IRA by Irish communities in Britain and especially 
America. Even British Government sources still insisted on a German connection asserting that 
‘Money is coming for the IRA from the United States...German circles in Americas are believed 
to be furnishing these funds’ (9/4/1940, TNA, DO 35/1107/1). Public perceptions also refused to 
accept that IRA and German Intelligence activities in Eire were under control, despite far more 
stringent Public Safety and Emergency Legislation being in place in Eire than in Britain.  
Many factors combined to perpetuate a British generalised distrust of the Irish and 
Ireland. The 1939 S-Plan campaign, feeling that the IRA would, as they historically had, attack 
during wartime and the perception that the IRA was communicating with and being funded by 
Germany, all contributed to a perception of the Irish as being enemies of Britain. This distrust 
mutated, after IRA activity decreased, into a fear that Nazi activity became the greatest, yet 
uncontrolled, threat in Eire. As this change was most noticeable towards the end of the war the 





                                                          
17 The only other evidence of German interest in Ireland, aside from the mooted ‘Plan Kathleen’, was a 
proposal by Luftwaffe General Kurt Student to launch a diversionary decoy parachute landing in Ulster in 
conjunction with the invasion of Southern England (Case Green). According to Student, however, Hitler 
insisted ‘Eire’s neutrality must be respected. A neutral Irish Free State is of greater value than a hostile 
Ireland. We must be glad that Ireland has remained neutral up to the present.’ (MacCartney, 1961, p. 727). 




3 DANGEROUS NEUTRALITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Initial British reactions to Irish neutrality focussed on disappointment, a sense of betrayal 
by a British Dominion and an expectation that, should the war intensify, her neutrality might, or 
should, be dropped. Many were of the opinion, even in the British Government, that Ireland was 
a Dominion except when it came to British defence, despite the unqualified agreement that all 
Dominions had been granted their own decisions on foreign policy by the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster. The 1937 Constitution of Ireland now officially named Eire, or Ireland in English, 
also repudiated the Irish states Dominion status by redefining the country as ‘associated’ with the 
British Commonwealth rather than a member of it, an expression of de Valera’s long held and 
controversial policy of ‘External Association’ (McCullagh, 2018, pp 215-6). This repudiation was 
lost alongside Articles two and three, which laid claim to Northern Ireland ‘pending the re-
integration of the national territory’, considered so ‘objectionable, it would be a mistake to take 
much notice of them’ (TNA, DO 35/892/X.1/111) and considered by the Law Lords to bear no 
‘legal result’ (TNA, DO 35/891/.1/98). The changes may have seemed pedantic and empty 
promises, but they most certainly indicated an intention to pursue a different relationship with the 
Empire, building as they did on the successive attempts to dismantle Ireland’s political and 
constitutional ties to the Empire, and to lay the foundations for pursuing Ireland’s own policies. 
Chamberlain’s 1938 policy accepted the Irish position and was determined avoid intervening in 
a sovereign neutral state if it could be avoided, but also never formally agreed not to do so in 
order that Irish neutrality might be strained as far as possible towards British interests, whilst 
reserving the right to action if it became necessary (Canning, 1985, pp. 242-246). Until 
Chamberlain’s fall it was regarded that ‘the only line possible at present is to retain his (de 
Valera’s) good will and to render his neutrality as benevolent as possible’ (12/9/1939, TNA, CAB 
66/1/34), because more stringent measures against Ireland might be capable of ‘arousing 
considerable criticism and antagonism in this country’ (2/11/1939, TNA, CAB 65 2/2). Public 
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attitudes towards Eire were notably more understanding whilst the ‘phoney war’ continued. 
Though there were some who noted the portentousness of the changing of the decade, recording 
‘we seem to be at the end of things as we know them, moving forward into a new age…’ 
(23/13/1939, MO Diarist 5102), most were shocked, and undoubtedly frightened by the success 
of Blitzkrieg in West. This shock hardened attitudes to Eire. Eire, once a potential risk, now 
became perceived as a positive danger to Britain. 
Reflecting an initial expectation that Eire would drop neutrality as her danger increased, 
HI noted ‘uncertainty…about attitude of Eire Government’ and suggested the ‘loyal’ Irish in 
Scotland would welcome a clear statement of Irish intention (3/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). 
However, uncertainty was ended by confirmation of continuing neutrality, in November 1940, 
which provoked ‘a high degree of indignation’ and eliciting opinion that ‘De Valera will be 
crushed, and by us’, that ‘it's perfectly disgusting, they even say they 'll fight us’ and ‘I know 
what I'd like to do - wipe them out’ (15/11/1940, MO FR 493 - Seventh Weekly Report for Home 
Intelligence). In government it was agreed that Eire’s attitude was ‘short-sighted and dangerous, 
and their suspicions are exasperating beyond words’ (5/7/1940, TNA, CAB 66/10/5) yet basic 
British policy remained unchanged, whilst the vehemence of condemnation noticeably increased. 
Though the British and Irish positions were highly nuanced and designed to be reactive to 
circumstance, in public opinion, and indeed in some government circles, the complicated balance 
of Anglo-Irish relations was reduced, by frustration, anger, fear, and ignorance, to a binary choice. 
An editorial opined Ireland was simultaneously benefitting from British protection while 
remaining neutral and should be forced to accept that ‘Southern Ireland and not have it both ways. 
Either she is with us or against us…’ (Gloucestershire Echo, 02/01/1941, p.3). As a result, 
neutrality was increasingly seen as dangerous, threatening, and aiding the enemy. 
Public opinion on Irish neutrality presents several themes which require analysis. It was 
felt that neutrality, by June 1940, had been proven useless against the Nazi’s and would prove, in 
Eire’s case, no defence. Additionally, Ireland was considered militarily defenceless and thus 
prime target for invasion, so much so that forcing ‘assistance’ on Eire was considered viable. The 
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status of Northern Ireland also became of paramount concern as Eire’s stance could be used as a 
lever to end partition in return for an end to neutrality. Public opinion, on occasion, expected 
neutrality was a blackmail plot against Britain in its hour of need. Additionally, the landing of 
American troops in NI was interpreted as a defensive move against Irish invasion, and the 
bombing of Irish towns was interpreted as the price to pay for neutrality. Public discourse also 
frequently expressed that Eire should be punished for her stance. These themes combine and are 
exemplified in the controversy surrounding the Treaty Ports, undoubtedly the issue which 
manifested most clearly the problem of Irish neutrality for Britain. 
3.2 NEUTRALITY AS DEFENCE 
 
Irish neutrality was exceptional among the Dominions. The day after war was declared a 
Times editorial reflected the early uncertainty of the Dominions reactions to declaration. Relating 
spontaneous and unrequested declarations of all Dominions, except South Africa and Eire, as 
‘enormously valuable’, it acknowledged the ‘special circumstances…frankly realised in this 
country’ that affected the latter two (The Times, 04/09/1039, p.9). However, this opinion was not 
universal, with an MO diarist noting Eire selfish in the face of ‘the greatest calamity’ and ‘the 
principles at issue’ (26/11/1939, MO Diarist 5349). Despite de Valera’s continued insistence on 
a policy of strict neutrality, re-confirmed after the fall of France, it was not long before Irish 
neutrality was no longer to be considered within its historical context, and was often interpreted 
as ‘a policy of fear and indecision’ (Coventry Midland Daily Telegraph, 13/07/1940, p.4). Indeed, 
neutrality in general, not just in Eire, was interpreted as delusional. Letters to the press argue 
neutrality had not protected the European neutrals toppled in the race to Paris, with some 
suggesting cowardly motivation in the case of ‘poor deluded Eire…pathetic in her blindness’, 
urging de Valera to use his ‘moral courage’ (The Times, 11/07/1940, p.5). Similarly, it was 
sermonised that the Irish people should feel shame as they stood aside from a war against evil, 
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taking ‘an unworthy almost cowardly, attitude as this Meroz18-like neutrality’ (Nottingham 
Journal, 03/02/1941, p.3).  
    
Figure 3: Delusion of Neutrality, (Birmingham Mail, 10/07/1940, p.4)  
 
Newspapers typically reflected and perpetuated opinion that Irish neutrality was soon to 
be proven valueless and indefensible, and many considered their ‘delusion’ wilful, designed by 
the Irish government to placate the stupefy the Irish people. This attitude is best reflected by a 
cartoon depicting de Valera as relying on Hitlers decency in respecting Irish neutrality 
(Birmingham Mail, 10/07/1940, p.4). Meanwhile, postal censorship of Irish mail revealed 
invasion of Eire was anticipated by both British and Irish writers, and many Irish were 
‘pessimistic about Eire’s chances’, while most felt Eire unprepared (29/10/1940, TNA, INF 1/292) 
and practically defenceless (24/12/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). However, while accepting Eire was 
                                                          
18 Meroz: Biblical city in the Book of Judges condemned by God for refusing help their neighbours in battle. 
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vulnerable, most Irish felt ‘any deviation from neutrality will land the towns of Ireland in a worse 
plight’ (24/12/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). Though it made sense that it was unnecessary to invite 
German bombs while the country was unarmed, British opinion dismissed Irish attempts to arm 
themselves as a ‘ridiculous propaganda stunt’, arguing that even after being better armed Eire 
would ‘still continue to delude themselves with the fantastic idea that their little state can defend 
itself against Germany’ (The Scotsman, 19/03/1941, p.5). Undoubtedly a perception of amateur, 
ill-equipped, ill-disciplined Irish soldiers was not helped by some newspaper and magazine 
articles describing, and showing, the Coastal Watch service, created under British pressure and 
with limited resources, by the Irish government. A photograph in The Sphere magazine shows the 
‘Eire’s Security Force’ spot-checking a car by the coast, with a non-uniformed officer at a make-
shift roadblock giving more the impression of an IRA ambush or robbery rather than the action 
of a government representative. The picture is tellingly captioned ‘Eire “protects” her coast’, 
implying the protection was at least ineffective, or at worst reminiscent of gangsters ‘protection 
rackets’ (Bowen, F., 1940).  
Cowardly intent is also ascribed to the Irish in MO reports, not overtly linking cowardice 
to neutrality, though this was undoubtedly a contributary factor, but to the Irish character in 
general. Irish people are charged with defeatism alongside potential fifth column activity 
(9/6/1940, MO File Report 181 - Capitulation Talk in Worktown, 1940; 1/5/1941, MO File Report 
706 - Liverpool, 1941), but the charge of cowardice was rare in comparison to impressions that 
the dangers of Irish neutrality were caused by ignorance, stupidity, indifference, or negligence. 
Expectation that neutrality would fail to protect Eire lasted long after the Battle of Britain had 
ended fears of an immediate British invasion. By July 1941 an HI report writer argues that ‘final, 
overwhelming proof that neutrality is no protection against German invasion’ was established 
fact, yet was unbelieved in Eire (16/7/1941, TNA, INF 1/292), evidencing that the failure of the 
concept of neutrality, and Irish disbelief in the threat of the Nazi’s, had become a truism.  
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Figure 4: Neutrality no defence (Daily Mirror, 09/11/1940)  
Other HI and censorship reports evidence Irish popular support for neutrality, which was 
felt aided Britain as far as possible, and belief that it protected Eire from bombing (TNA, CJ 4/30; 
TNA, PREM 4/100/1). Indeed, in Ireland the fact that neutrality had endured was considered proof 
of its efficacy in protecting the new state. However, in Britain Irish neutrality was still deemed 
no more likely to survive than that of the defeated European neutrals. Indeed, in December 1941 
the Guardian continued the argument that ‘nothing has emerged more clearly from the present 
war that if defensive action is delayed until an attack has actually developed it is likely to be too 
late’, and that Salazar had accepted the preventative invasion of Portuguese Timor ‘which is 
perhaps more than can be said of many residents of Eire’ (The Guardian, 23/12/1941, LHMA). 
The Times further speculated that the delusion of neutrality was linked to a societal regression 
exemplified by the popularity of de Valera, who the writer suggests the people see 'as a political 
thaumaturge' (The Times, 28/04/1942, p.5), a worker of wonders, recalling the established 
stereotype that the Irish were overly superstitious. The argument that neutrality was not a 
legitimate choice was now so well established by many that it was argued there was only a binary 
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choice between war and invasion. Though some papers argued that that a binary choice 
‘seemed…logical…at a distance’ and the situation more ‘blurred and complex on the spot’ 
(Sunday Chronicle, 11/01/1941, LHMA), most asserted ‘there is no middle course in neutrality’ 
(Yorkshire Post, 15/02/1941, p.6) and that de Valera was ‘still protesting his neutrality in a world 
where such a thing does not exist’ (Daily Mirror, 13/01/1941, p. 2). For most in Britain the only 
solution to the binary dilemma was to join the war because ‘the neutral, in fact, shirks his share 
of the burden of humanity’ (The Times, 17/09/1941, p.5).  
3.3 DEFENCELESS IRELAND  
 
However, if neutrality was considered a priori as being no defence, Eire’s situation was 
further complicated by being, in military terms, virtually defenceless. O’Halpin argues the new 
Irish State had neglected defence for reasons stemming from the experiences of the Irish 
Revolution, which, combined with lack of money and a misplaced faith in the capacity of the 
international community to protect small nations, left Ireland unprotected, to the standards of 
others (O'Halpin, 1999, pp. 92-93). During the inter-war years, the Irish Dept. of Finance ‘saw 
the Irish military as a frivolous luxury’ considering the increase in taxation required to equip it 
more dangerous to the state than threat of invasion (Quinn, 2020, p.5) and by 1938 the Army 
General Staff warned the government that due to financial restrictions the Army was only capable 
of supressing ‘internal disorder’, rather than defending against any external aggressor (Young, 
1993-4, p.7). In the absence of clear mutual defence objectives co-ordinated with Britain, the Irish 
Army, at the outbreak of war, consisted of 7,600 regulars and 4,330 reservists, about 50% of what 
was considered necessary for wartime (Duggan, 1991, p. 179). Government Finance departments 
continued to cut these numbers until Blitzkrieg seemed sure to consume France, but the threat of 
being forced into the war by invasion ended the parsimony of successive Irish governments. De 
Valera approved a ‘Call to Arms’ and numbers increased to 36,730 regulars and 580 reservists 
for the duration of the Emergency (Duggan, 1991, p. 183). The Irish Naval service consisted of 
two Motor Torpedo Boats and grew to ten craft in 1941, and its Air Corps increased to about 
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thirty obsolete biplanes as and when British policy allowed. All the Defence Forces were 
consistently under-equipped and short of ammunition due to the difficulty of gaining supplies 
during wartime. However, the increase in human resources, the one directly under Irish control, 
reflected the seriousness with which the Irish government now considered defence. British policy, 
however, was to arm British Forces first and sell only that which was obsolete or unneeded to 
Eire.  
British opinion on the strength of the Irish forces was affected less by their actual state 
than by expectation of what an Irish Army would be. Paul McMahon argues the Irish Army was 
considered by Britain ‘a weak, divided force, wholly incapable of tackling a German expedition 
and barely able to contain internal unrest’ (McMahon, 2008, p. 322) and HI reported the public 
had ‘no confidence in the powers of the Eire government to resist invasion’ (2/7/1940, TNA, INF 
1/264). Such attitudes ignore the uniting powers of possible invasion, which had helped create a 
sense of unity in Britain under the Blitz but was somehow not expected to create the same unity 
in Eire19. In fact, the ‘Emergency’ did create a unity behind the government, a unity in favour of 
neutrality. By 1942 Britain was being informed that the Irish people tended to regard ‘friendly 
neutrality as something just as good as an active participation’ (TNA, DO 130/28) whilst the Irish 
government confirmed definitively that domestic issues were foremost for them by arguing that 
‘departure from neutrality would break the unprecedented national unity achieved on the basis of 
that policy’ and the ‘supposed dangers of neutrality (are) far less than…our involvement in war’ 
(NAI, DFA Secretary’s Files P14, 05/07/1940). Many Irish also undoubtedly felt that failure to 
allow Eire the resources to defend herself, reflected a continuation of the colonialist sentiments 
of the past20.  
As if to bolster this view, British opinion, in general, ignored Irish arguments and 
preferred to believe in her inability to weather the storms of war. The extent of public fears of 
                                                          
19 As Frank Aiken put it ‘one gun in the hands of an Irishman would be equal to ten guns in the hands of 
Englishmen defending Irish soil’ Quoted in NAI, DFA Washington Embassy File 119, 26/03/1941). 
20 1939 BIPO polls seemed to support this impression by showing 78.21% of respondents were not in favour 
of giving back German colonies after the war and 70.91% would fight rather than give them back (Liddell 
et al., 1996). 
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Irish invasion is best recorded in MO’s ‘A Survey of Public Opinion, July 1940’ which recorded 
expectations of the course of the war among students in Scotland. The survey questioned ‘What 
is likely to have happened to Britain by the end of this year?’, and elicited responses to nine 
statements covering various possibilities, which were to be answered with the reply ‘Yes’, 
‘Probable’, ‘Improbable’ or ‘No’. The statements included possible ‘invasion through England or 
Scotland’, while scope was left for additional predictions or views to be added if desired. The 
subsequent report concludes that 56% felt at least an attempted invasion of Britain probable, and 
34% expected this to be ‘turned out’, whilst 15.5% of responders spontaneously suggested an 
imminent invasion of Ireland and 10% expected that this would be successful, ‘at least in the 
South’ (MO File Report 284 - A Survey of Public Opinion, July 1-16th, 1940). The report exposes 
a significant level of expectation among those actively following the course of the war, that Eire 
would fall to the Nazi’s within the next six months. It also shows that Eire was not expected to 
successfully defend herself, but that the North could be defended by British Forces, as these would 
be superior to Irish directed forces. MO Diarist #5376 articulates a similar opinion when writing 
‘I fully expect that Hitler's invasion of England will make a big feature of Ireland, but the complete 
ignorance, unpreparedness of Ireland, and de Valera's obstinacy & censorship may easily cause 
us to be encircled’ (13/1/1940, MO Diarist 5376). Evidently, Irish leadership, as well as neutrality, 
was considered no defence and those of education and eminence, such as constitutional lawyer 
and philologist Prof. A Berriedale-Keith concurred arguing ‘It is of course patent that Eire is 
utterly unable to guard her neutrality by her own resources, which are negligible against modern 
methods of war’ (The Scotsman, 06/071940a, p.9). MP J Wardlow-Milne21 similarly warned ‘Eire 
is terribly vulnerable…hope of a peaceful and independent Ireland rests upon a victory for 
democracy’ (The Times, 08/07/1940, p.5). Though these arguments held some truth they were 
also exaggerated by assumptions that Germany would attack a weaker neighbour and attempt to 
encircle Britain followed by British invasion or a tighter blockade. Newspapers pointed out Irish 
weakness and the power of Blitzkrieg, arguing ‘the invasion of Southern Ireland stands a ten times 
                                                          
21 He would be part of a group which would bring about a vote of no confidence in Churchill in 1942 
73 
 
better chance of success than any attempt to invade Britain’ due to a small Army ‘destitute of 
experience…(with)…armament…inferior to the armament the Germans could transport even by 
air’ (Dundee Courier, 03/07/1940, p.2). This vulnerability and weakness, added to those British 
common beliefs of Irish inferiority, made it easier for British people to believe that Eire was an 
undefended, vulnerable backdoor to Britain. Though it made little sense that Germany should 
attempt two invasions rather than a simpler one, and it was argued that the British Forces in 
Northern Ireland would undoubtedly step in to repel an Irish invasion, it was still expected that 
the Nazi’s would gain a foothold because Irish Forces were inadequate, and the German Forces 
close to invincible. The Irish government believed in a singular invasion of Britain conformed 
with the shock tactics that were a vital part of Blitzkrieg22, while British opinion argued otherwise, 
noting that that de Valera ‘must realise that Eire is in danger; that Hitler wants Ireland as part of 
his plan to invade Britain ….’ (Liverpool Evening Express, 08/07/1940, p.2). Opinion was 
occasionally so certain that Eire would be overcome that Cassandra predicted ‘the miracle will 
not last’ and that ‘Eire's miraculous neutrality should have a new emblem - a shamrock lightly 
tossed into an open grave’ (Daily Mirror, 02/01/1941, p.4). 
3.4 BRITAIN AND IRISH DEFENCE 
 
However, Britain could not totally blame Irish defencelessness on the Irish, for Britain 
had also long neglected Irish defence, a consideration that also heightened British fears. The Irish 
Free State had been formed in 1922 under the understanding that Britain would continue to 
provide Naval protection, with the new state later taking over this responsibility. For the British, 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 included arrangements that upheld a contested belief that because 
of her strategic position, ‘Ireland was not …a Dominion when it came to defence’ (O'Halpin, 
                                                          
22 Warnock, Irish legate in Berlin, wrote ‘Everybody (here) is agreed…that Germany will endeavour to get 
in a sharp blow on actual British territory…it is thought this would have a shattering effect on…morale…’ 
(NAI, DFA 219/4, 18/05/1940). De Valera argued Hitler would just bypass Eire because he had the coast 
of Norway, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and France from which to launch an invasion of Britain or 
presciently that he might postpone invasion of British isles while he made a move to the East (23/6/1940, 
TNA, PREM 3/131/1). 
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1999, p. 84). Though this position was accepted by the Irish at the time, naval security was not 
taken over by the Irish, and was never discussed, even as the reserved Treaty Ports were returned 
to Ireland in 1938. The 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement had given the Treaty ports, unreservedly, 
back to Irish sovereignty, but with an expectation, not part of the agreement, that Britain would 
maintain Naval Defence and Eire would afford Britain ‘such facilities as required’ during time of 
war or ‘strained relations’. When the new treaty came into effect a government communique on 
the treaty explained ‘no agreement of any kind as to talks on questions of mutual defence has 
been come to or even considered’ (Londonderry Sentinel, 26/04/1938, p.5). Churchill, then out of 
government, fruitlessly regarded the 1921 Treaty, which he had helped negotiate, as binding and 
superseding the right of Ireland, as a Dominion, to neutrality. In October 1939 he believed Irish 
neutrality ‘illegal’ (TNA, FO 800/310), and by April 1940 he was reportedly ‘sick of them’ and 
considered Ireland was ‘stabbing England in the back’ (President’s Secretaries Files, 
Correspondence Ireland 1940, Box 40, Roosevelt Library). However, Churchill was not yet Prime 
Minister and his opinions, which often showed initial belligerence to Ireland, shortly followed by 
more sobering second thoughts23, were offset by better judgement in the Cabinet. Such attitudes 
would continue throughout Churchill’s premiership, and his annoyance at Irish actions bordered 
on the obsessional at times. As Paul Bew has argued, he ‘grumbled furiously at Irish neutrality, 
but he accepted the fact of its existence’ (Bew. 2016, p.148), however his attitudes kept Anglo-
Irish relations on a knife-edge, and did nothing to discourage anti-Irish feeling amongst a populace 
heavily invested in the concurrently growing ‘people’s war’ rationale. 
By 1939, it should have been clear that de Valera saw the 1938 agreement as the last 
barrier to Irish Neutrality, having stated in the Dail that the way was now open to the possibility, 
‘if they could see (any) way to do it’, of supplying Britain with food while staying out of any 
future war (De Valera, 1938), but it was also clear that this gave giving at least the impression of 
                                                          
23 At the loss of the Royal Oak Churchill argued at cabinet that the need for safer harbours was ‘brought to 
a head’ and that Ireland should be told ‘we must have use of these (Treaty) Harbours and intend in any case 
to use them’ (17/10/1939, TNA, CAB 65/1/50). The next day he admitted that he ‘had perhaps overstated 
this part of the case, since other anchorages were available (18/10,1939, TNA, CAB65/1/51) 
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close co-operation with Britain (McCullagh, 2018, p. 150). However, by the outbreak of war, it 
was clear to those who took interest that Eire would be neutral and therefore not be granting the 
use of the former treaty ports, because this would have amounted to an unneutral act. The differing 
perceptions of what ‘close co-operation’ meant to each nation, food exports to Britain from Eire 
to the Irish, and some form of joint defence to Britain, caused a sense of ‘betrayal’ of expectation, 
albeit one never set out in concrete terms, that led to the controversy and heated opinion, despite 
the situation being largely created by British policy.  
As we have seen Eire had neglected its own defence for many reasons, but, if Britain 
continued to argue the defensive indivisibility of the British Isles, Britain was equally culpable, 
suffering from ‘welcome forgetfulness’ (Moulton, 2014, p. 2) about Ireland. Indeed, by 1930 it 
was clear that the British public attitude to Eire was one of indifference, as if the age-old ‘Irish 
Question’ had been solved, and by repressing the past it might not again arise. As A J P Taylor 
so bluntly put it, ‘Men were bored with the Irish Question’ (Taylor, 1965, p. 161). In addition to 
never raising the question of naval defence of Ireland with the new Eire government, Britain sent 
no military attachés or diplomatic representatives to Eire before the 1938 Anglo-Irish treaty was 
confirmed. British and Irish forces later agreed to joint talks held to better the Naval defences at 
Berehaven (R Fisk, 1985, pp. 115-116), yet there was still a tendency to blame the Irish 
government for the impasse. British government documents often betray some dismissive 
attitudes towards the Irish. Maffey described de Valera’s attitude towards upgrading Irish coastal 
defences as ‘like that of a man who declined to insure his house against fire because the idea 
might alarm his wife’ (20/6/1940, TNA, ADM 116/5631), implying de Valera was ruled by fear 
rather than taking careful consideration of potential outcomes. Suspicion of Irish motives was 
frequent, especially after Eire’s refusal of the British offer to consider unification of Ireland, and 
because many leaders of the Irish Army had previously fought against Britain in the Irish War of 
Independence (McMahon, 2008, p. 323). Newspapers had reported that Eire frequently requested 
arms supplies so that they could defend themselves (Sunday Express, 10/08/1941, p.8) but most 
in government agreed it was inadvisable, assuming that arms given to Eire could find their way 
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to the IRA because ‘an Irishman does not like to give back firearms once he is in possession of 
them’ (TNA, PREM 3/129/2). Though the possibility of making Eire beholden to Britain by giving 
them arms, and using this to force concessions on supposed U-boat incursions, had been raised at 
the beginning of the war (West, 2005b, p. 38), by 1940 Malcolm McDonald insisted to de Valera 
that Britain required ‘better assurance that Irish resistance to the enemy would be 
effective…(then) we should be ready to let him have additional arms’, leaving de Valera to ask 
why would it be better to send in equipped British troops rather than just giving arms to the Irish 
troops already in place (23/6/1940, TNA, PREM 3/131/1). Such preconditions were interpreted in 
Eire as an insulting lack of trust coupled with an arrogance that denied an independent state an 
opportunity to defend itself. Evidently British opinion was that the Irish could not be trusted with 
British safety. 
3.5 BRITAIN’S BACKDOOR: INVASION OF IRELAND 
 
For the British Forces invasion of Eire was considered less likely than public opinion 
often argued. In May1940, Admiral Forbes argued an invasion of Eire was possible, but also that 
no such operation against Britain could be mounted without air superiority. He also argued that 
to keep the Northern Atlantic routes open, and protect Eire, a strong Northern patrol and a 
powerful covering force at Scapa Flow provided the best defence, which also covered the Faroe 
Islands, and did not require use of the Treaty ports (S. W. Roskill, 1954, pp. 251-252). After some 
sceptical argument from the Chiefs of Staff, who considered it was ‘highly probable’ that 
Germany wanted bases in Eire from which to attack Britain, Forbes’ policy was agreed. At the 
same time Churchill was undecided, agreeing that invasion by Germany was unlikely (20/6/1940, 
TNA, CAB 65/7/68) but at other times argued an Irish civil war would be advantageous to Britain 
as it would enable Britain to take Berehaven (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 204). That the latter opinion was 
expressed shortly after the Dunkirk evacuations yet before the capitulation of France suggests a 
tendency for fears over Eire neutrality to re-emerge at times of military defeat or setback.  
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This pattern also appears in public opinion with HI and MO sources noting frequent reports of 
rumoured invasion of Eire or invasion of Britain through Eire, mostly between May and 
November 1940, a period characterised by the greatest setbacks to the British and Allied cause. 
Starting with the Dunkirk evacuations and ending with the Battle of Britain, this period was where 
governmental concern over public morale was also at its height. Rumours of invasion of Eire 
appear early on with HI noting rumour gaining such ground that an announcement on Anglo-Irish 
mutual defence was expected (31/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). An MO report characterises June 
1940 as a period of general calm but emphasises the volatility of public morale where people were 
occasionally ‘exceedingly anxious’ and where ‘London consistently shows more anxiety, more 
sudden swings, and potential panics’, with ‘spy scares’ and a particular ‘increase in rumour 
current in early June’ (MO File Report 172 - Morale 3rd June (Misnamed 'Pilot Study on ARP 
Preparedness'), 1940), when it was becoming clear that France would be defeated. Though at 
times ‘very little fear is expressed’ and invasion was often discussed with humour24 (1/6/1940, 
MO File Report 286 - Prediction, Restriction and Jurisdiction, 1940), the defeat of France brought 
about a distinct change. 
 MO report argued that after the defeat of Holland and Belgium a new optimism 
descended, and people felt air raids and invasion were still far away, interpreted as ‘the product 
of our own propaganda’ (MO File Report 172 - Morale 3rd June (Misnamed 'Pilot Study on ARP 
Preparedness'), 1940). Yet a few days later another reported frequent rumour of possible invasion 
of Ireland (MO File Report 254 - 'Morale Today 6/7/1940', 1940) and an MO diarist records a 
discussion with a work colleague who argued ‘I think he'll attack Ireland. That's where the danger 
is - there should never be this "Eire"’ (9/7/1940, MO Diarist 5083), indicating that some felt the 
danger so great as to excuse the denial of Irish independence. Occasionally opinion went so far 
as to portray neutrality as an invitation to invade for both sides, with editorials arguing that while 
the sincerity of Irish assertions that invasion would be resisted ‘cannot be doubted’, a ‘nucleus 
                                                          
24 MO FR 286 ‘Prediction, Restriction & Jurisdiction’ 01/06/1940 noted ‘typical conversation’ on predicted 
40 days of rain. ‘It had to stop - must be fine for Hitler’, ‘Oh yes - he's coming on Friday, isn't he? Mustn't 




Figure 5: First France then Eire (Daily Mail, 06/07/1940) 
 
of an efficient fifth column’ provided ‘an invitation to the enemy’ (Linlithgow Gazette, 
21/06/1940, p.4). HI repeatedly evidenced expectation that Germany would violate Eire’s 
neutrality (17 & 28/6/1040, TNA, INF 1/264), and newspapers could not countenance any option 
for Eire other than either letting either Britain take over Eire’s defence or have Germany invade, 
because Eire represented such ‘an obvious invitation to German invading forces’ (Manchester 
Evening News, 08/07/1940, p.2).  
Some argued that Hitler would gain inspiration from the past. The Times first referred to 
the works of Professor Ewald Banse suggesting these inspired the Nazi’s (The Times, 22/07/1939, 
p.11). Banse predicted a long hard-fought war against the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (The Times, 
13/01/1940, p.5) which would achieve Hitler’s aims (The Times, 23/12/1939, p.5). By June 1940 
letters to the Editor argued Banse’s 1934 plan, which included a landing on Merseyside from 
Ireland, could be the basis for a 1940 invasion (The Times, 04/06/1940, p.4). The Banse plan was 
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wisely suggested as a blueprint for invasion in various newspapers25 and encirclement by invading 
simultaneously from France and Ireland became the expected method used to overcome the 
RAF’s continued air superiority over the channel26. This also seemed more plausible given 
popular opinions of Irish defencelessness, the IRA, and Nazi spies in Eire, alongside isolation of 
Britain as the last remaining opponent of Nazi Germany. HI reflected expected attack from the 
west almost as soon the BEF returned from Dunkirk with reports in the southeast that ‘many think 
Hitler will invade first Eire and then Cornwall’ (8 & 11/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264), though this 
may also have been wishful thinking that the invasion land in someone else’s back garden. 
Newspapers spuriously argued de Valera was aware of plans to send 50,000 Germans from Spain, 
joining with the IRA to overthrow the Irish government (Lancashire Daily Post, 13/06/1940, p.5). 
Where such speculation is offered as a news article it is unsurprising that HI reports note rumours 
of invasion of Eire across the four Home countries throughout June and July (18,19,25,27/6/1940 
& 6,8,9/7/1940,  TNA, INF 1/264). In this febrile atmosphere German Radio propaganda 
‘devoting an ominous ammount of time to Ireland’ (Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 24/06/1940, 
p.4) was interpreted as ‘indicating an early German air invasion’ (6/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) or 
a diversionary tactic from other action (Birmingham Post, 06/07/1940, p.4). Public letters to the 
press often argued that Eire’s delusion on neutrality was caused by an inability to see that the 
danger from Germany was far worse than any old tyranny experienced at the hand of Britain 
(Aberdeen Press & Journal, 11/07/1940, p.2), once more implying neutrality was based on a 
hatred of Britain.  
There were some more nuanced understandings of Eire’s position regarding invasion. 
Though The Times argued that the concept of neutrality had been a war casualty, it nevertheless 
argued Eire did have the geographical advantage of British protection denied to the fallen neutrals 
                                                          
25(Birmingham Daily Gazette, 03/02/1941; Daily Record, 03/02/1941; Daily Record, 10/05/1941; Daily 
Record, 15/02/1941; The People, 04/08/1940; Sunday Mirror, 01/06/1941)  
26 General Student, CIC of German Airborne Forces, had recommended an airborne diversionary attack on 
NI alongside British invasion (Lidell-Hart, 1948, pp. 229-230) but it is unlikely this scheme was ever more 
than a personal idea of Student’s (Blake, 1956, p. 155note 1). This was discounted as NI was now home to 
previously unknown numbers of British Forces personnel (Blake, 1956, p. 157). A purely airborne invasion 
was attempted in May 1941 with huge losses in Crete, after which the airborne division was disbanded.  
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stating ‘if help were needed to meet a German invasion, it would be neither belated nor 
ineffective’ (The Times, 13/07/1940, p.5), effectively conceding the Irish stance had some 
validity. Other papers agreed Eire’s position on the edge of Europe made neutrality more viable 
because ‘hitherto neither of the major belligerents needed her to outflank the other’ (Yorkshire 
Post, 08/01/1941, p.2) or more to the point, the Nazi’s invasion of Britain through Eire would 
‘be…a case of doing a very difficult job twice over’ (Dundee Courier, 13/07/1940, p.2). Another 
more rounded view argued Eire held other geographical advantages due to her mountainous and 
boggy landscape, underdeveloped road system and a lack of natural resources or supplies of use 
to the invader (Manchester Evening News, 25/03/1941, p.4). A number also argued ‘the will of 
the Irish people’ would not only ensure dogged resistance (Manchester Evening News, 
25/03/1941, p.4), but also to make Eire ‘a hornet’s nest for any invader’ (Portsmouth Evening 
News, 26/09/1940, p. 2), doubtlessly reflecting memories of the Irish War of Independence. A 
Sunday Express article, on the ‘land of mystery’, acknowledges that its readers probably knew 
little of the new nation, but well argues the Irish point of view, noting Eire would not, as things 
stood, enter the war due to the possibility of losing her independence and because she believed 
her forces could hold back German invaders long enough for British troops to come south from 
Ulster (Sunday Express, 10/08/1941, p.8). The Scotsman similarly argued Eire was relying on 
help from Ulster and ‘Mr de Valera knows this and is well content to let things be’ (The Scotsman, 
26/11/1940, p.4). This analysis has subsequently proved to have been the basis for de Valera’s 
high-risk, tightrope strategy of neutrality, designed to make invasion of Eire as fraught and as 
costly as possible to any invader (NAI, DFA Legal Advisors Papers, 07/02/1940). However, 
despite the existence of some understanding of Eire’s position and sensibilities, most opinion did 
not accept Eire’s nuanced scheme of defence as valid. 
However, with the passing of time, and despite ‘Considerable exasperation over Eire's 
attitude’ (13/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264), ‘interest in Irish question greatly decreased’ (30/7/1940, 
TNA, INF 1/264). Indeed, by August there was some indication that people were being complacent 
and believed ‘fairly widely’ that ‘invasion (of the British Isles) may be indefinitely delayed’ (1 & 
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2/8/1940, TNA, INF 1/264), while by September ‘there is less talk now of the invasion of Britain 
through Eire’ (6/9/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). The subject becomes less prominent in contemporary 
sources thereafter. By October 1940 possible invasion through Eire excites less comment and 
morale reports for Home Intelligence note no ‘particular interest in Eire this week…(and) its 
significance seems to have receded in the public mind’ (MO File Report 439 - First Weekly Report 
For Home Intelligence October 1940, 1940). Nevertheless, HI morale reports kept a section 
opened for comment on public opinion on Eire until the end of the war, though these often 
contained no comments, until the ‘American Note’ crisis of 1944. 
Notwithstanding, occasional invasion rumours still occur in other sources, though these 
often indicated an expected invasion, by Britain, to force the of use the former ‘Treaty’ ports or 
prevent a Nazi takeover. Some opinions suggested that ‘the excuse …that Britain was restrained 
by regard for legality will be taken as the final proof of feebleness in high places’ (MO File Report 
165 - Notes on the Present Morale situation and Morale Today, 1940), and that ‘if Eire stands up 
to us, we should annex her, as Germany does with the small countries who stand in her way’ (MO, 
FR 486 - Sixth Weekly Report for Home Intelligence). Such action, it appears, would have been 
acceptable due to distrust and the unpredictability of Ireland’s course. Reading a newspaper story, 
soon proved false, of an offer to Ireland from Hitler, and despite conceding ‘It may be historic 
justice if we have to pay up for our past record in Ireland and items like the Black and Tans’, MO 
diarist #5376 still chooses to believe the thesis of the article, that ‘our danger from Eire remains’ 
(13/1/1941, MO Diarist 5376). The same diarist later worried about the significance of American 
troops in Ulster, wondering ‘Is invasion considered to be likely then? The Irish might help the 
Nazi's rather than the hated English’ (26/1/1942, MO Diarist 5376). This welcoming of US 
soldiers coincided with a rumour ‘that it had been discovered that Germany had used air bases in 
Ireland to bomb Liverpool’ (MO FR 1165 - Morale in February, 1942). That such rumours gained 
some currency is an indication of both the fear caused by distrust of Irish motives, and an 
ignorance of current political, social, and military conditions within Eire, where neutrality was a 
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popular and enduring policy. For some MO contributors fear of Irish incompetence, invasion and 
possible betrayal remained a tangible and enduring concern. 
HI reports note rumour of impending invasion of Eire in January 1941 deduced because 
of air-raids in Merseyside (14 & 29/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292) though by now this caused ‘no 
serious anxiety’ because of ‘complete confidence in our ability to deal successfully with such an 
adventure’ (29/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). By March there were rumours that ‘Eire is about to be, 
or has been, invaded’ (5/3/1941, TNA, INF 1/292) no doubt fuelled by continuing press 
speculation that Britain would be encircled. An editorial interpreted the release of German 
propaganda film ‘My Life for Ireland’ as Hitler’s ‘preliminary move to establish Nazi justification 
for the “protection” of Eire’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 21/02/1941, p.6). It has been argued that 
‘Hitler would not have hesitated to invade Ireland, had he thought it worth the risk’ (McCullagh, 
2018, p. 198) but the risks outweighed the benefits (R Fisk, 1985, pp. 225-226), and some 
contemporary opinions agreed. However, this did not affect the dismissive tone detectable in most 
comments on Eire. A typical article agreed with the Irish attitude that an Axis invasion of Eire 
‘would be suicide’ but could not resist adding the caveat that if Eire gave up her neutrality she 
would become ‘a wealthy and happier nation with permanent security guaranteed’ (Daily Record, 
30/05/1942, p.3), implying that Ireland was still deluded, backward and unstable nation on the 
brink of disaster and requiring the guidance of Britain or the Allies. The future for Eire was 
continually interpreted as dangerous, penurious, dependant and self-imposed.  
3.6 BLACKMAIL, UNITY AND BLOCKADE 
 
In addition to popular feeling that Eire was dangerously reliant on Britain and Ulster for 
defence, it was also asserted that de Valera’s government was using the circumstances of war to 
force an end to Irish partition by blackmail. Early reports on Eire’s stance reflected the progress 
made with the 1938 Agreement which settled all outstanding disagreements with Ireland except 
partition. Some suggested that ‘agricultural interests’ in a neutral Eire better disposed towards 
Britain ‘were making efforts to expand their industry for our mutual advantage’ (Liverpool 
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Evening Express, 21/11/1939, p.2), and could therefore help feed Britain if blockaded. However, 
at the same time the War Cabinet had requested the Lord Chancellors opinion on the possibility, 
legality, and effects of expelling Eire from the Commonwealth. Notwithstanding the ill-feeling 
felt by some over Irish neutrality, the Law Lords concluded that having Eire outside of the Empire 
would cause more difficulty than having them neutral within it (7/11/1939, TNA, CAB 67/2/30). 
The Dominions Secretary, Eden, also pointed out that pressure on Eire was ‘likely to affect 
detrimentally the interests of this country either directly or indirectly’ and could seriously damage 
relations with the other Dominions (20/11/1939, TNA, CAB 67/2/53). Opinion was divided within 
the War Cabinet on the level of threat caused by Eire but did not blame the threat on neutrality, 
because the US was also neutral, but still considered helpful. Similarly, the public felt ‘growing 
hostile criticism of the 'selfish' attitude of America’ (20/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264), yet Irish 
neutrality appeared to be judged differently from the neutrality the US, who traded arms with the 
Allied belligerents, and Switzerland, which provided trade and economic services to Germany. 
For Eire, it was suggested, their neutrality was illegal, illegitimate, irresponsible and a product of 
either self-deception or blackmail against Britain, so much so that it was considered a positive 
danger that required effective, and justified, action.  
It was the refusal to co-operate in a joint Defence Committee for both parts of Ireland that 
caused indignation to transform into accusations of blackmail. Before this refusal Cranborne had 
recommended the War Cabinet maintain the Anglo-Irish trade commitments made with the 1938 
agreement and avoid any action which ‘would tempt Eire further in the direction of economic 
self-sufficiency’, thereby threatening food supplies to Britain (16/8/1940, TNA, CAB 67/8/20). 
However, after the refusal of defensive co-operation, suggestion of an Irish blockade becomes 
progressively louder. HI in Belfast noted a mixed reaction on joint defence and reflected 
speculation that Malcolm MacDonald’s mission to Dublin had included discussion on partition 
as well as defence (1/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). In fact, both Craigavon and de Valera had insisted 
on pre-conditions before any talks could take place that were inimical to the other side, with the 
result that refusal to talk was considered in Belfast as ‘banging the door on any proposals for a 
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united military command of Ireland’ (05/07/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). In Edinburgh HI 
consequently reported ‘renewed anxiety about Ireland’ blaming both Irish leaders. Craigavon was 
considered an ‘obstacle to agreement…on joint defence’ (5/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) and 
newspapers pointed out his obstructionism creating unnecessary and intolerable pre-conditions 
on joint defence (Dundee Courier, 03/07/1940, p.2). Cassandra, in The Daily Mirror argued there 
was ‘bigotry and contempt for Eire’ bordering on ‘a religion’ from which any deviation ‘aroused 
his bitter hostility and hatred’ (Daily Mirror, 03/07/1940, p.4). While acknowledging the 
difficulty of reconciling such inimical neighbours (The Times, 08/07/1940, p.5), many 
newspapers argued both Irelands should settle their differences and co-operate, at least on 
defence. For the newspapers both Ireland’s were acting illogically, yet predictably, with one 
adding that to expect anything else would be ‘false to tradition’ (Coventry Midland Daily 
Telegraph, 09/07/1940, p.4). However, most argued the danger to Britain was so great, and Eire 
so vulnerable, that it should be de Valera who should make a ‘spontaneous gesture’ (The Times, 
08/07/1940, p.5) to Britain and Ulster.  
By 12th July HI reported the impasse between North and South was accepted as ‘an 
insuperable obstacle’ in Belfast and yet in London there remained much anxiety over both 
Irelands (12/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). As Ulster had demonstrated her loyalty to Britain, attitudes 
began to stiffen against Eire. With some arguing that as a commonwealth member Eire was ‘under 
the clearest obligation’ to work with Britain, and that the right of Britain to enforce this obligation 
‘is beyond doubt’ (The Scotsman, 06/07/1940a, p.9), it became a repeated that ‘de Valera is 
making use of our war difficulties to exploit his seeming opportunities’ (Western Mail, 
29/11/1940, p.5) and charging Irish unification as the price of her co-operation. An offer including 
a promise of potential unification was turned down in secret (5/7/1940, TNA, CAB 66/9/31), Paul 
Bew has argued that  this offer ‘is no clearer sign of the desperation of Britain’s position’ (Bew, 
2016, p. 147), and the Irish government insisted ‘Neutrality was not entered upon for the purpose 
of being used as a bargaining factor’ (NAI, DFA Secretary’s files A2, 11/07/1940), it was still 
considered that de Valera ‘would have liked Northern Ireland thrown in’(Evening Dispatch, 
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08/11/1940, p.4) with any deal on co-operation. The desperation of the British position was felt 
keenly, and refusal of the offer served only to bolster opinion that Eire was determined to do 
anything to avoid co-operation with Britain. One paper spoke for most when it argued ‘Eire is a 
poor, bitter, hopeless little part of an island’ and if the obstinate and stupid de Valera ‘won't listen, 
be damned to him. The Allies must …defend Ireland’ (Sunday Express, 11/01/1942, p.4). Such 
feelings also inspired newspaper correspondents to threaten Eire, with one insisting that ‘a 
reckoning must come, not by force of arms’ but by cutting supplies because ‘the lives of the 
British sailors, lost off the Irish coast, demand that’ (Southern Reporter, 26/12/1940, p.3). For 
some ‘blackmail’ over Irish neutrality served to prove Ulster’s worth. Pointing out that de Valera 
‘in effect’ wanted to neutralize NI, a letter to The Times argued the value that Ulster presented to 
British defence would be unlikely to be ‘any less in 20 years’ time’ (The Times, 22/11/1940, p.5). 
Another suggested he had now lost ‘all chance of securing a United Ireland in the lifetime of any 
living man’ (The Times, 20/11/1940, p.5), emphasising that Eire’s stance was not only blackmail 
but also injurious to her own interests.  
 
Figure 6: Irish Stubborn mules (Daily Mail, 10/01/1941) 
With Craigavon’s death it was felt ‘any possibility of it (a united defence) now seems to 
have vanished because of Mr de Valera's stubborn policy of neutrality’ (The Scotsman, 
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26/11/1940, p.4), and by 1943 it was argued Eire had ‘not fully realised what it had lost’ in proving 
the strategic worth of Ulster, but had also ‘forfeited, in considerable part, that American goodwill 
upon which they have heretofore relied’ (Evening Standard, 21/04/1943, LHMA).  It soon became 
a bugbear for many that political action against Eire would be impossible, other means of 
influence, or punishment, were considered. Eire had, knowing she was economically dependent 
on sales to Britain, embarked on rationing and autarkical policies in preparation for either the fall 
of Britain or blockade from any quarter. As Kathleen Paul has pointed out it was, after all, 
necessary as ‘the fact of economic dependence made the proclamation of political independence 
all the more imperative’ (Paul, 1996, p. 122), making Eire able to, with some degree of possible 
success, have her political voice heard in war time. Though newspapers suggested better 
economic relations might lead to better political outcomes (Liverpool Daily Post, 26/061940, p.2), 
many began to point to Eire’s reliance on imports as a potential means to demonstrate what they 
would lose, arguing ‘If Hitler wins the Irish will lose everything - even their traditional right to 
disagree with everybody’ (Liverpool Evening Express, 08/11/1940, p.2). An exchange of letters 
in the Yorkshire Post illustrates public attitudes by arguing over the economic relationship 
between the two countries. One writer argued Britain should consider what ‘we have given de 
Valera’ including  providing 90% of Eire’s trade and ‘keeping’ 500,000 Irish workers (Yorkshire 
Post, 15/11/1940, p.6), while it was up to other correspondents to point out that neither were 
‘given’ or ‘kept’, but constituted ‘something (Eire had) to sell which suits us and profits us to 
buy’ (Yorkshire Post, 18/11/1940, p.2); a trade which would not have taken place were it not 
‘beneficial to both parties’ (Yorkshire Post, 19/11/1940, p.2). Eire was therefore not beholden to 
Britain for this trade beyond the terms of payment but was considered by some to be ungrateful 
all the same, including by some in government who considered Ireland benefitted from goods 
protected by the Royal Navy. Because Eire had long availed of an informal agreement with Britain 
over the use of British ships to import goods, Churchill, and some in the cabinet, thought it 
possible to pressurize Eire by denying shipping space, while plausibly denying that this was 
punishment because it was reasonable to expect British needs to be served first. After de Valera’s 
final confirmation, in November 1940, that the Treaty Ports would not be given to the use of any 
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belligerent, Maffey, who had previously been understanding and conciliatory of the Eire 
government, now reported de Valera was ‘in a position of dictatorial power’ and that his ‘first 
interest is himself’. Suggesting that ‘no country in the world will react more readily to economic 
pressure’, he recommended Britain should publicly blockade Eire or at least pay prices which 
made agricultural sales uneconomic, prompting Churchill to sound out the effects on Britain of a 
secret blockade (22-23/11/1940, TNA, CAB 66/14/2). When these proposals were considered at 
the War Cabinet Cranborne argued a denial of shipping space would make the Irish recognise that 
the use of the Treaty ports was mutually beneficial, and Woolton at the Ministry of Food agreed 
this would force Eire to negotiate on Britain’s terms (5/12/1940, TNA, CAB 66/14/2). Though the 
exchequer and the board of Trade reminded the cabinet of potential detriment to British coffers, 
Churchill sounded out military advice on the practical effects of losing Irish coast-watching and 
cable facilities (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 1175). By the 5th of December it was already arranged between 
the British government and the major oil companies that sales of petrol to Eire would be 
deliberately kept low, and that Eire was not to be told of this arrangement, despite the fact that 
such supplies could not be used by German operational aircraft or U-Boats (5/12/1940, TNA, CAB 
80/24 ). By the end of the year, it was arranged that Norway and Greece would be similarly 
prevented from using British ships if they did not prevent their own ships supplying Eire 
(30/12/1940, TNA, CAB 66/14/23). The secret policy of effective blockade was begun on the 2nd 
of January 1941 and, it was felt in the War Cabinet, that this had ‘been achieved without their (the 
Irish) being able to feel that we have deliberately subjected them to pressure’ (19/3/1941, TNA, 
CAB 66/15/37). However, it was soon clear that British public opinion was not fooled.  
Almost as soon as the secret blockade was enacted newspapers began to interpret the new 
policy of Navicerts as confirming that Eire was ‘feeling the pinch’ (Gloucestershire Echo, 
02/01/1941, p.3), speculating the Irish were starting to believe in their economic reliance on 
Britain, which would lead to the leasing of the ports (Yorkshire Post, 03/01/1941, p.2). British 
public rumour circulated that Irish petrol shortages were ‘due to deliberate British Policy’ 
(22/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292) and newspapers argued the Irish believed ‘rightly or wrongly, that 
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we are putting a sort of economic screw on because we haven't got the ports’, citing Churchill’s 
speeches on the Treaty ports and a press campaign against Ireland as corroborative evidence 
(Newcastle |Journal, 04/02/1941, p.4). However, it was not so clear to the Prime Minister that the 
intention ‘to make southern Ireland realise how great a wrong they were doing to the cause of 
freedom by their denial of the ports’ (17/2/1941, TNA, PREM 3/128) was having the expected 
effect. The Chancellor, Kingsley Wood, argued ‘the operation was making Eire progressively 
more uncomfortable’ daily and that ‘Eire will very possibly come to us in three or four weeks’, 
the report of which was appended the handwritten cursory note ‘press on’ from Churchill 
(20/2/1941, TNA, PREM 3/128). By September seven months later, Churchill was still asking 
Wood ‘But is the medicine working?’ (10/9/1941, TNA, PREM 3/127). The effect of the informal 
blockade was only to drive Eire to more rationing and self-reliance, spurring the government to 
more extensive state control of the economy and trade, on a par with many of the wartime 
measures in place in Britain. Rather than finding that ‘being Sinn Fein - Ourselves Alone- has 
distinct disadvantages’ (The Scotsman, 04/04/1941, p.4).  Eire was learning the extent of its 
economic powers of self-government.  
Even as grain production and manufacturing for the home market grew, and visitors to 
Eire were still reporting plenty of food in Irish shops, reports on ‘public opinion in Eire’ still 
argued the Irish man ‘correlates the inconveniences which he has suffered with the war’ rather 
than his countries ‘absolute dependence’ on Britain (30/9/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). However, by 
November 1943, after Lord Woolton’s warnings of a worldwide food shortage, there were some 
questions raised on British policy towards Eire. A letter to The Times pointed out a ‘catastrophic 
fall in the volume of Irish supplies of food to this country’ caused by a fall in imports to Eire of 
fertiliser, animal feed, fuel and spare parts from Britain, and that this, coupled with and a 
restriction in prices paid to below the market level in Eire, conspired to stop a trade in foodstuffs 
worth £20 million annually, mostly to Britain at a time when it was needed most (The Times, 
04/11/1943, p.5). That Eire had not come to terms over the Treaty Ports, or starved, tended to 
evidence the argument that her attempts to ameliorate the effects of the blockade had worked. 
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Nevertheless, the argument that ‘the people of Eire must learn…that they can have no social or 
economic future outside the natural orbit of the British Empire and the United States…’ (Sunday 
Express, 12/03/1944, p.4) carried on, implying the country’s independence unviable and 
upholding the supposed prospect of an unwilling re-integration into the UK. 
3.7 FORCING ASSISTANCE ON EIRE 
 
Though there was initially some understanding of the Irish position in government, it was 
clear by the end of 1940 that the public could only assume the worst about Eire, even as the 
expectation of a British invasion decreased. An MO report on the ‘Immediate International Uses 
of Mass Observation’ indicates the ease with which interference in a foreign sovereignty was 
considered. The reporter assumes an aerial invasion of Eire is likely and argues it would benefit 
Britain that she know if the Irish people and their government were at odds over neutrality, so 
that Britain could embark on propaganda to destabilise the Irish consensus on neutrality (MO File 
Report 225 - Immediate International Uses of Mass-Observation, 1/6/1940). Public opinion soon 
proved less subtle. By the 3rd of June MO notes that ‘excess of regard to legality’ was considered 
as hindering the war effort and the first target of a new, necessary ‘toughness’ should be Eire (MO 
File Report 165 - Notes on the Present Morale situation and Morale Today, 1940). Though 
newspapers sometimes encouraged mutually agreed action on Eire’s defence ‘if Mr de Valera but 
says the word…’ (Daily Record, 02/07/1940, p.6), most began to argue that ‘assistance’ should 
be forced on Eire for the good of Britain. Churchill had by then already considered direct action 
on Ireland by asking Ismay, his military attaché, to consider the benefits to Britain should Eire 
plunge into Civil War because of German invasion (Gilbert. 1993a, p.204). The Daily Mirror 
asked, ‘are we going to take the lead in Ireland?’ urging that ‘we do not want to wake up tomorrow 
to find that Ireland is in German hands, and that Mr de Valera has done his best and failed… the 
nation will not tolerate another disaster through lack of foresight and initiative’ (Daily Mirror, 
06/07/1940b, p.5). The failures of the BEF in France created expectation for pre-emptive moves, 
especially after the impasse between Craigavon and de Valera on a united defence plan became 
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known. Alternatives were suggested, as the Irish could not agree, including that ‘Imperial Forces 
should at once be sent to Eire, notwithstanding the technical breach of Eireann neutrality that that 
would involve’ (Yorkshire Post, 08/07/1940, p.2). The next day public opinion feared that because 
de Valera wanted a neutral, united Ireland Britain should send in troops with or without consent 
(9/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). Letters to the editor began to encourage invasion ‘to remove the 
danger’ because ‘if we do not (invade) then Hitler will’ (Coventry Midland Daily Telegraph, 
13/07/1940, p.4). Others acknowledged that British troops would be unwelcome but failing to see 
that any foreign troops would also be anathema, suggested an ‘international Brigade’ (Daily 
Express, 22/04/1940, p.4).  
In Ireland such newspaper reports on Irish vulnerability were interpreted as a campaign 
to force an end to neutrality, and the rejected offer of a proposed end to partition was expected to 
cause more vehement argument (NAI, DFA Secretary’s Files P14, 05/07/1940). These stories 
coupled with news that a Swiss Intelligence officer had informed Britain that Ireland and Iceland 
would be invaded by Germany on the 15th of July, convinced Walshe, the Eire Chief Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, that the campaign contained ‘all the tricks and wiles which they (Britain) 
commonly use against small peoples…’ (NAI, DFA Secretary’s files A2, 15/07/1940). By August 
Walshe was asking ‘has Britain guaranteed not to invade us?’ and Dulanty relayed Caldecote’s 
assurance that it was ‘no part of their policy to go into Eire unless the Irish government invited 
them’ alongside a refusal to issue any guarantee (NAI, DFA Secretary's Files P5, 09/08/1940). 
Many in the Irish government, comparing the British non-committal response and news media 
stories to those of Germany, concluded, as Warnock did, that German attitudes appeared more 
friendly27 (NAI, DFA 205/420, 20/08/1940). Britain’s refusal to rule out invasion of Eire or to 
curtail newspaper excesses only served to exacerbate Irish fears of re-occupation, and further 
convinced the Irish public that neutrality was protecting them. 
                                                          
27 Warnock noted of German newspapers the ‘tone used in reference to Ireland has never been inimical, 
and it has often been very friendly…’ (NAI, DFA 205/420, 20/08/1940) 
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In Britain, by 1941, and despite Britain’s uncertain and reactive policy towards Eire, an 
HI report on postal censorship suggested British public opinion felt the Irish were suffering from 
what the writer called ‘persecution mania’ and a ‘neurotic fear of British re-occupation’ 
(2/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Nevertheless, several press articles appeared which argued that 
forcing Eire into the war would be counter-productive and some argued that neutrality was 
designed to protect and assert Irish independence. One article asserted the Irish people felt keenly 
the pressure from Britain and argued ‘stop trying to push Eire along the way she will not go…this 
is a separate country, and the British have never recognised that’ (Yorkshire Post, 14/02/1941, 
p.2), while another syndicated article argued, as the de Valera’s government did, that ‘if...Mr 
Churchill would make a categorical statement that Britain would not seize the ports or enter Eire 
without invitation, that would have profound affect in improving our relations’ (Newcastle 
Journal, 05/02/1941, p.40. However, these were far from the norm. Yet feeling that the problem 
was caused by misunderstanding occasionally appeared, most notably in a highly unusual public 
criticism that Britain had failed to convince the neutrals ‘of our certainty of ultimate victory’, 
though this did not mention Eire specifically (19/9/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). Letters to the editor 
sometimes argued Irelands ‘same right to proclaim neutrality as…the United States, Portugal, or 
Switzerland’, to be ‘defended by her own citizens on her own soil’ and to be ‘as free and self-
responsible…as are the other Dominions’ (The Times, 20/11/1940, p.5), with one writer believing 
the Irish course to be ‘a short-sighted policy’ but that it had to be accepted in order to avoid further 
problems (The Times, 20/09/1939, p.9). Journalistic visitors argued the British should ‘consider 
how best Eire can be useful’ within their limitations by guaranteeing Irish independence and 
availing of her food exports at reasonable prices (Yorkshire Post, 14/02/1941, p.2). Yet most 
arguments for forcing assistance on Eire did not take such arguments into account with simple 
binary analyses of the impasse being far more prevalent. Some argued that Eire’s reliance on the 
British bulwark between Eire and Germany was unfair and immoral and argued Britain should 
act because ‘they cannot go on indefinitely enjoying all the blessings of peace without making 
some sacrifices’ (Falkirk Herald, 08/01/1941, p.4).  
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Other reasons why Eire should be ‘brought to her senses’ included, foreshadowing the 
‘Plato’s Cave’ interpretation of Irish neutrality, that like a ‘primitive man sheltering in a cave on 
the edge of a volcano…the ordinary man just carries on unthinkingly’ because ‘neutrality breeds 
indifference’, and is relied upon as if it were ‘a magic charm’ (Yorkshire Post, 10/01/1941, p.4). 
Some simply argued that because Germany had proved they would invade other countries simply 
to gain strategic advantage Britain could not be constrained by propriety in such circumstances, 
adding that ‘too much time has been wasted in futile attempts to conciliate the government of 
Eire… (The Scotsman, 15/04/1941, p.4). Many opinions conceded the Irish right to neutrality and 
independent action and argued that British forbearance proved that ‘however much we suffer from 
it…Great Britain abides by her word’ and the Statute of Westminster was ‘a bond…by which we 
shall abide’ (Daily Telegraph, 07/05/1941, LHMA), with some even seeing neutrality as ‘a 
vindication of the freedoms conferred by the Statute of Westminster’ (Western Morning News, 
14/03/1944, p.2). Yet most could not square this view with opinion that Eire ‘seeks to enjoy the 
benefits of neutrality at the expense and to the detriment of their friends in their extremity’ 
(Birmingham Mail, 11/03/1944, p.3). Many felt the Americans, already giving valuable aid to 
Britain in supplies and materiel, though still neutral, and with a large Irish - American population, 
could redress this dichotomy as a ‘big brother to independent Ireland’ (The Times, 10/07/1941, 
p.5; 26/09/1940, p.5; Western Morning News, 15/11/1940, p.2). However, until the end of 1941, 
American neutrality prevented direct intervention in a war zone and in a country unwilling to 
accept such aid. 
3.8 AMERICANS IN IRELAND  
 
American neutrality was not interpreted as harshly as Irish neutrality. Addison and Crang 
characterise British attitudes to all the neutrals, at the beginning of 1940, as ‘wishful thinking’ 
that they would join the war but attitudes to the US, in comparison to those on Eire, were 
benevolent (Addison & Crang, 2010, p. 126), From the outset American neutrality was regarded 
as more reasoned, more representative of the American people, more legitimate, yet still 
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unfortunate and understandable. Early letters to the press pointed out the American history of 
neutrality and isolationism, arguing that America could, and should, only act as American public 
opinion dictated. One letter asserted the US should be allowed time to ‘catch up and express 
itself’, to organise her Armed Forces, ‘then the neutrality law will be changed’ (The Times, 
26/09/1939, p.5). While most argued America should take its share of moral responsibility 
(Liverpool Daily Post, 23/01/1940, p. 4), the history of America and her internal politics were 
accepted as a mitigating factor. Throughout 1940 HI regularly reflected ‘dissatisfaction at 
America’s attitude’ alongside hope that America would ‘help actively’ (6/6/1940, Addison & 
Crang, 2010, p. 85). These reports on the neutral US do not contain expressions of antagonism, 
or hatred, but include expressions of resignation (7/6/1940, Addison & Crang, 2010, p. 91) linked 
to opinion that Roosevelt was doing ‘all that was possible’ and ‘there was little he could do’ 
(11/6/1940, Addison & Crang, 2010, p. 103). Though postal censorship picked up references to 
Britain fighting for freedom on the Americans behalf while they profited from arms sales bought 
with ‘hard cash’ (5/9/1940, TNA, CAB 66/11/39), in general, opinion on the US was far more 
equivocal than that on Eire, with more signs of irritation evident rather than outright 
condemnation28 and threats of action.  
However, as it became clearer that America was changing her Neutrality Laws, HI 
showed more acceptance of US intentions (22/6/1940, Addison & Crang, 2010, p. 143) and 
expectation that the US would eventually join the war (Addison & Crang, 2010, pp. 140, 
193,306,348,373)29. The American declaration of war was publicly welcomed and changed 
opinions on Eire. HI began to reflect suggestions that America could change the stalemate on Eire 
(14/1/1942, TNA, INF 1/292) arguing that protective American forces in Eire would be preferable 
to the Irish people (6/2/1941, TNA, DO 130/28). However, it was plain at the outset that America’s 
entry into the war did not affect the British War Cabinets attitude towards Eire, and despite 
                                                          
28 An article ‘Behind the lines’ suggested irritation at the US while stating Roosevelts condemnations of 
aggression could be recorded to save time ‘if he were to have a gramophone record made’ (Daily Record, 
15/04/1940). 
29 Though one newspaper accused the US as making a fetish of her neutrality (Liverpool Evening Express, 
29/10/1941) as Elizabeth Bowen had done in a report on Ireland to the British Government (9/11/1940, 
TNA, DO 130/28). 
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Churchill’s immediate message to de Valera ‘to say that now was Eire’s chance to come into the 
war on our side and offering to meet…at any time’ (TNA, CAB 65/20/15), the War Cabinet 
concluded on the 19th of the month that this offers refusal was not cause for ‘immediate action’ 
(TNA, CAB 65/20/24).  However, public opinion often expected that the US would pressurise 
Eire into change. Almost immediately after Americas declaration rumours appeared that 
American troops would land in Ireland with HI in Belfast expecting that ‘American troops will 
eventually replace British troops in Northern Ireland’ (11 & 21/1/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). The 
syndicated ‘London Letter’ column argued ‘if the Americans were to ask for bases (in Eire), they 
would certainly have lent them’ (Liverpool Daily Post, 13/01/1942, p.2) and HI reported hopes 
that the Americans would do what Britain ‘hesitated to do’, that is ‘enforce some kind of 
agreement with Mr. de Valera’ (21/1/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). The eventual landing of American 
troops in Ulster was interpreted as a signal of preventative measures against invasion of Eire, 
including possible American occupation of the whole island (26/1/1942, MO Diarist 5376; 
8/6/1942, MO File Report 1306 - Americans in Ireland, 1942; 4/2/1942, TNA, INF 1/292), 
intention to take over the Treaty Ports (4/2/1942, TNA, INF 1/292) or an attempt to allay fears of 
encirclement (27/01/1942, MO Diarist 5338). One MO diarist had once felt the Irish would be ‘as 
ready to kill British as Germans’, but now was convinced ‘there is some hope they'd side with the 
Americans and help repel the Germans’ (27/1/1942, MO Diarist 5447). For many it was now clear 
that such a move into Northern Ireland confirmed suspicion of threat and perfidy from Eire, 
indeed the level of threat felt is reflected by over-inflated estimates of the number of troops 
arriving, with one rumour suggesting three million GI’s had landed in Ulster (1/2/1942, MO FR 
1165 - Morale in February, 1942).  
Newspapers generally agreed that Eire’s position had changed with some suggesting it 
analogous to that of Iceland, whose defence had been taken over by the then neutral US from 
Britain the previous year, even adding that de Valera could not entertain suspicion against 
American troops (The Scotsman, 27/01/1942, p.4) despite his immediate protest in the US that 
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the Eire government had not been consulted on the deployment30. The issue of Irish consent, 
where Iceland had consented to US protection, was often treated as irrelevant in the case of Eire. 
Indeed, this was the stuff of comedy for the Daily Mirror which published a cartoon of de Valera 
in wild protest trapped between a German and an American soldier (Daily Mirror, 29/01/1942, 
p.3). The same paper continued to represent Eire’s choice as a binary one, a month later, by  
 
Figure 7: Ireland's binary choice (Daily Mail, 29/01/1942)  
threatening that the ‘Americans are not inclined to fool with her (Eire) much longer’ (Daily 
Mirror, 02/02/1942, p.4). Public opinion concurred that Irish consent was a moot point, regarding 
de Valera’s protest with ‘contemptuous amusement’ and ‘impatience’ (4/2/1942, TNA, INF 
1/292) and disbelieving that assurance that US soldiers were in no way a threat to Eire should be 
necessary (8/2/1942, MO File Report  79 - Public Feeling About Aliens, 1940). 
The arrival of American troops also bolstered arguments of Irish intransigence, 
foolhardiness, and evasion of responsibility by proving Ireland needed to be protected. In fact, 
US troops had been sent to the place where British Army training had taken place since the first 
                                                          
30 The Irish felt their situation also analogous to that of Persia, a neutral invaded by Britain without consent. 
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days of the war, and thus contained ready infrastructure for use by new recruits. It was also 
expected to prove no problem to the Ulster people who were regarded as loyal enough to welcome 
US soldiers with open arms, and indeed many were billeted in private residences31. Despite 
several reports that relations between British and American troops and American troops and 
Ulster locals were strained, such reports were interpreted as minority opinion. According to the 
Regional HI officers ‘there is a total absence of hostility towards the Americans among the 
civilian population’ despite rumour that Americans were saying ‘we have come to win the war’ 
and causing street fights (11/2/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). An exhaustive MO report on Americans 
in Ireland reported ‘On the whole, American prestige is high…and the Americans are generally 
liked’ but went on to state that the higher pay of the GI’s, their alcohol consumption, their 
‘sophistication’ and ‘tendency to almost unwittingly look down on the locals, and maybe talk 
down to them’ caused antagonism. This antagonism is excused as being due to ingrained 
prejudices in the Ulster people, and where the Protestant majority were supportive as these forces 
as a bulwark against ‘the constant fear of Catholic (Nationalist) trouble’, and the Catholic minority 
are ‘largely antagonistic’ due to the presence of any foreign soldiers. Adding that American 
ignorance of sectarian tensions created a situation where ‘vicious’ propaganda against them could 
spread quickly beyond ‘the more ordinary and normal-minded approval shown by the majority’, 
the writer nevertheless concludes that ‘no-one could have done what the Americans have had to 
do without generating some antagonism…the amount…is much less than might have been 
anticipated’ (8/6/1942, MO File Report 1306 - Americans in Ireland, 1942). Such explaining 
away of antagonism reflects a tendency to see the Irish people as the cause of the problem while 
minimalizing the effects of major social dislocation. Though there was also similar evidence of 
disquiet at the presence of American troops in Britain, alongside knowledge of their affect in 
Ireland, disquiet in Ireland was explained by familiar cultural expectations of the Irish people. 
Though postal censorship from NI revealed people were apprehensive at the presence of GI’s 
because ‘they are not a bit like our nice British Soldiers (8/12/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30) and that others 
                                                          
31 Though publicity of this fact was regarded, in Ulster, as ‘a direct invitation to the enemy to bomb 
civilians’ (11/2/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). 
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were ‘sick of the way this country has kowtowed to America’ (MO File Report 1481 - Morale 
Report in October 1942, 1942), these feelings were often explained as rumour ‘deliberately spread 
by the IRA’ (4/6/1942, TNA, INF 1/292) thereby demonizing the holding of such opinion. 
3.9 NORTHERN IRELAND AND DEFENCE  
 
It was also plain that for the British government Ulster was interpreted by many as being 
the saving grace against a wholly neutral Ireland, with no British bases from which to protect the 
Northern approaches to Britain. Indeed, in Belfast it was argued that ‘if De Valera had his 
way…all Ireland would be neutral, disarmed, and helpless’, and that Britain should send in troops 
to prevent a German invasion with or without Irish consent (9/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). However, 
British public opinion on Northern Ireland itself was not so clear. HI reports suggest that attitudes 
in Northern Ireland were regarded, in contrast with those in Eire, as ‘clear cut’ in their support for 
the War, even suggesting that the Sectarian divide was closing by observing most there felt 
‘Catholicism should not be regarded as evidence of disloyalty’ (28/10/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). 
However, the same report argues Craigavon to be highly criticised and suggests that despite 
attestations of Northern Irish loyalty, bigotry against the south was occasionally suspected of 
working against British interests. For some, the undertones of Craigavon’s rhetoric pointed 
towards greater pride in proving Northern loyalty to the UK, in opposition to Eire, rather than in 
winning a war in the cause of morality (Woodward, 2015, p. 15). Postal censorship reports 
certainly reflected that some in NI positively relished the prospect that after the war Eire, ‘Dev. 
and co. will find themselves on the doorstep (of the Empire), with the door shut on them’, with 
one writer recording ‘I hope so at any rate’ (8/6/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). One of the first British 
Forces in NI commanders quickly characterised the leadership of Ulster as being ‘so fanatically 
Orange as to be almost unbalanced’ and suggested they must compromise with Eire ‘otherwise 
there is every possibility of Eire…. making no resistance when invaded’ (Huddleston, 
14/06/1940, LMHA). Huddleston’s was a minority view, and he was unsurprisingly, within a 
month, removed to the Governor-General ship of Sudan, but his words show a frustration with 
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Unionists not unlike that of those as impatient with the Southern Irish. MO diarist #5116 similarly 
argued that ‘English people easily forget’ or did not know that in NI ‘the Catholic minority are 
oppressed and no one except the 'mad' Irish raises a voice’ (07/08/1941, MO Diarist 5116). It 
often appeared the distinction between the two cultures of Ireland, ‘Unionists…hard-headed, 
realistic, practical; the other, dreamers, idealists, impractical to the point of foolishness…’ 
(Kennedy, 1988, p. 183), often used to assess the motives of all Irishmen, was losing its power 
with greater familiarity.  
Though many Forces personnel in NI reported interactions with the Northern Irish in 
friendly terms, one found them ‘very funny towards us’ until the locals realized his unit would 
not ‘do a bit of damage to the town’ (Cotter, 1944, IWM). Others were more condescending. One 
MO diary records a returning soldier describing Ulster people as ‘living in feudal times...just one 
or two big shots and all the rest are a lot of perishing peasants. The writer’s assessment that this 
attitude reflected merely ‘good-humoured contempt’ (02/1942, MO Diarist 5236) perhaps 
indicates that he had already heard a lot worse attitudes towards the Irish. Others still were openly 
derisive recounting sabotage and attacks on Forces personnel, confirming NI as ‘not all friendly’ 
(31/01/1941, MO Diarist 5076). Many may well have agreed with an American pilot who 
concluded his reminiscences of Northern Ireland with ‘"Ireland for the Irish" and they can keep 
it for my part’ (Schulze, 1944, IWM).  
A British narrative formed resenting continued lack of Conscription in Ulster, and 
asserting NI was not pulling her weight in the war effort or being obstructive by putting sectarian 
issues first. Though the first exclusion of NI from the effect of the Military Training Act (1939) 
was generally accepted, with newspapers arguing, as did the government, that it would cause 
difficulties out of proportion to the value of the 2000 men involved’ (The Scotsman, 02/05/1939, 
p.8), by June the next year HI in Belfast reports ‘disquiet’ over attacks on the NI government for 
‘alleged weakness in war effort’ causing ‘unnecessary alarm’ (11/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). The 
second time conscription in NI was raised similar reactions emerged with newspapers urging 




Figure 8: Mules on the same track (Daily Mail, 6/7/1940)  
 
to create fresh trouble for ourselves nearer home’ (Perthshire Advertiser, 28/05/1941, p.4) 
‘Apathy’, NI governmental ‘lack of drive’, and sectarianism were blamed for continuing Ulster 
unemployment in postal censorship reports (1/2/1940, TNA, CJ 4/30). NI newspapers carried 
numerous letters to the Editor refuting such ‘weakness’, arguing that conscription was supported 
in NI but denied by the British Government, and bemoaning that the British did not understand 
NI. One letter decries another which stated ‘British workers do not know the difference between 
Orangemen and the Irish Republican Army’ arguing the MOI should inform them (Northern 
Whig, 11/11/1940, p.4). Postal censorship also revealed denial of conscription had made Ulster 
people that 'if the government does not want or need us, we are just as well where we are’ 
(1/8/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). Indeed, it was clear that some correspondents in Ulster were unafraid 
to declare that their stand against the South had been instrumental in saving Britain from herself. 
Alluding to the 1938 Agreement several letters to the press argued ‘Where would England be 
today if she had given Ulster up to de Valera…’ and urged Britain to never give up ‘her valuable 
bridgehead in Ireland’ (Northern Whig, 11/11/1940, p.4). Others spelled out successive British 
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governments ignoring the advice of Ulstermen and concluded that ‘if present distresses do 
something to counteract English prejudice against accepting Ulster views on Irish matters, it will 
be of advantage in the future’ (The Times, 14/11/1940, p.2). One letter argued it was ‘only Ulster's 
foresight in fighting Home rule that has saved Britain’ (Belfast Newsletter, 15/08/1942, p.2). This 
blame game continued throughout the war, and parallels, to a large degree, the tendency to blame 
Eire for her problems, and shows Ulster to blame Britain for hers. It was not unusual to tar Ulster 
with the same ‘Irish’ brush when it suited British sensibility, or for Ulster to proclaim her right to 
self-government from Britain when it suited hers.  
Criticism of Ulster, which HI reported ‘rather marked at one stage’ due to continuing 
industrial unrest and unemployment, began to decline in June 1942, due to the new NI PM Basil 
Brooke who had successfully lobbied for more war industries to be located in NI. However, the 
volatility of public opinion was evidenced by feeling that the traditional total stoppage of factories 
for holidays in NI was a wasteful extravagance ‘in view of the war situation and the urgent need 
for munitions and supplies’ (14/7/1942, TNA, INF 1/292), and by reports of visitors to NI feeling 
‘those blasted Irish drift around in civvies doing jobs that girls are doing in England’ (1/8/1942, 
TNA, CJ 4/30). Northern Irish people frequently referenced high unemployment in postal 
censorship reports (TNA, CJ 4/30) and indicated resentment of southern workers deemed to be 
waiting to take the job of anyone who volunteered for the Forces (8/12/1942, 30/8/1943, TNA, CJ 
4/30). By 1944 the result of these resentments, a wave of strikes, caused greater British public 
indignation, with HI reflecting ‘irritation and indignation to a state of mind bordering on despair’ 
with the overwhelming majority being against the strikes, regarding the striker’s obduracy as a 
refusal to help Britain (28/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). Such impatience, and readiness to blame the 
‘Irish character’ for their actions, reflects the same assumptions of ‘Irishness’ against Ulsterman 




3.10 BOMBS ON IRELAND 
 
Reaction to bombing of Ireland indicated an ability to turn all news of Eire against the Irish. 
Initially, the Irish were castigated for avoiding bombing by declaring neutrality, but nevertheless, 
when bombing occurred, neutrality was also interpreted as the cause of this; by not being in the 
war, by not choosing a side and by not benefitting from British protection, Eire had brought this 
on herself (Yorkshire Evening Post, 04/01/1941, p.4). When German planes bombed Dublin in 
1941 a newsreel commentator noted this was ‘the price to pay for sitting on the fence' (Pathe 
News: Germans Bomb Dublin, 1941), ignoring that the price of belligerence, as had been proved 
in Britain, would have been much more of the same32. Neutrality was portrayed as a provocative 
act, that stepping aside was an invitation for bombing, with one newspaper squarely blaming de 
Valera, who ‘for all we know he has no greater desire for German domination than for a return to 
British rule. He has, however, been going the right way to invite it’ (Western Morning News, 
28/08/1940, p.4). One paper even suggested the bombs fell because Eire had rejected offers from 
Germany to help regain the Treaty ports if these were taken by Britain, and from Italy that they 
would ‘have the support of the Roman Catholic world if they were attacked’ (News Chronicle, 
13/01/1941, LHMA). A cartoon suggested this was a precursor to invasion and suggested by 
continuing to refuse defence co-operation both Ireland’s were waiting to be crushed (British 
Cartoon Archive, Evening Standard, 30/08/1940) (Figure 9 below). British public opinion was so 
unsympathetic to Ireland as to blame her for her own bombing. The expedient of relying on Britain 
for her defence was also interpreted as inviting destruction by British bombs used to drive out the 
enemy in the event of invasion ('Foresight', 1941). Thus, Eire could not be allowed to think she 
could have her cake and eat it, and she would be bombed in every eventuality. 
Others interpreted the bombings as Nazi ‘terrorism’ designed to keep Ireland neutral 
(Yorkshire Evening Post, 04/01/1941, p.4), and insisted ‘They (the Nazi’s) intend to keep her so 
                                                          
32 HI special report on Eire from a competent observer, confirmed by Postal Censorship reports, argued the 
heavy bombing of English towns has aroused great feelings of horror in Eire, but the Irish popular reaction 
was ‘look what would happen to us if we handed over the ports’ (11/12/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). 
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if they have to bomb every Irishman out of his home to prove it’ (Daily Record, 01/06/1941, p.9). 
Others doubted Irish resolve would survive the bombings, with newspapers and public 
characterising the bombings as designed to ‘frighten Eire out of any resistance’ (Dundee Courier, 
01/06/1941, p.2). However, most saw the bombings as proof of an impending invasion, despite 
the tiny number of bombs affecting only civilian targets. The Daily Sketch argued nobody would 
believe Goebbels insistence that the bombs were British, and that Germany intended to invade 
Eire to bring the convoys from the States within Germany’s reach, now making Eire's position ‘a 
vital and imminent problem’ (Daily Sketch, 02/06/1941, LHMA). Others similarly over-reacted 
to ‘the recent visits of German aircraft to Eire may be in the nature of reconnaissance’ and that 
the ‘country is important in the battle of the Atlantic and the peril is the nature of Germany's need’ 
(Yorkshire Post, 09/06/1941, p.2). Popular opinion in Northern Ireland felt bombing ‘a test of its 
reactions, or alternatively an attempt to intimidate de Valera’, and even that somehow ‘the IRA 
will exploit the bombs to strengthen the case for union, and consequently the neutrality of the six 
counties’ (8/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). An MO diary reflects private opinion of the same type that 
the bombing was ‘a preliminary to a quarrel as a pretext for invading Eire. He (Hitler) wants to 
ring the U.K. round’ (3/1/1941, MO Diarist 5039). 
           
Figure 9: Cross-cultural Invitation to invasion (Evening Standard, 30/08/1940)  
103 
 
Fear of deception or traitorous behaviour by the Irish resulted in little sympathy for 
Ireland, though it was a neutral nation bombed by Germany like Belgium, Holland, Denmark and 
Norway, whose bombing was condemned. David Gray, the US Ambassador to Eire, it appears 
from a reply by Walshe, insinuated that the bombings were not protested loudly enough by the 
Eire government, thereby leading him to assert the Irish were duped into believing the bombings 
were accidental. As Walshe subsequently argued the bombings were not condemned as a ‘wanton 
deliberate act because…. such was not the case, (otherwise) the tragedies would have been far 
greater…’ (NAI, DFA Secretary's Files P48A, 1941). Though the Irish government successfully 
gained an apology and compensation for the accidental bombing, caused by Luftwaffe 
navigational confusion33, British public opinion, in general, remained influenced by 
preconceptions and prejudices against Irish neutrality. Newspapers in general interpreted the 
bombings as at the very least an opportunity to re-assess neutrality and take a side (Western Mail, 
28/08/1940, p.4). Some opinions were even so antagonistic as to revel in the bombing of Eire; HI 
reports on postal censorship argue that English, Scotch, Welsh and Northern Irish letter-writers 
all agreed the bombing a good thing, ‘that will teach them to co-operate with us’ (2/1/9141, TNA, 
INF 1/292).  
Another bombing attack, this time on Rome, was protested by de Valera, on the grounds 
that, as a symbol of religion and as a sacred city that could never be rebuilt, Rome should be 
spared blanket bombing by both sides. De Valera’s appeal had mirrored that of the Pope, whose 
appeal, it was considered, would fall on the Germans deaf ears. HI recorded criticism of Mr de 
Valera's joining in the appeal to spare Rome (4/4/1944, TNA, INF 1/292) and MO Diarist #5088 
considered the request ‘useless’ and added the Pope ‘should have stopped the war at the start’ 
(13/3/1944, MO Diarist 5088)34. Harsh assessments of the appeals by Pope and Taoiseach are 
                                                          
33 The North Strand bombings in Dublin were subsequently blamed on British attempts to deflect direction 
finding radio signals (“The Battle of the Beams”) used to guide Luftwaffe bombers to their targets (Carter, 
1977, p. 85). However, the technology used was not able to deflect the signal from one target to another 
and could only limit reception (Robert Fisk, 24/01/1999). The bombing of Dublin was therefore accidental. 
34 Some were more sympathetic to the Pope’s dilemma. MO Diarist 5116 noted, on the Popes message of 
condolence to Mussolini on his son’s death, ‘The average person’s idea (in England) of the Pope is queer. 
They forget that the Pope can only take sides when religion and freedom are assailed’ (7/8/1941, MO File 
Report 2134 - State Managed Pubs in Carlisle, 1944). 
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evident in Irish Postal censorship which revealed divided opinion where some felt it ‘a shame 
bombing such a beautiful and sacred city as Rome no matter what the military objective’ but 
others, echoing the general tone of British opinion, condemned the ‘hullaballoo’ in Eire adding 
that this was hypocritical when de Valera had ‘remained silent when Warsaw, Belgrade, 
Coventry, St Pauls, Canterbury etc. were ruined’ (8/9/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). MO recorded that 
most agreed that the appeals were to be ignored when Rome was a legitimate military target, 
though some admitted sorrow that this was the case, ‘only a very few were totally opposed’ and 
‘The Pope's message on the subject had little effect on feeling... (MO File Report 1882 – 
Fortnightly Bulletin (13)). A BIPO poll revealed how far British, and Irish were apart revealing 
84.32% approved and 8.03% of respondents disapproved of the bombing (Liddell et al., 1996). 
For British opinion it appeared the frustration of the enemy topped all other concerns, so much so 
that raising an alternative opinion was to invite attack or condescension. 
3.11 THE TREATY PORTS 
 The question of the Treaty ports, within the empire but part of a Dominion legally able 
to decide their own policy, came to exemplify the problem of neutral Eire in World War Two, but 
the issue was not initially so divisive. The 1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement was welcomed in general, 
and few voices, besides Churchill’s, remarked on the impact this would have on British Naval 
defence. However, as war seemed to be becoming inevitable, newspapers began to address the 
issue, though the ports exact significance proved controversial. By February 1939 newspaper 
editorials cited an ‘awakening to the danger of (the Irish) position in the event of war’ but this 
‘awakening’ was not due to fears for British defence, rather the paper argued the cost of the ports 
was an economic burden that Eire would regret accepting (Western Morning News, 18/02/1939, 
p.8). This writer was less concerned at any danger posed to Britain than the burden they would 
prove to Eire and did not believe the ports defensively vital. 
 Indeed, Naval defence and the Treaty Ports were not initially considered problematic by 
the British government. Maffey initially argued de Valera’s ‘task will not always be easy, but he 
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is possessed of tact, common sense, and a welcome freedom from preconceived ideas’ (The Times, 
28/09/1939, p.15). Canning argues that Maffey was initially ‘convinced that de Valera was 
already bending Irish neutrality as far as possible under the circumstances’ (Canning, 1985, pp. 
249-250) and argued enforced use of the ports would end the passive support of the Irish 
government and her people (24/10/1939, TNA, CAB 65/1). Sanger argues Malcolm MacDonald, 
sent to try to persuade de Valera to reconsider neutrality, similarly ‘considered that Irish neutrality 
had been very benevolent towards Britain’ and appreciated the ways in which Eire gave valuable, 
secret help. MacDonald later argued Eire would have been immediately invaded by Germany if 
the ports were given to Britain (Sanger, 1995, pp. 199-200). Maffey’s stance would not practically 
change throughout the war, but frustration changed his attitudes, and those of others, as the war 
progressed.  
 Initial military policy on the treaty ports generally fell in line with the Director of Plans 
at the Admiralty who argued ‘the use by our forces of Berehaven and Lough Swilly would be a 
considerable convenience but is not vital…the prohibition to all submarines is acceptable if 
effective. If ineffective it is to our disadvantage’ (19/9/1939, TNA, ADM 1/10366). It was disbelief 
that Eire would or could guarantee this protection of their waters which fuelled many assertions 
that Britain should have the bases at almost any cost. The difference of opinion was also 
encouraged by the rival conceptions of what the ports represented for each country. The return of 
the ports, which Churchill described as a ‘lamentable and amazing episode’ (Churchill, 1948, p. 
249), represented for Eire a step towards achieving the country’s territorial integrity, but 
represented for Britain protection of Britain’s trade and lifeline to the US. This was of no interest 
to Eire while she was developing her own economic and political values and could reasonably 
feed her own population. As Blake argued ‘Except under conditions of direct invasion, the 
strategic interests of Eire and those of the United Kingdom were no longer identical’ (Blake, 1956, 
p. 45). Thus, the threat of invasion brought these differences of significance to a head.  
As Blitzkrieg consumed much of Western Europe in the Spring of 1940, the chiefs of 
Staff committee argued the loss of Berehaven was ‘curtailing the range of convoy escorts to the 
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west’ and that ‘Irish neutrality works to the advantage of the Germans’ (30/5/1930, TNA, CAB 
66/8/13). The issue was hotly contested at cabinet, as the shock of Blitzkrieg caused many to fear 
that which they could no longer control in Eire. Though the Germans now controlled the Southern 
approaches to Britain, and an alternative route through the North channel into the Irish sea was in 
use (S. W. Roskill, 1954, p. 349), the argument continued. By August the Admiralty argued that 
because ‘these bases being made available is practically entirely dependent on enemy action’ but 
‘a strong possibility of enemy attack on Ireland still exists’, plans should be made to consider the 
Foynes area as a new fleet base (20/8/1940, TNA, ADM 116/5631). Clearly, contingency plans 
had to be made should the tide of war require further action35 but in September the cabinet 
dismissed the issue once more because ‘the additional military commitment…(required)…simply 
could not be accepted’ (S. W. Roskill, 1954, p. 351). Nevertheless, CIGS John Dill argued the 
risk of poor relations with an Irish government might precipitate ‘all possible action short of open 
hostilities against us and short of an invitation to the Germans’, but that cost of this would be 
acceptable were Britain to gain the Ports (Dill, 04/12/1940, LHMA). Dill, unable to trust in Eire’s 
ability to handle her own affairs without endangering Britain, found it acceptable to sacrifice Irish 
sovereignty for doubtful British gain. Governmental indecision and lack of consensus on the 
Treaty Ports caused repeated flashpoints of fear and uncertainty to arise, and in the circumstances, 
it was excusable that the Irish often feared the worst36. At such a time when fear of invasion was 
at its height and public opinion was apt to accept that Blitzkrieg had succeeded in part because of 
Fifth Columnists, it was easy to believe in the perfidiousness and obstinacy, if not stupidity, of a 
nation popularly believed to be a constant thorn in the side of Britain. That Eire was seeking the 
best outcome for itself while avoiding loss of sovereignty, was thus perceived as working against 
British interests.  
                                                          
35 Martin Gilbert notes that to re-route Britain's Atlantic trade along more secure routes, various bases were 
under consideration by the Chiefs of Staff, including the Canaries (Spanish), and the Azores and the Cape 
Verde islands (Portuguese). The Chiefs of staff believed that the 'most valuable base' would be Gran Canaria 
(Gilbert, 1993b, p. 389). 
36 Maffey asked Walshe if he believed re-occupation by Britain possible, to which Walshe replied ‘…I felt 
sure it was going to take place’, yet Maffey insisted Britain keep up the pressure on Eire (NAI, DFA 
Secretary’s Files A2, 18/10/1940) 
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The Ports issue came to an early public flashpoint after publication of a story in the Daily 
Mirror, headlined ‘Britain Buys Bases in Eire’, argued Britain had outmanoeuvred Germany by 
getting her blow in first and ensuring ‘Any plans which Germany may have had for an attack 
through Eire have been check-mated’ after Britain had paid 50 million pounds to regain air and 
sea bases returned by the 1938 agreement (Daily Mirror, 11/05/1940). Archival sources indicate 
the story was based on rumour which was assumed to be correct merely because it was passed by 
the censor, but The Mirror was informed by the MOI, watchful of the delicate position of Anglo-
Irish relations, that it was not the censors job to check the newspapers sources (11/07/1940, TNA, 
DO 35/1107/12) but rather to censor information injurious to security37. Though the story was 
retracted it served to create potential leasing of the bases as a new theme. By July the Birmingham 
Post was suggesting that Eire’s budget deficit would be aided by the leasing of Ports (Birmingham 
Post, 08/07/1940, p. 2) and several papers argued that the USA had leased other ports, and this 
had not affected their neutrality (Dundee Courier, 09/11/1940, p.2; Liverpool Daily Post, 
06/11/1940, p.2), though it was highly unlikely that bases in Canada and the Atlantic, or the USA 
itself, could be bombed so easily as Eire. The Mirror article did not consider Irish neutrality 
compromised by any lease, while other editorials agreed arguing Britain was merely seeking ‘to 
resume use of two or three Irish naval bases that were hers till two years ago’ (Dundee Courier, 
09/11/1940, p. 2), as if the 1938 Agreement could be abrogated simply by necessity.  
The 1938 agreement was also being retroactively recast by some as the first act in the 
appeasement policies which led to Munich, once more highlighting parallels between Eire and 
Germany. Editorials and Letters on the ‘folly’ of the 1938 agreement (The Scotsman, 10/07/1940, 
p.9; 24/03/1941, p.6) connected this to the ‘Guilty Men’38 narrative emerging as a response to the 
                                                          
37 In an indication of how blasé government attitudes were towards Irish sensibilities at this time Duff 
Cooper, head of the MOI, argued such articles were undesirable, yet understandable because newspapers 
‘having sent a special correspondent out to Eire…had to make use of the stuff…brought back with him’ 
(TNA, DO 35/1107/12). 
38 ‘Guilty Men’ (1940) by ‘Cato’ described Dunkirk as a campaign lost before the troops took the field, 
who were let down by a generation of politicians who vacillated, appeased, and refused to face up the 
dangers of the Axis powers. This interpretation was held in by some in the forces – Montgomery later wrote 
responsibility ‘lies squarely on the shoulders of the political and military chiefs in the years before the 
war…that campaign…was lost in Whitehall…and this cannot be stated too clearly or too often’ 
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disillusionment of the public with the political establishment that supported Appeasement 
(Evening Dispatch, 03/10/1943, LHMA). Letters cast the ports loss ‘a first-class political 
blunder’, ‘unwisely surrendered’ (The Scotsman, 10/07/1940, p. 9) ‘without any conditions or 
guarantees whatsoever’ (The Times, 20/11/1940, p.5), and ‘a capital error’ (The Scotsman, 
06/07/1940b, p.9). Though some papers lamented ‘our self-created handicaps…and Eire seems 
to be in the front rank of them’ (Evening Dispatch, 03/10/1943, LHMA), most newspaper 
comment considered only the immediate situation which they felt necessitated the Ports use, 
despite the invasion of sovereignty this represented. Turning the blame on the Irish Cassandra 
argued a refusal of the Ports was seeking, in the face of an almost invincible, powerful, and 
immoral enemy, ‘a solution in the downfall of the British Empire’ (Daily Mirror, 07/11/1940, 
p.4), proving it became more popular to believe Irish stubbornness had created this problem rather 
than British error. MO at this time recorded ‘considerable indignation about Eire's…refusal to 
allow the use of her ports’ merging this opinion with existing prejudices on ‘the traditional 
'difficultness' of the Irish people’ (8/11/1940, MO, FR 486 - Sixth Weekly Report for Home 
Intelligence). One Newspaper represents the most reductive of attitudes by simplifying the Irish 
position, arguing ‘it comes back to the same old story; the Southern Irishmen still distrust the 
British (and) with customary Irish cussedness they refuse to recognise that our victory is theirs’ 
(Aberdeen Press & Journal, 18/11/1940, p.2). By the end of 1940, the belief in Irish ‘cussedness’ 
almost totally obscured the possibility that Britain had helped create the impasse over the ports. 
It was also increasingly suggested that the Irish were ignoring the threat that blitzkrieg 
represented. Though the British forces understood that ‘demoralisation’, due to the psychological 
effects of blitzkrieg on soldiers, was a vital part of the success of blitzkrieg tactics (Fennell, 2019, 
p. 112), popular British opinion showed signs that demoralisation had travelled home with the 
survivors from Dunkirk. The combined losses of the early war, and de Valera’s November 
confirmation that the Treaty Ports would never be given over to any belligerent power, created 
                                                          
(Montgomery, 1958, p. 49). The public tended to agree that their sacrifices were mitigating the mistakes of 
Thirties’ governments (Calder, 1991, p. 125). 
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the conditions where danger in Eire was so great as to excuse resort to the annexation tactics 
employed by the enemy. On the day that the Daily Express front page story confirmed de Valera 
had declared that as long as his country remained neutral naval bases would never be handed over 
to Britain ‘in any circumstances or any conditions’ (Daily Express, 08/11/1940, p.1), MO 
recorded ‘feeling that …if Eire stands up to us we should annex her, as the German's do with 
small countries which stand in her way’ (8/11/1940, MO, FR 486 - Sixth Weekly Report for Home 
Intelligence) and a week later ‘a great deal of comment in favour of forcibly taking the ports 
which we needed…’(15/11/1940, MO FR 493 - Seventh Weekly Report for Home Intelligence). 
While a few noted the refusal a ‘tragedy’ for Anglo-Irish relations, as well as ‘unchristian and 
unjust’ (Bath Weekly Chronicle and Herald, 23/11/1940, p.15) most reacted with anger and threat. 
Churchill deplored the ‘complete banishment of the British Navy from Irish territorial waters’ and 
newspapers and readers took up this distaste arguing ‘Eire should be told…that we insist upon 
having the use of these ports immediately (and) in the event of refusal…Eire must be prepared to 
take the consequences’ because  ‘in fact, though not intent, he (De Valera) is an ally of Hitler, 
because of the advantages he gives to Hitler and the handicaps he imposes on us’ (Portsmouth 
Evening News, 07/11/1940, p.2; 08/11/1940, p.2). One writer more concisely put it that Irish 
neutrality was ‘impossible’ and that ‘those who are not with us are against us’, thus the Irish bases 
should be taken for the duration (Yorkshire Post, 13/11/1940, p.2). Another correspondent, clearly 
expecting Irish perfidy, wrote ‘I hope that we have made it absolutely clear that if he (De Valera) 
permits a German landing…we should at once…assert the rights so unwisely surrendered in 1938’ 
(The Scotsman, 10/07/1940, p. 9). By the end of 1940 it did appear that, as argued by the Irish 
government, some British newspapers had indulged in a campaign to arouse public indignation at 
the Irish stance. Indeed, a Daily Record news article entitled ‘Outcry for Eire Bases Grows’ argues 
that ships attacked off the north-east Irish coasts could have been saved by ships or planes from 
Western Irish bases but offers no evidence of any ‘Outcry’ or indeed it’s growth (Daily Record, 
04/12/1940, p. 2). On the same day Sir John Dill, CIGS, suggested to the War Cabinet that Britain 
should ‘have it put about in America that here was America sending us aeroplanes and arms, 
which were for all practical purposes being sunk by de Valera’ (Dill, 04/12/1940, LHMA), an 
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exaggeration which was adopted by many in popular discourse. A few months later public anger 
had grown, and at least in one writer, was convinced that refusal to engage in war was ‘almost in 
the same category as an actual attack emanating from Eire territory’ (Tuohy, 08/02/1941), 
evidencing the pervasiveness of the argument it engendered.  
Newspapers argued de Valera was wilfully relying on neutrality that was ‘valueless 
without the protection of the British Navy’ (Liverpool Daily Post, 08/07/1940, p.2). Some argued 
‘Mr de Valera presumes on our protection (and) rewards it by the rejection of even a business 
deal’ evidencing the flippancy with which some regarded the threat of punitive bombing if Eire 
leased the ports to Britain (Evening Dispatch, 08/11/1940, LHMA). It was also considered that 
Eire’s security would be increased by British occupation (Daily Telegraph, 13/11/1940, LHMA) 
and some argued Britain was acting with great leniency towards a nation which owed her freedom 
to Britain and yet ‘not lift a finger to help in the only way she could’ (The Scotsman, 19/03/1941a, 
p.9). Some also believed a plebiscite would prove the Irish wanted the British back in the 
contested ports (Rochdale Observer, 14/12/1940, p. 2), while others accused de Valera of a ‘fear 
and cowardice’ in believing the Irish could not bear the type of bombing attacks that had occurred 
in Britain (The Times, 09/01/1941, p. 7). Yet those with experience of Ireland argued that ‘It must 
be realised that in the minds of people here there is no feeling of having let England down, no 
admission that England can make demands as of right and justice’ (TNA, PREM 3/128) and thus 
it often appeared that what British people thought the Irish believed, rather than what the Irish 
actually believed, was basis enough on which to form an opinion.   
 Pressure to allow the use of the Ports, before supposed inevitable German invasion, 
continued into 1941, with occasional voices arguing that Eire was aware of her situation and was 
handling it as ‘a matter of high national principle’ (Yorkshire Post, 10/01/1941, p. 2). Indeed, by 
January 1941 a former US Ambassador to Eire was arguing that de Valera’s fine balancing act 
between the belligerents was working well, would last longer than most thought, and was ‘an Irish 
problem for Irish solution’ (Daily Telegraph, 12/01/1941, LHMA). However, on the whole 
opinion on the Treaty Ports generally considered de Valera ‘short-sighted and thoroughly 
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obstructionist’ and ‘implacable’ (Birmingham Post, 13/01/1941, p.2) and rumours of impending 
British troop movements to take the ports persisted (26/01/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). The issue was 
supposedly urgent enough for one magazine to suggest ‘a substitute for Air bases in Ireland’ the 
creation of floating ‘unsinkable’ platforms in the Atlantic off the Eire coast (Anon, 22/03/1941), 
a solution surely more expensive, if not impossible, to implement, than defending the ports against 
German and Irish opposition. However, towards the end of the year 1941, after postal censorship 
reports had shown ‘very little modification of feeling, however, over the question of ‘the ports’ 
in Eire’ (26/03/1941, TNA, INF 1/292) and that ‘the majority of writers are still against’ leasing 
the ports at all (16/07/1941, TNA, INF 1/292), MO still reflected the occasional rumour that ‘We 
intend to invade Southern Ireland very soon’ (MO File Report 775 - Morale Reports Fifth Weekly 
Report New Series - Rumour & Careless Talk, 1941).  
 By 1942, and the landing of US troops in Ulster, impatience at the lack of the ports 
seemed to be still prevalent, and newspapers argued ‘the Americans...will certainly display less 
of that tenderness for which the British are known in their dealings with small peoples’ and would 
soon ‘have something drastic to tell Mr de Valera’ (Harrogate Herald, 04/02/1942, p.5). An 
exchange of letters in The Times shows that the issue of the Ports was still of psychological 
significance to many despite the lack of progress on the issue and the expectations of action from 
America. However, correspondents now began to argue more how to apportion blame or to justify 
the actions of 1938, than the possibility of imminent invasion. Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord in 
1938, put the case that the Treaty Ports were indefensible against a hostile Eire while Britain 
upheld its continental obligations, and argued the same function could be achieved by ‘non-Eire 
bases, trusting to improved anti-submarine measures and to the longer-range modern destroyers’ 
(The Times, 04/02/1942, p.5). Deeply unpopular in government39, Chatfield’s letter prompted 
argument exemplifying the deep rifts caused by the loss of the ports, but also gave the impression 
                                                          
39 On the request of Lord Chatfield to use official records for his memoirs, Churchill noted ‘No man has 
more need to fear investigation of his record than Lord Chatfield, who shamefully failed to state the naval 
case against his giving away the Irish bases. Moreover, he was a sailor who prolonged his official life after 
he had left the Navy by building up credit with the advocates of appeasement. If it comes to a fight, he is 
going to get pretty knocked about’ (M Gilbert, 1983, p. 1122 footnote). 
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that Chatfield’s argument was now accepted, at least by readers of The Times. Immediately, arch-
unionist MP Prof. DL Savory, who consistently argued Irish neutrality illegal, reminded Chatfield 
of the clause in the 1921 Anglo-Irish agreement allowing the use of Irish Ports ‘in time of war’ 
and argued if this had not been abrogated ‘the neutrality of Eire, with all its dis-advantages, would 
have been rendered impossible’ (The Times, 05/04/1942, p. 5). He further agreed that ‘the 
perfectly fatuous abandonment of the ports in Eire has cost us thousands of lives and hundreds of 
ships’ and recalled Ulster's contemporary disgust in 1938 (The Times, 09/02/1942, p.5). Other 
correspondents related an ‘immediate improvement in Anglo-Irish relations’ due to the return of 
the ports and as a result ‘Irish public opinion is by no means so neutral’ (The Times, 13/02/1942, 
p.5). Some argued that other factors, such as the inter-war reduction in the size of the British fleet, 
had some influence (The Times, 13/07/1940, p.5). One stated that Savory had missed the point of 
the 1938 review that the ports were a liability without Irish co-operation (The Times, 11/02/1942, 
p. 5); 14/02/1942, p.5). To conclude the exchange, former head of the civil service Warren Fisher 
argued that charges that Chatfield was ‘a man of Munich’ were ‘unfounded’ and ‘indefensible’, 
and that any charges on the Irish Ports issue ‘had been disposed of’ (The Times, 03/03/1942, p.5). 
Though this exchange suggested most Times correspondents accepted Britain had made the best 
of a bad situation, still HI recorded more rumour, perhaps by this time reflecting wishful thinking, 
that US forces ‘are to size the vital ports of Eire when the time for definite action arrives’ 
(27/08/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). The level of discourse on the Treaty Ports had greatly diminished 
by the end of 1942, but the controversy did not by any means die, and where it did appear, it was 
equally abrasive in tone. 
  In 1943 it was clear that public scorn over the loss of the Ports had diminished in 
frequency but not in tone. The Topic does not emerge in HI reports or MO after 1943 but remained 
an occasional subject in newspaper correspondence. Despite the passage of time proving that Irish 
neutrality could last, was popular at home and was not an invitation to invade that Hitler could 
not pass up, occasional voices still argued the loss of the Ports caused lives to be lost in the 
Atlantic. An unusually vitriolic letter from a ‘Torpedoed Shipmaster’ to The Times related a ships 
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Captains charge that Eire ‘is traitors land’ and argues any other British sailor would agree that 
‘the policy which withholds from us the use of the South Eire bases…has doomed numbers of 
men to death by exposure…’ yet assures the reader his argument is only with the Irish 
government, not the Irish people, one of which saved his men by sending the distress call (The 
Times, 18/05/1943, p.5). Another writer, not wishing to belittle the sacrifices of the War of the 
Atlantic, pointed Eire was not traitorous because the Statute of Westminster legalised Dominion 
neutrality, and because the Ports ‘were returned unconditionally’ (The Times, 22/05/1943, p.5). It 
seemed that the charge that Eire had effectively drowned British sailors in the Atlantic simply 
could not be affected by the diminution of attacks on Eire. By the end of the year newspaper 
correspondents were still confidently arguing that the ports should have been taken ‘by force if 
necessary’, and comparing the current war to the previous, asserting that there was nothing to stop 
the perfidy of U-boat landings ‘especially as de Valera is more of an enemy than a friend to us’, 
as if nothing had changed in the inter-war years (Western Morning News, 23/12/1941, p.2).  
3.12 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Though most contemporary British concern was of an impending invasion of Britain, 
Eire, throughout the war, was considered dangerous for many reasons and at different levels of 
intensity. The most virulent opinion appears to emerge strongest at times of military setback or 
diplomatic conflict. In general, British public attitudes were ‘expressions of contempt for, and 
impatience with, the policy of Mr de Valera's government…(with)…very little sympathy for their 
afflictions, nor any understanding of what causes them’ (12/02/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). This was 
also a time when public opinion seemed to lurch between periods of optimism and feelings of 
helplessness, localised hysteria, irrational behaviour, distrust of government, and characterised by 
talk of the possibility of a negotiated peace (Mackay, 2013, p. 77). Fear of the unknown made it 
easier for people to choose to blame other ‘enemies’ who would provide a safe outlet for anger as 
well as a soft target. However, this did not mean that the information was not available to dispute 
that understanding. Despite the problems caused by the need for secrecy created by benevolent 
114 
 
neutrality toward Britain, which Donal O’Drisceoil terms ‘the double game’ (O'Drisceoil, 1996, 
p. 292), there is plenty of evidence, publicly available, which would justify a level of 
understanding of Irelands neutrality. Instead, public opinion often chose to believe the worst of 
Ireland, de Valera, and the Irish.  
Initial public reactions, at the outbreak of war, were sometimes accepting and 
understanding of Eire’s right to neutrality. Reflecting this mood, the British government was 
determined to push neutrality to its limit to gain concessions for Britain. However, as Blitzkrieg 
consumed Western Europe, the needs of British defence, while continuing to uphold the values 
so violently destroyed by the Nazi’s conquer, caused no change in her policy, but considerably 
more vehement argument. Many appeared to believe that Eire would end neutrality in the face of 
the Nazi’s despite repeated evidence that the Irish government was confirmed in its policy and 
that the Irish people supported it. Public opinion frequently condemned Irish neutrality as no 
defence thus endangering both islands, some interpreting it as delusional and soon to be proved 
worthless. Even as it became clear Britain would not be invaded while the RAF was unbeaten, 
fears over a ‘stab in the back’ from Irish territory persisted. Anger was at its height in November 
when a final, unequivocal refusal, under any circumstances, to allow the use of the Treaty Ports 
by any belligerent, was issued by de Valera. As a result, because of annoyance at this apparent 
suggestion of equivalence between British and German intentions, the problem began to morph 
towards a binary choice for Eire between joining the war or being invaded by Germany. 
‘Irishness’ had become politicised as becoming everything that the newly emergent Britain did 
not aspire to, Ireland was becoming Anti-Britain despite ancient and continuing ties. Eire was 
now considered to be shirking her duty, positively inviting invasion, and by her inaction aiding 
the German war effort. The threat of invasion was perceived as so high that most saw Irelands 
geographic advantage of being within the range of British defence capabilities, as no guarantee 




Public opinions on the troublesome Irish did not tend to address the longstanding neglect 
of the issue of Irish defence by both governments. The fact that the Treaty Ports required repair 
and modernisation, the cost of which was out of all proportion to their usefulness, as had been 
argued when they were returned to Irish sovereignty in 1938, was ignored by those who longed 
for their return. The Irish army was indeed practically defenceless, sparsely armed, and deeply 
distrusted in Britain, especially those who remembered the ‘Tan War’. Though the Irish Defence 
Forces rapidly adapted to the new need for defence, many British could not accept that these 
changes were enough, enabling the Irish to defend themselves, and the British and American 
governments refused to arm the Irish Forces in case those new arms fell into the wrong hands. As 
the two countries of Ireland could not agree on joint defence initiatives sparked accusations of 
Eire was using her possible entry to the war as blackmail to regain the North, and Ulster of bigotry 
and prioritising Ulster above the interests of the UK. Though Eire consistently denied blackmail 
the impasse over joint defence both proved Ulster’s strategic worth and that other tactics might 
be required to pressurise Eire into change.  
It was commonly accepted that Eire was being effectively blockaded, despite the secrecy 
surrounding governmental policy discouraging oil companies from dealing with Eire, and the 
control of Eire’s shipping with the Navicert system. The unequal economic situation between 
Britain and Eire was commonly seen as a potential weapon though some argued better economic 
relations would benefit Britain itself under a German blockade. The public assumed this was being 
done, as indeed it was, and frequent indications that Eire was ‘feeling the pinch’ emerged, though 
the secret blockade only served to push Eire towards more self-reliance, and more extensive state 
control of the economy. Alongside this assumption many argued that Eire should be forced into 
acquiescence, by arguing that Hitler would only do the same. Pre-emptive invasion was openly 
suggested either by British or international troops, and when Eire requested guarantees that this 
would not happen this was dismissed as ‘persecution mania’ or indicative of a country turning its 
back on civilisation. It was also indicative of the British public attitude to Eire that she was blamed 
for her own bombing, with neutrality being conceptually stretched towards becoming 
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provocative. Though a few felt the bombings were intended to make sure Eire remained neutral, 
most argued they were proof of impending invasion, despite their minute impact. It seemed that 
in British opinion, for Eire bombing was the price of sitting on the fence.  
Neutrality for Eire was deemed cowardly or due to hatred of Britain, but American 
neutrality was generally accepted as unfortunate but valid. The US declaration of war was also 
interpreted as a stick to beat Eire with as the public assumed the Americans landing in their 
training bases in the North would takeover Eire. The arrival of these troops was generally taken 
as proof of Irish perfidy and Irish consent at their landing considered irrelevant. Problems with 
the assimilation of troops in Ulster were often dismissed as being due to Irish bigotry despite 
similar problems arising in Britain, where Americans troops were not excused their indiscretions. 
Indeed, Ulster was not always excused the taint of ‘Irishness’, with many arguing Ulstermen as 
troublesome as their Southern neighbours in their efforts to prove their loyalty to Britain whether 
it helped to win the war or not. The distinctions between the two Irelands, in the British 
consciousness, were beginning to blur, as the lack of conscription, high unemployment and a 
wave of strikes in Ulster began to expose the differences between Ulster and Britain. However, 
in the end, the usefulness of Ulster was proven, and it was rewarded by a commitment by the 
British government to keep her within the UK.  
Controversy over the Treaty Ports came to exemplify most of these attitudes. Initially 
more understanding attitudes prevailed, allowing that the Ports may have been no more than a 
financial burden, but Blitzkrieg in the West created expectation that the Irish stance would be 
adaptive. Military attitudes hinged either on a belief, or disbelief, that Irish precautions against 
enemy U-Boat infiltration would be effective, or on the strategic indivisibility of the British Isles. 
Those who disbelieved could neither accept that U-Boats were not operating in large numbers off 
the Irish west coast or that the Northern Irish ports used by the Royal Navy were, with greater 
technological innovations and greater intelligence capabilities, able to cover the Northwest 
approaches to Britain. Those who hankered after the return of the Ports did not adapt to the 
changing circumstances of the war, so much so that Canning argued, with justification that ‘Not 
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only was the need for Berehaven as a base for the main fleet purely an invention of Churchill’s, 
but, if anything, the need for the Irish ports as bases in the anti-submarine campaign had been 
diminishing rather than increasing since the outbreak of the war’ (Canning, 1985, p. 249). The 
shock of Blitzkrieg made it possible for the public to believe that Eire would allow the leasing of 
the Ports to Britain, or America, and that Eire should be forced to co-operate because it was felt 
militarily necessary. The 1938 Agreement was also slowly recast, in time of need, as the opening 
chapter in the failed policy of appeasement, an argument which cast Eire alongside Germany as 
shamefully submitted to, but now Britain’s enemy. The Irish were being reviled for taking the 
course Britain had left open for them, which appeared to endanger the whole of the British Empire 
and civilisation. As de Valera confirmed the Treaty Ports would not be used by any belligerent, 
the argument turned away from British culpability to Irish idiocy in allowing this position to 
continue. Refusal to return the ports was also cast as unjust, unchristian, and creating the 
conditions where Eire should be cast out of the Empire or even invaded for the sake of British 
safety. Most could not see that this action was equivalent to those actions which were vilified 
when taken by the Nazi’s. Some also felt it was an indication of British leniency in the face of 
great provocation that Britain did not reconquer Eire.  
The psychological impact of the refusal of the Treaty Ports on the British public is hard 
to underestimate. This was the issue that was argued and reargued over several years of the war, 
creating great controversy and attempts to blame the Irish for a situation neither of essential 
strategic significance nor pressing material need. Those who believed the Irish to be effectively 
drowning Allied sailors by their refusal couched their arguments in terms that reflected their belief 
that Ireland should never have been given her independence at all. This also provided a precise 
reason to exclude the Irish from the British national narrative, the myth of Britain standing alone, 
being formed by the experience of this most all-encompassing war. Nevertheless, evidence 
indicates that counter arguments to this forming narrative of Irish intransigence in the face of 
common sense, were available. Indeed, an article in The Evening Dispatch argued the Irish case 
with great clarity, but to little avail, showcasing some of the arguments later proved correct as the 
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course of the war changed direction towards the East, and pressure eased on Britain. Written by 
an Irish journalist John T. Grealish this argued the Irish saw no reason to give ‘over the derrick 
less anchorages called 'naval bases' for propaganda purposes’ (Evening Dispatch, 03/10/1943, 
LHMA). 
If attitudes softened over time, it was not, in general, due to a belief that Eire was no 
longer dangerous to Britain, but more because other developments became more pressing, or the 
public became more convinced of ultimate Allied victory. High points of controversy coincide 
with military failure or heightened fear of the power of Blitzkrieg, rather than the assurances of 
the Eire government that they were keeping the Nazi’s out of Ireland in a way that did not 
endanger their independence. Though evidence to the contrary was available, it was believed the 
Irish were anti-British even to the point where they would rather be under the Nazi heel than help 
Britain. Post war discoveries proved after the invasion of Britain was postponed, the German 
Navy considered the possibility of an invasion of Ireland ‘completely hopeless’ because there 
were no defendable anchorages available, including the Treaty Ports, and concluded that using 




4 A PLACE APART 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ireland’s constitutional relationship to Britain has often been re-defined, but Ireland 
always occupied a curious middle-place, politically once a country of the UK, yet culturally a 
place apart (Fitzpatrick, 1989). Definitions of Irishness concentrated on cultural difference, 
creating an expectation of what Irish people and their ‘character’ would be. Binaries of civilised-
barbaric, Catholic-Protestant, industrial-pastoral, brave-cowardly, hardworking-indolent, canny-
stupid, and moral-debauched had longstanding cultural impact by the time of World War Two, 
and racialized representations of Irishness still had cultural currency. Yet there was also a cultural 
expectation that Ireland would come to Britain’s side in the event of war, aided by ignorance of 
the constitutional position of the Irish Free State, now a Dominion able to make her own foreign 
policy decisions. Ireland was considered by many a part of the Empire at the least, and some 
considered her essentially still part of the United Kingdom. However, as the war progressed there 
were many ways in which Ireland was becoming perceived as culturally, politically, socially, 
different. Irish and British identity was being re-formed and changed by war. Part of this process 
for the British was a gradual realisation that Ireland was not, or at least no longer, culturally, or 
politically a part of the United Kingdom. Cultural difference, in the past ignored when it suited 
Britain, after the war became represented by FSL Lyon’s ‘Plato’s Cave’ analogy, which proposed 
the separation of Irish and British cultures, Irish culture being oppositional, inward-looking and 
isolationist, and aspirationally opposite to the new Britain being forged by World War Two.  
4.2 MO 1939 RACE SURVEY 
 
Questionnaire responses to the 1939 MO ‘Race Directive’ form a useful baseline from 
which to track changes in British opinion on Ireland and the Irish throughout the war. Issued in 
1939, after the start of the IRA ‘S-Plan’ bombings, but before the formal declaration of Irish 
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neutrality, the questionnaire (MO Race Directive Questionnaire, 1939) comprised several 
questions on ‘race’, some of which related to the Irish. Though the questions were ill-conceived, 
unsolicited, and additional comments reflect the writer’s perceptions. Question two required the 
ranking of ten ‘races’ on a preferential scale according to whom respondents ‘would prefer the 
British nation to collaborate or associate with’, including Eire, and question three required the 
ranking of ten national leaders by which was accorded the most ‘respect’, including de Valera. 
One respondent commented that ‘grading people in order of merit repulses me’ (MO Directive 
Respondent 1335, 1939), and several others point out the question’s conflation of race and 
nationality (MO Directive Respondent 1143, 1939; MO Directive Respondent 1318, 1939; MO 
Directive Respondent 1426, 1939). However, the loose concepts used reflected the imprecise 
nature of contemporary and historic notions of race, and was, as such, no barrier to similarly 
chaotic responses. Indeed, one respondent similarly conflates ‘race’ and ‘class’ by stating he felt 
as repelled by ‘poor people in England’ as he did by ‘negroes’ (MO Directive Respondent 1095, 
1939). Such responses indicate that any grouping of similar people could be interpreted as a ‘race’ 
by many of the MO respondents. 
Statistical analysis reveals collaboration with the Irish ‘race’ scoring 5.l and respect for 
de Valera 5.4 (Moulton, 2014, p. 317), where one is most favoured and ten the least. These figures 
provide little insight in themselves, but the additional comments were influenced by a 
combination of pragmatism and prejudice. One noted collaboration with such a small country 
would be hardly worthwhile (MO Directive Respondent 1206, 1939), but surprisingly, these do 
not reflect intolerance of the Irish ‘race’ and only two were antagonistic. The first argues 
collaboration would not be easy as ‘they are so implaccable (sic)’ (MO Directive Respondent 
1578, 1939), and the second rates the Irish ‘a miserable tenth, if you [sic] must consider them (my 
prejudice dates back long before this IRA business)’ (MO Directive Respondent 2200, 1939). 
Most commenting respondents considered the Irish to be natural Allies, with a typical response 
being ‘…I do not regard the Irish as ‘foreign’ in any sense’ (MO Directive Respondent 1039, 
1939). These attitudes evidence Clair Wills’ argument that many British people saw Eire as being 
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still somehow British despite gaining Dominion Status in 1922 (Wills, 2008, p. 5). The survey 
suggests that MO contributors would regret the detachment of Ireland from the Empire. 
Some opinions on ‘respect’ for de Valera are equivocal, seeing him as ‘a fanatic but 
sincere’ (MO Directive Respondent 2187, 1939). In total eleven of three-hundred and seventy-
two respondents rated de Valera in first place and one comment notes he ‘seems sensible about 
peace’ (MO Directive Respondent 1057, 1939). However, twenty-three unsolicited comments 
indicated no respect for the Irish leader. A few felt they did not have enough knowledge to 
comment (MO Directive Respondent 1040, 1939) but twenty-one awarded de Valera last place in 
a list below Hitler, Goering, Mussolini, and Stalin. One wrote ‘I class these both (de Valera and 
Hitler) as fanatical, egocentric fools and personally despise almost every quality I believe them 
to possess…’ (MO Directive Respondent 1403, 1939). De Valera had proved himself implacable 
in his ‘anti-British’, Irish Nationalism, but nevertheless most expected the Irish people would be 
more amenable to collaboration. Indeed, respondents saw no contradiction in the same people 
having elected him. As a constitutional Nationalist de Valera represented a certain danger of 
secession, not least because of his political history, but still British opinion did not believe the 
Irish people shared his views.  
Despite a few comments to the contrary, the directive reveals that recent IRA activities 
had politicised Irishness in combination with the Irish states attitude to conscription in Northern 
Ireland and of its nationals in Britain. Mo Moulton has shown that after the Anglo-Irish War, 
‘being Irish became a more personal and less political matter…. Irish political traditions were 
preserved in cultural and nostalgic forms’, and thus ‘simultaneously more acceptable and yet 
persistently different’ (Moulton, 2014, p. 280). However, by time of the 1939 Race Directive, the 
1938-1940 IRA ‘S-Plan’ bombing campaign and preparations for war, ‘Irishness’ once more 
assumed a more political dimension and was later reinforced by the adoption of neutrality. It is 
this ‘politicised’ Irishness that is rejected by MO respondents; any expressions of Irishness related 
to politics, irredentism, an independent foreign policy, or indeed any policies which worked 
against the interests of the UK, were regarded as a manifestation of cultural perversity. This 
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attitude was focussed on displeasure at Irish ‘disloyalty’ to the historical connection between the 
two islands, despite a marked ignorance of this connection being characterised by violence, 
colonialism, and religious intolerance. Indeed, as Angus Calder argued, even as late as the end of 
1940, ‘there is plenty of evidence that the British pubic knew, and by implication cared, very little 
about the British colonies’ (Calder, 1991). Even after a massive MOI ‘Empire Crusade’ campaign 
there was ‘no significant improvement in the number of people who knew…the difference 
between a Dominion and a Colony’ (Home Propaganda: A Report Prepared by Mass-
Observation for the Advertising Service Guild, 1941, p. 18).  
De Valera was a representation of negative themes of Irishness for many, and his 
supposed traits combined to place the Irish leader on a level with similarly ‘fanatical’ European 
dictators. As Kushner states ‘belief in, or more rarely, opposition to, Englishness was critical in 
formulating and articulating responses (whether positive, negative, or ambivalent) to minorities 
at home and abroad’ (Kushner, 2004, p. 233). This distinction reflects a view that the Irish were 
not perceived as foreigners, or necessarily racially different, but were merely politically misled. 
The MO race survey indicates that Irish Nationalism was the most distasteful aspect of Irishness 
to British sensibilities, serving well as a baseline from which to measure changing attitudes 
towards the Irish in reaction to the exigencies of war. The rest of this chapter will recount 
transformations after 1939 in strength of feeling, as well as the formation of new antipathies. 
4.3 THE PEOPLE ARE WITH US  
 
Eunan O’Halpin argues ‘Eire’s neutrality can hardly have been a surprise to those 
connected with Irish affairs, though the British public and even certain official and political circles 
may have cherished the illusion that in the event of war with Germany Britain would be allowed 
to use the Eire ports which had been given up in 1938’ (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 28). When it became 
clear that Eire was pursuing an independent foreign policy, those who felt Eire should support the 
empire interpreted Irish neutrality as treachery by the Irish government. Throughout the war a 
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belief that their Fianna Fail elected government misled the Irish people appears mostly in the 
press and appears to have followed the Churchillian rhetorical intimations that ‘three quarters’ of 
the Irish people ‘are with us’ in the war and it was the ‘malignant minority’ which de Valera ‘dare 
not …offend’ which was keeping Ireland neutral (Gilbert, 1993a, p.143). In June 1940 a 
Newcastle paper argued ‘in recent weeks the Irish people have been awaking to their new menace’ 
(Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 24/06/1940, p.4), and a Manchester one that ‘It is probable that 
the large Cosgrave party would welcome the leasing of the bases to Britain’ (Manchester Evening 
News, 08/11/1940, p.2) despite evidence that Fine Gael also supported neutrality. By the end of 
December 1940, when British fears of invasion had declined, fears of an Irish invasion were still 
current. Even attitudes accepting the relevance of the Irish experience of British rule argued that 
Irish grievances were best dismissed in the face of Nazi invasion. Though the Irish have ‘nursed 
a genuine grievance against England’, one letter writer added, ‘The attitude taken up by Mr de 
Valera during the present crisis cannot for long be tolerated by the Irish people’ (Stirling 
Observer, 11/11/1940, p.3), once again believing de Valera was unsupported by the Irish majority. 
A more direct letter argued ‘the vast majority of the Irish people want to be with us’ and that 
‘when ‘dev’ is drummed out, we will have a real; united, peaceful Emerald Isle’ (Western 
Morning News, 02/12/1943, p.2), continuing to deny Irish public supported de Valera despite him 
having won a general election six months earlier. Before the 1943 Eire election, newspaper 
editorials had formed a narrative expecting a change in political direction in Ireland, soon proved 
wrong when de Valera’s Fianna Fail remained the largest party represented in the Dail40. The 
media was, however, not party to more reliable information gathered from Irish people and Ireland 
itself, and this tends to mediate the lack of understanding in the newspaper opinion. 
Secret Postal and Telegraph censorship and HI reports revealed Irish writers 
predominantly supported neutrality and de Valera, which influenced government policy. These 
also reveal increasing sympathy with Britain, with HI noting that ‘Anti-British feeling is less in 
                                                          
40 Though FF lost seats this was mainly due to a rise in votes for the Farmers Party in protest at the 
governments wartime regulation of the farming industry. Since all parties supported continued neutrality, 
the election could hardly be considered a vote on the question. 
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evidence,’ (24/12/1940, TNA, INF 1/292) at the end of 1940. By 1941 reports note that this 
support did not equate with desire to join the war and concede that ‘There is very little 
modification of feeling, however, over the question of ‘the ports'’ (26/3/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). 
Reports stress continued support for de Valera’s stance before and after the 1943 election, with 
one writer arguing ‘I hope they put Fianna Fail back again.... De Valera kept us out of the war 
anyway’ (8/6/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). A 1942 survey of letters from Britain to Eire, most likely from 
Irish immigrants living in Britain, revealed 424 out of 521 letters comment favourably on 
neutrality (1/2/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30), and a 1943 comment argues that no leader ‘would get much 
support…in going into the war’. Clearly the Irish people valued peace above plenty with the secret 
blockade41 having little effect on Irish opinion, with one writer noting ‘We are short of almost 
everything.... (but) what we have is peace…’ (8/1/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). There is, however, some 
evidence indicating the vehemence of anti-neutrality opinion in Britain with one report relating a 
current joke in Britain asserting ‘that all the yellow races are in the war now except Eire’ 
(1/2/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30). A February 1942 report highlights a telling opinion that ‘Ireland, when 
she enters the war, will do so as an independent and separate sovereign state, following her own 
destiny’ which insightfully explains the assertiveness of sovereignty which formed a basis of Irish 
motivation (1/2/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30), an argument frequently brought to the attention of the 
British government by volunteer commentators in, or visiting, Eire. 
These volunteer commentators reports sent to government from those who knew Ireland, 
tend to support the conclusions of the Postal censorship reports. These argue the majority had 
faith in neutrality, and that to believe otherwise was wishful thinking. A.A. Mowat, a British 
teacher who spent her summers in Eire, wrote in April 1942 that ‘The people as a whole, 
Anglophile, or otherwise, regard active participation in the war as out of the question’ (TNA, DO 
                                                          
41 Lord Cranborne had suggested to the War Cabinet ‘Quietly, un-ostentatiously, without any public 
declaration of policy, we should employ every method in our power to keep her (Eire) lean…. what would 
be the result of such a policy...it would tend to weaken his (de Valera’s) hold on the Irish people…’ (TNA, 
PREM 3/128). This was imposed through refusing space in British supply convoys that had been previously 




130/28), and ‘JS’ reported that in September the Irish government had ‘successfully created an 
‘idée fixe’ in the minds of the population that neutrality is an assurance against the hardships of 
war’ (TNA, DO 130/28). Notes on Eire, sent by Anglo-Irish novelist Elizabeth Bowen under her 
married name of Cameron, as Fisk notes (R Fisk, 1985, pp. 411-412), report ‘Support of Mr. de 
Valera's policy of neutrality is general in almost all classes and is impressive... (and Irish) 
neutrality is identified with her integrity. In fact, neutrality = (sic) Independence’ and that ‘Eire 
regards her declaration of neutrality as a positive act...an act of strength, not weakness’ 
(13/7/1940, TNA, DO 130/28). These writers reported widespread support for de Valera’s 
government and neutrality in all classes. Of these reports, sent to the DO, only one writer was 
asked to contribute such a report and the others provided information of their own volition. The 
DO felt this information useful in all cases, and the records indicate that these reports were read 
by ministers of state. Elizabeth Bowens reports were particularly useful to the British government 
because of the political circles she had access to. Her personal knowledge of James Dillon, the 
only anti-neutral politician in the Dail, whose dissenting opinion was only barely tolerated, 
revealed the strength of pro-neutral feeling. Bowen reported him to be able but ‘very much 
disliked’ (9/11/1940, TNA, DO 130/28) and ‘the enfant terrible of the Cosgravites’ (9/2/1942, 
TNA, DO 130/28), with a ‘reputation of being a war-monger’ even after his resignation from Fine 
Gael (31/7/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). Visiting Australian historian W.K. Hancock wrote ‘The 
Government is neutral, but the people are by no means neutral’, but added the vital proviso that 
he estimated 85% ‘though in thought and speech pro-British, does not feel called upon to make 
any real effort in our support’ (16/11/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). Other intelligence sources had 
noticed changing opinions which they could only grudgingly accept. The Admiralty 1941 report 
on ‘Quisling’s in Eire’, indicated ‘a great change’ from previous opinion with ‘everyone pro-
German and confident that Britain would lose the war’, but attributed this change to Irish 
opportunism and that ‘the popular side in Eire is the winning side’ (14/01/1941, TNA, ADM 
22/3486). Even when the Irish were perceived as changing to the right opinion it was attributed 
as being for the wrong reasons. 
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These sources indicate the British government had reliable evidence that the Irish people 
not only hoped for an Allied victory, but also agreed with de Valera’s policy of neutrality. 
However, this conclusion was often negatively interpreted as an expression of the paradoxical 
nature of the Irish people, an interpretation based on cultural antipathy rather than the available 
evidence. These sources probably helped to create a cautious consensus in the War Cabinet that 
forcing the issue of the Treaty Ports would be counter-productive unless circumstances of war 
made their use necessary. It is frequently obvious that this consensus was held only grudgingly 
and is often qualified with a witheringly condescending interpretation of Irish motivations. 
Though the British wartime press was not subject to censorship, except where matters of 
military security was concerned, it was useful to the British government that the true state of 
public opinion in Eire was not widely known so that it kept up pressure on Eire to allow the use 
of the treaty ports. However, the fact that some papers came to similar conclusions than those in 
the censorship reports through their own research, shows that some papers were perhaps pursuing 
a political agenda by representing Irish neutrality as unpopular in Eire. Indeed, the Irish 
government complained to the British Government of a press campaign to malign Irish 
motivations. Rare dissenting opinions included a Times editorial arguing the ‘widespread and 
sincerely held’ belief that Ireland would be bombed if the Treaty Ports were used by the Royal 
Navy and held that this ‘explains the paradox that many convinced neutralists are to be found now 
serving in the crown forces’ (The Times, 28/04/1942, p.5). Further a Daily Herald article argued, 
unusually, that the ‘Irish people are not "loyal" or "pro-British"’ and ‘there is no special reason 
why they should be’ (Daily Herald, 08/08/1939, p. 5) and a notable letter to the Editor argued 
‘the present government in Eire was elected by the people, and the same people are thankful for 
neutrality’, sagely adding ‘why should there be bloodshed in Ireland when it can be avoided?’ 
(Birmingham Gazette, 07/06/1945, p.2). A few commentators seemed to believe the Irish stance 
was not one-dimensional and was a reasonable response in her circumstances. 
However, the great majority of newspaper comment relied on a narrative that the Irish 
were being misled and readers were left unable to understand nuanced Irish motivations, 
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preferring to believe in simpler binary choices. This attitude tended to become more entrenched 
as the war progressed and by 1944 HI reports revealed that ‘outside Northern Ireland the results 
of the Eire election excited almost no interest…though there was some surprise at Mr de Valera's 
increased majority’ (8/6/1944, TNA, INF 1/292), suggesting that if there had been more interest 
in Ireland this would have been less of a surprise. After the June 1943 election the narrative of 
the Irish people being misled did not disappear but mutated to focus on the large number of Irish 
volunteers in the British Forces, which was often publicly upheld as evidence that at least these 
Irish people rejected de Valera’s neutrality. A letter to the Editor effectively divides the 
‘honourable’ and ‘dishonourable’ Irish, charging de Valera with casting the Irish race ‘as nothing 
better than Nazi champions’, yet ‘Irishmen of decency and pride did not let her down, and never 
will’ (Birmingham Mail, 19/05/1945, p.3). From these sources it is apparent that common 
attitudes were reflexive and adaptive to circumstances and allowed for a device with which to 
separate the ‘good Irish’, that is those helping Britain, from the ‘bad’. However, antipathy for the 
Irish over neutrality cannot be entirely separated from historical and cultural antipathy present in 
British culture for hundreds of years, which predisposed British opinion towards hostility. 
4.4 THE IRISH CHARACTER 
 
The question of Irish neutrality was not solely responsible for public perceptions, with 
attitudes also being affected by cultural antipathy to foreigners in general, and the Irish in 
particular. An MO File Report ‘Public Feeling About Aliens’ notes attitudes to all ‘foreigners’ 
are ‘at least apprehensive’ and that this was ‘to a very large degree about, for instance, the Irish…’ 
(MO File Report  79 - Public Feeling About Aliens, 1940). The same report concludes that ‘If you 
ask people what they think about 'foreigners' you establish an immediately unfavourable 
attitude… which could easily be converted into stronger antagonism or stronger favourability’ 
(MO File Report  79 - Public Feeling About Aliens, 1940). Such feeling reserves the right for the 
holder to change his or her opinion according to how closely the foreigner conforms to British 
values and concerns. Perceptions were changing by April 1940, when ‘Ordinary people regard 
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the Irish as a race at least as separate as the Germans, and there is much potential hostility towards 
them’ (MO File Report  79 - Public Feeling About Aliens, 1940). By November the same year 
many were ‘in favour of forcibly taking the ports’ (15/11/1940, MO FR 493 - Seventh Weekly 
Report for Home Intelligence).  
It was natural for some in the civil service to assume that ‘the Irish people as a whole are 
probably more suggestible than the other peoples of these islands…They will, in fact, accept 
anything they are told (within limits), provided they are told in the right way, are told it often 
enough and do not hear too much of the other side of the case’ (TNA, DO 35/1011/3)42. The 
commander of British forces in Northern Ireland similarly opined ‘the Irish are like the 
Germans…they lack civic pride and courage…are venal, …fundamentally dishonest…vulnerable 
to propaganda’ (TNA, DO 35/1011/3). Indeed, the Irish government legal advisor forecast this 
kind of cultural antipathy by his expectation that if Ireland were ‘loyal’, ‘we might be expected 
to insist on our pound of flesh in Ulster at a very awkward time’, repeating the common 
conception of Ireland in World War One, that the ‘Irish cannot be trusted' and would ‘always have 
a grievance', using the war to blackmail Britain over NI (NAI, DFA Legal Adviser's Papers, 
16/09/1939). As a result of such attitudes many British appeared to regard the Irish as 
unappeasable. However, one perceived fault in character was blamed more than all others for 
neutrality: that of Irish behaviour being paradoxical and nonsensical. 
The Irish ‘character’ was often expected to create the deepest paradox. This was typified 
by Elizabeth Bowen’s ‘Notes on Eire’ ‘the wish of the main body of Irish people is to see England 
nearly beaten but not quite’ (14/8/1940, TNA, DO 130/28) and a Daily Express ‘William Hickey’ 
column records a ‘Current Dublinism: Eire wants to see Britain beaten provided Germany doesn't 
win’ (Daily Express, 09/04/1941, p.4). A similar joke was syndicated in newspapers, emphasising 
the paradox of Irish people in the British Forces by presenting two Irish RAF crew discussing de 
Valera while flying through German flak, with one concluding ‘Well, there's one thing that can 
                                                          
42 Strict Irish censorship measures played into such fears. 
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be said for de Valera - at least he's kept us out of the war’ (Forfar Dispatch, 30/03/1944, p. 3). 
Such jokes implied at least naivety, if not ignorance on the part of Irish people, and even that they 
were confused by their own country’s stance43. Occasionally, the perceived contradictions 
inherent in the Irish character were used in the most blunt and puerile commentary, such as a 
Birmingham Gazette cartoon portraying supposed Irish post-war preparations, in which de Valera 
panics that he has no rifles when the war is nearly over (Birmingham Gazette, 03/10/1944, p.2). 
 
Figure 10: Timely Action (Birmingham Gazette, 03/10/1944)  
The old charge of internal division and intrigue among Irish nationalists was also 
rehashed to portray the Irish stance as doomed to failure, when a magazine reminded readers of 
the failings of the 19th century Fenians ‘…wherever two or three Irishmen are gathered together 
in the name of conspiracy, there is the informer in the midst of them…. Which is why Irish 
conspiracies always fail…somebody always knows which side pays best’ (Grey, 18/01/1941). 
                                                          
43 A Liverpool Echo 28/03/1944 Letter to the editor, from an Irish immigrant to Britain, suggests ‘Don't try 
to understand us. Hell, we don't even understand ourselves’. This shows the stereotype was so strong as to 
be accepted by the Irish themselves. 
130 
 
Such portrayal exemplifies not only paradoxical ‘Irishness’, but also suggests the Irish would, by 
their nature, be the architects of their own downfall.  
4.5 IRISH VS BRITISH VALUES  
 
However, new attitudes towards the Irish were being formed alongside a re-evaluation of 
what it meant to be British during this period of trial. The MO report ‘What does Britain mean to 
you?’ (MO File Report 878 - What Does Britain Mean to You?, 1941) is packed with portrayals 
of the British which lionise ‘British values’ such as ‘freedom of speech’, ‘freedom of thought, 
opinion, religion and action’, ‘home and the good things in life’, ‘settling of problems peaceably’, 
and ‘tolerance and good humour’. Here the British character is one of positive values, and its 
shortcomings are the harmless inadequacies of a well-meaning ‘Nation of Muddlers’, reflecting 
common conceptions of why Britain was fighting the Nazi’s (MO File Report 878 - What Does 
Britain Mean to You?, 1941). Elsewhere in MO opinions on the Irish character are less indulgent. 
Indeed, prejudicial statements unexpectedly appear in reports on seemingly unrelated subjects, 
proving an ingrained cultural bias. The historically common charge of Irish indolence is in 
evidence in a report on ‘Reconstruction’ where ‘Two Irish Girls…smoked, idled…refusing to 
work’ (MO File Report 1485 - Reconstruction IV, 1942). Familiar accusations or Irish 
drunkenness appears where the absence of Irish drunken ‘navvies’ is used to mitigate against state 
control of Pubs (MO File Report 2134 - State Managed Pubs in Carlisle, 1944), and their harmful 
presence, drinking methylated spirits, appears in a report on Anti-Semitism in London (MO, FR 
A12 - Anti Semitism Survey, 1939). A report on ‘Neighbours’ charges the presence of Irish people 
with lowering living standards (MO File Report 1456 - People's Homes, 1942), while the charge 
of the Irish living in filth appears in ‘Refugees’ (MO File Report 174 - Refugees, 1940), where 
Belgians refugees fleeing the Nazi’s purportedly showed traits supposedly similar to Irish 
behaviour. In these reports, there is indication that not only certain prejudices are associated with 
the Irish, but these have also become truisms, a cultural shorthand to uphold newer prejudices.  
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In the formation of a new conception of Britishness, ideas of Irishness were being cast as 
oppositional. Precisely because the Irish were not in a war creating great social and cultural 
change in Britain, the ‘Irish character’ was cast as unchanging, negative, and intentionally 
obstructive. Refusal to grant use of the former Treaty Ports is ‘associated with the traditional 
'difficultness' of the Irish people’ (MO, FR 486 - Sixth Weekly Report for Home Intelligence) and 
‘regarded as typical senseless Irish pig-headedness, if not downright treachery’ (MO File Report 
569 - Airmen, 1941). There is little attempt here to understand Irish motivations, and obstructive 
behaviour as seen as enacted intentionally impede the traditional enemy or for no reason at all. 
Morale reports argue there is ‘continued criticism of the Irish, particularly on the line that the Irish 
always make trouble’ (15/11/1940, MO FR 493 - Seventh Weekly Report for Home Intelligence), 
and a diary reports opinion that ‘The Irish are a nasty quarrelsome lot, anyway’ (22/02/1942, MO 
Diarist 5010). A particularly vitriolic opinion on Irish ‘duplicity’ asserts the ‘Irish in general are 
regarded as superficially 'charming' and glib, but as basically a bunch of thieves, idlers, drunkards, 
ne'er-do-wells, boasters and liars’ (MO File Report 569 - Airmen, 1941). It was also felt by some 
that the Irish were defeatist, and this was bolstered by the opinion of one of those regularly 
reporting to the DO on opinion in Eire, who commented on the ‘returned Irish’ workers that they 
were ‘great carriers of defeatist rumours’ and that these ‘stories of disaffection in British factories’ 
were ‘quoted (here) as authorities’ (E. Bowen, 2009, p. 54). A direct comparison between 
Britishness and Irishness is made in reaction to the Liverpool Blitz, relating one woman’s opinion 
that ‘I think it's those wretched Irish trying to create panic… They are going around shouting 'stop 
the war' and 'we’ve had enough'. English people wouldn't do that’ (MO File Report 706 - 
Liverpool, 1941). Such reactions beg the question; did the British character deem wanting to avoid 
death by bombing irrational and cowardly? If this were the case or not, it was plain that most 
considered the Irish were just not made of the same stuff as the British.  
Despite her being involved in the war, there is evidence in MO that British opinion saw 
the Northern Irish as having shared characteristics with their Southern neighbours. As ‘Ulster 
Shipping Situation’ succinctly states ‘Everything in Ulster is intimately mixed with the religious 
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dichotomy which divides the country…’, and ‘this division is…closely linked to all security 
problems’, inferring that government in the province was most invested in deterring IRA and 
Nationalist irredentist activities rather than prosecuting the war. Emphasising lack of conscription 
and Ulster’s distance from the effects of war the report concludes ‘Ulster is in the war, (but) 
psychologically it is not fighting it. It is only helping to fight it …Even the Blitz on Belfast has 
not really awakened the people… the slackness in the atmosphere is unmistakeable…’ (MO File 
Report 1309 - Ulster Shipping Situation, 1942). Ulster’s loyalty is seen as qualified and its self-
interest draws some parallels with Eire’s neutrality, where Ulster is considered British but not 
quite British enough. Similarly, public opinions in MO suggest that Northern Irish people are 
‘foreigners’, within the United Kingdom. Indeed, this research did not find a single statement, 
which distinguished if a person identified as ‘Irish’ was from the North or from the South. There 
is no sustained evidence of a belief in a separate Ulster identity. Though three female immigrant 
workers are reported as having connections with Belfast (MO File Report 1344 - People in 
Production, 1942), and may have been Northern Irish, this is not confirmed, leading to the 
conclusion that for those who contributed to MO, both Northern and Southern Irish were 
universally ‘Irish’.  
Whether attitudes towards the Irish were motivated by misunderstanding, ignorance, the 
supposed Irish ‘character’ or rejection of the Irish stance, the effect was often the same; that 
despite evidence showing Ireland was not acting as an enemy, it was easier to believe that she 
was. In a syndicated article J.L. Hodson investigates ‘the Riddle of Eire’ and finds that ‘I have 
not found anybody who…would act in any fundamental way different from the manner in which 
Mr de Valera is acting’. The article begins by noting that before leaving a friend said to him ‘I 
suppose you are visiting what is really a hostile country’ and debunks common myths such as the 
reported hundreds of Germans attached to their legation in Dublin and the rumours of U-Boats 
being refuelled in Irish waters (Newcastle Journal, 03/02/1941, p.4). Hodson did not write if his 
friend’s opinion was changed, but it is certain that most British people saw the ‘Irish character’ 
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as an indicator that the Irish did not share British values, and repudiated British political and 
cultural influence.  
4.6 LONG MEMORIES 
 
Nationalism and self-determination had become the most important aspect of Irish 
politics, and yet for many British commentators the new policy of neutrality displayed a 
continuation of obduracy in the face of British guidance, a product of short-sighted self-interest 
and enduring historical animosity, rather than a reaction to centuries of over-lordship, or less still 
a policy that could keep Eire out of the war. Though some attitudes conceded that Britain had 
done some injustice to the Irish, most believed they should forgive and forget and look to the 
future rather than the past. Blaming the Irish for bearing grudges the Portsmouth Evening News 
editorial ‘Blind Ireland’ portrays Irish neutrality as an ‘immobilization of Britain's Western flank 
simply because of an ancient (and, by now, very tedious) isolationist mood born of hard times 
long ago’ (Portsmouth Evening News, 13/07/1940, p.2). Other papers asserted that many Irish 
people, because of their ancient grudge, ‘would rather submit to Nazi domination than see a single 
British soldier or sailor on their shores’ (Manchester Evening News, 08/11/1940, p.2). Several 
editorial opinions of this type appear in connection with Cromwell, many of which suggested that 
‘The jackboot of Hitler will make a far deeper imprint in Ireland than the heel of Cromwell ever 
did’ (Sunday Express, 06/04/1941, p.4). Politicians also noted a historical basis to many of de 
Valera’s arguments for neutrality, with Canadian Prime Minister McKenzie King reported as 
being unable to ‘get him past the Battle of the Boyne’ (Newcastle Journal, 29/01/1941, p.4), 
whilst Maffey openly considered the Irish ‘a vendetta-minded people’ (TNA, CAB 21/1843). 
Further, the British Council justified its exclusion of Eire from its list of Neutral nations where it 
would continue its ‘soft power’ mission, by weighing up ‘the risk of expenditure…on nothing 
more valuable than the entertainment of a hostile nation’ (TNA, DO 35/21011/3), displaying an 





Figure 11: Living in the Past (Evening Standard, 30/08/1940)  
HI reports also reflected a perception that the Irish were only able to look backward rather 
than to the future, and blaming this on irrationality, grudges, and racial characteristics. A 1944 
report concludes that only a small minority in Scotland, mostly Irish immigrant workers, 
understood de Valera’s views ‘usually raking up past history as justification’ (14/13/1944, TNA, 
INF 1/292). Reports even from early in the war argued that British people felt ‘It is useless to 
expect rational or logical thought or sentiment in Eire. The historical, the religious, the mythical, 
and the frankly ridiculous continually obtrude themselves’ (24/12/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). The 
Irish stance was ‘emotional’ rather than ‘logical’ and could only be understood ‘if allowance is 
made for historical and emotional actors, together with a certain racial perversity’ (2/1/1941, TNA, 
INF 1/292). Few, of course, made these allowances. It was also asserted that in the past the Irish 
had taken advantage of British munificence and had interpreted this as frailty. Reporting to the 
Dominions Office on public opinion in Eire, ‘JS’ charged that heretofore ‘generosity’ shown to 
the Irish by Britain had ‘been treated as signs of weakness and accordingly despised’ when in fact 
measures by Britain ‘were tokens of expedience’ (30/9/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). However, some 
British commentators who had visited Ireland counselled against discounting the impact of history 
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on the Irish. Professor Hancock argues, that from the point of view of Irish history neutrality 
‘possesses strong validity’ because ‘we are still too close to Easter 1916, and the succeeding 
troubles to expect to find a united Ireland fighting on our side’ (9/11/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). 
Elizabeth Bowen acknowledged the tide of anti-Irish feeling but encouraged a spirit of 
compromise writing ‘I could wish some factions in England showed less anti-Irish feeling…The 
charge of "disloyalty" against the Irish has always, given the plain facts of history, irritated me. I 
could wish that the English kept history in mind more and that the Irish kept it in mind less’ 
(9/11/1940, TNA, DO 130/28). A.A. Mowat also argued the future was being risked by both 
attitudes to the past; ‘The chances of political rapprochement between Britain and Eire seem 
slender at the moment: the British know too little, and the Irish remember too much’ (30/4/1942, 
TNA, DO 130/28).  
MO shows public opinion on the supposed Irish attitude to the past emerging in a diarist’s 
book review, which interprets An Irish Journey by Sean O'Faolain as a ‘display of the mentality 
of an Irish nationalist…Nothing English is good, and he rakes up all kinds of traditions to inflame 
the national spirit’ (08/10/1941, MO Diarist 5076). MO File report #569 ‘Airmen’ contains a 
remarkable assessment of feelings of this type, and its writer concedes ‘I have been amazed by 
the amount of feeling which manifests itself against the Irish’. It continues, ‘although there is 
fairly wide recognition that Britain, in the past, committed some sort of crimes against Ireland, 
there is (a) practically no knowledge of what form this crime took… (and), (b) in any case all this 
is regarded as completely finished and done with - Ireland is now free and has nothing to complain 
of…(and) (c) …the Irish are regarded as a wild and thriftless lot, unfit for self-government, who 
probably only had themselves to blame’ (MO File Report 569 - Airmen, 1941). This attitude 
existed alongside different attitudes to those citizens of Eire who had volunteered, and gave their 
lives, in the British Forces. American soldiers in Northern Ireland were, according to an MO 
report, officially warned that the Northern Irish Nationalist was ‘highly suspicious and over 
sensitive, as the result of centuries of trouble’ but also reports Nationalist and Unionist 
predispositions are a reality for the Northern Irish as ‘illogical and ill-informed as they may be’ 
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(MO File Report 1306 - Americans in Ireland, 1942). The implication of such advice was that the 
Irish inhabited a world of grudges, disinformation and illogical fears somehow connected to a 
past which was long gone, and a world aloof from that being faced by the belligerents. However, 
when British commentators mentioned the past ‘betrayals’ of the British by the Irish, these 
historical arguments were not deemed illogical or ill-informed. A 1940 HI report asserted fears 
that 'another Casement plot is being hatched' and used this to explain a ‘Deep and growing distrust 
of Eire’ (24/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). 
However, a more liberal assessment of Irish motivations, while noting that ‘there are 
illiterate peasants on the West coast of Ireland, who will indignantly ask a harmless English tourist 
how he justifies Strongbow's invasion of Ireland', concludes that 'History is the cause of all the 
trouble and it is the curse of Ireland’. The same article relates that 'Unfortunately England has 
forgotten, and so does not understand why Ireland remembers' (Wells Journal, 24/02/1939, p.2) 
correctly anticipating that most public reaction to Irelands history would be dismissive of the 
mistakes of the past and would therefore interpret Irish policy as a self-inflicted wound. Others, 
such as Malcolm McDonald, after agreeing that the Treaty Ports were rightly given up in 1938, 
was, by 1941, bored by the Irish, regarding her neutrality a product of ‘her dull, unending 
grievance against us’ (Nicolson, 1967, p. 186). As Oliver McDonagh has noted, a fundamentally 
different view of the relevance of the past, a deeply Christian belief that morality is timeless in 
Ireland, and a Whig conception of progressive history in Britain (MacDonagh, 1992, pp. 6-7), 
culturally destined the Irish to remember and the British to forget.  
4.7 DE VALERA  
 
Diarmaid Ferriter characterises de Valera during World War Two as mixing ‘public 
stubbornness with an informal pragmatism (in) assisting the Allies’ because he knew there was 
‘no such thing as absolute neutrality’ and wanted to ‘avoid divisions in the body politic’ (D 
Ferriter, 2007, p. 256). It was a tightrope walk that he took so seriously as to deal with as both 
137 
 
Taoiseach and Minister for External Affairs. But for the British the Taoiseach personified the 
worst of the Irish character for many British commentators, becoming the ultimate example of 
the Irish obsession with the past. Newspapers asserted that he ‘still wears black for the comrades 
killed in the 1916 rebellion’ (Daily Express, 28/05/1943, p.2) whilst displaying a great ‘capacity 
for remembering old scores’ (Perthshire Advertiser, 27/11/1940, p.6). No doubt influenced by 
such commentary an MO diarist similarly wrote ‘de Valera thinks of nothing but what Cromwell 
did to his grandfather’ (13/3/1944, MO Diarist 5088). British newspapers often portrayed de 
Valera as dour and ungenial with the Daily Express noting as an ‘American born linguist (sic)44, 
teetotaller, non-smoker...the sombre schoolmaster’ (Daily Express, 28/05/1943, p.2), whilst the 
Picture Post portrayed ‘one of Mr de Valera's most striking achievements is to have made Irish 
politics dull’ (Anon, 10/07/1943). However, he was more frequently portrayed as a ‘virulent 
Anglophobe’ with a hatred for Britain so strong that he would endanger his own countrymen. The 
Cassandra column described him ‘a silent soured old man…A leader who has forgotten how to 
lead. A boneless wonder shivering on the scaffold of what used to be called ‘neutrality’ (Daily 
Mirror, 10/056/1941, p.2). He was also charged with having ‘a singularly stubborn and inelastic 
mind’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 11/03/1944, p.2) and seeing Ireland through rose-tinted 
spectacles (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 23/10/1941, p.2). A strained argument was asserted by 
some that de Valera was not truly Irish, attempting to further distance his motivations from those 
of the Irish people. One early editorial describes de Valera ‘As a representative of Irish character 
he is…a misfit. …he is only half an Irishman’ (Perthshire Advertiser, 27/11/1940, p.6). Towards 
the end of the war a reader clutched at the straw of his birthplace by writing ‘Personally I am 
inclined to believe that he is still a citizen of the USA. If that is so…, could he be charged with 
treason?’ (The Scotsman, 19/07/1945, p.4), emphasising the lengths to which some would go to 
punish him. Though some letters to newspapers show support for de Valera, reminding readers 
of his Irish mother, his rearing in Limerick, his fight for independence in 1916 and that he was 
                                                          
44 In fact, de Valera was a Mathematician and teacher.  
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once Chairman of the League of Nations (Birmingham Mail, 23/05/1945, p.3), most were 
dismissive of de Valera as blind to reality and fuelled by hate.  
This dismissiveness of de Valera’s sensibilities is also apparent in some government 
papers. In an early War Cabinet meeting Chamberlain implied de Valera had no grasp of his own 
situation by insisting on the need to instil ‘some sense of reality into Mr de Valera’ and Halifax, 
then Foreign Office Minister, urged that McDonald should ‘continue the process of educating’ 
him (TNA, CAB 65/7/68). Maffey wrote to Lord Cranborne ‘de Valera has a ‘one-track mind’…. 
he has never…moved from the…narrow avenue of hate…his prejudices are ingrained now’ (TNA, 
PREM 3/133/6), and described Irish protests at the execution of the Coventry bombers as part of 
‘the congenital anti-English complex’ (TNA, DO 35/1107/1). Political protestations at the 
‘ignorance’ of de Valera were not confined to Britain. The US ambassador to Eire, David Gray 
described de Valera’s government as ‘always the same malign genius that controls. This man is 
blind to handwriting on walls and deaf to the rumble of approaching catastrophe’ (TNA, PREM 
3/128). Such attitudes would lead to the ‘American Note’ crisis of March 1944, an attempt to 
make de Valera ‘take sides’ by either expelling the Axis legations or, by refusing, being cast as 
aiding Axis espionage, which in time became the focus of frustration and animosity towards 
Ireland. As Paul Bew argues Gray’s memoir show’s de Valera’s position, unbending since before 
the war, was destined to disappoint and ultimately frustrate Gray45, who he felt could not grasp 
the context of the German threat, especially by prioritising neutrality over an end to partition and 
a refusal to deviate from a standpoint of moral equivalence between Axis and Allies (Bew, 2012, 
pp. xiii-xix). His views became progressively strident and came to a head with the American Note 
Crisis.  
De Valera’s unmoving stance led Maffey to characterise de Valera’s government as a 
‘dictatorship (that) has created the phenomenon of unity on the basis of neutrality (and must) 
                                                          
45 Bew argues Gray’s reputation has been unfairly maligned in recent analyses spawning what he calls 
‘the pragmatic pro- neutrality narrative’ and that his work was evocative of a high-point in the ‘special 
relationship between Britain and America (Bew, 2012, p. xxx)  
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make it a casus belli’ (TNA, PREM 3/133/6), inferring that this was no more than a way to 
maintain power. Maffey argued that expecting a ‘generous gesture’ from de Valera was a mistake 
as ‘Generosity is not in his nature. He is cold, calculating, and egotistical. His first interest is 
himself…he is at the moment in a position of dictatorial power’ (TNA, CAB 66/14/2). This view 
appears in increasingly virulent form throughout the war and appears as an enhancement of the 
conception of de Valera found in the MO 1939 Race Survey. Elizabeth Bowen’s reports to the 
Dominions Office include a number of observations which tend to support accusations of a 
dictatorship, including reports that the Irish Times felt ‘the country's press is free only in name’ 
(31/7/1940, TNA, DO 130/28), that de Valera was ‘unable to admit that he could ever have been 
at any time, wrong’, and that in the Dail he betrays ‘intellectual weariness, and the very barest 
degree of tolerance exercised towards most of the speakers’ (31/7/1942, TNA, DO 130/28), though 
herself never directly suggested any dictatorial use of power. Cassandra argued de Valera's 
‘assertion that those who suggested the people had lost faith in his government, were fifth 
columnists...shows a lack of balance that augers ill for the Irish people’ (Daily Mirror, 
10/06/1941, p. 2), but stopped short of calling him a dictator. The Scotsman, however, declared 
he ‘behaves like an Irish Fuhrer’, unable to co-operate with anyone (The Scotsman, 21/06/1943, 
p.4)46. The view that he was a dictator must have been widespread enough to encourage the Daily 
Express to disparage it in ‘An Englishman's guide to Irish Politics’ published in 1944. This Q&A 
piece explains de Valera was Taoiseach and leader of the largest party in the Dail, rather than a 
dictator, but implied that because ‘he rides roughshod over all opposition’ and the other parties 
are too disunited to pose any real opposition, the effect on politics was the same (Daily Express, 
13/03/1944, p.2). Bluntly, Paramount News’ ‘Ireland – the Plain Issue’ described de Valera as a 
dictator carrying out his own personal vendetta against England (Cole, 1996, p. 37) proving the 
US was equally prone to hyperbole when discussing Ireland. One paper directly compared de 
Valera to Hitler by asserting he was ‘using the emergency in which Great Britain finds herself, to 
                                                          
46 Though all Irish governments during the war were coalitions.  
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practise as ugly a piece of blackmail as Hitler tried with France and Great Britain over Austria’ 
(The Scotsman, 26/12/1941, p.4).  
 
Figure 12:  Blinkered and Mulish Eire (Daily Mirror, 03/01/1941) 
De Valera’s obstinacy was also a feature of newspaper opinion, but some still suggested 
that ‘perhaps Mr de Valera has a price’ and alluded to cowardice and corruption asserting that 
‘this looks like the first time in history that the sheer stubborn bigotry of one man has forced a 
sovereign state to the very edge of the abyss’, like the other European neutrals (Daily Mirror, 
01/11/1940, p.4). A few weeks later Cassandra, after the death of Craigavon, suggested that now 
de Valera’s ‘formidable foe’ is out of the way, his ‘bigoted policy that is so destructive to the 
hopes of all Irishmen of goodwill’ may be amended (Daily Mirror, 26/11/1940, p.4). Letters to 
the editor also decry ‘the mulish obstinacy of de Valera and his followers’ (Daily Record, 
13/11/1940, p.7), and these accusations of obstinacy appear more frequently, and with more 
opprobrium as the war progressed, with a 1944 editorial opining that by then de Valera had ‘out 
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Canuted Canute; he denied the very existence of the tides’ (Evening Standard, 13/03/1944, 
LHMA). For British opinion, de Valera was a misguided, hate-filled dictator leading his people 
to their destruction to spite an ancient enemy.  
4.8 CUTTING OFF THE NOSE TO SPITE THE FACE 
 
By 1941 attitudes towards the Irish in MO appear to change, with neutrality being 
interpreted as a distancing of Ireland from Britain. The Irish were becoming ‘foreign’ in 
aspiration, seen to be becoming insular and uninterested in world affairs, following de Valera 
‘whose gloomy mind revolves around ancient Irish wrongs’, and concluding that they would 
rather be ‘tortured by Germans than to be saved…by America and Britain’ (Daily Mirror, 
29/01/1942, p.3). MO Diarist #5349 was ‘amazed and amused at the parochialism of the Irish 
outlook’, arguing Ireland should be exposed to the Nazi’s, ‘without loss of life’, to make them 
more ‘conscious of the great big world’ (29/11/1940, MO Diarist 5349). Similarly, ‘Cassandra’ 
felt their independent foreign policy made Eire ‘anti-British, ruled by obstinacy, short-sighted 
self-interest and enduring historical animosity’, and suggested ‘that the people of Eire have not 
yet had enough close experience of the Teuton (Daily Mirror, 01/08/19441, p. 2). Similarly, MO 
diarist #5098 asserted Nazi invasion ‘would do them good…Then they would realize that the 
English are not so bad after all’ (06/11/1940, MO Diarist 5098). It was a regular assumption that 
the Irish were so ignorant of the world that they would welcome a British defeat even as the Nazi’s 
came that one step closer to Irish shores. 
Many saw this as ignorance as being wilfully blind to the situation. In an Admiralty 
‘General Report on the Position in Eire’ it was asserted ‘in certain parts of Eire no interest 
whatever is being taken in a possible invasion as the inhabitants have no interest outside their 
farms’ (July 1940, TNA, PREM 3/129/2). The News Chronicle similarly argued the Irish were 
‘both blind and deaf, for the dictatorial powers of the government censorship department have 
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blanketed every form of criticism of government and of the belligerent powers’ (News Chronicle, 
13/01/1941, LHMA). 
 
Figure 13: Blind Eire (Daily Mail 06/07/1940) 
Analogy to blindness was no doubt exacerbated by widespread knowledge that de Valera 
had very poor eyesight requiring surgical intervention. A Daily Mirror cartoon of de Valera, on 
a throne, blindfolded like the soldiers guarding him, and sitting under a Nazi dagger (Daily 
Mirror, 06/07/1940, p.2), elicited complaint from the Eire government. Elizabeth Bowen wrote 
on how easy it was for British opinion to see neutrality as ‘an affair of blindness, egotism, 
escapism or sheer funk’ but argued that if all the facts of the Irish situation were well known, 
England would see the truth in de Valera’s contention that war would ‘be sheer disaster’ for Eire 
(9/11/1940, TNA, DO 130/28). Despite entreaties by some to look beyond first impressions most 
opinions in British government saw Eire continuing in a ‘malade imaginaire’ and ‘confined by 
the walls of her sickroom’ (1/1/1941, TNA, FO 371/2910/8), while Maffey told de Valera that 
Ireland was ‘like a leaf in a backwater between rushing torrents’ (20/6/1941, TNA, DO 35/1109/6). 
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As the war progressed Eire fit into a growing narrative that by standing aloof from the world the 
new country would fail as a nation by consequence of its own actions.  
4.9 FAILING IRELAND  
 
Ireland was fast becoming seen as a place apart from the rest of the world, avoiding 
progress and modernisation, as well as the war. The left-leaning Picture Post was at the forefront 
of a newsprint tendency to portray Ireland as backward, economically, and politically failing, 
under the yoke of Catholicism, and without aspiration, totally opposite to Britain, fighting for a 
better world. In January 1941 Picture Post devoted a whole issue to planning for a new Britain 
when the war was over, urging the commitment to achieve an end to food poverty, reform of 
education, a universal health service, universal employment (Hopkinson, 04/01/1941). In contrast 
to the aspirations of Britain Eire was reported, in the same magazine, as two-thirds ‘peasant 
farmers’ with ‘a large head of children’ in a land where industry was ‘severely discouraged’ 
(MacDonald, 27/07/1940). Predicting failure for de Valera’s policy of self-sufficiency, Picture 
Post articles portrayed the people of the south of Ireland as ‘a people conditioned by a defiant 
Nationalism, an archaic language….’ (C. Connolly, 11/04/1942), with ‘no great aptitude for 
things mechanical’ (MacDonald, 27/07/1940) and contrasted them with the Northern Irish by 
charging Southerners as behaving like ‘overgrown infants’ (Ervine, 02/03/1940). Such articles 
led to a Picture Post ban in Eire, an outcome that only served to confirm to readers the oddity and 
paradox that was Ireland. One readers letter starts with ‘Congratulations on your banning in Eire’ 
and deprecates Irish censorship as having ‘cultivated a queer habit of using a robust blue pencil 
to knock their own brains out’ (Fegen, 24/08/1940).  
However, it was the Sunday Dispatch that published the most stinging article of this type. 
Dorothy Crisp’s article ‘I see the Tragedy of Ireland’ (Sunday Dispatch, 05/06/1943, LHMA), 
suggested the Irish people should reassess whether the de Valera government’s insistence on 
neutrality was worth the price they had to pay for their current situation. The article insists ‘Eire 
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is dying a slow death at the hands of the de Valera government’ which is characterised as ‘an iron 
dictatorship and a censorship that could teach Goebbels a few tricks’. Recounting a declining 
birth-rate, heavy censorship, increasing emigration and the assertion that the economy was upheld 
by money sent home from the Irish abroad as evidence of hopeless economic situation, Crisp 
describes the Irish government as causing ‘informed people everywhere (to want) only one thing 
- the British to come back and impose one government on the whole country' (Sunday Dispatch, 
05/06/1943, LHMA). The article portrays all Irelands problems as a product of their own action 
or inaction, and, though the article presents valid points about unemployment, emigration and 
birth-rates, the expectation that these would cause economic collapse, was grossly exaggerated. 
Eire was portrayed as being oppositional to the aims of the ‘plan for Britain’ and ‘the People’s 
War’, by allowing continued poverty, poor health, poor education, emigration, and unemployment 
to continue without planning for a better, more industrious future. The article connects progress 
and war so closely that one cannot seem to be imagined without the other. Eire’s attempts to 
achieve progress without bloodshed are somehow seen as less laudable than British progress at 
the cost of millions of lives. It is undoubtedly the conclusion that the ‘informed’ people of Ireland 
would want a return to British rule that led Irish government to block the import of the Dispatch. 
for this not only implies that the great majority of Irish people were ignorant to their own 
condition, but also that the Irish state, because of its impending failure, had no right to independent 
existence. That Ireland’s dreams of a country ‘joyous with the sounds of industry’ were only 
slightly different than those of the ‘people’s war’, as exemplified in de Valera’s St. Patricks Day 
speech in 1943 (Quoted in R Fisk, 1985, p. 417), would preferably be achieved without bloodshed, 
mattered little. 
Several other sources reflect public feeling that Ireland would forever be dependent on 
Britain. Commenting on a visit to Ireland ‘JS’ wrote to the Dominions Office of the Irish that 
‘they are in a position where they are forced to admit their dependence on Great Britain’ 
(30/9/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). In the War Cabinet, as early as 1940, Cranborne presented a 
memorandum arguing that ‘The Irish are at present living in a world of illusion. They consider 
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that a prosperous Eire is indispensable to Britain…. (but) she is entirely dependent on us’ (TNA, 
PREM 3/128). This attitude continued into 1942 with Maffey writing that Eire will fail as a state 
and must look to Britain for relief, blaming this situation entirely on de Valera’s policies, 
including neutrality, and asserting that de Valera himself knew as much (2/2/1942, TNA, CAB 
66/21/37). This kind of attitude, alongside continued British and American refusal to arm Eire so 
she could defend herself, caused not entirely unjustified resentment in Ireland. At the same time, 
that British people were uninterested in Ireland and repudiated all Irish nationalist aspirations, 
dismissing the Irish with ‘expressions of contempt for, and impatience with, the policy of Mr de 
Valera's government’ and ‘little sympathy for their afflictions’ (12/2/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). A 
Times editorial reflects this disinterest by describing the 1943 election as ‘hardly even a footnote 
in history’ (The Times, 26/06/1943, p.5) and another paper asserted it was irrelevant to Britain if 
de Valera were to fall and the ‘Cosgrave party’ take over because ‘the difference for us would be 
that between Tweedledum and Tweedledee’ (Dundee Courier, 26/06/1943, p.2). British derision 
for Ireland and the Irish ranged from ignorance of any problem to asserting the Irish could never 
be truly independent. 
Those who were slightly more interested in Ireland often used the cause of Irish language 
revival as evidence of backward-looking policies doomed to failure. Before the war attempts to 
revive the Irish language were blamed for lowering the standard of education and creating a new 
ideology which made ‘fanaticism a virtue’ (Birmingham Post, 23/08/1939, p.13). Maffey 
characterised de Valera’s aspirations for Ireland as to create a walled-in ‘island paradise’ with 
‘everyone talking Gaelic’ as ‘a nightmare to the average Irishman’ (TNA, DO 35/1107/1), and a 
correspondent to the Times decried ‘Erse-ridden Eire’ (The Times, 11/11/1940, p.5). That several 
German diplomats and academics were interested in Gaelic revivalism, did not help the cause of 
language revival in British eyes (9/11/1940, TNA, DO 130/28), though British press attaché John 
Betjeman used the Irish language47 as part of his soft power approach to propaganda (O'Drisceoil, 
                                                          
47 Betjeman frequently wrote letters to Irish correspondents in Gaelic language and script. He wrote to 
Coyne, Irish censor, that ‘by this time next year, my letters will be wholly in Irish if I am alive’ (Quoted in 
O'Drisceoil, 1996, p. 147). 
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1996, p. 197). By 1944, attitudes had hardened to the point where de Valera’s speech arguing 'that 
if Eire fails to make Irish the everyday language of the people’ it will have 'failed in everything' 
was used as evidence that De Valera’s government had truly failed (Dundee Courier, 14/08/1944, 
p.2).  
Towards the end of the war newspapers reported that de Valera’s government had created 
an economic disaster and that the Irish people were poverty stricken. The Times argued that ‘the 
sole preoccupation of Mr de Valera's government of Eire is to find palliatives for an economic 
situation which has reduced many Irish standards to those of the eighteenth century’ (The Times, 
26/06/1943, p.5). Newspapers also saw Ireland as having failed to become ‘a modern nation’ by 
not concentrating on progress and compromising with Britain (Daily Record, 13/01/1940, p.7). A 
narrative connecting lack of modernisation to the possibility of a recurrence of famine also 
emerged. Newspaper articles blame poverty on the current government and linked neutrality with 
causing misery and starvation, especially in rural areas. The Western Mail asserted that if de 
Valera had joined the war in 1939 ‘Eire would today be enjoying a period of prosperity instead 
of languishing in the depths of despair, a branded country with a future entirely devoid of hope’ 
(Western Mail, 04/12/1944, p.2), whilst another editorial relates ‘Eire’s penalty for neutrality’ is 
that Eire ‘has suffered just as severely as if Germany had added her to her list of occupied 
countries’ (Yorkshire Post, 16/11/1944, p.2)48. As early as 1940 the Daily Mail had warned of 
potential famine and Forward! replied pointing out that no matter the level of poverty and 
potential for famine, under British rule, for most of the Irish people, this had always been a 
possibility (Forward! 30/05/1940, LHMA). Though there was evidence by 1941 of heightened 
discontent in Eire focussing on food and other supply shortages, increasing unemployment, 
censorship, and ineffective controls on profiteering (26/3/1941, TNA, INF 1/292), such discontent 
still did not transform into desire to end neutrality. Though Elizabeth Bowen frequently heard 
‘We'd be better off if we were in the war!’ (12/7/1942, TNA, DO 130/28) this was not a majority 
                                                          
48 Though presumably with less destruction, brutality, murder, and genocide. 
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view49, and yet there is, alongside the narrative of impending starvation, a narrative of plenty, 
often judged in comparison with food supplies and rationing in Britain. 
Though some reports from Ireland emphasised a ‘fallacious impression of plenty, created 
by the ample supplies of meat, butter, eggs and milk, jam, tinned fruit etc.’ there were still two 
basic shortages of wheat and fuel which would impact more directly on the economy than others 
(30/4/1942, TNA, DO 130/28) and were subject to stringent government control50. Postal 
censorship reports indicated that by 1943 69% of correspondents were dissatisfied with living 
conditions in Eire, but the same report notes British visitors saw a different picture, writing ‘The 
food over here is wonderful, plenty of meat, ham, chocolate and fruit, the beer is terrific, you 
wouldn't know there was a war on here…’ and that ‘Northerners who come down here by the 
thousand their pockets stuffed full of money buying anything and everything’ (8/9/1943, TNA, CJ 
4/30).  Visiting MO diarists noted the abundance of food (7/9/1941, MO Diarist 5080 ) and one, 
from NI, referenced gaining supplies from the South, by various means, after admitting she felt 
‘abnormally hungry all the time’ (5/3/1940, MO Diarist 5462).  
 Though reports reflect a belief in both possible famine and plenty, in comparison with 
supplies available on ration in Britain, availability of food became an obvious point of division 
between the peoples of Ireland and Britain. Postal censorship reports note that complaints of food 
shortages in Britain ‘come mainly from people with Irish names’ and that ‘Most people agree that 
the rations are ample and forbid their correspondents to try to send them supplies from Ireland’ 
(30/8/1940, TNA, CAB 66/11/39). Though both peoples considered themselves adversely affected 
by food rationing, Irish people in Britain were considered to complain more and thus were less 
supportive of the sacrifice to be made by all.  
                                                          
49 See TNA, CJ 4/30, 1/2/1942 
50 Compulsory tillage was introduced alongside a total ban on private use of motor vehicles, moves which 
undoubtedly affected the governments popularity in rural areas. 
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4.10 ‘THE PEOPLES WAR’ 
 
Visitors to Ireland also often remarked on the contrast between Britain at war and Eire at 
peace, enjoying their visit as relief from the pressures of ‘the people’s war’. As Carol Acton 
argues visitors saw Ireland ‘as both an escape from wartime stresses and a place whose refusal to 
be disrupted by larger European events makes it seem indifferent to the experience of its wartime 
participants’ (Acton, 2010, p. 43). MO diarist #5080, in Ireland days before the outbreak, admitted 
he and his father ‘wished very much we could stay …for 'the duration' if it came - and be out of 
it…’ (30/8/1939, MO Diarist 5080) and another noting being in Dublin ‘was like living in a 
different country altogether – no blackout51, no excess of soldiers …’ (4/12/1939, MO Diarist 
5102). Other visiting diarists noted the slower pace of life, the friendliness of the people and the 
beauty of the Irish landscape, and the ease with which the war could be forgotten (MO Diarist 
5067; MO Diarist 5080; MO Diarist 5102). One diary records a friend’s impressions in which he 
saw ‘no reason why they should abandon their neutrality’ (7/9/1941, MO Diarist 5067). Yet 
visitors could not ignore the war completely, and one qualifies her feelings; ‘Yet I had a feeling 
of depression – I couldn’t live in such a precious peace – purchased, as it were, at other people’s 
expense, while they are suffering’ (2/5/1941, MO Diarist 5245).  
British Forces personnel training in Northern Ireland also recorded good times in Eire 
escaping from the war. On a visit to Bundoran, Co. Donegal, in Eire, Gunner Christy noted ‘Lough 
Erne’s wooded islands…a place of escape from war’ and ‘tea at a boarding house - best had for 
ages’ (13/7/1942, Christy, 1942, IWM). RAF Officer Willert related to his wife visits to the home 
of a retired Colonel in the same county, feeling ‘that these people were really pleased to have me 
for my own sake’ (5/1/1940, Willert, 1940, IWM). Later the same year he writes ‘Back again in 
Eire for work…A step back into the happy past …nothing to do but watch and dream…’ 
(20/5/1940, Willert, 1940, IWM) and in September after a walk by a lake in Donegal ‘I had a 
                                                          
51 A BIPO poll in 1942 revealed the blackout in Britain was the war restriction that the public resented 
most with 40.19% of respondents disliking it (Liddell et al., 1996). 
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comfortable bed of heather and went half asleep and dreamed vaguely…It was good to be alive’ 
(30/9/1940, Willert, 1940, IWM). Navy Coder S W Wallace recorded being told friendly tales by 
locals52 and friendly border guards when crossing the border to get cheaper beer and otherwise 
unobtainable ice-cream in Eire (30/6/1943, Wallace, 1943, IWM). For visitors, this peaceful isle 
now seemed so different from Britain, like another country. The seductiveness of an oasis of 
peace felt by British visitors in neutral Ireland, was a relief to some but for others led to 
resentment, not only due to Eire being under the protection of Britain, but also due to longing for 
such peace at home. Many felt that Eire’s neutrality had allowed them to shirk their part in the 
war as part of the British Empire, and the relative lack of disruption caused by being outside the 
war distanced the Irish from the experience of the British people.  
This relationship to the war was often portrayed as availing of the benefits of empire 
without contributing. MO diarist #5349 reflected on Irish neutrality that ‘As it is, they get all the 
best of the empire and turn down the responsibility’ (29/11/1940, MO Diarist 5349) despite 
evidence of many Irish people fighting privately in the British Forces. A letter to the editor reveals 
the opinion that the Irish ‘have no sympathy with our effort to keep alive the true spirit of 
humanity’ yet ‘they are re to-day living ...because we are shouldering the burden in every 
direction, and they are doing nothing - nothing to help us’53. This letter further suggests a boycott 
of Irish goods and advocates that British ships should no longer supply Eire ‘for the benefit of 
these people who dislike us so intensely’ (Western Mail, 23/11/1940, p.5). An editorial comes to 
a similar conclusion noting de Valera ‘This inveterate enemy of Great Britain… prepared to 
benefit by the protection which British naval and air power…remains austerely aloof’ (The 
Scotsman, 26/12/1941, p.4). The characterisation of Eire as an enemy was also felt in government 
as Churchill remarked in the right circumstances the British people would show ‘a storm of wrath 
against de Valera and his adherents’, and in any case, they had a right to know ‘who are the 
enemies who are hampering our efforts to feed them’ (TNA, ADM 1/10366/274/4). 
                                                          
52 Including that an old lady quietly snoozing in a canteen he visited was General Montgomery’s mother! 
53 Unknowing of vital intelligence co-operation and other aid described in the Cranborne Report  
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The differing experiences of war in Britain and Eire were also proved by a narrative of 
acceptance of the British experience by some Irish people living in Britain. HI reports evidence 
of opinion that these were ‘ashamed to admit their nationality, because people are so 
contemptuous of their country’s neutrality’ (8/1/1941, TNA, INF 1/292) and this was reflected in 
government circles where Brendan Bracken, Minister for Information barred the BBC from 
covering the Eire elections arguing ‘the public would be horrified if they heard anything from the 
BBC about de Valera and those lousy neutrals; people of Irish stock overseas are heartily ashamed 
of Eire’s attitude’ (Quoted in O'Donoghue, 2014, p. 120). In 1941, however, a HI report 
acknowledges that praise of British resolve written to Ireland from countrymen in Britain did not 
change Irish attitudes to neutrality (12/2/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Fear of air attack was charged 
as being the main difference between the stoic British character and the apprehensive Irish. When 
postal censorship revealed ‘some writers are annoyed at rumours prevalent in Ireland of 
destruction done by air-raids’ with one relating from Newcastle that ‘people here are not much 
annoyed by the planes coming, we all go down to the shelters and sing songs’ (30/8/1940, TNA, 
CAB 66/11/39) indicating the shared experience of the Blitz helped create a new unifying force, 
which separated the Irish in Britain from the Irish in neutral Ireland.  
4.11 RELIGION  
 
Religious differences also compounded the growing conception of Irish separation from 
the Empire, and on occasion, duplicitous Irishness and Catholicism are treated as one and the 
same. A housewife in Bolton comments in June 1940, that ‘next door, she’s an Irish woman, she’s 
Roman Catholic…. She got turned out of the store down her (sic) for being fifth column’ (MO 
File Report 181 - Capitulation Talk in Worktown, 1940). Diarists with links to Northern Ireland, 
often discussed Irish Catholicism with abject distaste, with one describing it as ‘That horrible 
religion…’ (5/5/1945, MO Diarist 5296), and another writes of the Catholic church as ‘an 
honourable, dignified, sincere, elevated, trustworthy, intelligent cage’ (14/11/1940, MO Diarist 
5439). Both appear to believe its followers, often Irish Nationalists, deluded by Catholic teachings 
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and influenced by a religion disinterested in freedom of thought and action. ‘American soldiers 
in Northern Ireland’ records rumoured deaths after drinking local home-brewed poteen, giving 
the rumour credit because a confirming source ‘was Protestant and a reputable citizen…’ (MO 
File Report 1306 - Americans in Ireland, 1942), implying that local Catholics were not. 
Catholicism, being a convenient marker for distinguishing loyalty to the crown, was also to be 
used as a marker of credibility.  
A report on the Greenock By-Election of 1941 similarly notes the existence of religious 
communities in Scotland, relating that ‘The Irish in Greenock …seem to be a smaller and less 
unpopular minority than in Glasgow’, but reveals ‘Battle of the Boyne celebrations (12th July) 
…are declining very rapidly. There hasn't been a fight for 4 or 5 years… (MO File Report 778 - 
Greenock By-Election, 1941). It seems that enduring sectarian antipathy, in Scotland at least, only 
required an igniting spark to rise once more to conflagration. Continuity of religious antagonism 
is also hinted at in a report on ‘Morale in Liverpool and Manchester’, where it is noted that the 
Irish ‘are surprisingly not the subject of racial statements about bad morale from the Non-Irish’, 
yet blames this on a ‘lack of close ties with Liverpool as a native home’, and this ‘lack of 
identification with Liverpool …being offset by Roman Catholicism, which gives a positive faith 
and guidance in difficult times, a factor which has been found extremely advantageous to morale’ 
(MO File Report 538 - Liverpool and Manchester, 1940). That religion is seen as a negative 
influence in Glasgow and a positive influence in Liverpool and Manchester, suggests that the 
attitude of the natives was more dependent on the holder of the opinion rather than the subject of 
it. It seems more likely that showing the ‘right attitude’ to the war, rather than religious affiliation, 
was of more importance to public opinion.  
4.12 CONCLUSION 
 
In the Interwar period, as Mo Moulton has shown (Moulton, 2014), Irishness had become 
less politicised mainly due to the creation of the Irish Free State and reduced activity by the IRA. 
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Though the ‘S-Plan’ bombings in Britain created outrage and anti-IRA feeling, attitudes to the 
Irish people, aside from their government, were often conciliatory. The MO 1939 Race survey 
shows, as Clair Wills argues, that MO respondents did not feel the Irish to be foreigners, rather 
an integral part of the empire and even the UK (Wills, 2008). However, the same survey makes it 
clear that de Valera, and the Irish nationalism that he came to represent to British people, was felt 
to be representative of all that was wrong with Ireland. On occasion the survey also proved that 
many MO contributors also found it hard to distinguish between the motivations of the IRA and 
constitutional nationalists working within the democratic political system. Some also thought the 
Catholic Church too powerful and a force working against progress and freedom of thought. 
However, it was clear that though Ireland was thought of as being misled by nationalists, it was 
still thought of as one of the home nations. 
 At the outbreak of war, despite frequent reports that Ireland would be neutral, public 
expectation was that Ireland would join the Dominions in declaring war. When Ireland did not, 
public opinion, and newspaper narratives, reflected a failure to accept that the ordinary Irish 
people supported neutrality. Newspapers, either due to poor investigation or a desire to promote 
‘a people’s war’ narrative, in the main chose to believe the Irish people were being misled by anti-
British Irish nationalist politicians. The British government was party to more accurate 
information from postal censorship reports which reflected an Irish public sympathy for Britain, 
but also a belief in neutrality, identifying it with Irish independence. These insights created a 
cautious consensus in the War Cabinet that, unless circumstances changed, and considering the 
secret and valuable intelligence co-operation already in place, it would be better for Britain to not 
to use force against Ireland. However, this was all unknown to the press and public who, even 
after the 1943 election re-instated de Valera, still found it hard to believe the Irish people were 
not on the British side, and a new narrative emerged that Irish people joining the British Forces 
were now exhibiting the true Irish ‘fighting spirit’. Those who joined up had taken sides and were 
cast as Anti-neutral although there was much evidence to the contrary. The narrative of the Irish 
people being misled by nationalism only got stronger throughout the war, especially in reaction 
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to the Fall of France, the Battle of the Atlantic, the reaction to spy scares and the preparations for 
D-Day, showing that feeling towards Ireland and the Irish was highly reactive to circumstance. 
In a war of extremes, it was much easier for people to believe in binary choices rather than 
nuanced reality. 
However, it is impossible to discount the effect of historical antipathy, where, when it 
suited British opinion, the Irish could easily be regarded as foreigners though the nations were 
united in one state before independence. As early as 1940 there are signs that the Irish were once 
more being regarded as foreign. It is important to note public reaction to foreigners in general was 
at least antipathetic, and similar sentiment toward the Irish can be found against refugees, and 
especially, Jews. An MO Anti-Semitism survey (MO, FR A12 - Anti Semitism Survey, 1939) 
reports accusations of ‘Job snatching, cheap labour, undercutting, boycotting’ by Jews, 
accusations that would latterly be levelled at the Irish. Attitudes to their supposed ‘character’, 
formed in previous centuries, also plainly retained cultural currency. Ancient charges of 
indolence, stupidity, superficial charm, and inability to face the facts, are used to bolster and boost 
opinion that Eire’s actions were expected to be troublesome because it was in their nature. Notably 
one aspect of older Irish prejudices not repeatedly used, though by no means absent, is the trope 
of comical paradoxical Irishness. Treating the Irish as a joke was far less prominent than in 
previous times, reflecting the level of danger that Irish neutrality was supposed to present. 
 There was also evidence that ‘Irishness’ was being recast by the British concurrently 
alongside ‘Britishness’ by the trials of war. Irishness was becoming oppositional to everything 
that Britishness meant. Angus Calder argued the ‘myth of the blitz’ narrative helped debar the 
Irish from the collective struggle against the Nazi’s (Calder, 1991, pp. 65-66). Because the Irish 
were not in the war, they were not learning the lessons the British were learning, at least according 
to the myth of the ‘people’s war’. The Irish were afraid of air-raids, were not standing up to 
oppressors, were not fighting for progress, were not sharing in a common constructive experience, 
which would shape the future. As Clair Wills argues ‘…as the war was increasingly understood 
as a ‘people’s war’, a struggle by ordinary civilians against the monster of Hitlerism, Ireland’s 
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stance was looked upon as a betrayal of democracy itself’ (Wills, 2008, p. 7). In a time when all 
motivations were becoming interpreted as part of an ideology, Ireland’s stance could not be seen 
by the British as practical, it had to be aloofness and avoidance of responsibility.  
The Irish were also being cast as backward-looking and ruled by grudges of the past and 
because of this destined to fail, even to the point of having to return as part of the UK. De Valera’s 
St Patrick’s Day speech of 1943 is often represented, to this day, as a backward looking, idealist 
vision of an Ireland which almost celebrated poverty, using the term ‘frugal comfort’ as an ideal 
for the future. However, as David McCullagh points out, this ‘frugality’ was to be achieved by a 
fairer distribution of wealth, to ensure a minimum for everyone, through modernisation and 
economic growth (McCullagh, 2018, p. 229). Envisaging an ‘ideal Ireland’ a land ‘whose 
countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous 
with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children…’ (Quoted in R Fisk, 1985, p. 
417), de Valera’s vision was perceived as being unachievable and undesirable in Britain, though 
this was the same aspiration expected of the post-war British Governments by the British 
electorate. Adherence to Catholicism fit this narrative, similarly fearful of modernisation and free-
thinking, and historically disloyal to the crown, also enabling the portrayal of spiritual inspiration 
for neutrality as smugness. Similarly, the question of Eire’s claims to Northern Ireland was the 
bearing of an ancient grudge, which should be forgotten in the face of Hitler. Elizabeth Bowen 
characterised this different view of history as Irish ‘childishness and obtuseness’ but accepted that 
‘any hint of a violation of Eire may well be used to implement enemy propaganda and weaken 
the British case’ (TNA, DO 130/28). By 1942 public opinion of Ireland and the Irish was 
dismissive and disinterested in a nation that had stepped aside from responsibility and was 
suffering for its lack of ambition. However, Irish suffering was not characterised as stoically borne 
like Britain’s and was being interpreted as being for little purpose. Thus, Ireland was both an 




5 IRISH IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN BRITAIN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Public opinion on Irish people who settled in Britain had always revolved around a 
dichotomy; that is that Irish people, until 1949 in British law, were British citizens, but were 
culturally ‘foreign’, which made them perceptually mutative. Cultural differences became 
obvious as emigration to Victorian Britain grew with the death of Irish industries and with the 
popularity of Social-Darwinist pseudo sciences of ‘race’, which gave putative justification to fear 
and disdain of cultural difference. By the time the Irish Free State was formed the legal basis of 
Irish Nationality had not changed, but perceptions of Irish perfidiousness in the revolutionary 
period certainly had. Both the new Irish State and Britain aimed to reduce migration, with the 
Free State governments fearing British restriction would expose the shortcomings of Independent 
Ireland (Daly, 2006, p. 139), and Britain fearing societal unease. Though there had been previous 
attempts to limit or stop Irish immigration to Britain54, post 1921 attempts to do so assumed, with 
the Southern Irish now ruling their own state, Britain should rescind their British nationality. Daly 
and Delaney have noted especially vocal attempts in Scotland to limit predominantly Catholic 
Irish migration (Daly, 2006, p. 144 n.; Delaney, 2000, pp. 84-93). In 1928 attempts by Scots local 
authorities, concerned over the increased numbers of the ‘least desirable class of Irish immigrants 
into this country’, requested repatriation of Irish persons who became chargeable to the poor rate, 
except for ‘certain classes of workers e.g., female domestic servants’ (TNA, CAB 24/197). In 
response the Home Secretary, Joynson-Hicks, showing equal disdain for the Irish, concluded that 
immigration control could not be enforced against British citizens, and that ‘the damage had 
already been done’ as it was ‘the Irish and their descendants already in Scotland who represent 
the real problem’ (20/02/1929, TNA, CAB 24/201). By July 1930 the requests had been studied 
                                                          
54 ‘Irish immigration’ is a misnomer as Irish people, before 1921, were born in the UK so could not be 
‘emigrating’ by moving to another part of it; they were migrants. After 1921 citizens of the Irish Free State 
and Eire were, in British law, British citizens. I use ‘Irish immigration’ because it was generally perceived 
as such.  
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by the Scottish Secretary, who concluded that that the number of Irish persons being charged to 
the poor rate in Scotland, the number of Irish people convicted of crimes and indeed the number 
of Irish immigrants in general, had decreased between 1901 and 1921, and the 1931 census was 
expected to show a similar decrease (TNA, CAB 24/213). It became clear that any changes to the 
‘immigration problem’ were due to changes in public perception. By 1938 the British government 
had agreed no restriction of Irish immigrants as they were not a drain on public funds, were useful 
unskilled workers, and did not cause the unemployment of natives (Glynn, 1981, pp. 61-67). 
 However, the necessities of war made the continually vital supply of labour from Ireland 
even more important to the British war economy. Despite traditional unease at Irish immigration, 
and fears of infiltration by enemies of the state, 198,538 Irish travel permits were issued 1940-
1945 to GB and NI (T. Connolly, 2000, p. 52). However, these numbers do not accurately reflect 
the total number of Irish persons who travelled to Britain to work because they include seasonal 
workers, those who may not have used the permits, every journey each traveller made, and visitors 
who did not travel for this purpose. Several sources estimate the number of Irish workers in Britain 
during the second World War to be around 100,000 persons (Delaney, 1998, p. 31) and the British 
Foreign Office statistics stated the same number, from NI and Eire, in Britain in 1943 (TNA, DO 
35/1230). The paucity of accurate information on the number of Irish people working in Britain 
in this period typifies the problems inherent in tackling the subject of Irish immigrant workers in 
general in this period, mainly due to the CTA, disputed British Nationality and poor record 
keeping. This inaccuracy, coupled with cultural antipathy based on the shared history between 
Britain and Ireland, means it is extremely hard to find where the truth lay in any of the disputed 
facts that make up the history of this period, as the official historian of the subject of Irish Labour 
in Britain during the war acknowledged (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 1). However, for the purposes of 
this study, the contemporary and historical controversy caused by this confusion evidence a large 
amount of subjectivity, and sometimes violent antipathy in the historical record, worthy of close 
analysis. These views often existed despite dire necessity for Irish workers and affected the 
formulation of policy as well as their experience within the milieu this necessity created.  
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5.2 ONLY IN IT FOR THE MONEY 
 
In 1939 the context of impending war, rearmament, immigration, and the IRA ‘S-Plan’ 
attacks combined to create an atmosphere of turmoil and scapegoating. Initial agitation against 
Irish Immigration was not however based on Eire’s attitude to war or the IRA campaign. Initial 
agitation on immigration was based on the employment of Irish workers while local men were 
out of work (The Scotsman, 19/01/1939, p.10), for example a Liverpool councillor urged an 'Irish 
Bureau' be set up to monitor the city's Irish immigrants and expel those who fell to poor relief or 
criminality (Liverpool Echo, 19/01/1939, p.9). By February a committee formed on this basis was 
‘vigorously’ promoting a petition to government asking for ‘appropriate action in the interests of 
local labour....' (Liverpool Daily Post, 13/02/1939, p.2). While ‘The Man o’ The People’ column 
argued unambiguously ‘jobs for our own countrymen first and safe employment for all of them 
when peace returns!’ (The People, 03/03/1940, p.9), letters to newspapers also linked immigration 
to high unemployment, with one writer arguing that Irish immigrants should be allowed to enter 
only if they ‘possess enough money to keep themselves for a certain period…’ with the added 
proviso that ‘their luggage does not consist of bombs!’ (Northants Evening Telegraph, 
13/05/1939, p.5). Others agreed, concluding that a ‘back to Ireland’ policy would solve 
unemployment, while an MO respondent argued Irish people were only interested in British 
money, ‘particularly when they all trouped off home last September’ (MO Directive Respondent 
1433, 1939), before the Munich Agreement. Irish people were also expected to contribute equally 
and have the same attitude as British workers and works Welfare officers often argued that the 
Irish were not ‘here to do war work’, a typical argument being that ‘they are eager to earn as much 
as they can. That's why most of the Irish girls work pretty well…There's very little evidence of 
their having the right spirit towards their work...’ (02/08/1943, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly 
Bulletin (13)). There was little appreciation of the differing circumstances of Eire’s neutral 
position, her history, or her people’s motivations. 
 By the end of 1941 HI was reporting that Irish neutrality was being added to this 
resentment which allowed Irish workers to make money while others fought for their right to do 
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so (12/12/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). However, this was rare; more often economic and security 
fears affected views on the workers ‘invasion’ from Ireland. Agencies such as the Wartime Survey 
and Home Intelligence, repeatedly argued that issues on the Home Front were of most public 
concern, and Irish immigration one of these. Mary Adams, founder of HI, wrote the purpose of 
her agencies work was to ascertain ‘What the Public is Asking?’ and one early specific question 
on unemployment asked, ‘why do labourers (including many Irishmen) earn £10 or more a week 
building aerodromes and on other government work, while soldiers only earn a few shillings?’ 
(01/08/1940, TNA, INF 1/283), indicating that many felt the government was favouring Irish 
workers above ‘their own’. Further, the Irish, long accustomed to sending money home to family, 
were frequently accused of profiting from British misfortune as they were not liable for 
conscription. HI reports note early in the war that locals in Crowborough and Corsham resented 
Irish labourers working on defence projects, when ‘many Britons are unemployed’ (8/8/1940, 
TNA, INF 1/264) and where a man could ‘save in a week as much as, in Ireland, he would earn 
in a month’ (11/09/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Irish workers were not reticent about poor conditions 
in Eire and that they were glad to be working in Britain arguing ‘I'd sooner work in England than 
in Ireland’ and ‘They pay very bad money in Ireland. The girls in the shirt factories only get 30/- 
a week, and they sweat themselves to get it’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). 
Private letters reveal that many were aware of Irish workers in the jobs of those who had been 
called up, earning good wages, and expressing intention to stay after the war. One relates the 
poverty of Eire and tells that the Irish in Britain encourage their friends to come over too; the 
writer knows this because ‘I read their letters…so I get first-hand news of their reactions’ 
(Hudson, 03/12/1941)55. No doubt this kind of information spread, and fuelled feeling that the 
Irish were profiting from neutrality at British expense.  
It was acknowledged by the Irish that a lot of money was being sent home and 
Government Postal Censorship reports showed they were grateful for it. One writer argued ‘we 
would have had a famine here, but for that outlet’ (8/9/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30) but another believed 
                                                          
55 The letter reveals the author was a postal censor. 
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the work easier, arguing ‘you would do more work in one day in Bantry than a week here’ 
(15/01/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30). Though the same source also betrayed evidence that some Irish 
workers were unhappy with their lot financially56, there is much evidence the Irish knew they 
were ‘not popular’ in a factory context (15/1/1942, TNA, CJ 4/30). HI reports frequently note 
complaints of high wages for Irish Labourers, with rumours of pay at ‘Seven pounds a week with 
additional lodging allowance of 24s 6d’ (22/7/1943, TNA, INF 1/292) and MO noted this affected 
industrial relations when ‘imported workmen, often Irish, come in on high-time rates to build a 
new factory or aerodrome, upsetting the whole local pattern’ (MO File Report 1344 - People in 
Production, 1942). Some believed the Irish were getting all the best positions in their factory, 
though it was counter claimed by the Irish workers that locals lacked initiative and drive (MO 
File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). A belief that the Irish getting preferential 
treatment and were profiting from Britain was widespread throughout the war but came to a head 
after the Travel ban before the D-Day landings. Editorials were happy that thenceforth Irish 
workers in Britain ‘will not be permitted to leave; and they will pay their share of income tax like 
every British wage-earner’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 13/03/1944, p.2). Later, correspondents 
wanted even more from Irish workers, agreeing with one writer who argued that those who did 
not protest at de Valera’s condolences on Hitler’s death ‘should be sent home’ as they ‘are not 
entitled to the same rights as those who opposed the Hun and his partners’ (Birmingham Daily 
Gazette,28/05/1945, p.2). This writer appeared to believe that working in Britain required the 
worker believe in the political morals of the majority, a requirement not unlike that of the regime 
that had just been defeated.  
An MO report succinctly concluded the ‘most important…feeling against Irishmen in 
England (is that they) only come here to undercut British wages and do Englishmen and Scotsmen 
out of jobs…amass small fortunes (and take) them back to Ireland, thus impoverishing England’ 
                                                          
56 A Report of Irish Labour in the UK No. 4, quoted one writer; ‘the men are running out of this job out is 
the worst in England for pay and conditions. The poor labourers have only 1/5 1/4 per hour...I have not a 
penny as I can barely feed myself the money is so small’ (15/1/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). Another was upset 
nearly half his income was stopped in tax (08/06/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). 
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(08/02/1941, MO File Report 569 - Airmen, 1941). Various sources evidence the belief that 
money was being sucked out of the British economy and this motivated industrial unrest 
(31/07/1942, MO File Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942). MO reported ‘there is no doubt 
that much money is being sent back to their families in Ireland’ but often such views took no 
account that money was moving all over Britain, to ‘Wales, Scotland, Lancashire, and other areas’ 
(01/06/1940, MO File Report 267 - Economic Effects of the War, 1/6/1940)57. The same report 
noted this money was being spent ‘paying for previous poverty…repaying arrears on rent, rates, 
doctors’ bills….as well as personal debts’ (MO File Report 267 - Economic Effects of the War, 
1/6/1940). However, evidence of animosity is more prevalent against the Irish, not least because 
this was the largest group of imported workers in wartime Britain and because they were actively 
encouraged by government agencies.  
Despite Irish workers doing work necessary for the smooth running of the war economy, 
some even saw no return or benefit arising from their employment. Indeed, one newspaper report 
linked the workers remuneration, suggested to be £5 million pounds a year, to the ‘land annuities 
Mr. de Valera's government objected to paying’ as part of the 1938 Agreement (Daily Telegraph, 
03/08/1942, LHMA), implying that Ireland was recouping her loss of this money unfairly. Many 
did not consider the money well-earned and ignored the fact that it was taxed at the same rate as 
home workers. An exchange of letters in The Times indicates some of the resentment, and fear of 
economic ruin, that characterised opinions on Eire, historically considered to be a drain on British 
resources. St John Ervine, Ulster playwright and World War One veteran, argued in a series of 
letters to The Times, that the true figure leaving Britain was £7 million, representing ‘a clear gain 
to Eire’, and that this led him to believe Eire would be bankrupt without ‘being maintained, as 
well as protected, by Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (The Times, 29/05/1943, p.5). Responses 
to his letter point out that this was not ‘a clear gain’, but was given in exchange for services, 
gladly received, at least, by the farmers of South Lincolnshire, who felt the Irish ‘excellent 
                                                          
57 On occasion Jews, Scots and the Welsh were blamed for ‘taking British Jobs’(sic) (01/11/941, MO File 
Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942) 
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workers (and) they certainly give us good value for money’, whilst another pointed out that a 
large proportion of it was being sent home by Irish men and Women in the Forces or involved in 
vital war-work (The Times, 01/06/1943, p.5). Ervine re-iterated his opinion once more in 1945, 
once more ignoring the value of labour, arguing if Irish people could maintain themselves in 
Britain as well as their family at home it was evidence that Great Britain and NI was ‘subsidising 
Eire, and being repaid with neutrality’ (The Times, 06/03/1945, p.5). This time it was General 
Hubert Gough’s turn to point out that remittances represented evidence 'of a single aspect of the 
magnitude of the unofficial contribution to our British war effort’ (The Times, 14/03/1945, p.5), 
whilst another General, Hugh Montgomery, made the same point and asked if Ervine ‘also 
grudges the pay to the approximately equal numbers of voluntary enlistments from Eire in his 
majesty's fighting forces?’  (The Times, 16/03/1945, p.5). Once more Ervine replied that Eire was 
reliant on Britain and should re-join the Commonwealth (The Times, 26/03/1945, p.5), whilst 
another correspondent counter-argued Eire was the nation which would feed Britain for years to 
come (The Times, 09/05/1945, p.5). The whole argument Ervine put forward, described by Hugh 
Montgomery with understatement as ‘curiously ungenerous’ (The Times, 16/03/1945, p.5), 
typifies the resentful reaction of most commentators, even those with some knowledge of Eire 
and the articulacy to argue their point with appropriate nuance. Ervine’s argument, like most, 
could not escape the essential basis of anti-Irish cultural bias; that Britain was more powerful than 
Ireland, and in all things superior, so Ireland should submit to her.  
5.3 TAKING ADVANTAGE 
 
Not only were Irish workers resented for sending money home to Ireland but also for 
taking advantage of other British comforts at British expense, rather than as a return for their 
labour. Some resented the workers right to vote in Britain, later raised in the commons (Derby 
Daily Telegraph, 03/11/1943, p.5), and incredibly that the Irish ‘listened to Lord Haw-Haw and 
nothing else’, believing ‘atrocity stories as lies’ (20/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292), whilst it was 
possible that Britons also might believe such propaganda. Opinion also linked their stay with 
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conscription, arguing that to be conscripted was the price Irish people should pay for working in 
Britain (MO Directive Respondent 1452, 1939). By May 1939 a Coventry newspaper, before the 
August bombing, argued that Eire enjoyed ‘all the privileges of common citizenship while sharing 
none of the responsibilities’, and therefore that Irish Immigrants should ‘serve or go home’ 
(Coventry Midland Daily Telegraph, 01/05/1939, p.6). Of course, after the Coventry bombing 
feeling against Irish immigrants became more violent as it encompassed hatred of their connection 
with terrorism 
However, most opprobrium was accrued by those who sought medical treatment in 
Britain, which tended to bolster popular theories of Irish pestilence and poor hygiene. Though it 
was true that many of the diseases and infections still not eradicated by post-war universal 
healthcare were a problem in Ireland, fear of contagious disease being transported through these 
workers was more of a concern to the MoL than the impact of actual disease. Before 1943 reports 
from billeting officers reported to various agencies that the health and hygiene of some of the 
Irish workers was cause for concern, and some resented the drain on the resources of the state. 
Pressure was building for the imposition of health checks before arrival in Britain. The official 
history of the employment of Irish workers in wartime Britain, by A.V Judges, reports that many 
providing billets for the Irish workers were ‘distressed by the lack of familiarity with common 
sanitary appliances shown by some of the billettees…(some)…without the remotest notion of 
what baths and lavatories were for’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 35). Though the writer acknowledged 
that British workers could be dirty, that the Irish may not have had the best of facilities on their 
journey, and ‘travel was a peril (to hygiene) in itself’58, nevertheless Irish workers ‘had a bad 
name’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, pp. 44-45). A HI special report on ‘Imported labour’ revealed they 
were seen as ‘a source of constant trouble’ with one factory matron arguing 30% of these, from 
Scotland and Ireland, were either filthy, lousy, or diseased, and one Town Clerk had evidence that 
thirty-seven potential billets issued ‘blank refusals from housewife's to accommodate them’ (TNA, 
                                                          
58 The Judges history acknowledges the transit hotels in Dublin which many workers were practically 
compelled (page 44) to use before they embarked, had a very poor reputation, and it must have been difficult 
to avoid contamination from fellow travellers on route. 
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INF1/292: Special Comments Industry: Imported Labour). Billeting officers also ‘looked askance 
at Irish men and women’ and few authorities would agree to compulsory billeting. Indeed, it the 
MOH ruled that ‘compulsory billeting was never to be used, even as a threat where Irish workers 
were concerned, as feeling ran so high’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 42). However, instances of 
contagion were few with ‘only a small proportion of the Irish…verminous, dirty, drunken, and 
diseased, but their number was sufficient to terrify the ordinary housewife’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, 
pp. 43, footnote 41) already prejudiced against troublesome Irishry. There is some evidence that 
the MoL attempted to allay these fears after attempts to blame the Irish workers for an outbreak 
of scabies in Birmingham, arguing that they was ‘no direct evidence that Irish importees are more 
subject to scabies than other people of the same type’, concluded ‘this is, however, a very different 
thing from saying that the Irish importees are responsible for the spread of the complaint’ (1942, 
TNA, LAB 26/9). This argument did not clearly dispute the argument that the Irish workers were 
unhygienic, rather it argued that there was no evidence they were diseased before coming to 
Britain. Despite the acceptance of many anti-Irish tropes, it was plain that necessity required the 
recruitment to continue.  
However, MO records occasions where expectations were upset, and the Irish workers 
treated with kindness once they had been accepted. One notable example being the billeting of an 
Irish girl who, on becoming ill and having had an operation, was abandoned by her employer and 
the Labour Exchange, and forced to rely on her landlady’s kindness while convalescing. The 
landlady’s initial resistance to an Irish lodger changed to anger at government who had brought 
the girl over here and then denied all responsibility, vowing to ‘raise hell until something is done’ 
(MO File Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942, p. 292). However, according to Judges many 
billeting housewives contended with lodgers with ‘odd physical or mental defects’ such as serious 
hernias, and a few astonishing cases of ‘raving maniacs, cripples and at least one totally blind 
man’, but ‘these were oddities and rare’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 43), but still undoubtedly caused 
resentment. However, the Judges history loses some of its objectivity when relating that ‘the most 
improbable physical and mental complaints were apt to develop after workers reached their 
destination’, and that a significant number of pregnancies were dealt with in Britain (TNA, LAB 
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8/1528, p. 38), suggesting that that some wanted to avail of better healthcare than that available 
at home. In this idea he was not alone, and some believed Irish women were not only availing of 
British facilities but were also using the excuse of working in Britain to hide the shame of an 
unwanted pregnancy (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). As Jennifer Redmond 
has pointed out such concerns and assumptions fed into an already established ‘narrative that 
focussed almost exclusively on the shame of the ‘fallen woman’’, allowed for British opinion to 
puncture Eire’s professed reputation as an exemplary Catholic and moral country, and ‘obfuscated 
the experiences of the vast majority of emigrants…who did not come into contact with welfare 
services’ (Redmond, 2012, pp. 163,183,185). The lack of reliable data on illegitimate births 
among Irish immigrants has led to historical exaggeration of the problem (Jackson, 1963, p. 69), 
though more recent analysis of Irish state sponsored Catholic church agencies in Britain, and the 
dual state sponsored repatriation scheme, has argued that any problem that existed decreased in 
frequency, for various reasons, year on year (Redmond, 2012, pp. 168-172). Contemporaneously, 
anecdotal evidence and cultural expectancy, combined with general opinions on the ‘deserving’ 
or ‘undeserving’ poor, combined to create a narrative where Irish people were often seen as 
undeserving recipients of misguided British charity. 
Though the Irish in Britain were often historically assumed only receivers of medical care 
(Miskell, 2003, p. 82), it has been argued that the contribution of Irish Medical professionals in 
Britain has been under-researched (Redmond, 2014). Because an ‘oversupply of medical 
professionals in Ireland was historically absorbed by Great Britain’, and 4,652 medical 
professionals applying for travel permits to return to Eire between 1940 and 1942 (Redmond, 
2016b, p. 96), there is evidence of a large cohort of male and female medical Irish migrants in a 
wide range of medical employments and disciplines (Redmond, 2014). Nursing was ‘regarded as 
the most desirable and accessible profession for those (Irish women) considering migration to 
Britain’ during the mid-twentieth century (Ryan, 2008, p. 460), not least because Irish trained and 
trainee nurses were exempted from wartime restrictions on immigration to Britain and the high 
cost of nurse training in Eire (Ryan, 2008, p. 460). Between 1941 and 1948, 17,840 travel permits 
were issued to Nurses leaving Eire for Britain (Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1949, Quoted in 
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Redmond, 2012, p. 180)59. Additionally, by 1939 the majority of Irish trained doctors headed for 
work in the British Forces, whose short-service commission system offered much higher 
remuneration and chances for advancement (O'Connor, 2016, pp. 196-197). That these Irish 
medical professionals are not recognised in contemporary sources studied here, bar one ‘drunken 
doctor’ discussed later in this chapter, speaks of ignorance of their contribution, or a tendency to 
believe in a continuing narrative of Ireland as being a drain on British resources, rather than a 
contributor. 
By 1943 public opinion had necessitated the addition of standardised pre-travel medical 
examinations for Irish workers. As the official history points out this innovation covered aspects 
of general welfare concern (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 43) as well as allaying public fears, and allowed 
for both ‘de-lousing’ and healthcare checks before reaching Britain. These were taken on by the 
Irish government and the medical inspection service afforded on behalf of the British government 
was considered ‘100 per cent efficient’ and that ‘not one man or woman who was transferred 
through the General scheme was able to evade vetting. Several local authorities and private 
individual’s requested the cost of healthcare to be recharged to Eire, with one Scunthorpe hospital 
even refusing to urgently treat an Irish worker with TB without first gaining a promise from the 
MoH that they would pay (30/06/1944, TNA, MH 55/1151). Whilst the MoH considered these 
cases to be so few as to be able to expect the local authorities ‘to take these isolated cases in their 
stride’ some authorities questioned the right of the MoL to import people and then charge their 
healthcare to them. A lengthy controversy ensued between the MoL, MoH and local authorities 
was widened to involve the treasury, with all parties seeking to evade payment, as it became clear 
Eire could not be recharged. It was even argued that TB patients should be funded by the MoH 
while Mental health cases should be repatriated60 (TNA, MH 55/1151). The row over the cost of 
welfare for the imported workers was couched in terms that represented the Irish as ‘foreign’ 
                                                          
59 The travel permit system recorded only journeys taken rather than persons travelling and includes some 
of those joining the NHS post-war. However, this is still a large Irish cohort.  
60 By September 1944 it was finally admitted that the cost should be borne by the MoH, pending 
repatriation, even as the British government refused an offer to fund the treatment of Irish Forces Personnel 
with war attributed TB from Eire (TNA, MH 55/1151). 
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rather than British citizens, an influx of unwanted persons proving to be more costly than their 
worth.  
5.4 SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
However, though Anti-Irish feeling was only a part of xenophobic responses to the war, 
where other minorities were targeted, these prejudices in turn affected attitudes to the Irish. An 
MO report on ‘Aliens’ recorded that the conception of ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ was dangerously 
adjacent to that of ‘the enemy’ (MO File Report 79 - Public Feeling About Aliens, 1940). HI 
reports resentment of ‘200 Cypriots’, British subjects, who supposedly worked only the requisite 
weeks required to claim benefits and then left with no reason, before, in an indication of wider 
concerns, calls for internment of Czech and Polish refugees (30/05/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). By 
the time of the fall of France, refugees and migrants were conceptually conflated with the threat 
of espionage. One correspondent to The Times argued the column of refugees consisted of many 
‘genuine cases’ but included Quislings, Communists, Fascists, ‘friends and admirers of Hitler’ 
plus ‘no inconsiderable number of Irish and Indian malcontents’ (The Times, 21/05/1940, p.7), all 
considered potential threats to security. Though this writer felt that to intern them all would rob 
Britain of a potential future ‘Anti-Nazi Foreign Legion’ (The Times, 21/05/1940, p.7), most 
popular opinion argued the refugees should be refused entry because of the threat they embodied. 
Such attitudes meant that soon many alien nationals in Britain were at risk of violence. By June 
1940 ‘very strong Anti-Italian feeling’ was reported in Wales as many Italian businesses were 
wrecked by crowds, and all over the country (11/06/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) before Italians joined 
Germans and Austrian nationals in internment. Where Eire was often equated with enemy 
countries pre-existing fears of ‘a useful Fifth Column nucleus’ of about 1,000 Irishmen employed 
on building defence works in Anglesey, being ‘openly’ anti-British (10/6/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) 
and fanned by a ‘a press campaign’ on ‘foreign agents” (TNA, LAB 8/1528), combined to create 
a perceived invasion by Irish workers harmful to security. Resentment manifested in many ways, 
but especially in a belief that the Immigrant workers should not be allowed, once they had agreed 
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to work in Britain, to travel home whilst the war continued. Newspapers reported belief that new 
workers sold information to the Nazi legation on their return home (Perthshire Advertiser, 
16/07/1941, p.4), and an HI special report on Merseyside reported that it was ‘common 
knowledge’ that it was safe to get a travel permit by promising to stay for the duration and then 
break that promise, because travel back to Eire or Belfast was so easy to obtain (10/6/1941, TNA, 
INF 1/292). Open travel to and from Ireland remained a rumbling resentment until coming to a 
head with the embargo on travel imposed before the D-Day, when this policy was almost 
universally lauded as putting an end to the problem of security leakage. However, much of popular 
attitudes seemed to be based on prejudice of what the Irish character, and people, were like, rather 
than any evidence of treachery. Though Irish workers coming into the country during the war had 
to face assumptions about their motives, they also had the weight of a long history of Irish 
Migration to Britain, which created cultural expectations of the societal effect a new influx of 
Irish might entail. Irish workers were initially expected to be, because of the Irish ‘character’, 
much the same as their forebears had been perceived in the years before.  
5.5 STEREOTYPES 
  
Many stereotypes formed against Irish workers were based on a generalised fear of 
cultural difference, and these fears were ‘often modelled on the supposed behaviour and 
characteristics of male workers, with many post-war theories of migration also showing ‘a 
tendency to consider women migrants within narrow domestic and familial concepts’ (Ryan, 
2008, p. 454). As a result, it is vital to consider issues of gender expectation when discussing 
perceptions of Irish workers.  
Contemporary records studied for this thesis record a generalised fear and suspicion of 
all outsiders. An MO report on ‘Bombing on Merseyside’ typifies responses to the newer more 
‘mixed population’ of the city which included ‘Chinese, Arabs, Greeks, West Indians, transient 
seamen…and a large settlement of Irish’ but singled out the Irish as ‘of a poor, even primitive 
type’ (10/06/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). The Irish, however, were also singled out with HI 
168 
 
exemplifying the Irish as ‘not generally liked’ and criticised for their supposed temperament, 
described as ‘mostly of a low type, dirty, uncouth and troublesome' (12/12/1941, TNA, INF 
1/293). The charge of drunkenness is a constant theme concerning male Irish workers, recalling 
older perceptions of drunken ‘navvies’61, imported labourers from Eire were said to be the ‘terror 
of law-abiding citizens… (while) drunkenness and assault are frequent’ and ‘several of these 
labourers have had to be put in mental hospitals’ (25/03/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Reports of 
drunkenness emerged in most HI regions, and this was especially unpopular where Irish workers 
were accommodated in private billets, with the public urging the use of labour camps away from 
local populations (03/09/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Drunken Irish people were charged with being 
‘quite childish’ and unable to ‘control themselves’ (MO, FR A12 - Anti Semitism Survey, 1939), 
and construction workers were said to ‘go for miles for a drink and then become fighting drunk’ 
(04/08/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). But it was not only the ‘navvies’ under suspicion of drunkenness. 
Postal Censorship picked up an accusation that an Irish doctor working in England was ‘always 
drunk’ and had administered too much ether, nearly killing a woman and two children at a hospital 
in Blackburn. An MoH investigation concluded there was no evidence of his drunkenness at work 
or at home (TNA, MH 79/515). That the doctor was ‘discreetly’ investigated based on one report, 
not an official complaint, says much on the ease with which it was believed that a doctor’s 
‘Irishness’ could lead him to endanger patients and negate his Hippocratic Oath. Though there is 
evidence that Irish drunkenness did occur it appears that accusations would often be believed 
without supporting evidence. Indeed, Irish workers writing home also complained of their 
compatriots behaviour, even recording some deportations due to excessive drinking (15/01/1942, 
TNA, CJ 4/30). These accusations also appear in relation to men, with no accounts of female 
Hibernian inebriation found in this survey. More balanced reports after lengthy investigation 
tended to reveal that, even amongst the ‘navvies’, ‘the men are well behaved and have pride in 
                                                          
61 MO Report on State Managed Pubs in Carlisle 01/07/1944 – Respondents felt it unfair that Carlisle was 
singled out for state control of Pubs arguing ‘we're no worse than anywhere else…it was all these Irish 
navvies lying piled up in the gutter every Saturday night in the last war that did it’ (MO File Report 2134 - 




their appearance and conduct’, but the actions drunks ‘receive undue prominence’ while most 
‘live and work unseen and unnoticed, content to carry on with their work’ (TNA, INF 1/786). 
Most perceptions of Irish workers, however, were not formed after investigation, rather after an 
impulsive recourse to cultural expectation. 
Both Male and Female Irish workers were also charged with deliberate absenteeism, time 
wasting and moaning about conditions (31/08/1943, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly Bulletin 
(13). (1943), with some castigated as cowards for not wanting to return from home leave after 
heavy bombing raids (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). Absenteeism was 
however not solely a problem with the Irish workers, with the overall rate for 1939-1941 doubling 
the pre-war figure and rising even more from 1943-1945 (Mackay, 2013, p. 121). MO records 
rare agreement with Irish ‘girls’ not wanting to return to blitzed Birmingham, with British workers 
noting ‘I don't blame them’ and ‘I wouldn't have come back myself’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube 
Investments Ltd, 1942). Other reports characterised the Irish as ‘over here for the cash’, ‘proud’ 
to be neutral, ‘fifth columnists', and Scots respondents reportedly noted ‘an Irishman without 
grievance is miserable, and Ireland has groused down the centuries’, while grousing about the 
Irish (The Sunday Post, 21/12/1941, p.2). Irish workers charged with laziness were often only 
assimilating themselves into a prevailing culture of lassitude. By the end of 1941 HI was reporting 
that postal censorship of the Irish mail revealed ‘frequent references to deliberate slackness, 
sometimes on the part of labourers who find idleness condoned, sometimes incited by their 
superiors’ (11/09/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Many instances appear in these reports of Irish workers 
reporting slack working by all, with some able to easily slope off into the woods for a nap while 
others noted that in all Army and Navy contracts ‘if you work too hard and get too enthusiastic, 
well you won't be very popular’ (15/10/1941, TNA, INF1/292: Special Comments Industry: 
Imported Labour).  
Though both immigrants and local workers were equally slack, competition arose where 
circumstances warranted. The ‘Tubes’ MO report relates an attempt by local workers to oust their 
rivals when covering the Irish women’s holidays, by arguing they should be getting their ‘better’ 
170 
 
jobs as they had outproduced the Irish team by ‘all work(ing) in together’ (MO File Report 1496 
- Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). Slack working, it seems, could be easily overcome where 
competition was fierce enough. The same report plainly states it was the prevailing culture that 
workers were let ‘lounge about’, with some getting bored waiting for work to be allocated (MO 
File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942) and an Irish female voice supported this 
interpretation arguing ‘nobody ever bothers you. If they see you standing around and not doing 
anything, they don't ask you what you are supposed to be doing’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube 
Investments Ltd, 1942). In such circumstances, it would be unusual for Irish workers to be singled 
out for laziness where all workers were, to some extent or another, ‘browned off’ by their work. 
However, the Irish were singled out in greater number, for other reasons, often depending on 
entrenched gender assumptions. 
Additional animosity appeared because of ‘a half-hidden feeling of distrust, and of 
resentment that women should be doing men's work’ with Irish female workers ‘criticised for 
going to extremes…either too free in their manner, or too proud to answer a civil "good morning"’ 
(MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942), falling into the stereotypical ‘historical 
trope of the Madonna versus the Magdalene, or mother versus the whore’ (Schrover & Yeo, 2010, 
p. 4). But this male censure was not solely aimed at Irish women. The men of tube Investments 
argued women in general were ‘a nuisance’ who held up the work, and some even turned to 
sabotage to prove female workers incompetent. An MO investigator at ‘Tubes’ unearthed 
evidence that female workers suffered the previous male shift workers dismantling and loosening 
a lathe in such a way that ‘it would take up to an hour to adjust it into working order again’, to 
prove women incapable, and prove their own worth outside becoming a conscript. More 
perceptive male workers agreed this was ‘sabotage’ that they’d be ‘shot for’ in other 
circumstances (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942).  
The same report also unfailingly refers to the Irish workers as ‘girls’ whilst British 
workers are referred to as women (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942), 
infantilising the Irish, who were often young and unmarried, but also deemed unsophisticated and 
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impressionable. Jennifer Redmond has pointed out the extra censure Irish female Doctors 
contended with was a sign that ‘the single status of many of these migrant women placed them 
outside the realm of the traditional’ (Redmond, 2014, p. 92), and it is equally probable that Irish 
women in an engineering environment would have been equally castigated for travelling away 
from home, unmarried and into traditionally male employment. But infantilization was not solely 
by the purview of men, or indeed only at ‘Tube Investments’. At a nameless munitions factory, 
the Welfare Officer, a woman referred to as ‘Miss B.’ who most of the female workers felt was 
‘lovely’, treated the Irish ‘girls’ ‘like a mother’ (02/08/1943, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly 
Bulletin (13)) indicating that infantilization crossed lines of gender. Married Irish women or 
mothers were also subject to prejudice and resentment, with one male Welfare Manager, asked to 
employ an Irish new mother, despite his obvious misgivings, feels that he ‘daren’t refuse her’. 
Perturbed by the mother feeding her child and noticing that she had been discharged from the 
ATS at around the time of the child’s birth, he also takes note she has no wedding ring 
(01/01/1942, MO File Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942). Though he reluctantly employs 
her, he plainly feels she will be nothing but trouble as an unmarried Irish woman with a young 
child. Workers similarly felt the Irish ‘girls’ too much trouble asserting that they run to welfare 
officers ‘with the most ridiculous things, not to mention troubles right outside the factory…. like 
this business of getting mothers fixed up’ (02/08/1942, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly 
Bulletin (13)). Some may have found the provision of welfare officers time to Irish ‘girls’ 
excessive, but at least one of these recognised the dislocation they must have felt, not least by 
acknowledging that many arrived in British factories ‘not told that it’s heavy and dirty work when 
they’re in Ireland’ (Sheridan, 2000, p. 168). Lunn points out that this shock was not confined to 
Irish workers (Lunn, 1993, p. 109) but it was also clear that some of the welfare officers 
recognised that settling the unsettled workers was their job role, with ‘Miss B’ arguing ‘I'm very 
fond of my Irish family’ and admitting some ‘weren't treated very tactfully’ (MO File Report 
1882 – Fortnightly Bulletin (13)). The provision of welfare officers especially where there were 
large numbers of Irish female workers was, as Jennifer Redmond has pointed out, was not entirely 
172 
 
pastoral or indeed altruistic, as numbers of those, of all nationalities, leaving work due to poor 
conditions and homesickness was detrimental to the war effort (Redmond, 2018, p. 213). 
Religion also highlighted difference in the factories where workers noted the piety of 
Irish labourers in work encampments and remarked on ‘scapulars and holy pictures’ and the 
deduction from wages to pay for a priest to come and say weekly Mass (12/12/1941, TNA, INF 
1/293). Workers tended to conditionally accept their faith because the Irish workers were, ‘with 
very few exceptions…moral in outlook’ but ‘even inclined to smugness’ (MO File Report 1496 - 
Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). The Protestant faith of Ulster Irish workers was never, as far as this 
study can tell, remarked upon in MO or HI reports and no question existed about the national 
status of persons from Northern Ireland, who, as United Kingdom Nationals, possessed all the 
rights any British national could claim in Great Britain. Though Eire citizens in Britain were also 
British citizens, though not in Irish law (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 2), it appears that, in the factories 
there was little distinction between North and Southern Irish, all were referred to as ‘Irishmen’ as 
if they are from the same country, and often as though they shared the same Irish ‘character’. 
5.6 INTEGRATION   
 
Holmes argues the widening of areas of Irish employment and its geographical spread 
outside the cities, may indicate a tendency towards integration and incorporation of the Irish into 
British society, but continuing hostility towards the Irish, which did not always discriminate 
between North and South, should not be ignored (Holmes, 1988, p. 178). Throughout this studies 
sources there is evidence not only of poor integration at work, where the nationalities do not mix, 
but also of discrimination against Irish workers. On the ‘Tube Investments’ factory floor it was 
plain that national groups tended to keep to themselves, with the Irish ‘girls’ distrusting local 
women and the British reciprocated this feeling. The Irish accused the Birmingham women of 
being miserable, who’d ‘crack their faces’ if they smiled, or ignorant and two-faced, while the 
Birmingham women said the Irish were too ‘fond of each other's company, and rarely make 
friends with any but their compatriots’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). A 
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factory welfare officer remarked on the isolation of Irish workers, while trying to explain that she, 
or billet owners, had little to complain of, commenting that she felt ‘sorry for them left in a corner 
of the canteen here while I'm called away…’ (31/08/1943, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly 
Bulletin (13)), leaving the reader in no doubt that there was no mixing between the groups over 
lunch. Integration into the community was made harder by billeting that infringed the privacy of 
both parties. Some of the ‘Tubes’ ‘girls are comfortable in their billets, but the majority are 
discontented and unhappy…considerable friction is often caused by a girl finding she is expected 
to spend her whole private life, and often share a bed, with a complete stranger’ (01/11/1941, MO 
File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). A lack of communication also caused many 
problems, from disagreements over provision of food in lodgings (31/07/42, MO File Report 1344 
- People in Production, 1942) to arguments over payment and the suitability of the work (MO File 
Report 1882 – Fortnightly Bulletin (13)); MO File Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942). 
However, integration was urged on Irish workers in one important respect, where ‘A newcomer 
is solemnly warned against working too hard; "We don't do too much. They don't pay you for 
doing too much"’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942).  
Whilst the Irish workers at ‘Tube Investments’ were female and worked in a 
predominantly female environment, most male Irish workers worked in construction. Though 
these suffered from prejudice they appear less personally affected by it and mixed better into the 
workforce they joined. Postal censorship shows many reports of Irish workers feeling welcome 
in the building trade, with some professing Britain ‘a great country to work in’, that ‘if I had 
thought it was so grand here, I would have been here years ago’, and arguing they were now in 
better company than they were at home (15/01/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). Those reviewing the Irish 
post concluded that, in 500 out of 538 letters checked, the writers showed ‘strong pro-British 
feeling’ and revealed Irish labourers felt well treated, by the British people rather than the British 
government (01/02/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). Yet in reports on British opinion there were many 
instances of friction between ‘drunk Irish navvies’ and locals, and only infrequent evidence of 
occasional improvement in relations with local people (12/12/1941, TNA, INF 1/293). This is 
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perhaps an indication that the British were genial towards the Irish themselves, but ultimately less 
so when citing their feelings to other observers. 
In general, male Irish workers employed in construction were billeted in work camps built 
for purpose, apart from the civilian population. As we have seen there was evidence that Irish 
building labourers were considered drunks prone to violence, but a lengthy MO report titled 
‘Demolition in London’ goes further in depicting these men as part of an under-class unable to 
get better work, ‘sometimes represented (as) the last step in a man’s degradation’ (MO File Report 
768 - Demolition in London, 1941). Here the work culture included racial discrimination excused 
as happening in an ‘atmosphere of comradeship…(where) there is no end of banter’ (MO File 
Report 768 - Demolition in London, 1941). Though some Irishmen were ‘excellent workers’, and 
‘most of the gangers on these jobs were Irish and were admirable…’, they were still regarded as 
foreigners, suffering racism typified by ‘racialised designations’, such as the ‘negro Sam’ and 
‘Irishman Paddy’. For the report writer this was ‘a much milder form of racialism which does not 
really deserve the title…it is not dangerous, for it exists only in private’ (MO File Report 768 - 
Demolition in London, 1941), as if excusing the problem went some way towards solving it. 
Though acknowledging other ‘very objectionable’ examples of racism, the report concludes such 
incidents were not generally the norm., arguing that ‘foreigners of every race’, including negroes, 
Chinese, Indians, Czechs, and German Jews, are welcomed in an atmosphere where not only race 
but class ‘is reduced to a paltry obstacle’ (MO File Report 768 - Demolition in London, 1941). 
However, the report clearly shows discrimination that needed only a spark to grow to a 
greater ferocity. Demolition workers in 1941 continued to suffer the same prejudices as their 
forbears in the previous century, but suffered a more insidious racism, which, coupled with 
ignorance of the age-old ‘Irish Question’, effectively allowed assumptions of untrustworthiness, 
duplicity, and incompetence to be accepted. Assimilation and tolerance was merely professed 
until it was expedient that it be discarded. After the war Irish representatives found that the level 
of welfare and social provision by the MOL in the workplace was ‘surprising’ (Daly, 2006, p. 
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270), and a member of the Connolly Association62 argued ‘there is no race-hatred here… (where 
none) have any time for any fascist propaganda’ (Dooley, 1943, p. 7), it was more frequent that 
difference was foremost in British minds as soon as any level of disagreement was raised63. Not 
only had prejudice made integration of the new workers harder, the institutional process within 
which these workers were imported made easy integration less likely. With such attitudes and 
institutional bureaucratic officiousness, it is unsurprising that, at the time of the ‘Tubes’ report, 
for the Irish imported workers there, ‘the average duration of employment was three months’ (MO 
File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). As Holmes has suggested, it may have been that 
Irish workers integrated enough to be able to make a peaceful living in Britain most of the time, 
they did not integrate into British society, tending to create their own communities and identities 
and thus remaining outsiders.  
5.7 ORGANISED RECRUITMENT  
 
 The process by which the Irish workers were imported was deeply affected by existing 
prejudices and contemporary public sensibilities. Though it was widely known that Britain was 
reliant on imported labour, it was still resented that ‘the Ministry of Labour imports these men’ 
and adjudged there should be ‘some form of control and inspection’ (25/3/1941, TNA, INF1/292), 
proving the public unconvinced by the recruitment controls in place. Cabinet members and the 
Military shared public concern over security and the social impact of the influx. As a result, 
recruitment policy, and its implementation, became progressively more regimented and 
bureaucratic. The ‘official history’ of Irish workers in Britain was commissioned from historian 
A.V. Judges who was forced, by the MoL, to preface his account with an endorsement that ‘the 
                                                          
62 The Connolly Association was at this time devoted to campaigning for a united, independent, and socialist 
Ireland based on the principles of the 1916 risings Citizen Army leader James Connolly. Throughout the 
war the Association took great interest, through Trade Unionism, on the welfare of Irish workers in Britain 
63 MO report ‘Tubes’ contains an example of the amplification of difference and a most stunning lack of 
tact. The Lord Mayor of Birmingham ‘joked’ to the workers ‘An Irishman and a nigger agreed to have a 
fight. They said that they would fight until one of them cried "Enough"! After two hours the nigger cried: 
"Enough!” The Irishman replied "Faith, that's the word I've trying to think of for the last hour and a half!’. 
After some laughter from the crowd ‘without exception the Irish girls were very much annoyed stating ‘he 
shouldn't have done it…’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942) 
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narrative is not intended for publication in its present form’, was for consumption in the UK only, 
and that ‘no use should be made by the War Historians of any matter reflecting on Anglo-Irish 
relations without first consulting the Manpower section’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528). The embargo 
reflected the potential for embarrassment to both countries involved; Eire could have been 
accused of an ‘unneutral’ policy, and Britain exposed as unacceptably reliant on a country to 
which she was diplomatically opposed. Judges detailed history was unpublished and official 
histories of wartime production gave only a general acknowledgement of the Irish role without 
indicating the depth of contemporary controversy64. The report represented how the MoL 
balanced the need for Irish labour against the prejudices against it and explains the guiding 
principles behind the MOL decisions. It also shows what Kenneth Lunn has called ‘a repeated 
pattern of both hostility and eagerness to employ the Irish’ (Lunn, 1993, p. 108).  
In in the first nine months of the war there were no restrictions on travel between Great 
Britain and Ireland, only starting in June 1940 by which time Blitzkrieg in the West had increased 
general fears of fifth column menace and invasion. Before this time the War Cabinet was divided, 
with Churchill opining ‘there are plenty of Irish traitors in the Glasgow area ....’ (Gilbert, 1993a, 
p. 71) and Eden arguing the Irish emigrated ‘in order to better their condition and not because 
they sympathise’ with the UK government (20/11/1939, TNA, CAB 67/2/53) or the IRA. 
However, there was a generalised feeling in government that some Irish ‘would behave as a 
menace in any conceivable circumstances’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 3). After Dunkirk, however, 
the War Cabinet previously forced to accept that any travel scheme would not ‘remove all 
risk...(but) recruitment of labour from Eire cannot be discontinued in the interests of national food 
supply’ (12/6/1940, TNA, CAB 67/6/47), and mindful that Britain was also forced to rely on 
Garda Siochana screening, instituted new controls on all immigration. However, these had to be 
almost immediately relaxed in the case of Ireland as it became clear the regular supply of seasonal 
                                                          
64 See Inman, who summed up the Irish contribution as 30,000 of the total 2 million British munitions 
workers (Inman, 1957, p. 174) and, later, Holmes arguing the Irish provided an important supplement of 




Irish agricultural workers was affected, with special six-month agriculture only visa’s being 
introduced which kept holders away from sites of military importance (TNA, LAB 8/1528, pp. 5-
6). Later a system of travel permits, designed to allow in only those vouched for by the Irish 
police, ensured necessity would trump the supposed effect on national security65. The 
dichotomous dynamics of the system was described as inherently ‘Irish’ by Judges (TNA, LAB 
8/1528, p. 3), where Britain was forced to welcome Irish labour but at the same time begrudge 
it’s necessity. Indeed, as the Ministry of labour made concessions on Temporary Agricultural 
Irish Immigration, the JIC was arguing that, though there had been ‘little if any’ sabotage whilst 
building aerodromes for the Eastern Command, this did not necessarily mean there would not be, 
and advocated that ‘all aliens and Irish be cleared out’ of the area (May 1940, TNA, CAB 81/87). 
The dichotomy may have seemed ‘Irish’, but it was allowed to continue by the British 
government, with unproven expectation affecting policy at all turns.  
By June 1941, however, after conscription in both NI and of Irish citizens in the UK was 
concluded not worth the trouble it could cause, the Ministry of Labour pressed for a substantial 
increase in Irish recruitment. Despite continued opposition on security grounds, it was agreed that 
the demand for labour was so great that the risk should be tolerated, if recruitment was organized 
with governmental oversight. However, Irish workers were kept from employment on the 
sensitive southern coast (Inman, 1957, p. 139) until the last year of the war. To secure the 
desperately needed workers, the guiding principle of controlled recruitment was to find recruits 
‘with the minimum of publicity to allow for plausible denial by the Irish government, so protective 
of its neutrality’ (Inman, 1957, p. 170). However, this did not make Irish workers popular and, as 
Inman noted, many industries, especially those involved with military production, were reluctant 
to employ them (Inman, 1957, p. 139). Observers in Eire indicated that there was a large pool of 
workers available to British production eager to travel if they would only be allowed home leave 
(A A Mowat, 30/9/1942, TNA, DO 130/28), while another argued in Britain that British 
                                                          
65 Contemporaneously the Irish government had, under Emergency legislation, started to intern IRA 
members and sympathisers.  
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employment would be ‘a most excellent piece of propaganda’ which could change Irish opinions 
of Britain (McDonnell, 6/2/1942, TNA, DO 130/28). Meanwhile, Toms, MOL liaison to the 
Dublin recruitment office, adjudged that ‘the majority of the recruiting agents adopted a superior 
attitude and assumed they had a right to run roughshod over Eire regulations, and seemed to 
interpret them as being instituted for anti-British reasons’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 28), reflecting 
common prejudices. Government attitudes were only different in tone, being couched in more 
diplomatic terms, to those of the public and resultant policy was driven more by necessity.  
The initial processes of recruitment were confusing and unnerving for the Irish workers 
due to often haphazard organization. The private agents already recruiting in Eire before 
government control of the practice, were acknowledged as using questionable practices and 
bribes, which caused resentment by colleagues as well as British and Irish government agencies 
(TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 9). In addition to the temptation to cut corners is gaining much needed 
recruits, agents were not above lying or at least bending the truth on wages and conditions, 
especially building and civil engineering agents who made exaggerated promises about wages 
and conditions of work which employers were unable to fulfil (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 22). This 
caused problems for the receiving employers who must placate Irish workers annoyed that ‘they 
tell you anything to get you over here, and once you're here, they refuse to give you your passport 
back’ (MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). In addition to deceits, travel 
arrangements often went wrong. After an application process that included twenty-one separate 
stages of action, to be followed in sequence, some workers arrived in Britain totally unexpected 
or did not arrive at all. Some travellers were left at the docks with no idea of where they were to 
go, some travelled without provision of food or money for expenses and ended up seeking help 
from the authorities. One volunteer is quoted by Judges as saying ‘We had a terrible time coming 
here…. if I could have got back, I would have run!’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 41). After being 
treated either under haphazard early conditions, or later under an almost militarised process, 
neither under the traveller’s control, it was unsurprising that many workers felt unwelcome or as 
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if they had been fooled into a situation that was not as they expected. Few of those receiving these 
workers knew of their travails along the way and some undoubtedly assumed them ungrateful.  
The processes of recruitment were later streamlined as it became clear the previous 
process was not retaining those employed. Need for medical inspection drove this change as many 
British people would not house Irish workers. The effect of medical checks and ‘de-lousing’ was 
insulting to the workers and many ‘would flatly refuse to part with their clothes for disinfestation’ 
(TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 36) with many no doubt reminded of stories of the ‘coffin ships’ of the 
1840’s, overcrowded, typhus-ridden transports from Famine Ireland (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 43). 
The new processes included segregation of Irish workers onto separate and dedicated 
transportation, and this, though designed to simplify the recruitment process, only added to 
feelings of distrust. By 1944 the recruitment process was so streamlined as to as to almost 
commoditise the workers, who were centrally recruited, medically examined, de-loused, put on 
their own boat-trains and sent directly to their workplace for billeting in shared accommodation 
with strangers. In return it was expected that the Irish recruits were employed on the same terms 
as British law provided. As Judges argued, ‘recruitment and distribution of labour was now 
collectivised and completely institutionalised’ (TNA, LAB 8/1528, p. 71). This often led to Irish 
workers, unaccustomed to Britain, becoming uncomfortable and suspicious enough to fear the 
situation they were now in, subject to an almost militarised operation, away from home in a 
country that was not always friendly. The Judges report notes on of the Dublin Ministry of Labour 
officers opinion that ‘Quite a real source of trouble was the suspicion for which some of the Irish 
had for us all... (though) almost always very polite and deferential (compared with English 
workers) … (they) clearly felt themselves in a foreign and slightly hostile country’ (TNA, LAB 
8/1528). The streamlining of the recruitment process had more to do with British utility than 
allaying the fears and concerns of the Irish workers and had only marginally bettered the 
experience of those coming to Britain earlier. 
Employers, often culturally opposed to employing Irish workers but forced by necessity, 
admitted that ‘apart from sheer prejudice and the anxieties of employers on security grounds, 
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there was a variety hindrances created by differing habits and social customs’ (TNA, LAB 
8/1528). Correspondence to the MoL shows many letters complaining of the ‘quality’ and ‘ability’ 
of Irish workers, and two, from the same company, stand out as particularly unbending in their 
assumptions. A Welfare Officer of the London Public Transportation Board wrote to the MoL, 
demanding assurance that any further Irish staff sent to his canteen would be ‘a satisfactory type, 
capable of performing the duties’ required, before complaining of three Irish workers recently 
sent to him. Generally criticising their arithmetic and reading abilities, their appearance, 
cleanliness and health, the officer argued one was so filthy, rather than most obviously suffering 
from poverty, as to be impossible to employ in a kitchen66. Another was described, by way of 
‘both appearance and intelligence’, as incapable of doing anything but the roughest work 
(20/04/1945, TNA, LAB 8/966). The officer did not appear to consider that the provision of 
training or uniform might ameliorate some of the problems presented. A second letter shows these 
three were sent back to Dublin, having been deemed ‘unplaceable in any other employment’, 
before exposing the mentality of its writer, who dismissed another Irish woman who had 
‘demanded’ a travel pass and the cost of her travel home. The writer argued that, as he had not 
seen her unaccompanied by a sailor, he expected that ‘the girl would eventually find some means 
of paying her own fare back’ (27/04/1945, TNA, LAB 8/966). That the writer could assume that 
he could divest himself of all responsibility for an employee because of her perceived morality 
attests to a largely preconceived set of notions of what Irish women deserved in life. Indeed, the 
possibility of accommodating her insecurities did not seem to occur to this writer, as it also 
appeared in the case of the Scots farmers who, when angered by the ease with which Irish workers 
could leave their employ, suggested that they instead be compelled to work ‘under the provisions 
of the Essential works’ (31/12/1941, TNA, INF1/292), rather than be incentivised further. Some, 
it seems, felt the Irish should be grateful for the positions no matter the working conditions. 
                                                          
66 The Officers main complaint about this woman was that she had ‘no skirt, only a piece of sacking pinned 




However, there were occasions when the sensibilities of the Irish were accommodated, 
and as a result the Irish workers adapted well to their new situation. MO reports occasions where 
Irish workers were treated with respect enough to encourage them to stay in Britain, most notably 
in ‘Tube Investments Ltd’, a report on factory industrial conditions (MO File Report 1496 - Tube 
Investments Ltd, 1942) where the Welfare Officer was successful in adapting working conditions 
for the Irish workers. Another notes that despite the ‘Irish girls…(being)…one of her (the assistant 
to the chief Welfare Officer) chief problems’, the officer had coped well with them and had 
received the Irish workers appreciation (31/08/1943, MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly Bulletin 
(13)). However, HI revealed that, though the Irish workers had a favourable view towards their 
British colleagues, British workers were in general critical of the Irish on account of ‘their rowdy 
behaviour and their presence in England being the result of Eire's neutral position’ (TNA, INF 
1/293). The journey to Britain by Irish workers was to be smoothed by works welfare officers, 
but nevertheless these often inferred that many problems they dealt with were due to their charge’s 
character, rather than the dislocation the immigrants felt (03/12/1941, MO Diarist 5100; MO File 
Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942). A personnel manager’s MO diary berates a jilted bride 
wanting to return to Derry for wasting his time, rather than accepting that this was part of his job. 
A few days later, he dismisses the thought of employing an Irish girl ‘who looks intelligent enough 
to be trained’ based on her nationality (MO File Report 1344 - People in Production, 1942). A 
more understanding Welfare Officer reported ‘We've only had one or two complaints from 
landladies about dirt and drunkenness’, but notes “But that’s what I'm here for’, though the 
attitude of others evidently hampered her role when ‘(some) weren't treated very tactfully…, and 
their Irish pride was aroused so they took the release’ (MO File Report 1882 – Fortnightly Bulletin 
(13)). Their billets in Birmingham were sometimes of a good standard but some Irish workers 
complained they had little privacy, poor washing facilities, and inedible food, where provided. 
Some houses were large and filled with workers, male and female, which caused many Irish 
women to feel unsafe (01/11/1942, MO File Report 1496 - Tube Investments Ltd, 1942). Some 
were forced to live alongside the family in their billets and felt an ‘unwelcome intruder’, 
encouraged to leave the house as much as possible. Many would have preferred a hostel, which 
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the ‘Tubes’ officer tried to organise a hostel and club for Irish workers. Though the MoL also 
expressed interest in using hostels or works related clubs as part of the streamlining of the 
recruitment process (TNA, LAB 8/1528), in this case, it was never to come to fruition.  
Only one ‘Irish Club’ for female immigrant workers appears to have come to fruition 
because of the MOL concern over recruitment and retention of Irish workers. Henrietta Ewart 
argues the Selly Oak Irish Girls Club, Birmingham, formed in 1943 was considered a success, 
due to a membership of around 100, even though this represented only 8% of the local Irish female 
workforce and 25 of 26 ‘lost’ members had not returned after a Christmas visits home, despite 
the clubs activities (Ewart, 2012, pp. 257-263). Even here contemporary assessment of the club 
reflects public concerns and expectation. The Birmingham Local Welfare Officer noted the club 
was marked by the ‘noise’ of the socializing, although there was also no ‘rowdyism’, presumably 
a relief of her own or societal expectation. The girls were judged of ‘a steady and a good type’ 
but were not being attracted by any other clubs’, perhaps reflecting a degree of homesickness 
offset only by the sharing of mutual experiences away from home. The issue of illegitimate 
pregnancy was also discussed in reports to the Ministry even though this area of the clubs work 
was miniscule in comparison to the rest of its activities, aiding only two women who may not 
have been members. As Ewart argues, the Selly Oak club is an example of what motivated welfare 
officers on the ground could achieve, but also its efficacy in reducing loss to the workforce is 
impossible to judge (Ewart, 2012, pp. 257-263). However, well intentioned as it may have been, 
the club was judged by behaviour it managed to avoid rather than what it achieved. The use of 
hostels or clubs was proposed where the Irish girls were ‘much of a type’, fond of each other’s 
company, insular and unwilling to mix with local people (MO File Report 1496 - Tube 
Investments Ltd, 1942). Lack of acculturation through accommodation only added to feelings of 
cultural difference and did little to change British opinion on racial stereotypes. 
Distrust against the Irish continued, especially in work on government contracts right up 
to the end of the war despite Irish workers being given Admiralty clearance to work in 
Southampton shipyards, in 1943, provided they did not deal with ‘invasion barges or work in 
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connection with landing operations (TNA, LAB 8/694). A few weeks later, Portsmouth dockyard 
desperate for labour, was denied recruits from Eire: ‘the Admiralty have had to decide that the 
security objections outweigh even the labour supply difficulties’ (TNA, LAB 8/694). Despite no 
cases of sabotage or attack by IRA sympathisers, it was considered too dangerous to employ Irish 
workers on projects involved in the re-invasion of Europe right until the end of the war. 
Additionally, those Irish who worked on shipyards away from the south coast were distinctly 
unappreciated with reports that Cammell Laird Shipyards were keen to ‘send the Irishmen 
packing’ as soon as the war was over (01/05/1945, TNA, CAB 24/197). Indeed, as the war ended 
a distinction was made between the contributions of the Irish volunteers to the British Armed 
Forces and immigrant workers, with reciprocal unemployment benefits awarded to Irish former 
soldiers in Eire but none to Irish workers who returned home. Though national insurance 
payments, less benefits drawn were returned to the Eire government, unemployment insurance 
was not on the grounds that civilian workers were mercenary in their reasons for volunteering, 
whereas those that joined the military had rejected their government’s neutrality in volunteering 
to fight in the UK forces (Wolf, 1975, p. 21). It also became clear that Irish workers would 
continue to be necessary to Britain to aid post-war reconstruction, and refusal to pay 
unemployment would mean many would stay for work and fewer would draw their benefits if 
they had gone home. The dichotomy of the necessity of Irish labour versus resentment of their 
employment was set to continue for years to come.  
5.8 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Most perceptions of Irish immigrant workers were affected by the dichotomy represented 
by the dire necessity for workers alongside public distrust of their motivations. To suspicion of 
their potential as subversive elements was added a cultural expectation of detrimental social 
impact, and fear that they would be used to replace men who could be conscripted into the forces. 
The number of these Irish immigrants was difficult to determine due to a combination of the 
problems caused by the CTA and disputed Irish nationality, as well as the porous nature of the NI 
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border and an inexact system of travel permits, despite attempts by both governments to regulate 
supply and demand for these workers. These unknowns only added to unease at the influx of Irish 
workers. Most female Irish workers joined an already stressful factory working environment in 
which gripes, concerns and resentments grew alongside production targets and extending working 
hours. By 1941 more than half of the workers in 160 factories polled were working a fifty-five-
hour week and despite attempts to lower this rate just under half of women workers were working 
typically a fifty-five- or sixty-hour week in 1944 (Parker, 1957, pp. 444-445). Such conditions 
led to the kind of malaise which exacerbated absenteeism, petty squabbles, and industrial action, 
aside from creating a generalised feeling of being ‘browned-off’, which tended to ‘prove’ age-old 
stereotypes in the case of the Irish. Male Irish workers tended to work in construction and 
demolition which also created similar pressures, although many would have been previously 
acclimatised to long hours and hard, physical work. In these circumstances industrial unrest could 
easily have been expected without pressures brought about by the exigencies of war, but a pattern 
of worsening attitudes towards Irish immigrant workers progressed through out the war, and as 
the number of Irish workers employed rose. 
Initial controversy over the employment of Irish workers was influenced by pre-war 
concerns that Irish people were employed while many natives were unemployed. The 1939 IRA 
S-Plan campaign, which had prompted many attempts to register Irish people in Britain, and 
concerns that Irish workers were simultaneously mercenary and a drain on resources, combined 
to create gnawing resentment in the workforce. This resentment did not affect government policy 
in the first nine months of the war, but after the Fall of France a system of travel permits, largely 
reliant on Eire’s governance and intelligence, was instituted. Neutrality was rarely a consideration 
in feeling against Irish immigration, due to a misplaced assumption that Eire could be persuaded 
or coerced into war, until November 1940 when de Valera made it clear that the Treaty Ports 
would not be given to any belligerent. Neutrality would later combine with other resentment at 
the Irish stealing British jobs thereafter.  
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Popular belief that the Irish immigrants were working for mercenary motives tended to 
de-politicise both their motivation and their perceived effect on society, and this contributed to an 
invisibility which slowly dissolved as more Irish workers were imported until the height of their 
numbers in 1944. From 1941 this slow expansion grew fears that Irish workers were being 
favoured by government through the MOL. Many were concerned that Irish workers were better 
paid, had better conditions, and were unfairly excluded from conscription, and the levels of 
animosity grew along with the steady increase in their number. Additionally, a culture of secrecy 
involved in O’Drisceoil’s ‘double game’ (O'Drisceoil, 1996, p. 292) contributed to the culture 
where unabated growth of rumour could occur. Though some regarded these workers as the 
vanguard of future peaceful Anglo-Irish collaboration, most felt them a threat, especially so on 
government and defence contract work. Resentment grew to a flashpoint at the introduction of a 
travel ban to the whole of Ireland leading up to the D-Day landings, where suspicion of 
information leakage by travelling workers created the opinion that such action by the British 
government had been long overdue. Reaction was later sparked by de Valera’s condolences on 
Hitler’s death which prompted calls for the expulsion of Irish workers who would not disown de 
Valera’s action. Post-war assessments of the impact of information leakages state some occurred 
but that these were ‘of little value and more often than not incorrect’ (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 47,52; 
TNA, KV 4/9) and both MI5 and Eunan O’Halpin have agreed that ‘the enemy had no organised 
intelligence service in Eire’ (TNA, KV 4/9) and that ‘the opportunity for to do so was open’ 
(O'Halpin, 2003, p. 60). 
Many felt the outpouring of money returned to Eire by workers in Britain amounted to 
the British people upholding the Eire economy, and that Eire was profiting from being neutral. 
Some also saw no real benefit to Britain in employing these workers, and some even proposed 
the erosion of their rights by denying access to voting rights, medical aid, accommodation, and 
poor relief. Irish workers were frequently considered vectors of disease and vermin, as well as 
being unhygienic and filthy refused by those expected to billet them in their homes. The MOL 
attempts to ameliorate these problems revealed that such problems were few, but the public 
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reaction to them was out of all proportion to their number. The Welfare Officers appointed to ease 
the dislocation and problems encountered by Irish workers, in general, worked well to keep their 
charges at work, but a few did accept prejudicial assessments of the ‘Irish character’ to explain 
the problems that did arise. Though government organisations were generally happy with the help 
and actions of the Irish government regarding Irish workers, an ugly undercurrent of opinion 
remained arguing that their worth as workers outweighed the cost of their use.  
Irish workers were often charged with the same stereotypical behaviour as had their 
forbears in Victorian times. In addition to being felt unhygienic the Irish were also charged with 
drunkenness, a charge which in general followed Irish male construction workers and these 
accusations achieved undue prominence. Also charged with absenteeism this was unlikely to be 
at higher levels than that of the general factory working population, but this may have been given 
undue prominence because Irish workers had the opportunity, in grants of home leave, to escape 
wartime conditions by going to Neutral Eire. Irish female workers were affected by assumptions 
as to their national character alongside their gender. Aside from being described as ‘a nuisance’, 
alongside native female workers, the Irish women were infantilised, and considered needy or 
attention seeking, and invariably described by male and female co-workers, welfare officers and 
the MO report writers as ‘girls’. This was not, however, a purely British attitude as the Irish 
Government encouraged Catholic Welfare agencies to act in the interests of all Irish migrants, 
though these invariably showed much greater interest in women (Daly, 2006, p. 278). Post-war 
Irish governmental analysis also judged Irish female migrant workers as coming from the lower 
classes and reported British attitudes that they were ‘either very good or very bad; there was no 
in between’ (Daly, 2006, p. 283). Irish women could not escape the judgement of others for being 
Irish and female, though being pregnant afforded the most opprobrium from all sides (Daly, 2006, 
pp. 285-286).  
As a result of such judgements and perceptions, there was a pattern of poor integration of 
Irish workers into the working community, despite the efforts of the MoL, recruiters and welfare 
officers. Irish workers tended to keep to their own kind and where mixing of nationalities occurred 
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it was often accompanied by arguments which started due to the attitudes and prejudices of the 
native workers. What integration occurred in terms of conditional acceptance, where the Irish 
were accepted where there was no competition for jobs, higher pay, or conditions. As a result, 
many Irish found a safe space in employment where they were accepted, but in conditions where 
native workers felt themselves slighted, anger and discrimination would emerge. Male Irish 
workers tended to be less estranged from British co-workers because of a camaraderie built 
around hard-work within a team of workplace ‘gangers’, and shared worksite camp 
accommodation, though they were not immune from occasional, and sometimes violent, 
resentment. Female workers were often further removed from their native fellow-workers by 
keeping their own company, being accommodated in either private billets or in their own groups 
made from friends made on the job. As Delaney has argued, it is hard to gauge levels of integration 
through outward manifestations (Delaney, 2000, p. 139), and argues oral testimonies show the 
Irish were not subject to ‘overt hostility’ (Delaney, 2000, p. 145), it is useful to note that these 
contemporary sources show overt hostility, but they are not necessarily being aimed at the Irish 
themselves. These hostile comments are being related to British observers, who, by way of shared 
culture, may also subscribe to some of these attitudes, or at least will not react as badly, or 
potentially with as much hostility, as an Irish observer. The British observer, through this 
mechanic will always hear more of true feelings than the object of the prejudice. These 
contemporary and mostly confidential sources are likelier to reveal more true, subjective, feeling 
and attitudes than other sources. 
The dichotomy involved in the use of Irish workers in wartime Britain also created a 
situation hurtful to the pride of the British; where the government had to negotiate with a newly 
formed country, once under its total control, now a self-determining Dominion. Expected 
acquiescence was not forthcoming and the British government found it no longer necessary to 
assuage the Irish government’s concerns to facilitate Irish migration, as the end of the Atlantic 
war meant workers could be accessed from other sources. Resultant policy towards Eire became 
both more combative and dismissive. Unemployment benefits would not be paid to those Irish 
188 
 
workers who had returned to Eire, and reciprocal benefits were only given to those Irish who had 
served in the British Forces. This policy resulted in many of those who travelled to Britain staying 
after the end of the war to work on reconstruction projects. The ‘double game’ also allowed British 
policy to effectively dismiss the contribution of Irish workers to the British economy by 
supressing its official history, thereby avoiding unpleasant truths about British reliance on Irish 
workers. This uncomfortable history did not square with the emerging myth of the ‘People’s War’, 
which cast Britain as the lone, lasting bulwark against Nazism from summer 1940. As a result, 
popular perceptions of Irish conduct during the war easily merged with long-standing prejudices 
to create the opinion that by standing aloof from the war, Eire had no part in it, making no 
contribution, if not a negative, troublesome one. The effect of British policy in ignoring the Irish 
contribution and afterwards castigating and punishing Eire for her neutrality, was in fact to make 
it most likely that most of the workers invited during the war would stay, despite continued ill-




6 THE IRISH IN THE BRITISH FORCES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of Irish men and women in the British Forces in World War Two is contested in 
several ways, not least due to difficulty in assessing their numbers. An exact figure is impossible 
to determine for several reasons, including the contested definitions of Irish nationality. Legally 
Britain regarded Eire citizens as British citizens, and the British Army, historically multi-cultural, 
did not record the nationality of its soldiers, nor did it distinguish between Northern and Southern 
Irish. Indeed, contemporary documents and reports often reflect British conceptions by conflating 
British and Irish as one nationality67. The Irish in the British Forces often embraced multiple 
identities, displaying allegiance to their comrades and the crown, as well as their homeland. Most 
importantly, by 1939 independent Ireland had only existed for eighteen years, and its people were 
still accommodating secession from the Union. Irish identity and nationality were therefore 
conceptually mutable, and often best defined by the individual. Additionally, it suited both the 
British and Eire governments that the number of Irish people in the British Forces was not 
publicized. The Irish State could not acknowledge the contribution of these men and women, as 
doing so might compromise fragile neutrality (Lunn, 1993, p. 102) and the British government, 
though welcoming additional recruitment, officially took care not to compromise further 
enlistment by official criticism of Irish neutrality. As a result of secrecy and dearth of detailed 
records, estimates of Irish people in the British Forces vary from 50,000 to 165,000 (T. Connolly, 
2000, p. 53). Contemporary estimates are often dubious, but two attempts at finding a more 
evidence-based figure are the most reliable. Official Dominions Office figures, released in 1945 
to forestall supposed attempts by the Irish state to mitigate Irish neutrality68, have the advantage 
                                                          
67 For example, in Mass Observations 1945 File Report 2286 on Prisoners of War, shows 77% of 
interviewed British POW’s were from the UK or Eire, whilst the other Dominions were awarded a separate 
percentage. 
68 This was an official reaction to ‘self-justification’ of Irish neutrality by the publication of ‘inaccurate and 
exaggerated claims as to Eire’s contribution to the United Kingdom war effort’ in several newspapers 
worldwide (TNA, DO 35/1230). Here Maffey condescendingly characterises the highest suggested figures 
as part of ‘a delusion as harmless as George IV’s belief that he took part in the Battle of Waterloo’.  
190 
 
of being produced by an authority with direct access to recruitment records, though these are still 
subject to a degree of estimation (see Table 1).  
DO 35/1230 Eire Northern Ireland 
Army & RAF – Men 37,440 37,579 
Army & RAF - Women 4,520 3,081 
Royal Navy 3,000 3,000 
Merchant Navy (estimated) 500 500 
Total 47,450 44,160 
 
Table 1 Irish Servicemen DO 35/1230 (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 32) 
 
Taking evidence of Irish birth to denote nationality, and assuming Irish combatants died 
at the same rate as others, Yvonne McEwen has used Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
evidence to arrive at the most analytically reliable figure for Army service (see Table 2). That 
these two sets of figures are not wildly different lends some degree of believability, yet it is also 
indicative of ignorance at the contribution of Irish volunteers that McEwen’s serious independent 
analysis of the numbers involved did not take place until 2004.  
Yvonne McEwen Eire Northern Ireland 
Irish Soldiers in the British  
Army in WW2 
50,644 49,302 
Table 2 Irish in the British Army extrapolated from CWGC records (McEwen, 2004, p. 83) 
6.2 SOURCES  
 
Due to the invisibility of the Irish contribution, existing contemporary sources are 
infrequent, not least because of the security implications of allowing soldiers to write diaries or 
send uncensored letters while in service. Doubtless the fact that Irish soldiers rarely served 
together, and even ‘Irish’ brigades and regiments contained only a minority of Irish soldiers, also 
meant Irish identity was often subsumed by that of the regiment or brigade. Indeed, surviving 
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wartime diaries of those in Irish regiments often betray no sense of Irish identity or mention any 
Irish personnel (Ager, 1942, IWM), and one diary by Irish Guardsman W.A. Simpson (Simpson, 
1944, IWM) only mentions pride in fellow Guardsman Kenneally VC, whose history illuminates 
the pitfalls of assuming the national identity of many British soldiers69. It was rare that Irish 
identity trumped regimental identity for serving soldiers, adding to their invisibility. Additionally, 
the Irish volunteers had no spokesman representing them in the political sphere at home, and often 
had only the mercurial Churchill speaking for them in Britain, lionising their contribution to the 
British Forces while at the same time vilifying their government and leaders. This distinction 
between personal deeds and state policy implied that the Irish government ill-lead, and 
deliberately miss-informed its citizens into accepting neutrality. The distinction implied state 
policy, and those following it, were dishonourable70, though many in the Forces disagreed. This 
distinction caused confusion in Britain, with Dominions Secretary Lord Cranborne’s admission 
that ‘many Irishmen who are gallantly in the Armed Forces of the crown, nevertheless believed 
that Mr de Valera was right to maintain neutrality’, yet still felt their views ‘curious’ (TNA, CAB 
65/39/22). This typified many peoples struggles to accept Irish motivations.  
Yet evidence of the Irish contribution, and British attitudes towards it, appears in 
censorship reports on letters home, the occasional diary in military archives, letters to newspapers 
and other government papers. However, reflecting the lack of public awareness of the Irish in the 
British Forces, reports on public opinion, such as Mass Observation (MO) and Home Intelligence 
(HI) show little appreciation. The subject simply does not arise in the MO 1939 Race survey, and 
comments during the war, such as the suggestion that news of IRA activity may have been 
censored by the British government (15/11/39, MO Diarist 5406), often indicate the continued 
acceptance of stereotypical concepts of ‘Irishness’, and ignorance of the contribution of Irish 
                                                          
69 Leslie Jackson used the identity papers of Irish seasonal worker ‘John Patrick Kenneally’ to join the Irish 
Guards, after serving military detention under them as part of the Honourable Artillery Company. The truth 
of his English and Jewish ancestry did not emerge until after the war (Condell, 07/11/2000).  
70 The film ‘The Halfway House’ similarly draws the conclusion that fighting in the forces makes the 
Irishman honourable – the film records an Irishman’s conversion from supporter of neutrality to soldier in 
the British Forces (Dearden, 1944) 
192 
 
volunteers to the British Forces and immigrant workers. News of the contributions made by Irish 
people was rare.  
6.3 IRISH IDENTITY AND THE BRITISH FORCES 
 
Historical associations, of course, impacted on Irish identity, not least because of Unionist 
and Nationalist allegiances. Notwithstanding these, many embraced a dual identity, most notably 
the ‘Anglo-Irish’, a mainstay of the officer class of the British Army, represented by professional 
soldiers like Montgomery, Alan Brooke, Alexander, and Dill. This class was augmented by 
volunteers from Eire who felt allegiance to the new Irish state yet joined the Allied cause. As 
Bernard Kelly argues, ‘Irish people could have multiple loyalties – to the Allies, to London, to 
their regiments, to their associations, to their comrades – and still be loyal Irish citizens’ (Kelly, 
2012, p. 189). RAF fighter pilot Brendan ‘Paddy’ Finucane was one such Irish volunteer. Born in 
Dublin of an English mother and Irish father, who had taken part in the Irish revolution, and living 
in Britain since 1936, Finucane exhibited his Irishness by displaying a shamrock on his Spitfire. 
Personal papers held at the Imperial War Museum, include letters of condolence on his death from 
hundreds of admirers, with one notable letter lauding his Irishness and evidencing the co-option 
of his identity by both Irish and British sources, arguing ‘He was a true Gael and never forsook 
his own land. How galling for you when the press called him a British Ace, an Australian Ace, in 
fact anything but an Irish ace’ (Letter, Finucane, 1943, IWM). Indeed, it was a common 
assumption that those who fought in the British Forces must have identified with Britain. Some 
saw a direct link between Southern Irish participation in the British Forces and continued 
perceived or vestigial claim on British identity. Sir Basil Brooke inferred as much when noting, 
in 1946, that ‘I have heard it said in a boasting manner that Eire men went forward to the war. Of 
course, they did, but they were our men, they were our people who thought as we did’ (Cited in 
Hennessey, 1997, p. 92). Yet these assumptions were often dispelled. Often Irish volunteers were 
not simply on the ‘British side’ but were only on the British side unless the British were ‘against 
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Ireland’, with many supporting Irish neutrality, which they saw as a protection for their families 
at home.  
Using the reminiscences of Irish volunteers in the British Forces from the University 
College Cork Volunteer archives, Bernard Kelly cites that of fifty-five interviewees, twenty-two 
supported neutrality, thirteen disagreed and sixteen ventured no opinion (Kelly, n.d., p. 15). These 
sources, oral histories recorded in the late 1990’s reflect the problem of remembrances being 
affected by the passage of time, reflection and subsequent events. The contemporary sources used 
for this thesis reflect a higher percentage of support for neutrality. Postal censorship reports from 
troops reveal support for neutrality even during the Travel ban imposed between Britain and 
Ireland during the preparations for D-Day in 1944. Irish troops ‘admit that the ban is 
understandable but maintain that de Valera's attitude as the leader of a neutral country is strictly 
correct and that he is acting within his rights’ (TNA, WO 204/10381), and another, from the same 
month, quotes ‘I am glad that dev. stood out for his policy, but I think you will agree that Churchill 
was quite fair in his statement on the subject’ (TNA, WO 204/714). Captain Henry Harrison, a 
veteran of World War One, spoke for Irish Socialists in Britain at a Connolly clubs conference, 
saying ‘I am a defender of Ireland’s neutrality under existing circumstances, but if it were not for 
my age, I would be fighting against the Germans…But that does not mean in any way that I 
condemn Ireland for her neutrality…’ (Dooley, 1943, p. 11). Some newspapers also 
acknowledged the attitudes of Irish men in the Forces, but could not, it appears, fully understand 
it. The Times editorial noted ‘While most of the large number of Irishmen employed in the British 
war effort would probably endorse his (de Valera’s) policy of neutrality…many of them are 
opposed to his other policies, which appeal mainly to the more insular stay-at-homes’ implying a 
lack of adventure and worldliness in those that chose not to go to war (The Times, 13/05/1944, 
p.5). These attitudes served to bolster the opinion that the Irish in the Forces were ‘our sort’ of 
Irish and identified with British values. 
However, most editorial opinion and letters to the editor on this subject, concurred with 
the belief that those Irish people in the forces had chosen to denounce neutrality by their actions. 
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Many believed that these men and women, as one editorial put it, ‘understand quite well what the 
trouble is and where it lies. They would not be where they are, did they not feel that their country 
is following the wrong line of policy’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 12/03/1944, p.5). Additionally, 
British public attitudes sometimes suggested that Irish political movements acted more out of 
hatred for Britain than love of Ireland, though some questioned such binary assumptions. A Letter 
to the Editor of the Belfast Newsletter implies anti-Irishness in this assumption by asking if, ‘in a 
future world war the Czechs were to seize the opportunity to stage a rebellion in Prague, would 
your correspondent...say that their action was inspired by hatred of Germany, or by love of 
Bohemia?’ (Belfast Telegraph, 09/08/1936, p.9). 
Conditional loyalty to the British Forces was understandable to the estimated 5,000 
NCO’s and privates who were AWOL from the Irish army serving with the British forces (Keogh, 
1994, p. 123). Recent research by Joseph Quinn has illuminated how this conditional loyalty 
played out in World War Two. Quinn argues the size of the Irish Defence Forces, though suffering 
high wastage since the Irish Civil War, continued to decrease until the Fall of France in 1940 
necessitated a recruitment drive which brought a draft of 40,000, and membership peaked in June 
1941, falling dramatically thereafter (Quinn, 2020, p.8). Coinciding with the Nazi invasion of 
Russia, Quinn argues this represents the time of highest number of desertions and corresponds 
with a surge in recruitment from Eire to the British Army and that it is possible that 15% of all 
Eire recruits to the British Forces were deserters from the Irish Forces (Quinn, 2020, p.9). While 
Quinn concludes most Irish Army deserters joined the British Forces after June 1941, preferring 
continued military service (Quinn, 2020, p.23), this interpretation is supported by evidence 
considered here, including postal censorship reports, letters to newspapers, and diaries. These 
reflect that Irish people in the forces wanted to protect Ireland while under threat of invasion and 
were willing to continue to protect Ireland in the British Forces after this threat had passed.  
They saw their service as protecting Ireland, however, for British opinion, Irish state 
neutrality was incompatible with the contribution of Irish people to the British Forces, making 
the Irish position a paradox. The continuation of the long-standing British cultural stereotype of 
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the Irish, and the basis of most ‘Irish’ jokes, the paradoxical stereotype provided an easier way of 
understanding the motivations of men such as ‘a crazy Irishman from Roscommon, a bomber 
pilot in the RAF…. (with) all the traditional dislike for the British, yet like thousands of other 
Irishmen he has joined them in this fight against Hitler’ (23/11/44, Morris, 1945, IWM). The 
paradox is frequently used, especially in newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, with the 
Irish stance portrayed as being ‘neutral if she has to fight everyone in Europe’ to stay so 
(Reynolds, 1941, p. 56).  
Adding to the confusion for many was the contentious question of military uniform. As 
Wendy Webster has noted, British uniform conditioned the public response to foreigners, and 
those wearing a shoulder flash denoting their home country on a British uniform often reported a 
more positive welcome than foreign civilians (Webster, 2018, p. 52). However, Irish combatants 
wore no distinctive uniform markers, due to the need to avoid identification as combatants from 
a neutral country, as well as the state continuing to accord Southern Irish people British 
citizenship, and it was often only when Irish soldiers spoke that British people knew of their 
nationality. Yet, the wearing of a British Uniform in Eire became an early concern, and a marker 
of Irish ‘intransigence’. The Evening Dispatch noted public disquiet, and sense of insult, at the 
banning of British uniform, noting that because ‘(they) prohibit the wearing of belligerent 
uniforms and intern belligerent combatants’, the public felt the ‘Irish are anti-British’, despite the 
same measure being actioned by all other neutral countries (Evening Dispatch, 03/10/1943, 
LHMA71. The question was soon settled, after pragmatic considerations superseded those of pride, 
and civilian clothes were provided for British Forces personnel on departure to Eire. Sir John 
Maffey, British Representative in Eire, reported to Lord Cranborne that de Valera was ignoring 
recruitment in Eire, but insisted those Irish in the British Forces should not come home in uniform. 
Maffey added that Britain should be mindful not to upset this situation. However, he could not let 
this agreement alter his view of de Valera’s irksome fastidiousness by adding ‘It is again one of 
                                                          
71 See also ‘Soldiers who Infringe America’s Neutrality’ where Canadian soldiers were warned not to go 
near the American border in Uniform or they might face internment (Western Daily Press, 17/07/1940). 
196 
 
those unreasoning prejudices to which attention must be paid…’ (TNA, PREM 1/340). Maffey did 
not appreciate the paradox of his own situation in accepting Irish neutrality while deriding it as 
unbending and irksome.  
Irish neutrality added a level of paradox into conceptions of the Irish military tradition as 
well as the ancient stereotype of the Irish as a martial race. Notwithstanding all the above, there 
was some evidence that British people recognised the historical contribution of Irish people in the 
British Forces. A Liverpool newspaper, like many others, acknowledged the breadth and depth of 
the Irish contribution, and reported that ‘Leaving aside the Anglo-Irish…a number of the Irish-
Irish are in England's fighting services…they are in all the services … (Liverpool Daily Post, 
18/11/1940, p.2). The Guardian similarly noted ‘Irish neutrality is neutrality with a difference. 
There are 150,000 Irishmen in the British Forces…and a quarter of a million Irish workers in 
Britain's war factories’ (The Guardian, 11/08/1942, LHMA). There was also pride in the Irish 
roots of many of the leaders of the British Armed Forces. Postal Censorship in Northern Ireland 
captured, in a letter from Belfast to London, pride in the Irish Generals, asserting ‘what and where 
would your country be without them, lost as it would have been in the past without their 
predecessors’ (8/12/42, TNA, CJ 4/30). The interesting use of ‘your’ rather than ‘our’ country 
might imply that the writer assumes that the reader may not know that these heroes were Irish. 
Similarly, a Belfast Newsletter editorial confirms pride in ‘Ulster’s Generals’ Montgomery and 
Alexander 'as both men belong to old and distinguished Ulster families’ and concludes that ‘in 
nothing, perhaps, do the Ulster people themselves find keener satisfaction than in having provided 
the British Army with its most famous leaders' (Belfast Newsletter, 14/09/1945, p.4). That these 
heroes were solely referred to as British generals in the British press, and regarded themselves as 
British, seems to confirm that these were considered Irish in Ireland, but British in Britain, and 
the act of joining the British Forces seemed to confer Britishness upon Irish volunteers.  
It should also be noted that newspapers do not evidence significant prejudice against Irish 
troops in British Forces, or express that these might have harboured IRA sympathies. Only one 
mention of this possibility has emerged in this study, that of MO Diarist 5406, who in November 
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1939 related an overheard story of two Tank Corps men on a bus saying that in a friend's regiment 
two IRA men had joined up and one was caught in the act of trying to set fire to a petrol dump 
(5/11/39, MO Diarist 5406). This lack of evidence of a suspected fifth column activity in the 
British Forces tends to bolster the contention that British opinion was content to believe that Irish 
people in the British Forces adhered to British conceptions of the war. Occasional stories of Irish 
in the British forces in receipt of public charity also tended to bolster this view, with one recipient 
officer, formerly of the Free State Army, graciously asserting ‘Your kind act serves to cement the 
friendship and loyalty of every Irishman in the British forces to the common cause’ (Hull Daily 
Mail, 03/08/1940, p.13).  
6.4 THE ‘FIGHTING IRISH’ 
 
The paradox of Irish volunteers in the British Forces was most notable in November 1940, 
when Churchill criticised the Irish refusal of the Treaty Ports in the House of Commons on the 
same day that Irishman Capt. Fogarty Fegen was posthumously awarded the VC for ramming the 
Admiral Scheer to protect the rest of a 38-ship convoy (R Fisk, 1985, p. 252). Captain Fegen was 
of a Catholic Irish family steeped in naval tradition, his father rising to the rank of Vice Admiral, 
and represented a longstanding and vital tradition of Irish soldiery in the British Services72. This 
tradition continued after independence and in 1936 the Army still ‘could ill afford to lose 
(Southern Irish) recruits’, and proposed provision should be made to allow Irish nationals to serve 
in the British forces whilst retaining their Irish nationality (TNA, CAB 53/28). This helped create 
a useful stereotype, that of the ‘fighting Irish’; Irish soldiers in foreign armies noted for their 
bravery, fortitude, and sacrifice73. A letter to the editor of the Daily Herald exhibits a number of 
tropes associated with this stereotype; that the great Irish Regiments still contain ‘some of the 
most daring fighters in the Army’, these men follow the tradition of their fathers, are led by some 
                                                          
72 In 1780 1/3rd of British Officers were Irish (Bartlett & Jeffery, 1996, p. 7) and in 1830 over 40% of the 
army was Irish-born or the sons of emigrants (Spiers, 1996, p. 337).  
73 As Bartlett and Jeffery note, this was one of few stereotypes shared by the British and all shades of Irish 
Nationalists (Bartlett & Jeffery, 1996, p. 7). ‘A Sorrowful Clare woman’, offering condolences on the death 
of Brendan ‘Paddy’ Finucane in 1942 wrote, ‘No wonder England is sore about Eire's army. Sons of the 
Gael do not run away from danger but court it’ (Finucane, 1943). 
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of the greatest military commanders and are proof that ‘not all Irishmen are bomb-throwing 
fanatics' (Daily Herald, 03/02/1040, p.6). British newspaper views of the fighting Irish in World 
War Two often lauded their contribution without reference to neutrality. Reports noted the 
contribution of both North and South in British regiments (Newcastle Journal & Mail, 
20/07/1940, p.4), while others espoused their work ethic and positive attitude, noting ‘The Faughs 
have a wonderful war record dating back to the eighteenth century. They are ready for anything…’ 
(Belfast Newsletter, 06/03/1940, p.9). The Daily Mail encouraged the Irish to ‘Forget Yesterday’, 
and that many ‘have served in the Army of Eire and now they are prepared to fight in the forces 
of a nation against whom their country waged such a bitter struggle so short a time ago. But that 
is the way of the Irish. Through the centuries they have pledged themselves to freedom....’ (Daily 
Mail, 26/10/1939, p.12). This attitude was also heard in the cabinet with the Secretary of state for 
the Home Department (Sir John Anderson) voicing, shortly before his replacement, that ‘Irish 
people were resolute fighters and he thought that they would be capable of dealing with 
parachutists or airborne invasion’ (TNA, CAB 66/7/68). 
However, the idea of the ‘Fighting Irish’ was something which could become dangerously 
close to being fetishized, a heroic image of daring and courage unrelated to the ordinary men and 
women who joined up. A copy of a book review by John Pierce of a memoir of Brendan Finucane 
in the fallen flyers personal papers rails against the books tendency to project Finucane as an 
‘emblem’ or ‘personified shamrock’, ‘making his mind a mystic madhouse of Greek and Gaelic 
heroics’ (Finucane, 1943). A comrade of Finucane’s wrote to his parents that ‘The book is 
manifestly a fanciful effort to represent Paddy to the general public as the type of character (that) 
will appeal to the vast field of Irish lovers & hero worshippers’ (Letter W.D. Perl, Finucane, 1943, 
IWM). Both reviewers were at pains to depict Finucane as an ordinary young man of duty and 
talent looking forward to ‘a job with figures, auditing or accounting, who insisted that ‘pilots are 
perfectly normal people’ (Review, Pierce, Finucane, 1943, IWM). The comments show an 
obvious disdain for the book and its writer, who professed to have known Brendan in Ireland, but 
was unknown to Finucane’s family, as well as disdain for the world of ‘Gaelic heroes’ and tales 
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of myth and fancy that were written about them. They preferred to see Brendan as a brave man, 
an Irish volunteer and ‘not a dreamer’ (Review, Pierce, Finucane, 1943, IWM), something that 
had been for centuries an Irish stereotype rather than an English one. Indeed, some British felt the 
Irish volunteers naive to contribute to the war uncompelled. Describing training at Caterham 
Camp shortly after Dunkirk, H. Broderick Pitland wrote ‘I and another Dubliner, Patrick Mooney, 
are the only two volunteers in our hut out of 22 conscripts. We…are looked upon as bloody daft 
by the conscripts’ (Pitland, 1940). Volunteering would be part of the stereotype where the Irish 
are always ‘up for a fight’, however, in general early attitudes to Irish troops were positive and 
unqualified, stressing the martial tradition of the Irish throughout the centuries. A writer to The 
Times, exemplified this attitude by quoting Napoleon, who reportedly said ‘Give me English 
soldiers, Irish officers, and French Generals, and I will conquer the world’ (The Times, 
18/10/1939, p.9).  
Such faith in Irish competency was rare after the fall of France, and the paradox of Irish 
men in the British Forces while their country remained neutral, appears more strongly in public 
discourse. British contemporary attitudes signal that the paradox could only be explained by Irish 
volunteers repudiating state neutrality. The Liverpool Daily Press opined that ‘The Irish do not 
take kindly to neutrality even, or especially, in a private fight…’ (Liverpool Daily Post, 
18/11/1940, p.2), inferring that those who take up arms are truly ‘Irish’. Readers’ letters often 
concurred, with one writer asserting ‘there are no real Irishmen afraid of all the Germans between 
here and hell. We will win this war without the Eire ports but the help of thousands of patriotic 
Irishmen’ (Newcastle Journal & Mail, 23/11/1940, p.4). Contemporary news also features Irish 
emigrant groups and associations in Britain, and all over the world, carrying resolutions against 
Irish neutrality, and these often cite the tradition of the fighting Irish to show common cause with 
the Allies. A meeting in London organised by a former deputy-lieutenant for County Cork moved 
that Irish men and women living under the hospitality of Great Britain did not approve of their 
country's neutrality, and that ‘Irishmen, as they did in the last war are taking a major part in the 
defence of the empire’ (Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, 21/02/1941, p.6). A similar report of 
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this kind relates ‘Former members of the IRA are joining the Irish Regiment which has been 
established on the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Their attitude is that the issues facing the Union 
of South Africa and the British Empire are of such importance that it is their duty to sink past 
differences and throw in their lot with their fellow Irishmen’ (Hull Daily Mail, 08/01/1940, p.4). 
Such stories contributed to a discourse in which those Irish who have emigrated were considered 
less insular than their parochial countrymen at home, hiding behind neutrality from the realities 
of the world, further enhancing the supposed disconnect between people and government.  
However, some British opinion saw neutrality as part of a natural progression for Irish 
nationalists and this brought about fierce criticism. A writer signing himself ‘A Scot and Glad of 
it’ replies to a previous letter lauding the Irish volunteers from ‘Irish and Proud of it’. The Scot 
writes that the Irish writer tells only half the story and asks ‘is he proud of Ireland's association 
with Germany in 1916.... Can he really take pride in the gallantry of Irishmen who support Britain 
without condemning the policy of Mr de Valera?’ (The Scotsman, 07/12/1940, p.9). Here de 
Valera’s policy is seen as an extension of the nationalist tradition that believed ‘England’s 
difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’ and makes clear that the writer considers Irish soldiers should 
confront their leaders and share the risks of being part of a combatant nation. The issue of 
neutrality was becoming a rigidly divisive tool with the Irish being either for or against, 
distinguished from each other by the act of volunteering in the Allied Armies. A letter in the Daily 
Mirror written by an ‘Irish ex-soldier’ asserts ‘Don't worry chums. When the thousands of our 
men who are now fighting the German's get back to Ireland… (we will) remind de Valera that not 
for him did I lose a leg at Dunkirk in 1940’. The paper answers ‘Goody, Goody! Keep it in mind. 
We'll be relying on you!’ (Daily Mirror, 24/11/1944, p.6)74.  
Emergency legislation in Ireland, and particularly that covering censorship, contributed 
to a conception in Britain that the Irish were ashamed of their countrymen’s contribution. A 
Belfast paper noted 'Today ministers in Dublin seem to be ashamed of the men from Eire who 
                                                          
74 This letter is titled ‘Eire! Eire!’ meant to rhyme with ‘Hear! Hear!’ proving the copy writer does not 
know how to pronounce the name of this troublesome country. 
201 
 
have enlisted in the British Fighting services. Public mention of them is prohibited....’ (Belfast 
Newsletter, 15/07/1944, p.2), and The Guardian noted ‘There is little about Fogarty Fegen or 
about Paddy Finucane in the Irish newspapers, but there is any amount of talk about them in Irish 
pubs.....’ (The Guardian, 11/08/1942, LHMA). Pamela Hinkson wrote to the editor of The Times 
that Irish soldiers were volunteering in large numbers, both Catholic and Protestant, ‘with double 
generosity’ as they were doing so without the promise of preferential post war treatment in their 
own country (The Times, 21/07/1943, p.5), foreshadowing the controversy in Britain over Post-
war treatment of these volunteers. Newspaper reports also made it common knowledge that Irish 
Forces personnel were deserting to join the British Forces, reporting the denial by the Eire 
government of estimates that 12,000 soldiers had deserted the Eire Army for the British (Belfast 
Telegraph, 16/12/1943, p.3). Belfast Newspapers reveal that Southern Irish volunteers often 
crossed the border illegally, however this was often overlooked by the courts who discharged 
them to the care of recruiting officers (Belfast Newsletter, 10/06/1942, p.2; Belfast Telegraph,  
30/03/1942, p.3). Such action was in stark contrast to that taken against Eire citizens not intending 
to volunteer, who were often ejected. Similar reports in Britain showed that men who had deserted 
the Irish Forces to join the British were arrested and imprisoned whilst visiting Ireland, and, on 
returning to their units in Britain, were charged with desertion from the British Army, though they 
were often acquitted and returned to their British units (Daily Herald, 10/10/1944, p.3). Reports 
from Britain showed a tendency for some Irish soldiers before the courts to be treated quite 
leniently, even if they had deserted (Western Daily Press, 28/06/1943, p.2). There is further 
evidence that the public knew of the risk the Irish government avoided by downplaying the role 
of Irish volunteers, with HI reporting a rumour that Lord Haw-Haw had ‘warned Eire that the 
bombing of Dublin, will be repeated if men from the south of Ireland continue to join the British 
Forces’ (18/7/1941, TNA, INF 1/292). Whilst a large proportion of the British public had direct 
knowledge of the effects of bombing, and doubtless understood the Irish desire to avoid these, 
many believed that the risk should be taken and that shirking it was dishonourable.  
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6.5 AN IRISH BRIGADE  
 
The traditions of the ‘Fighting Irish’ prompted opinion that the time was right to create 
an Irish Brigade to give these recruits regimental pride and, to some extent, recreate some of the 
Irish regiments disbanded at Irish independence. As Early as October 1939 representations had 
been made to government by, among others, Lt General Sir Hubert Gough, retired Anglo-Irish 
veteran, whose campaign to have the contribution of the Irish volunteers recognised, did not cease 
until long after the war had ended. His long correspondence in The Times’ received support in 
many quarters, but his proposals were initially ignored by the Army and Government. Lord 
Craigavon notably dismissed a petition for an Irish brigade as ‘not a thing to be taken seriously’ 
and noted ‘I am sorry to say the Sir Hubert Gough has gone off a good deal…but I am not going 
to say one word against him because there is no doubt, he was at one time a very gallant soldier’ 
(Birmingham Post, 30/10/1940, p.2). However, in July 1940 the War Cabinet considered the 
possibility of sending the London Irish battalions to Eire if that would help break the diplomatic 
deadlock over the Treaty ports. Considerations mitigating against such a move included a problem 
which would remain unsolved, that is the ‘Irish battalions’ were not predominantly Irish. At the 
time, the London Irish first battalion comprised only 28% Irishmen and the second only 23%, 
with only 15% and 9% respectively from Eire. Eden’s memorandum to the War Cabinet on this 
issue concluded that it would be necessary to take hundreds of Irish men from many different 
units, upsetting the valuable cohesion of existing units, and forming a new unit based on 
nationality rather than skills amounted to a waste of valuable human resources. For Eden this was 
a doubly unnecessary disruption when ‘there seems no strong reason to suppose that they would 
prove more acceptable to Mr de Valera than other British units’ (TNA, CAB 66/9/48). Indeed, de 
Valera had given no encouragement to such an idea, and it would be British Army presence rather 
than Irish soldiers that would create animosity.  
However, the prospect of an Irish Brigade in the British Army remained a popular theme. 
In February 1941, while agreeing Eire was entitled to her neutrality, a Sunday Express editorial 
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suggested ‘Let us revive those famous regiments which have been so much a part of the glorious 
history of Ireland…so that future generations…shall be able to say…the great the fighting 
regiments of Ireland were in the forefront of the battle, as always’ (Sunday Express, 16/02/1941, 
p.6). But it was a letter from Gough in The Times that spurred Churchill to raise the issue once 
more in cabinet in October 1941, saying ‘there were indications that public opinion in Ireland 
would be gratified’ by some recognition of the Irish volunteers contribution, and asked the new 
Secretary for War, David Margesson, to consider the possibility of creating an Irish Brigade (TNA, 
CAB 65/19/37). Interestingly Gough’s original letter did not express the opinion that the Irish 
would welcome such a move, rather that such a move could set in motion a ‘spirit of 
reconciliation’ in which to move forward in Anglo-Irish relations. The letter also asserts that Irish 
volunteers ‘represented valuable evidence that Irish neutrality is not a mask for a hostile spirit 
towards Britain’, and that an Irish Brigade would pose no infringement of neutrality, just as the 
Eagle Squadron in the RAF did not infringe American neutrality (The Times, 26/09/1941, p.5). 
Churchill’s response, that ‘we have Free French and Vichy French, so why not Loyal Irish and 
Dublin Irish?’ (TNA, PREM 3/127/5) betrays his opinion that Irish volunteers who joined the 
British forces did so for kinship with Britain. Gough’s campaign stimulated a lively debate, in 
several letter’s columns, and most letters seized upon Gough’s claims that Irish neutrality was not 
‘anti-British’, rather than considering his main theme, that Irish volunteers were making a 
significant contribution and that this ought to be recognised. Certainly, Churchill agreed, and was 
instrumental in creating, in 1942, the 38th Irish Brigade. However, Northern Irish opinion 
doubtless influenced how the battalion was eventually formed, and because of this the 38th was 
not constituted in the way Churchill conceived it.  
The Belfast Telegraph, on the same day as Gough’s Times letter was published, disputes 
his claim that an Irish Brigade could bring about reconciliation, arguing ‘no 'Irish', or 'Free Irish', 
Brigade can ever erase the fact that when civilisation itself was at stake Eire deliberately chose 
the way of 'Ourselves alone’’ (Belfast Telegraph, 26/09/1941, p.4). This unflinching opinion was 
echoed in December by Andrews, NI Prime Minister in a letter to the UK Prime Minister. 
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Reminding Churchill, as if it was needed, that after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 the only 
remaining Irish Army Battalions were territorially ‘Ulster regiments, and are considered so by our 
people’, Andrews warned that the ideas of Gough were ‘not acceptable to the people of Ulster’. 
They would also object to the name ‘Irish Brigade’ as it was associated with Irish who fought 
against England in the Boer war, Sir Roger Casement’s attempt in World War One, and a 
Blueshirt contingent in the Spanish Civil War (TNA, PREM 3/129/5). Northern Irish opinion was 
so vehemently against any recognition of Southern Irish contribution that, when the Brigade was 
formed in 1942, no special units of Southern Irish were formed, and was composed from a mix 
of existing Ulster battalions, territorial and home defence formations, and the London Irish Rifles. 
Northern Irish opinion seemed to be typified by replies in the Belfast Newsletter deriding Sir 
Shane Leslie’s 75 opinion that the Irish contribution had mitigated against invasion. LRH of 
Magherafelt wrote it was ‘specious…to suggest that Germany has been kept out of Ireland by...the 
fact that thousands of Irish volunteers have been allowed to swell the common defence’ and that 
Leslie’s statement made ‘no real contribution’ to the solution of the problem of the Defence of 
Eire (Belfast Newsletter, 27/11/1944, p.4). Newspaper correspondence in the North betrayed the 
general opinion that nothing from Eire, bar joining the war on the British side, would be 
interpreted as positive news. It was up to First World War Irish veteran Captain Henry Harrison 
to speak on behalf of the Eire volunteers, agreeing with Gough that their actions prove ‘that 
Ireland's chosen policy of Neutrality carries with it no element of hostility towards this country’, 
and that, though Irish regiments ‘may or may not be possible in this war’, ‘every Irish volunteer 
will be gratified if…there should be an official recognition of their service and nationality on 
traditional military lines’ (The Times, 14/10/1941, p.5). Ultimately, the closest the Irish volunteers 
came to this kind or recognition was Churchill’s victory speech in May 1945, which served to 
bolster the British belief that neutrality was not supported by the Irish people.  
                                                          
75 A first cousin of Winston Churchill and previously a Home Ruler. 
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6.6 A FIFTH COLUMN? 
 
Fears of ‘fifth column’ activity within the British Forces, especially when reported in letters 
to newspapers and editorials, usually referred to expected activity by the IRA. Early in the war, 
and during the 1938-39 IRA ‘S-plan’ attacks, comment typically restated the Irish Nationalist 
mantra that 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity to strike for freedom', citing the 1916 
rising and Casements attempts to form a German aligned ‘Irish Brigade’, as evidence of expected 
Irish perfidy. Public fears of Irish Fifth Column activities within the British Forces were minimal, 
but military intelligence actively searched for evidence to the contrary. Reports on the Censorship 
of Prisoners of war mail indicate that censors felt it necessary to search for signs of preferential 
treatment of Irish prisoners in German hands, and noted, on several occasions that ‘the German 
censor is marking all Irish mail with a Red Cross or red underlining's’ (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 
3/4/41). Though this was suspicious, later mails indicated that this was due mostly to the Germans 
being just as suspect of the Irish mails as the British (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 13/10/41), and 
that German censors required a special mark for letters that may need Gaelic translation (TNA, 
DEFE 1/335, report 26/7/41). 
Though marked mail often contained little of interest to the censors76, there were hints 
alerting censors to the possibility of attempts to form a German ‘Irish Brigade’, and indeed, at 
least one British POW also expected as much writing ‘Some of the Irish are going back to our 
headquarters. I suppose they are trying to turn them against us again’ (21/6/1941, TNA, DEFE 
1/335). Censored letters to Dublin revealed German attempts, based on an expected Irish anti-
communist and anti-English bias, at holding interviews designed to find those with an Irish 
identity in order to send them to a special camp (3/4/1941, TNA, DEFE 1/335). Other reports 
showed bribes of beer and cigarettes offered (29/2/1941, TNA, DEFE 1/335), the use of 
propaganda films (3/10/1941, TNA, DEFE 1/335), and offers of possible repatriation to Ireland 
                                                          
76Report No: 30 03/4/1941 in TNA, DEFE 1/335, reports one such letter, not addressed to Ireland, ‘merely 
contained a reference to the addressee possessing a “big Irish heart”. 
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(25/3/1941 & 13/10/1941, TNA, DEFE 1/335), to purportedly win over Irish soldiers to the Nazi 
cause. Worryingly for British Intelligence there was some evidence that Irish soldiers were 
responding to such overtures, with letters asserting the Germans were not so anti-religious as had 
been thought, reports of messages being sent to POWs families from friendly guards, of Irish 
soldiers learning German, and numerous reports that conditions in the ‘Irish Camp’, Stalag IIIA, 
were better than at British camp (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 29/4/41). Some attempts to co-opt 
Irish soldiers in British uniform were more direct. During summer and autumn 1940 censorship 
of POW mail revealed attempts to form a German Irish Brigade, but the plan was shelved at the 
time of Operation Barbarossa (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 56-57). Censors reports in 1941 note two men 
writing home that ‘all the Irish were assembled and asked individually which country they would 
fight for if Ireland and England went to war’, and that only ten replied they would fight for Ireland 
(TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 24/5/41). It might have been tempting to believe that this failed 
because most Irish personnel were more loyal to Britain than their home country, rather than the 
more likely prospect that they were showing solidarity against the enemy alongside their 
predominantly British colleagues. The second letter, in the same report, mentioning this incident, 
shows the writer knows there are ‘Irishmen on the Wireless broadcasting from here’ but adds ‘if 
you are waiting on me you are wasting your time’ (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 3/5/41), indicating 
that the writer considers he would never betray his comrades in the face of crude propaganda 
attempts to divide and conquer.  
Despite such attempts confidential security reports repeatedly state that there was little 
evidence of preferential treatment for Irish prisoners, and further that the mail examined produced 
little evidence of German activities among the Irish prisoners (TNA, DEFE 1/335). The letters 
intercepted indicated that most Irish prisoners of war writing home had good morale and were 
well treated. This was particularly apparent in letters from the ‘Irish camp’ where, as one soldier 
put it, ‘there are other Irish boys here too, so we often talk of home...’ (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 
13/10/41), displaying that the purpose of separating the Irish had the opposite effect to that 
intended, creating unity rather than division. Letters from the Irish camp reveal better conditions, 
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with sport, cinema and German lessons provided and less work expected, though some felt this 
put them in a ‘queer position’ against their comrades who were not so lucky. However, some men 
appreciated the camp, but realised ‘it was only for men with a particular point of view’, this 
division was noted by one soldier who wrote ‘fourteen of us could not see eye to eye with the 
remainder’ and were returned to their previous camps, ‘I feel easier in mind now that I am back 
here. The views of allegiance I took eight years ago will not be changed by anything’ (TNA, DEFE 
1/335, report 21/3/41). In general, censors concluded the Irish experience in German camps was 
like that of their British colleagues, and their nationality or political sensibilities proved no 
significant threat to security. As one Northern Irish combatant wrote home ‘The past year has 
been a wonderful experience, so full of varied interest and experience, excitement and boredom, 
chivalry and brutality, cheerfulness and depression. How adaptable the British soldier is, nothing 
can quench his spirit, he's top dog even here’ (TNA, DEFE 1/335, report 3/6/1941), and it is likely 
that most of his compatriots felt the same and acted accordingly. Though the 1941 ‘Irish Camp’ 
experiment failed, there were further intelligence reports of attempts to turn the allegiance of Irish 
Prisoners77, and a final attempt by Heinrich Himmler in July 1944. This SS plan was essentially 
to create a brigade based on the existing Free Corps/Legion of St George for propaganda purposes 
rather than as a reservoir of military manpower. As Mark Hull notes these ‘Irish were sent to a 
special camp at Buchenwald but proved impervious ‘against every influence’ (Hull, 2004, p. 207). 
Later it transpired that 7 Irish Privates out of 1,200 Irish POW prisoners of war, in the British 
Army, volunteered (Hull, 2004, p. 219). Official fears of disloyalty from Irish soldiers were 
proved exaggerated and appeared to be motivated almost solely by historical associations to 
Casements failed Irish Brigade rather than evidence of any real threat. 
 
                                                          
77 ‘14 October 1942 a telegram has been received from the military attaché at Berne to the effect that a man 
called Hewson, a PoW captured in Crete, had turned up. After a rough time as a PoW he had been 
approached owing to his Irish parentage with a suggestion that he should work for the Germans’ (West, 
2005a, p. 14)). 
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6.7 BELLIGERENT INTERNEES 
 
As a neutral power Eire was bound by international convention to intern belligerents 
found within their jurisdiction, though how this was to be done was by no means clear. 
Acceptance of internment, by British public opinion or government, was by no means easy 
because, as Bernard Kelly argues, of confusion over its purpose. Interned fliers were not prisoners 
of war but were required to stay in camps and to cease belligerent activities as if they were. For 
the Irish, the ‘sole reason Dublin detained combatant personnel was to fulfil Ireland’s 
international duty as a neutral country. Failure to intern, or displaying excessive favouritism to 
one over the other, would lead to questions over the validity of neutrality’ (Kelly, 2015, p. 56). In 
the febrile atmosphere of contemporary Anglo-Irish relations, this confusion did not preclude 
controversy or politicization of the internee’s situation.  
The problem of aircraft straying over Irish territory was confirmed on the day war was 
declared when two British seaplanes made a forced landings at Skerries and Dún Laoghaire 
harbour, due to poor weather, but were left to depart in better conditions. On 14 September 1939 
a British flying boat made a forced landing in Ventry Harbour, Kerry and this was brought to the 
attention of de Valera during a meeting with Sir John Maffey (R Fisk, 1985, p. 108)78. Such 
evidence suggests that the Irish government considered this to be one of the areas where ‘special 
consideration’ was to be granted to Britain, not least because it was feasible that Allied aircraft 
were on non-operational flights, whereas Axis aircraft were much more likely to be on active 
missions in Eire skies. Indeed, deliberate lenience on this issue is implied by a threat to use 
interment against Allied flyers if the British government did not clamp down on speculative 
newspaper stories of Irish aid to the Nazi’s (Kelly, 2015, p. 31; NAI, DFA Legal Adviser's Papers 
No: 55, 20/10/1939). However, as the numbers of downed fliers and landed sailors increased, and 
with German internees outstripping the British by five to one79, a more neutral policy was 
required. As a result, during 1941 and 1942, Allied personnel found in Eire were interned in a 
                                                          
78 The aircraft left with its crew after a local mechanic fixed an engine fault. 
79 Between 1940 and 1945 Allied internees numbered 45 and Axis 269 (Kelly, 2015, p. 2) 
209 
 
special camp, separated from Axis and IRA internees, at the Curragh. Never treated as prisoners 
of war and referred to as ‘guests of the State’, the internees lived under a regime, based almost 
solely on their word of honour, that they abide by a night-time curfew and could otherwise leave 
the camp on parole.  
However, the issue of internees in Eire elicited little public comment in Britain. Though 
the escapes of internees were widely reported these stories were rarely more than a few words 
with no added commentary. Reports on the first internee mentioned his forced landing due to fuel 
shortage, but also noted that he ‘had been generously treated’ and was reading as much as he 
could to continue his interrupted University Studies (Lancashire Daily Post, 11/12/1940, p. 4). In 
this research no evidence of public disquiet was found concerning Allied internees, but some is 
noted, in Northern Ireland, of ‘speculation’ over Axis internees (21/8/1940, TNA, INF 1/292) and 
the possibility of these escaping and contacting either the IRA or the German legation (13/1/1944, 
TNA, INF 1/292). Newspapers outside of Northern Ireland very rarely referenced British 
internments in Ireland, but there are a few references to the paradox of the Irish interning Allied 
flyers who were protecting the convoys that also supplied Ireland with food (Forfar Dispatch, 
11/11/1943, p.4; The Scotsman, 19/03/1941a, p.9). However, attitudes in the British Intelligence 
community and government betray, at least, annoyance at the few internments that did occur. In 
1940 a new intelligence section, MI9, was set up to aid prisoners of war escape, and these also 
attempted to aid Allied internees in Eire in their duty to return to service. These were assisted by 
a network of supporters and safe houses· in Co. Kildare and Dublin, generally among Anglo-Irish 
loyalists and ex-servicemen (McMahon, 2008, p. 333). The MI9 network was discovered and 
watched by G2, and their activities officially protested. But the intelligence services, and notably 
Guy Liddell, usually on good terms with their Irish counterparts, stood fast on their commitment 
to their internees. In his diary Liddell noted he and his brother Cecil agreed that attempts to free 
the Allied Eire internees should be ‘a rudeness which they must expect’ (31/10/1942, West, 
2005a, p. 22). But even so the need to be diplomatic in the face of Irish ‘intransigence’ meant 
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attempts to free the internees had to be discouraged 80, and, on at least one occasion, those 
internees who escaped to Northern Ireland were returned to the Curragh81. The issue was still an 
irritation in April 1944 when Cranborne requested, as a personal favour, the release of the 
remaining Allied internees as they were ‘a constant obstacle in the way of his desire to act in a 
friendly fashion towards us’ and caused ‘difficulties in the cabinet’ (NAI, DFA Secretary's Files 
A2, 03/04/1944). The lack of internment of Allied belligerents at the beginning of the war, 
followed by a period of internments, and then release of these under the ‘non-operational flights’ 
compromise indicate a reactive policy affected by the fortunes of the Allies, and it would be easy 
to assume that Ireland only interned Allied belligerents when it appeared that the Germans had 
the upper hand, and released them when the tide of the war had turned, and draw conclusions that 
the Irish were playing both sides. However, as Bernard Kelly points out this was not exceptional 
as ‘all European neutrals, excluding Switzerland, adjusted their internment regimes as the course 
of the war dictated’ (Kelly, 2015, p. 40). Sweden operated its policy along lines opposite to Eire, 
returning more German internees than Allied, and initiated the wholesale release of Allied 
internees in 1944. The Irish regime, however, never allowed the release of Axis internees despite 
written protests from the German Minister Hempel at the release of Allied servicemen (Kelly, 
2015, p. 41). The lack of public protest at Eire’s internment of Allied personnel in Eire reflects 
both the advantages the Irish internment regime offered, and the small number of personnel 
involved.  
 
                                                          
80 LHMA Papers of Baron Mayhew, brother of the first British internee FO Paul Mayhew, reveal his 
attempts, from within British Intelligence, to aid his brothers escape, were thwarted by senior officers 
unwillingness to upset understanding with their Irish counterparts (Mayhew, 1940). Paul Mayhew escaped 
in 1941, his marriage being widely reported, though his wife was sworn to secrecy over how he was free 
(Derby Evening Telegraph, 08/07/1941). Paul Mayhew died on active service in February 1942. 
81 Roland ‘Bud’ Wolfe, the only American held in Eire, initially served in the RAF Eagle Squadron, and 
twice escaped from the Curragh. In 1941 he was returned by senior officers, at the suggestion of Maffey 
and Gray (Kelly, 2015, p. 93), who were keen that the regime in the Curragh should not be tightened. He 
escaped again in 1943 and joined the USAF, from where his return was not requested. His first escape 
meant the end of MI9 policy of aiding escapes from Eire and subsequent attempts were organised solely 
from inside the wire.  
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6.8 EXPERIENCES OF THE IRISH IN THE BRITISH FORCES  
 
Postal censorship of letters from Irish people in the forces asserted that they were rarely 
singled out for special treatment, and, in general, felt well served by the British Army. There is 
some evidence that the British Forces were, on occasion, reactive to the special circumstances of 
Irish volunteers, a good example being the rescinding of a regulation preventing men adding two 
days short leave to their weeks privilege leave if their leave involved a sea passage, after ‘Irish 
personnel…(saw) in this an example of discrimination against them’ (31/5/1942, TNA, WO 
163/51). Stephen O’Connor’s research on Irish combatants in World War Two and concluded that 
most felt their identity was regarded as something to be embraced by the British Forces 
(O'Connor, 2015). In contemporary evidence, though some general references to anti-Irish feeling 
do occur82, troops mail censorship tend to evidence this conclusion, where reports note that there 
was ‘uniformly high morale…and no special tendencies to due to racial feeling were observed’ 
against Irish troops (13/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/714). Many Irishmen felt pride in serving and their 
letters showed it; ‘The general tone is excellent. Most writers are proud of being Irish and of 
serving in the British Army. Reference is often made to the large number of Southern Irish in 
H.M. Forces’ (30/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/714). The lack of prejudice against Irish soldiers reflects 
a positive advantage for Irish soldiers, who were assumed to be acting out of loyalty to Britain 
and her war aims, even when this may not have been their primary concern. Recent research has 
argued a large proportion of those who joined the British Forces from Eire were initially Irish 
Forces reservists, who felt unable to make a career in the Irish Army, while some were affected 
by domestic economic pressure because of poor pay at home83, others by apathy at being trained 
to fight, yet having no guns, and being limited to the performance of boring public works, such 
as hated Turf cutting. Others had traditional family association with the British Forces, or could 
                                                          
82 After witnessing anti-Semitism Mary Morris notes ‘I wonder if there will ever come a time when people 
are accepted as they are regardless of race, colour or culture. My Irish accent is still looked upon with 
suspicion by some people!’ (18/9/1944, Morris, 1945). 
83 The average Private First Class of the Irish Forces was left with 13 shillings pay, after expenses deducted, 
per week. In the British Army the equivalent was 22 shillings a week (Quinn, 2020, p.13-14) 
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not stand poor conditions, with some even citing the ‘unsoldierly’ Irish Army Uniform (Quinn, 
2020, p. 12-17). However, contemporary evidence shows the Irish in the British Forces were 
fighting for Ireland rather than Britain, for if Britain fell Ireland would be exposed to further 
threat. 
However, many Irish remarked on the one official policy which effectively discriminated 
against Irish people in the forces; that is the travel ban to Ireland instituted during the preparations 
for D-Day. The censors’ reports indicate that, though this was regretted, most Irish in the forces 
agreed that such as step was necessary, with one Irish soldier writing ‘I'm convinced that poor old 
Eire had to be become isolated, but I'm sure all sensible Irish people will realise it was essential’. 
Others felt it was now time for Ireland to reconsider her neutrality, on the grounds that choosing 
sides would be to her advantage now that invasion was no longer likely. One letter weighed up 
the advantages and disadvantages stating ‘The boys feel pretty sore about it... (Eire) needn't send 
any troops or indeed commit herself in any way - she' not likely to be bombed as a reprisal 
nowadays. All she need do is stop Jerry using wireless sets and diplomatic channels to give away 
secrets’ (16/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/10381). There were a few dissident voices, however, who 
insisted Eire was within her rights, but the travel ban was questionable while ‘400,00 Irishmen 
volunteered…. and to apply sanctions to a neutral country acting within its rights, seems rather a 
poor gesture of a United Front against Nazism. Why was not sanctions applied to Spain…?’ 
(16/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/10381). Another reports noted several writers took the action as an 
‘insult to fighting Irishmen’ who had all volunteered to fight for England (13/4/1944, TNA, WO 
204/714). The travel ban showed Irish personnel were most worried about the welfare of their 
families and the possibility of it delaying their mail, but ‘Despite this there has been nothing in 
the nature of protest nor any criticism of wisdom of the measures adopted by the British 
government for the maintenance of security’ (30/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/10381).  
Despite the few who questioned why Ireland was being treated differently from other 
neutrals, Irish soldiers appeared, by this time, to be more accepting of British views on how the 
war should be fought, and direct exposure to events outside Ireland, and of course to the realities 
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of the frontline, made them more sympathetic to policies which would finish the war expediently. 
Wendy Webster emphasises the effect of dual identities and common journeys of those Irish 
people in the British forces – many would grow to identify more strongly with their compatriots 
than with the sensibilities of those civilians at home (Webster, 2018, pp. 70-71). Censors’ reports 
also highlight that some Irish soldiers now appeared to react with disgust at the position of Eire, 
some hoping that the American Forces would take the treaty ports, and others the entire country, 
noting this ‘would be better for all concerned’. Others wrote home saying they saw no future for 
themselves in Ireland after the war (30/4/1944, TNA, WO 204/714). It appeared that the influence 
of British attitudes on those Irish people serving in the forces did affect their attitudes to their own 
country. But undoubtedly dual loyalties persisted, and it would have been interesting to see if 
these attitudes changed if Ireland had been later under threat of invasion.    
6.9 BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE IRISH IN THE FORCES 
 
Censorship of troop’s mail, despite the sheer numbers of Irish volunteers in the British 
Forces, sometimes indicated that British soldiers simply did not understand Irish Nationalism or 
that Eire was an independent Dominion, reflecting the opinions of those who completed the MO 
1939 Race Survey. They also, like the general British population, blamed the Irish government 
for leading the Irish people astray, but showed them no sympathy for their supposed plight. 
Several British troops saw de Valera’s policy as ‘surprising’ and a few thought him ‘a stupid 
nitwit who thought Eire could survive…without the help of England’ (13/04/1944, TNA, WO 
204/714). Some continued to feel that Ireland was a natural part of Britain, unable to survive 
independently, and destined to return to the Empire, as the temerity of neutrality had proved Irish 
independence untenable. A forces chaplain wrote in his diary that whether ‘Mr de Valera likes it 
or not the British Isles are a single unit, economically…and above all as we see clearly now 
strategically. Ireland is an essential part of a whole greater than himself…’, and after the war 
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Ireland must ‘accept her inevitably (sic) destiny, (or) this time we lapse instead into civil War’84 
(Quinn, 1943, IWM). Others lamented the position of ignominy to which they saw Ireland had 
descended, with one letter noting ‘Poor old Eire is a black dot on the map of the world now...’ 
(13/04/1944, TNA, WO 204/714). However, Diarist Mary Morris, serving in Queen Alexandra’s 
Royal Army Nursing Corps, summed up the general feeling of the British Services towards Irish 
volunteers when she wrote ‘there is remarkably little resentment or even comment on Ireland’s 
neutrality in this war. There were of course those dark mutterings from Churchill in the early 
days…(but) there are so many Irishmen in the British Services that most people have forgotten 
that they are volunteers, and this is not their fight’ (Morris, 1945/3/45, IWM). In general, Irish 
participants were more likely to be singled out as different from their peers when wartime events 
gave emphasis to one of two competing discourses; one that they were a vital addition to depleted 
military resources and the other where they were anomalies that could effectively be ignored. 
Newspaper articles frequently used Irish volunteers as an example of paradoxical 
Irishness, which allowed for their contribution to be dismissed as unexplainable. One article 
highlights the popular belief that ‘the people of Eire are easy-going courteous and friendly, but 
they are still very bitter towards the English’, but relates a conversation with a man, ‘meticulously 
neutral’, who surprisingly turned out to be an RAF pilot on leave at home (Aberdeen Press & 
Journal, 25/04/1944, p.2). Other reports note a similar paradox where at a public meeting on Irish 
neutrality a London Councillor spoke that ‘the English idea of the Irish temper was completely 
mistaken, Ireland liked peace but was always ready to take a share in a fight if this was forced 
upon her’, and that Eire’s attitude was ‘I stand for my rights, but I'll give you a hand’. He also 
succinctly explained the feeling of most Irish nationalists at the time, ‘I love English people, but 
I do not agree the English have a right to govern... (and that) no nation would have war if it could 
                                                          
84 This remarkable set of notes in Rev Quinn’s diary starts ‘The grievances of Ireland have always found a 
sympathetic hearing in England’. It continues to blame British governments for ‘indulging’ demands made 
by a people who know ‘full well how to exploit that English blend of tendencies and indolence which makes 
the British Government apt to make concessions for the sake of peace…’, and asks ‘When will the English 
realize that the dominant party in Ireland have no good will for them?’ (Quinn, 1943). It concludes Ireland 
should return as part of the UK, despite his characterisation of Anglo-Irish relations being clearly one of an 
ongoing mutually abusive relationship. 
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be avoided’ (West London Observer, 23/06/1944, p.5). This was the paradox that British people 
did not appear to understand, that the Irish would fight but their nation would stand aside, and the 
nation would fight, of their own choice, only if this were unavoidable.  
There was, after neutrality had weathered its first controversies, plenty of evidence in the 
public domain to show that Irish people (in Eire) did not feel they should invite bombing upon 
their unprotected cities, supported de Valera and neutrality, and still shared revulsion of Hitler’s 
domination of Europe. Yet some still could not quite grasp the intricacies of the Irish politics, 
such as the British Army Sergeant writing to the Western Morning News, initially asserts the Irish 
volunteers ‘love their country, so please give Eire's a break’, yet suggesting ‘the vast majority of 
the Irish people want to be with us. The snag is the government…de Valera just won't play’ 
(Western Morning News, 01/12/1943, p.4). This opinion, appears to typify most British public 
opinion of Eire during the War, being based on cultural stereotypes, the paradox of the Irish 
volunteers, British expedience, a profound ignorance of the realities of Irish Politics, and the dual 
cultures of Nationalists and Loyalists. The habit of most British soldiers of referring to both 
Northern and Southern, Nationalist or loyalist, Protestant or Catholic, as either ‘Paddy’ or ‘Mick’, 
reported in many memoirs85, is interpreted by Bernard Kelly as serving to eradicate the differences 
between different Irish cultures (Kelly, n.d.., p. 10), but could equally be interpreted as a sign of 
ignorance of these differences.  
Luckily, however, those Irish who volunteered for the British Forces often met more 
understanding comrades. Mary Morris wrote in her diary ‘I am reading Mein Kampf, which 
always makes Wally snort with anger. She calls me a fifth columnist!’ (18/6/1944, Morris, 1945, 
IWM), betraying that some could see that the actions of a dedicated and courageous nurse 
outweighed the possibility that she might agree with Hitler’s philosophy because of her choice of 
reading material. Camaraderie in the forces could overcome the influences of ignorance.  
                                                          
85 See memoirs of Sam McAughtry, Brian Inglis and Mary Morris, and the works of Richard Doherty. 
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6.10 POST WAR 
 
Even before the wars end the question of what would happen to the Irish volunteers after 
the war had begun to arouse public concern. In 1944 the British Legion in Dublin recommended 
that ‘everything possible should be done to dissuade men from coming to their homes in Eire 
pending release from the services’ owing to ‘practically no work to be found for ex-servicemen 
in Eire’ (TNA, DO 35/1229). British opinion added the expectation that those who had shown 
‘loyalty’ to Britain should be treated as heroes, even in their own land. Sean O’Casey had pointed 
out that the participation of the Irish in WW2 as simply an extension of a long history fighting 
Irish in ‘England’s Wars’ and drew attention to the fact that these men were destined to be 
uncelebrated when they returned home (O'Casey, 1944, p. 17), as had been the case in the First 
World War. Hubert Gough’ s letter to the Times urging the British government to give 
Unemployment benefits to those Irish who had accrued it in Britain, even if those entitled returned 
to Eire, because ‘They gave their services when needed and as long as they were needed (and) 
deductions have been made from their wages for unemployment insurance’ (The Times, 
12/01/1945, p.5), emphasising a growing feeling of gratitude in those who knew of the Irish 
volunteers. Brigadier AG Hewson concurred, adding ‘They volunteered to come to England in 
her time of need and are owed a debt which should be repaid’ owing to the ‘distress and poverty 
of many of the ex-servicemen’ living in Eire’ (The Times, 03/04/1945, p.3). Though the British 
government ensured Irish ex-servicemen could avail of National Insurance benefits after returning 
to Ireland, a principle written into the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, unemployment benefit was not 
extended to those leaving Britain, not least because of the amount of work this would involve, 
and a semi-official shunning of the Irish State due to neutrality. This undoubtedly led to many 
Ex-servicemen choosing to settle in Britain, where even if they could not find work in booming 
post-war reconstruction, unemployment benefits would at least be paid.  
Concern for the fate of the volunteers was at its height around VE day, after Churchill’s 
victory speech made special mention of the paradox of the Irish in the British Forces, dividing de 
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Valera’s motivations ‘so much at variance with the temper and instinct of thousands of Southern 
Irishmen, who hastened to the battle to prove their ancient valour’, from those the Irish people. 
Churchill’s statements of Irish government ‘frolics’ (W.S. Churchill, 13/05/1945) with the Axis 
legations in Dublin, alongside news of a near riot at Trinity College Dublin over the flying of a 
British flag in place of an Irish Tricolour, undoubtedly affected volunteers in the Irish forces who 
felt aggrieved by Churchill’s victory comments on de Valera. Mary Morris downplays the flag 
incident in her diary but took issue with anti-Irish remarks by ‘some arrogant young subalterns’, 
leading her to defend de Valera, though it is clear she does not admire him, and to dispute their 
accusations that Ireland is was ‘a hotbed of Nazism’ (6/6/1945, Morris, 1945, IWM). Irish 
volunteers no doubt felt their own contribution being belittled, and their state charged with a 
shameful abdication of responsibility. Predictably the Ulster newspapers put these accusations in 
their most biased form, after de Valera’s answer to Churchill’s victory speech restated the rights 
of small nations against their larger neighbours. The Belfast Newsletter charged that 'Mr De 
Valera's heroics about self-defence deceived nobody, least of all his own people. British Sea 
Power alone saved Ireland from a German invasion…. May the day be not too far distant when 
an ashamed and repentant Eire will realise how much it owes to them’ (Belfast Newsletter, 
14/05/1945, p.5). Once again, the established narrative of the Irish people being against neutrality 
returns, but without acknowledgement of the contribution of Irish volunteers.  
That is not to say that the British government was inconsiderate to the special needs of 
Irish volunteers. Viscount Addison, writing in October 1945, recommended ‘special 
consideration’ for the early release of Irish volunteers where it ‘is justified, and that release from 
the forces will enable the man to resettle in Eire, while delay might ruin his prospects’. He did so 
on the basis that ‘it is really unfair on these Irishmen to try to apply to them exactly the same 
standards as are enforced in this country. These men from Eire are volunteers…who…On their 
return they cannot hope for benefits from their own government but on the contrary may even be 
exposed to disabilities or become objects of local criticism’ (TNA, DO 35/1229/28). This reaction 
was no doubt influenced by reports from Maffey that he was being asked by the families of Irish 
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volunteers for his help in securing their expedient return to Eire, alongside stories of courts martial 
involving volunteers returning to Eire (TNA, DO 35/1229). 
Undoubtedly, the actions of the Irish government immediately after the war played into 
the hands of those who felt the worst of de Valera. Even before the last stern measures passed 
under the Emergency Powers Act before it was curtailed, British newspapers had revealed the 
plight of some Irish volunteers. Reports emerged of events in the Dail, where Dr T.F. O’Higgins 
of Fine Gael questioned the actions of the government for court martialling returning soldiers 
after he had been assured that no action would be taken against Irish Army deserters in Dail three 
days before. Ulster Newspapers reported his speech which suggested that the men were 
effectively being court-martialled ‘because they had soldiers blood in their veins’, and that the 
government was running a vendetta against them (Belfast Newsletter, 22/06/1945, p.2). In 
October 1945, when one of the last Emergency orders barred 4,020 deserters from the Irish to the 
British Forces from employment, benefits, pensions, and all work created by public funds, for a 
period of seven years, with British newspapers reporting O’Higgins continued opposition in the 
Dail, and some characterised the measure as if it were a prison sentence (Daily Mail, 19/10/1945, 
p.3). Reporting Minister of Defence, Oscar Traynor’s denial of victimisation, the Daily Express 
also reported that the appeal to annul the decree was lost without a vote taking place (Daily 
Express, 19/10/1945, p.3). British editorials saw the action as immoral, harsh, an affront to the 
freedoms the soldiers fought for and giving comfort to the forces of evil. The editor of the Daily 
Mirror urged the people of Eire to ‘repudiate Mr de Valera’s cruel attack upon their brave sons 
and brothers’, conceding that the action was legally viable but characterising it morally repugnant 
(Daily Mirror, 20/10/1945, p.2). The Belfast Newsletter added ‘This victimisation of soldiers who 
have fought in the war has caused widespread indignation to all except those who still regard 




6.11 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Irish volunteers in the British Forces were, in the end, doubly excluded from a share in 
the glory of victory. In Britain, and despite Churchill’s lionisation of Irish volunteers, tributes 
were rare. The invisibility of the volunteers only added to British bitter feeling against the Irish 
government and de Valera. When the war was over, rumours that the Irish spied for the Nazi’s re-
surfaced, in two post-war films (Webster, 2018, p. 251) and books full of fabulous tales of safe 
harbour for U-boats (West, 1998). In Ireland, some volunteers who had deserted the Irish Forces 
were punished by emergency order, and preference for work was often given to those demobbed 
from the Irish forces. Their choice to serve in the British Forces was derided by some whose 
opinion was that ‘Every citizen of this neutral state who joined a foreign army did an actual or 
potential wrong to his own country’ and ‘the only place of honour was and duty for the Irish a 
soldier was in the Irish Army’ ('The Leader'. Quoted in Roberts, 2000, p. 174), and this view was 
given official sanction. In the main, those volunteers returning to Eire found no place in the 
historical discourse of ‘the Emergency’, because that discourse was one that happened within 
Ireland rather than outside it, and those who had volunteered had left this discourse behind.  
British attitudes, however, were moulded by wartime expedience and historical 
associations. Initially the Irish in the British Forces were regarded as part of a tradition of service, 
the mainstay of which was the Anglo-Irish officer class. However, by World War Two the Irish 
represented, overall, a diversity of religion, social class, political inclination, and regional 
background. Steven O’Connor has shown that by the end of the war these classes amounted to 
20% of Irish officers (O'Connor, 2014, p. 185), and these doubtless influenced perceptions of the 
Irish amongst those under their charge. Initially perceived as ‘the fighting Irish’ before fear of 
invasion from France became widespread, neutrality did not make the position of Irish volunteers 
seem anomalous or paradoxical. However, by the time of the Blitzkrieg in the Low Countries and 
France, with neutrality perceived as no defence against invasion, but rather an invitation, paradox 
began to explain Irish motivations. The Irish volunteers to the British Forces had made their 
220 
 
choice to side with Britain against tyranny and must therefore have seen the war as the British 
did, and those that did not were deemed to be aiding the attackers by stepping aside. Evidence of 
the true, complex, motivations of Irish volunteers was widely available, but many did not 
understand conditional Irish loyalty to the British Forces. That these people fighting in the British 
Forces often supported neutrality, also contributed to a narrative of ‘Paradoxical Irishness’, where 
the state would remain neutral if its people had to fight for it to remain so. The British public, it 
seemed, preferred to believe that the ‘good’ Irish joined the ‘good’ war and the ‘bad’ Irish 
remained aloof. 
The stereotype of the ‘fighting Irish’ also contributed to this perception, by alluding to 
past glories of Irish Battalions. The contribution of the Anglo-Irish Commanders in the British 
Forces was lauded, yet these were rarely portrayed as Irish outside of Ireland and attempts to 
recognise the Irish volunteers in an Irish Battalion were also popular, but opposition from Ulster 
resulted in a battalion with no specific association with Eire, or indeed many Irish troops. The 
‘fighting Irish’ stereotype was also tempered by eulogizing Irish heroes, but not as ‘a dreamer’, 
or a hero of Gaelic Legend, often stereotypes of Irish ‘tall tales’. Men like Brendan Finucane were 
portrayed as practical, quiet, ordinary men doing their duty, without drawing too much attention 
to themselves; acting similarly to the way stereotypically British heroes were expected to act. As 
the war continued British attitudes to the Irish in the Forces grew more polarised, as the Battle of 
the Atlantic raged on. There grew a discourse where Irish emigrants were portrayed as being 
ashamed of their country’s neutrality, and where Eire was cutting itself off from reality began to 
emerge. Those who did not volunteer for the forces became seen as part of a backward and 
isolationist culture, controlled by de Valera, and invariably identified as Anti-British. Attempts 
to show that Irish neutrality was not anti-British generally failed.  
The Army considered the possibility of fifth column activity by Irish soldiers within the 
Army and found evidence of German attempts to undermine the loyalty of Irish volunteers, but 
found these attempts had little effect. Irish soldiers themselves reported little discrimination, 
though some were upset by the D-Day travel ban, many considered this militarily necessary and 
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some questioned continued neutrality after the threat of invasion had passed. British soldiers 
mostly tended to agree with public opinion that the Irish had been poorly led into neutrality against 
their will viewing Irish comrades as the Irish on the ‘right side’, and thus there was little 
resentment of neutrality, although isolated incidents occurred.  
The Post-war actions of the Irish state tended to bolster these views, and a discourse 
emerged where the Irish were perceived as being ashamed of the volunteers, and the actions taken 
against Irish Army deserters gave credence to the theory that those who volunteered for the British 
Forces had identified with Britain and were being punished for doing so. Though there was a 
British public discourse in favour of recognising the Irish contribution and making sure that these 
men received all the benefits they were entitled to in Britain, this, in effect, continued to uphold 
the distinction between those Irish who supposedly upheld British values, by staying in Britain, 
and those Irish that repudiated them, by returning to Eire. It seemed to most in Britain that the 





7 THE ENEMY WITHIN: AXIS  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Irish neutrality meant that Eire could not break diplomatic relations with Axis or Allied 
Nations as doing so for one necessarily meant favouring the other. However, as the only neutral 
part of the British Empire, and considering its proximity to the home nations, its open border with 
the United Kingdom and a certain cultural antipathy towards Ireland and the Irish, it was easy for 
Britons to expect preferential treatment and that Ireland would be a potential source of leakage of 
military intelligence. Initially public disquiet was concerned with the activities of the IRA who 
were often expected to collaborate with German agents. However, by 1941 the expectation of 
IRA collaboration notably lessened, but apprehension over Axis espionage activities, especially 
by the Axis legations, reached new heights. Any plans for an Axis invasion of Ireland were of 
differing significance to Britain than to Eire because both ‘Plan Kathleen’ and ‘Case Green’ were 
intended only as feints to draw fire from a simultaneous invasion of Britain. For Eire, the 
likelihood of invasion by Germany was low because of the protection afforded the whole of the 
British Isles by the Royal Navy and Air Force, while pre-emptive invasion by Britain, to prevent 
encirclement, was deemed much more likely. Coupled with the shared need for the extent of 
Anglo-Irish intelligence collaboration to be kept secret, these factors contributed to a public 
perception that Eire was a threat to British intelligence security. Additionally, public distrust of 
Irish motivations, intentions and competence also clashed with Irish sensitivity ‘not only about 
their independence, but about their ability to do all that was necessary themselves’, and it was 
therefore necessary to ‘let it appear that every measure was carried out by the Irish on their own 
initiative and not at the request of the British’ (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 24). This chapter will analyse 





7.2 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE  
 
Ignorance of Ireland and the Irish caused a lack of understanding which was partly a result 
of having no British official diplomatic representative, intelligence liaison or military attaches in 
the new Irish state between 1922 and 1938. For British Naval intelligence this meant an 
intelligence gap that Godfrey, head of Naval Intelligence, admitted was an oversight, writing ‘I 
realise now, that, in 1939, we knew very little about Ireland of the Irish; had we known more we 
might have tackled the problem effectively from the start’ (TNA, ADM 22/3486). This deficiency 
was also apparent in the public who, alongside Government and Intelligence, were equally unable 
to assess the validity of the many reports, rumours and lies being reported from Eire. Confusion 
in the British Intelligence community was also caused by British policy pulling in different 
directions. In this state of unease British policy, as it had done throughout Irish history, remained 
one of balancing between accommodation and confrontation. In times where Britain itself was 
under direct threat of invasion it was this lack of determined policy which caused confusion 
enough to make any rumour about Ireland believable. Indeed, intelligence received, which was 
possibly planted, either by mischievous German sailors or German Intelligence (McMahon, 2008, 
p. 300), also added to the confusion. 
In the first year of the war the British intelligence gap was filled by several SIS operatives, 
often retired or reservist Irish naval officers such as Lt Michael Mason86, whose activities ‘often 
exceeded their mandates and were a source of embarrassment to London’ (McMahon, 2008, p. 
291). However, with the appointment of a Naval Attaché, and the use of wireless transmitters to 
communicate, these amateur ‘spies’ relayed what little, often anecdotal, information they had to 
SIS in London. As McMahon argues the lack of information coming from Eire Coast-watch87 was 
                                                          
86 Lt Mason, a RN Reservist, was arrested after letting slip he had a RNVR commission while on a west 
coast ‘sailing holiday’ and was accused of spying. After being held for a week at the beginning of the war 
Maffey negotiated his release. 
87 Eire Coast-watch reported only four sightings of U-boats from September 1939 to May 1940 (May 1940, 
TNA, ADM 116/4600) 
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initially interpreted as being due to inability and inefficiency88, rather than the possibility that 
Germany was being careful not to infringe Irish neutrality. Opinions on Eire Coast Watching were 
clouded by cultural expectation from the start. When all sites were equipped with telephones in 
June 1940, British Intelligence were still unsatisfied, reporting the ‘personnel in some of those 
recently visited seemed anything but nautically minded and…can hardly be relied upon’ (TNA, 
PREM 3/129/2). Though the HMS Tamura made a disguised tour of the Irish West coast in order 
to find German U-Boats, and found none, its Captain was still suspicious of a population he 
considered ‘perfectly capable of anything’ (TNA, ADM 199/1829). Again, a lack evidence was 
interpreted as a result of insufficient effort and aerial reconnaissance was drafted in (Beesly, 1980, 
p. 137). In contrast to the SIS, those in the Dominions Office, with more experience of Irish 
affairs, were inclined towards scepticism. Maffey was a general, though not entirely equivocal, 
counterbalance to the susceptibility of some of the Intelligence services, branding most reports 
rumours of no special significance, and arguing that there was ‘no indication of a storm brewing’ 
(TNA, DO 35/1107/12). Walshe suggested the real possibility that all both governments good 
work could be undone by ‘well-meaning busybodies who are ignorant of …Ireland and the 
abiding determination of its people to work out their own destiny’ (NAI, DFA 2006/39, 
17/07/1940). Yet still, British Intelligence assumed the worst of Ireland not only due to cultural 
antipathies, but also because the stakes for Britain were so high. Where British Intelligence was 
struggling to understand Ireland, it is perhaps inevitable that newspapers and public opinion were 
equally unable to believe that the Irish were working in British interests.  
7.3 U-BOATS 
 
Fear over the activity of U-Boats in Irish waters was evident in the War Cabinet within 
days of the outbreak of war (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 28), and questions were to be asked in Parliament 
(Daily Mirror, 28/10/1939, p.4) the following month. Those with little experience of the Irish 
                                                          
88 The fifth column panic equally gripped Churchill, who dismissed Sir Vernon Kell as head of MI5 for not 
doing enough to uncover it (McMahon, 2008, p. 306). 
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west coast, knowing its isolation and small population, tended to believe rumours that ‘Fishermen 
in this area (Donegal) often see submarines…(and) get a ready market for fresh catches of Fish’89, 
and believed that U-Boats could venture into notoriously dangerous and rocky inlets and ‘lie 
stationary for days at a time’ (TNA, PREM 3/129/2). This attitude was notable in Northern Ireland 
with HI in Belfast recording public questions over ‘…West Coast harbours in Eire as potential 
enemy submarine bases’ (4/7/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). Naval intelligence was by July 1940 
admitting ‘…there is little confirmation of landings of U-boats except in one or two instances at 
Dingle and Kerry90 and probable communication with the shore in Donegal Bay’ (TNA, PREM 
3/129/2), yet this news did not reach the public, who, in this heady period particularly, often 
disbelieved official news91. Newspapers reported the landing of torpedoed ships survivors in 
Ireland by U-Boats, arguing that if this happened more sinister practices were possible. In 
parliament Northern Ireland MP Dr James Little charged that U-Boats were being refuelled off 
the Eire coast and described that believing Irish assurances that this was not the case as ‘putting 
the glass to the blind eye with a vengeance’ (Daily Herald, 14/10/1940, p.3; Newcastle Journal, 
14/10/1940, p.1). As a result of these accusations the subject was brought up in Parliament again 
(Hampshire Telegraph and Post, 18/10/1940, p.9). Lord Snell stated in the House of Lords, and 
Duff Copper in the Commons, that there was no evidence of such actions (Manchester Evening 
News, 22/10/1940, p. 6) and the Daily Telegraph explained the allegations were ‘ridiculed in Eire 
official quarters’. The paper reported that to supply the U-Boats ‘would involve a big organisation 
and fleets of lorries’ where ‘no such organisation exists’ and where ‘petrol…is strictly rationed 
and petrol pumps are closely supervised by the police or military’ (Daily Telegraph, 22/10/1940, 
LMHA). The Sunday Express also stated the obvious by asking ‘What stocks of heavy oil for 
submarines are to be found in small coast ports, and isn't it easier to go to French ports to refit 
and refuel?’ (Sunday Express, 10/08/1941, p.8). Some measure of the offensiveness of these 
                                                          
89 Instead of taking their catches inland they would somehow have preferred to sail up to a to a heavily 
armed U-boat on the off chance of selling a few Herring. 
90 These were cases of U-Boats landing survivors of torpedoed ships. 




accusations to the Irish was articulated by Lord Strabolgi, also in the Lords, spoke of his 
experience of the West of Ireland arguing that ‘the idea that you can convey large quantities of 
heavy oil fuel, or anything else, to supply German submarines, without it being known, is 
grotesque’ (Quoted in Bew, 2012, p. xxiii). However, rumour and expectation persisted despite 
the intelligence services being convinced that reports could ‘usually be traced to idle gossip’ and 
that ‘no real evidence has been found that U-Boats use bases in Eire’ (2/12/1940, TNA, ADM 
1/11104). That these expectations remained news despite a lack of corroborating evidence was an 
indication of the strength of feeling that the Irish could not be trusted and helped maintain Allied 
pressure against Irish neutrality.  
7.4 THE AXIS LEGATIONS 
 
As Eunan O’Halpin has shown, G2 had been monitoring the activities of Pro-German 
organisations in Eire since early 1938, even before MI5 had any knowledge the Fichte Bund in 
Eire (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 41-42), but also argues ‘that there were gaps in Anglo-Irish security 
sharing’ in the early war years, before the mechanics of the Intelligence collaboration had been 
settled92 (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 6). Yet, because of the IRA S-Plan campaign and the execution of 
the Coventry bombers, most disquiet over the enemy within Eire concentrated on the threat posed 
by the IRA. Even so there were some indications that Axis presence in Eire was an area of concern 
early in the war. Eunan O’Halpin argues that before the period up to February 1940 ‘was notorious 
for the large amount of reports, enquiries and rumours’ (O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 51-52). Later that 
year newspapers began to report ‘questions’ to be put to Mr de Valera concerning ‘the only 
German journalist at large in the British Empire...Dr Karl Petersen’, whether ‘the original 
blackout in Dublin was stopped at the request of the German minister’, if there were ‘short-wave 
transmitters being used (at the German legation)’ and ‘Does he know who is financing German 
propaganda leaflets in Eire? etc. etc.’ (Birmingham Post, 08/07/1940, p.2). Paul Bew has argued 
                                                          
92 American Intelligence did not share its knowledge with Eire and guarded the ULTRA codes ‘jealously’ 
(O'Halpin, 2003, p. 6). 
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that at this time, before an Allied victory was certain, ‘Dublin… had a greater priority: keeping 
the Germans sweet’ (Bew, 2012, p. xxi) and this interpretation was undoubtedly prevalent 
contemporaneously, and became represented by attitudes towards German diplomatic ties. 
Newspapers in Spring 1940 made a campaign of the issue of the Axis Nationals and Legations in 
Eire, including the Sunday Dispatch, Evening Standard, and the News Review93, which suggested 
that ‘strange men with square heads began striding self-importantly in and out of the…legation’ 
(News Review, 02/05/1940, TNA35/1107/12) as part of a huge team of commercial attaches sent 
to spy on Britain from Ireland. The press campaign resulted in a protest from the Irish 
Government, which was confident that information was not being leaked in this way (3/5/1940, 
TNA, DO 35/1107/12). Such public disquiet unrelated to the IRA was rare before 1941, but as it 
became clearer that IRA activity had practically ceased, the focus of British fears over Ireland 
changed towards the activities of the Axis legations.  
By 1941 the presence of a German Legation within the Empire, near an open border, 
where British Forces were training and guarding the vital sea lanes around Ulster, was 
characterised in newspapers as a ‘Trojan Horse’ and ‘the advance guard of German air-borne 
troops’ (Daily Mirror, 12/06/1941, p.2), ‘grossly overstaffed’ and ‘an active and well-organised 
espionage centre’ (Perthshire Advertiser, 16/07/1941, p.4). Some papers also asserted de Valera 
was aware of this, but his preventative measures had failed ‘and the leakages have continued’ 
(Devon and Exeter Gazette,17/03/1941, p.4), and one predicted the direction in which public 
opinion would turn, given time, by suggesting that British security was so threatened by the Axis 
legations that ‘Those who are not our friends must be treated as our enemies’ (Daily Mirror, 
12/06/1941, p.2). One paper later noted the transition in the focus of British fears by highlighting 
‘Disclosure in the Dail Eireann that Hitler's spies occasionally descend into Eire by parachute…’, 
‘hundreds of IRA men under lock and key at this moment’ and ‘Dr Karl H. Petersen... (making) 
himself prominent at all important gatherings...’ (Yorkshire Post, 31/01/1942, p.4). Wilder public 
accusations included that Rudolf Hess had really been on his way to Ireland when he landed in 
                                                          
93 See Sunday Dispatch 31/3/1940, Evening Standard and News Review 2/5/1940 
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Scotland in 1941(MO File Report 708 - Broadcast for North American Service, 1941), and that ‘I 
bet Lord Haw-Haw’s in Ireland by now’ (MO File Report 2232 – Easter Opinions). Perceptions 
of the Irish were such as to give such statements at least an air of possibility. The press, on 
occasion, suggested the British government was complicit in allowing this situation to continue, 
with one suggesting ‘in spite of the knowledge that…valuable information is constantly being 
passed to the enemy, (we) have accepted the situation without much complaint’ (Aberdeen Press 
& Journal, 13/01/1942, p.2). This simplistic view was, of course, far from the truth. 
That is not to say that no propaganda activities were organised by the German Legation. 
SIS established that the legation in Dublin organised and funded the dissemination of news from 
German news services and ‘cultivated individual members of the government and influenced the 
press censors to exclude newspaper stories that favoured Britain’ (McMahon, 2008, p. 373). In 
December 1940 SIS reported Berlin had requested the legation staff embark on an active policy 
of cultivating friendly relations 
 
Figure 14: The Enemy (still) Within (Daily Mirror, 17/04/1940) 
229 
 
by attending cultural events, travelling the country, receiving guests, and thereby creating a 
system of ‘verbal propaganda, whereby intermediaries would spread, stories about bad conditions 
in Britain ….’ (McMahon, 2008, p. 373). Such activities were not unnoticed by the British press 
who suggested the German press attaché Petersen and Minister Hempel were responsible to 
Henning Thomsen, said to be ‘Ribbentrop's No 1 agent outside Germany’, who socialised mostly 
at Gaelic League entertainments hoping that ‘discreetly listening to the monotony of fiddle and 
pipe will pay dividend some time, somewhere’ (Daily Express, 08/09/1941, p.2). Such a 
programme of ‘verbal propaganda’ was also the policy of John Betjeman, which he dubbed ‘good 
relations’, and was fully sanctioned by the MOI which believed overt British propaganda would 
be counterproductive in Ireland (Cole, 1996, p. 34). Inevitably the British press drew no 
conclusions at British policy but portrayed the German efforts as insidious. However, reports from 
visitors to Ireland related few occasions where this German effort undermined the Irish 
governments adherence to neutrality and relayed that Walshe insisted ‘the whole British notion 
of the power of the German Minister in Dublin was greatly exaggerated’, and that he was, in truth, 
‘just like a man in a cage’ whose every movement was watched (TNA, INF 1/786). The 
propaganda activities that occurred were not, by any standard, what could be called espionage.  
The balance of Irish neutrality was much more complicated than public opinion could 
know. Due to the need to protect the secrecy of Anglo-Irish intelligence co-operation those outside 
Allied Intelligence and War Cabinet circles were unaware of the details, and the extent, of the 
scrutiny that Irish military intelligence had placed the legations under. Particularly significant to 
newspaper and public unease was the presence of a Radio transmitter in the German embassy, yet 
it could not become common knowledge that Irish Intelligence preferred to intercept radio traffic 
rather than closing it down; a policy with which MI5 and the CIGS agreed94. Additionally, all 
telephone lines, cables, and diplomatic bags, including to the US, were diverted through Britain 
                                                          
94Alanbrooke Diaries 4th Feb. 1942 – After Churchill asked the CIGS if it was best to pressure the German 
legation out of Dublin; ‘We had discovered that as we had broken the German cipher…it was perhaps better 




to facilitate intelligence gathering, by both Irish and British Intelligence, and all wire taps, and 
Legation radio transmission transcripts were shared (31/10/1939, TNA, CAB 65/1/66). An attempt 
to increase the number of staff at the German Legation was stopped by de Valera by ordering 
their arrest if the plane landed (R Fisk, 1985, p. 251; McCullagh, 2018, p. 201). Yet still, not only 
did the newspapers doubt the efficiency of Irish Intelligence, but Winston Churchill also 
continued to believe ‘it could not be relied upon’ (21/11/1939, TNA, CAB 66/3/31), and even 
occasionally disbelieved British Intelligence on Ireland95. In reality, ‘Pre-war good relations’ 
ensured all complaints about possible espionage, sabotage and Axis legation activities ‘were dealt 
with by Liam Archer at G2 and almost without exception were found to be without foundation’ 
(O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 51-52). Indeed, the German Legation were ordered to stay out of Irish affairs 
and Ambassador Hempel was at frequent pains to do so (McMahon, 2008, pp. 406-407; UCDA, 
P150/2571, 15/12/1941)96 . By February 1942, MI5 officer with responsibility for Ireland, Cecil 
Liddell, had compiled a memo to Naval Intelligence which showed ‘conclusively that the German 
legation as such is not actively engaged in espionage although it may be cognisant of what is 
going on’ and that ‘it is known that the legation has an illicit wireless set communicating with 
Germany. Messages from Germany are of almost daily occurrence but the messages to Germany 
are only very occasional’ (West, 2005a, p. 228). By 1943, when the German diplomatic cipher 
had been broken, these conclusions were bolstered by rechecking of all previously recorded 
messages (McMahon, 2008, p. 406). Unknowing of these developments, and conditioned to 
expect the worst from Ireland, public opinion tended to question Irish competence and motives 
even further, sometimes believing the wildest of rumours, where it was interpreted that de 
Valera’s banning of Charlie Chaplin’s epic The Great Dictator was a sign of pro-German 
sympathies (Daily Mirror, 08/01/1941, p.2), and even that a German factory manager ‘gave 
smoke signals to German aircraft from his factory chimney’ (Sunday Express, 10/08/1941, p.8). 
                                                          
95 WSC to Admiral Godfrey TNA, ADM 205/2 10 Nov 1939 – After SIS concluded German Wireless 
Stations were not reporting positions of British troops, Churchill wrote ‘I do not believe the truth of the 
War Office statement that the whole of the German wireless has been examined and that nothing has been 
found supporting our accusation’ (Gilbert, 1993a, p. 355)  
96 Herman Goertz, the most successful Nazi spy in Ireland, ‘on his own admission was told to keep clear of 
the legation unless he found that this could not be avoided’ (West, 2005a, p. 228) 
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Despite indications to the contrary most continued to believe that Eire was the main source of 
German Intelligence on Britain.  
7.5 GERMANS IN EIRE 
 
At the height of German blitzkrieg in Western Europe HI reported considerable ‘spy 
scares’ reaching hysterical proportions in places (30/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264) and with awareness 
that neutral Ireland did not intern Axis nationals as Britain had done, rumour of German espionage 
activity in Eire became rife. In May 1940 HI reported rumours of a large ‘fifth column nucleus’ 
of German tourists in Eire and that Lord Haw-Haw was messaging these with code words in his 
radio broadcasts (18 & 19/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). In the same month The People reported that 
‘Ribbentrop is preparing to send a fresh batch of Nazi agents to Eire, to settle there under the 
guise of commercial experts and attaches at the German Legation in Dublin, and to direct German 
activities in England’ (The People, 14/04/1940, p.9). Rumours of excess numbers of Germans in 
Eire persisted into 1941, where HI reported a prevalent rumour that a woman ‘has seen with her 
own eyes many Germans in Dublin, and many more arriving lately’ and ‘that Eire has entered the 
war’ (27/8/1941, TNA, INF 1/292), reflecting both common expectation and an element of wishful 
thinking. Fear of invasion was linked by one newspaper to thousands of ‘potential fifth columnists 
(who) have joined the Eire Army volunteer reserve, the coast watch scheme and the local security 
corps’ further expecting that ‘in the event of a Nazi invasion, the gauleiters reserved by the 
Germans to govern North and South are to be men who are at the present moment hold high 
governmental positions in both administrations’ (Daily Gazette for Middlesborough, 17/07/1940, 
p.6)97.  
Undoubtedly such rumour was encouraged by newspaper reports that ‘there are 300 full-
blooded German officials free to do what they like in Eire…They are assisted by an organisation 
                                                          
97 The same article tenuously links possible Irish invasion to the fact that Hitler’s brother Alois had married 
an Irish Woman in 1911. The marriage lasted only three years with Alois having returned to Germany by 
1914 and bigamously marrying there in 1916. Adolf Hitler never visited Ireland and came to regard Alois’ 
Irish son William Patrick Hitler, later drafted into the US Army, as an embarrassment. 
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of 3,000…regarded by Berlin as auxiliaries...’ and opinion that the presence the legations as ‘an 
affront to the empire’ (Western Mail, 04/07/1941, p.2). De Valera was also portrayed as having 
thrown ‘his protective cloak over the Nazi agents in his midst’ (Birmingham Gazette, 31/03/1941, 
p.4). Some papers even suggested that Germans had infiltrated the government by emphasising 
de Valera’s good relations with Eduard Hempel (Daily Mail, 01/04/1940, LHMA), while 
‘William Hickey’ went so far as to suggest that De Valera had pursued ‘a long correspondence’ 
with Hitler ‘early in the War’, though admitting that this would be difficult to prove (Daily 
Express, 24/04/1941, p.2)98. In fact, the number of Axis nationals in Eire was known to the British 
government and their activities were under continued, shared surveillance by G2. By July 1940, 
a ‘General Report on the Position in Eire’ conveyed to the NID ‘that there are 2,000 Germans in 
Eire is considered by the Crime Special Division of the Civic Guard to be without foundation. 
There are actually 318 Germans and 149 Italians in Eire’ (July 1940, TNA, PREM 3/129/2), 
though this, of course, had no impact on public opinion that generally held that Ireland ‘is only a 
hotbed of Nazi spies’ (MO File Report 1481 - Morale Report in October 1942, 1942). The same 
rumours were also prevalent in the US, where, even after the Irish government confirmed to 
Washington in 1942 that there were only four Japanese people in Ireland, Brennan wrote ‘It is 
difficult to believe that this is not the result of a deliberate campaign to put Ireland in the wrong 
in the eyes of the American people’ (NAI, DFA Secretary's Files P2, 25/11/1942), a concern 
which resurfaced with the American Note Crisis in 1944.  
Fifth Column panic in Britain was partly a reaction to shock and disbelief at the swift 
defeat of France and the Low Countries. Paul McMahon argues that even the Allied Intelligence 
communities, stunned by Blitzkrieg and searching for explanation of its success, concluded that 
fifth columns had been instrumental in German conquests and that such organisations would 
emerge in Britain ahead of invasion (McMahon, 2008, p. 306). It was not until 1942 that the 
                                                          
98 There are, indeed, no records of correspondence between de Valera and Hitler. De Valera, a man of habit 
and strict diplomatic propriety, directed all affairs regarding Germany through the German Ambassador. 
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Abwehr’s capabilities, or rather lack thereof 99, were understood and the threat in both countries 
was put into perspective (McMahon, 2008, p. 393). Initially, though British Intelligence ‘had no 
precise knowledge’ of the organisation they were fighting, yet ‘they were convinced of its 
existence’ (15/5/1940, TNA, CAB 93/5), and the British public were equally convinced, but unlike 
the British intelligence services, the public were never really disabused of their opinion.  
7.6 IRISH INTELLIGENCE 
 
Irish policy towards Britain was based on giving enough concessions to convince that the 
benefits of co-operation outweighed those of coercion, whilst at the same time being consistently 
neutral to avoid German distrust. Though de Valera had warned the German Minister in Eire that 
Irish neutrality must bear ‘a certain consideration’ (MacCartney, 1961, p. 471) towards Britain, 
as Eire was still politically, militarily, and economically reliant on Britain, the tightrope on which 
Eire had to balance was, due to Ireland’s relative defencelessness, infinitely harder to walk than 
that of Britain’s tightrope walk between accommodation and coercion of Eire. News of the IRA 
Magazine Fort raid in December 1939, which netted over one million rounds of ammunition from 
under the nose of the Irish Army, did not encourage British faith in Irish Intelligence. However, 
the Irish States reaction to this raid, which regained 90% of the losses, involved a complete 
reorganisation of G2 and a re-invigorated drive to create the most efficient Intelligence agency 
possible, intent on ‘unleashing of the full force of the state on the IRA (Coogan, 1995, pp. 146-
147). 
Though British public opinion was convinced of Irish incompetence and ill-will, those 
more informed soon held different views. Within days of the opening of hostilities ‘frequent 
reports’ of German submarine bases off the coast of Eire were being noted by MI5 and newspapers 
                                                          
99 By 1944 it was clear that, as in Britain, German Intelligence agents in Eire, their numbers, their efforts, 
their training, and equipment, were greatly overestimated and the execution of their purposes woefully 
inept. In April, Guy Liddell noted Radio sets dropped in Ireland ‘were of a very high grade’ but their voltage 
and crystals were incorrect for use in Britain or Eire (West, 2005a, p. 185). In the face of such ineptitude, 
it is hard to objectively understand how British Intelligence captured all German Spies in Britain 
(Masterman, 1973) and yet considered it impossible for the Irish Intelligence services to do the same. 
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and initially Guy Liddell believed there seemed ‘little doubt that something of this kind is going 
on’ (West, 2005b, p. 25). However, it was clear by early October 1939, that MI5 soon appreciated 
the ability and good intentions of Irish Intelligence with Guy Liddell discouraging the setting up 
of an SIS network in Eire to maintain ‘frank’ relations with G2, which he described as ‘of great 
value to us’100. At the same time, he also suggested for the first time, and as he invariably did 
henceforth, that Naval Intelligence direct all their questions to Col. Archer at G2 for his input 
(West, 2005b, p. 37). Indeed, the NID had initially been surprised at the efficiency of Irish 
intelligence101 but were, nevertheless, still suspicious, and established a loose network of 
informers, of which G2 were aware but declined to pursue because it generally confirmed the 
paucity of ‘Fifth Column’ activity (McMahon, 2008, p. 349). As the war progressed it became 
clearer that co-operation was more effective than covert activity. By 1942 MI5 had become so 
comfortable in its relationship with G2 that it allowed a suspected spy to visit Ireland after capture 
(West, 2005a, p. 46)102. However, outside intelligence communities, it was a frequent first 
assumption that the Irish would be uncooperative, incompetent, and evasive, but there are 
relatively few contemporary reports of specific leakages. Those that do exist were influenced not 
only by cultural expectation of Irish trouble, but also by memories of the First World War, anxiety 
over the effectiveness of the British War effort and the successes of the Nazi forces. Undoubtedly 
government campaigns urging the public to ‘keep mum’ and the cultural phenomena of spy 
thrillers also played their part.  
7.7 LEAKAGES 
 
Since the security services considered ‘the actual crossing of the border into or out of 
Northern Ireland with its naval, military and Air establishments, dockyards and war factories, by 
                                                          
100 This plan was also vetoed by the War Cabinet (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 59). 
101 Letter to Maffey from Machtig 9/10/1939 – ‘We were very grateful for the early information about the 
Dingle Bay submarine (on the 4/10/1939). In fact, the Admiralty declined to believe that the news had come 
through so quickly, and we had to reassure them three times that it was true’ (TNA, DO 130/2) 
102 Joseph Lenihan had been apprehended after being sent to Ireland by Nazi Intelligence after his capture 
in the Channel Islands. He had offered to become part of the ‘Double Cross’ scheme but was deemed too 
unreliable. He was considered, like several other captured spies, to have used the Abwehr only to gain free 
and safe passage back to Ireland. 
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persons resident in neutral Eire, could not be prevented or even controlled’ (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 
27), it was not surprising that the public regarded spies and fifth columnists as a real threat, 
especially in untrusted Eire. Even channels under British surveillance were suspect and 
newspapers reported cases of smuggled letters to Ireland. Reports note the jailing of Irish workers 
for ‘communicating information which might directly or indirectly useful to the enemy’ 
(Birmingham Mail, 21/09/1940, p.3), with one suggesting this was particularly dangerous as an 
uncensored letter had been found alongside a ‘Young Ireland Songbook’ of songs that were 
‘violently anti-British’ (Liverpool Evening Post, 17/10/1942, p.3). A general suspicion, unlinked 
to any specific event, was evident most often in HI reports, and the report writers occasionally 
betray indications that they regard these rumours as commonplace, with one report noting ‘there 
is the usual crop of parachute and bombing rumours’ (22/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). When it came 
to rumours concerning Ireland, people appeared to be distrustful of their own government, so 
much that HI recommended ‘The public should be told that the (Fifth Column) situation in Eire 
is not being ignored (19/5/1940, TNA, INF 1/264). However, some cases of specific accusations 
relating to specific events do emerge. On 11th Feb 1942 the battleships Gneisenau, Scharnhorst 
and Prinz Eugen escaped from Brest and through the English Channel and later press reports 
suggested advance weather conditions, vital to the escape, were sent from the Dublin German 
Legation (Reynold’s News, 22/02/1942, LHMA)103. A month later, a report from RAF 
intelligence recorded that Dulanty ‘maintained that secret-service liaisons between the Irish and 
British authorities…made it certain that the British must have known that there were no such 
reports’ (TNA, INF 1/786), but that this of course could not be admitted. Equally secret was 
information discovered by Basil Liddell-Hart for his ‘Notes for History’, including that the Navy 
‘had been warned for weeks to be ready for their (the ships) emergence…’, that RDF stations 
were broken down and that aerial reconnaissance had spotted the ships at sea, but this report was 
ignored as the ships commander overruled an inexperienced pilot who he thought had ‘mistaken 
                                                          
103 O’Halpin has argued that though this was true ‘the same information was sent by several German 
meteorological aircraft in the area concerned, several hours before the Dublin transmission’ (O'Halpin, 
2003, p. 65). 
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some trawler for the Prinz Eugen’ (Liddell-Hart, 1942, LHMA)104. However, in general, public 
opinion followed newspaper reports, blaming the German Minister in Dublin, thereby simplifying 
a complex problem, creating a simple solution that scapegoated two traditional enemies.  
On the 19th of August 1942, the combined arms raid on Dieppe, Operation Jubilee, was 
launched with the objectives of testing new tactics, gathering intelligence, boosting morale, and 
demonstrating commitment to opening a second front. Soon after HI reports note public disquiet 
at the loss of life, and further reports indicated the public quickly sought explanation of these 
failures. Eight days after the raid official explanation that the raid was thrown off course was felt 
‘very weak, since the Germans might be expected to patrol the coast’ and raised the question of 
German foreknowledge of the raid (27/8/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). By the 3rd of September an HI 
report noted belief that there was foreknowledge and that enemy prisoners had told British 
attackers that ‘we knew four days ago that you were coming’ (3/9/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). 
Additionally, contemporary intelligence circles suspected poor security during and before the 
raid, which had been called off at least once hours before launch and admitted ‘two complete sets 
of operational orders and intelligence…were left on the beach’, which had undoubtedly fallen 
into enemy hands (5/9/1942, West, 2005a). By the middle of September, it was clear that 
suspected security lapses and a belief that the ‘nature and purpose of the raid have never been 
adequately explained’ (17/9/1942, TNA, INF 1/292), combined to cause so much uncertainty that 
when Churchill admitted that casualties were around 50%, official protestations that the raid was 
successful were hardly believed (1 & 8/10/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). It became common belief that 
the huge casualty rate was due to German foreknowledge, initially blamed on the Canadians’ 
(1/10/1942, TNA, INF 1/292), but by 1944 failure at Dieppe was felt ‘due to leakage of 
information from Eire’ (12/04/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). Returning soldiers impressions 
(8/10/1942, TNA, INF 1/292), the shock of failure, high loss of life and the lack of information 
had combined with cultural expectation of intelligence leakage, to make any rumour ‘half-
                                                          
104 In an indication of the complexity of the Anglo-Irish wartime milieu Eugene Esmonde, from Drominagh 
Co. Tipperary, won a posthumous VC leading the belated attack on these ships. 
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expected confirmation of deeply-rooted suspicions’ (Campbell, 1993, p. 13)105. It could also be 
similarly ‘half-expected’ that the information could have leaked106 through Ireland and it was a 
short step from blaming the Canadians, who had suffered the largest losses and were Allies, to 
blaming the Irish who were not. 
Roughly contemporaneous to the Dieppe raid concerns were also raised at direct flights 
from Lisbon and transatlantic flights landing in Eire. HI reports suspicion over an ‘enemy 
passenger plane flies over Watford nightly on its way to Dublin, unmolested’ (1/10/1942, MO 
File Report 1431 - Morale in September 1942, 1942; TNA, INF 1/292). Though these did create 
an ideal ingress for infiltrators O’Halpin argues this route was never used, that equal suspicion 
could be levelled at flights from Poole to Lisbon (O'Halpin, 2003, p. 72), and that all Irish mails 
sent this way were routed through British censorship (McMahon, 2008, p. 402). However, British 
opinion appeared to credit almost any rumours about Irish spy scares, including that ‘Jimmy 
O'Dea, the comedian in BBC’s Irish Half Hour…is said to be sending messages in code to the 
enemy (10/12/1942, TNA, INF 1/292). There were however a few voices offering alternative 
opinions against a general rumbling of discontent against Ireland. 
7.8 ALTERNATIVE VIEWS 
 Postal and Telegraph censorship revealed, at least to government sources, that the Irish 
people were not, in general, likely to aid German espionage or sabotage. These revealed that ‘93% 
                                                          
105 Deeply rooted suspicions appeared in Brian Garfield’s ‘The Paladin’ (1980), a novel concerning a 
British agent investigating U-boat stations in Donegal and offering details of the Dieppe raid to the German 
legation in Dublin.  
106 John Campbell shows that the Daily Mail printed details of the previous preparations, between 
postponement and the actual launch, gathered from locals on the Isle of Wight, and that Military Intelligence 
launched two investigations on suspected leaks (Campbell, 1993, pp. 5-6). Irish Historian J.P. Duggan 
argues Hempel leaked rumours of amphibious troop concentrations on the south coast (Duggan, 1989, pp. 
177-178), though O’Halpin believes he reported this as if it was gossip (O'Halpin, 1995). David Irving 
argued that the Germans had foreknowledge of the raid, but Stephen Roskill argued the Germans expected 
raids in general rather than specifically at Dieppe (S. Roskill, 1964). Campbell argues the film The Next of 
Kin, on the betrayal of a raid on a submarine base in France, had been ‘fairly widely distributed before 
Jubilee’, priming the public for likely intelligence leaks, and cites censored Canadian soldiers letters which 
mention the film when arguing that the Germans were ready for them (Campbell, 1993, p. 6). The film’s 
spy ring includes an Irishmen and a Belgian refugee blackmailed into helping them. They use ‘a neutral 
port’ to get the information to Germany (Dickinson, 1944) 
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of a total of 475 writers’ express sympathy and admiration for Great Britain, and that one writer 
revealed ‘we may be neutral…. but most of us are pro-British...’and one that ‘I would not see 
England beaten at any time. I do not know what this country would do if she was’ (8/6/1943, 
TNA, CJ 4/30). Another report argued ‘we keep sending boatloads of men and food to England - 
and they are both first class. We could scarcely do more if we made a formal declaration’ but 
feared, presciently, that after the war ‘Ireland will just be in the soup, forgotten and ignored’ 
(8/9/1943, TNA, CJ 4/30). Scottish socialist newspaper Forward! argued the Taoiseach's reply to 
the ‘American Note’, formally requesting the Irish government to disband the Axis legations in 
Dublin, was 'the only answer possible', adding ‘the facts are that the Japanese representative (has) 
no diplomatic bag, and…the German representative has had no such bag since the war started, 
and…neither has had any means of communicating with their countries save by cable, which 
passes through London’ (Forward!, 18/03/1944, LHMA). While the Western Morning News, after 
the subsequent travel ban on Ireland was instigated, argued that this should not be a vindictive 
measure or a penalty for neutrality, but recognised, again presciently, that the ‘American Note’ 
was delivered to gain ‘a reaffirmation of Eire's attitude to justify such a step, clearly desirable 
though it was in view of impending military operations’. The paper also added that ‘to describe it 
as "economic sanctions" imposed against a country for exercising a right conferred upon it by a 
statute…would do no good to the Allied cause now or in the future’ (Western Morning News, 
14/03/1944, p. 2). However, most newspapers continued to see the Irish stance as an attempt to 
‘both have its cake and eat it’ and arguing that the legations ‘staffs are solely occupied in spying 
upon our military preparations’ (Daily Herald, 22/03/1944, p.2) choosing to disbelieve that Irish 
intelligence was competent, and its intentions true to de Valera’s continued promise that he did 






7.9 THE AMERICAN NOTE CRISIS 
 
The persistence of Irish Governments determination to preserve neutrality combined with 
the necessarily secret nature of intelligence collaboration, created a frustration at the Irish stance 
which came to a head with the ‘American Note’ in early 1944. The US ambassador in Dublin, 
David Gray, initially worked well with his Irish hosts but soon became frustrated with the Irish 
refusal to grant the use of the Treaty Ports. As early as September 1941 the Irish government was 
concerned at Gray’s ‘general thesis…that we cannot be pro-Irish without being Pro-German’ 
(NAI, DFA Secretary's Files P48A, 1941) and by December asked the State Department for a 
more friendly attitude, especially from Gray, in the interest of American Irish relations (NAI, DFA 
Secretary’s Files P2, 1941 ). However, Gray continued to vent his frustrations, reportedly making 
the incendiary charge that Eire would give Hitler asylum after the war107 and telling journalists to 
‘tell the American people that Ireland is not standing by the United States’ (Newcastle Evening 
Chronicle, 05/12/1942, p.3). The American Note was the culmination of Gray’s policy designed 
to get ‘the Eire Government on record as having refused a request which had the object of 
safeguarding the lives of American soldiers, sailors and airmen at a vital point in the war’ (TNA, 
CAB 66/46), despite the objections of most interested parties (R Fisk, 1985, pp. 539-591). Indeed, 
by the end of 1943, the Admiralty, now using the Azores as anchorage, confessed they no longer 
needed the treaty Ports, and the Air Staff and Dominions Office warned strategic considerations 
should be considered less vital than political ones (3/9/1943, TNA, CAB 65/39/18), indicating that 
British support for the American Note was mainly to bolster a political purpose; that is to justify 
the isolation of Ireland in preparation for the launching of D-Day. 
In the Eire government Gray’s attitude was interpreted as part of a plan, suspected since 
1940, where a request that Eire expel the Axis representatives would set the preconditions 
necessary to justify at least the taking of the Treaty Ports, if not the reconquest of Ireland (NAI, 
                                                          
107 Quoted as disagreeing that Hitler would commit suicide he argued ‘Lots of people seem to think that 
Hitler will hang, as they seemed to think the Kaiser would last time. But I think that he will go to Eire, hire 
a magnificent lodge, and live happily ever after’ (Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 05/12/1942 ).  
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DFA Legal Advisors Papers, 07/02/1940). Guy Liddell astutely guessed this interpretation was 
behind Irish government thinking when he wrote of the trial of Goertz, arguing ‘They probably 
fear that we should use this case as a pretext for pressing the Eire government to forego its 
neutrality and turn the Germans out’ (6/1/1942, West, 2005b, p. 207). Eunan O’Halpin argues 
that the Eire government, fearing Gray would be behind any such moves, often sidestepped his 
involvement in security liaisons with the US because he was so mistrusted, and that US policy 
towards Ireland was ‘framed in isolation’ from the activities of Allied intelligence agencies 
(O'Halpin, 2000, pp. 82-83). In this atmosphere the Note, which ignored the opinions of allied 
intelligence and the significance of Anglo-Irish intelligence cooperation, did nothing to allay fears 
that Ireland was to be invaded.  
Issued on the 21st of February 1944 the American Note charged that Irish neutrality had 
‘in fact operated and continues to operate in favor (sic) of the Axis Powers and against the United 
Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend’ through 
‘highly organized espionage’ (UCDA, P150/2658, 21/02/1944). The Irish reply refused the 
request on the grounds that the removal of the legations could be recognised as a first step towards 
war which would negate Irish neutrality. It also pointed out that the Note itself did not include ‘a 
single instance of neglect’ or ‘proof of injury to American interests’ (NAI, DFA Secretary’s files 
A53, 21/02/1941). The Note was interpreted in Dublin as an ultimatum and the army was put on 
invasion alert. The Irish Government was incensed; they had done all they could to thwart 
espionage, knew this was effective, as did the Allied Intelligence agencies, but believed this was 
an attempt to condemn Ireland in the eyes of the world. The British authorities belatedly tried to 
limit the impact of the note for fear of destabilising the erstwhile productive intelligence liaisons 
with G2, with Maffey insisting that there would be no sanctions (NAI, DFA Secretary’s files A53, 
14/03/1944). Walshe tellingly argued that ‘the mind of the ordinary man in the street in England 
would now be prepared to accept anything and everything in the nature of espionage bogies…’ 
and that effect of this for Ireland ‘could not have been worse if there had been some evil genius 
in the Ministry of Information to push them on’ (NAI, DFA Secretary’s files A53, 14/03/1944). 
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McMahon argues that the American Note crisis was driven by two factors: a lack of intelligence 
co-operation between the US and Eire, and the US domestic political situation (McMahon, 2008, 
p. 418). However, Walshe was correct in his argument that British public opinion would be deeply 
affected by this attempt to force the Eire government into publicly taking sides. In March 1944 
MO notes that ‘Eire's refusal to get rid of the German and Japanese diplomats’ as a major theme 
of public discourse’ and was ‘one of the questions most frequently discussed by the public’ (MO 
File Report 2065 - Morale in March 1944, 1944). General approval of the request and 
condemnation of the refusal resulted in almost universal support for the travel ban that isolated 
Ireland, North and South, in preparation for the D-Day landings. Newspapers reacted by 
announcing ‘Mr de Valera's rejection of the United States Government 's request to clear Axis 
agents out of Eire is deplorable but hardly surprising’, with most arguing, as the Note had insisted, 
that it had been proved that Axis representatives were conducting espionage as they had done in 
other neutral countries, but provided no specific examples (Yorkshire Evening Post, 11/03/1944, 
p.4). Others argued that despite Eire’s ‘good faith’ its governments ‘impartial integrity is not 
sufficient protection against Axis duplicity’, and that arguing neutrality was the will of the Irish 
people was pointless as well as incorrect (Daily Herald, 14/03/1944, p.2). Some highlighted the 
Irish annoyance that the US did not expel the Axis diplomats while neutral and that ignoring the 
will of the people would have been ‘undemocratic’ (The Observer, 12/03/1944, LHMA), but such 
arguments were rare. However, there are also indications at this point that the question of Irish 
neutrality was becoming irrelevant for most as it had become clear that Ireland was not 
strategically vital, though some could not forgive the chagrin that Ireland had caused previously. 
Diarist #5349 wrote of public ‘impatience’ at Irish neutrality, but also ‘no ill-will in particular’, 
adding that it was time that ‘we just forget about them and get on with our own job’. The Diarist 
even saw treatment of Eire as ‘good publicity’ for Britain because she represented the self-
determination of small nations, even if it is ‘carried to extremes’. The writer allows that ‘from 
their point of view they were right’ but this realisation is begrudging and acknowledges the 
influence of past wariness of the ‘the Irish Question’, concluding ‘of course they are crazy’ 
(13/03/1944, MO Diarist 5349). This grudging acceptance that Eire might have a self-determined 
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future was to become more widespread after the war, but it was not to be accepted without 
bitterness. 
However, most interpretations followed Gray’s intention that Eire had now shown herself 
far out of step with the Allies. MO diarist #5157, a retired policeman, indicates the hardening of 
public attitudes by arguing of de Valera that ‘whatever we did wouldn't please him…I think the 
English people will want it settled once and for all after the war whether we are to regard them as 
irreconcilable’ (10/3/1944, MO Diarist 5157). Gray’s plan to finally get Irish neutrality on record 
as being advantageous to the Axis, condemned in public opinion, and to be isolated from the rest 
of the world until at least the end of the war, had been successful. 
7.10 ISOLATION OF IRELAND 
The American Note had cemented many aspects of previous attitudes towards Ireland, 
especially that Axis espionage in Eire had been proven. HI reports show opinion that is ‘indignant 
and disgusted at Eire's refusal to remove Axis consular and diplomatic representatives’ and that 
‘relatives of merchant seamen and naval men are especially angry’ (14/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). 
Subsequent reports emphasise ‘unanimous approval’ of the ban on travel and opinion that ‘even 
if we cannot take her over, stock and barrel’, all trade with Eire should be stopped because ‘People 
will always remember the loss in men and ships Eire has caused us’ (20/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). 
Though some attitudes were less vitriolic, arguing the American Note was ‘pre-mature’ and that 
to agree ‘would have been for Eire tantamount to declaring war on the Axis’, many still argued 
‘de Valera's refusal was unrealistic’ (20/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). Northern Irish reaction was 
most strong and lasting, even arguing for stronger measures, including the closure of the border 
(20/3/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). Reactions of ‘approval for the action taken’, feeling that ‘it should 
have been done long ago’ and ‘a desire for stronger measures’, were repeated for several weeks, 
with a report writer noting a month later that attitude on Ireland was ‘again on familiar lines’ 
(20/3/1944, 4/4/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). HI reports indicate, from this point on, unchanging 
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British opinion, but Northern Irish opinion reportedly came to accept the isolation of the whole 
island ‘philosophically’ and without complaint (12/4/1944, TNA, INF 1/292).  
Reports on public opinion also indicate that Ireland was now becoming irrelevant. As the 
war was being won, newspaper reports show more dismissiveness, condescension, and anger, but 
with less frequency. One report, entitled ‘De Valera Talks for Ten Minutes and Says Nothing’, 
on de Valera’s reply to Churchill’s speech announcing the isolation of Ireland, includes a blunt 
comment from Lord Bennet at the Admiralty that ‘Eire makes me sick’ (Daily Express, 
15/03/1944, p.3). Arguing that the reasons for isolating Eire have 'all along been sufficiently 
 
Figure 15: Intelligence Leakage (Daily Mail, 13/03/1944)  
obvious' and that the Irish had acted with impunity, some regarded the isolation of Ireland as a 
‘condign punishment’ (Aberdeen Press & Journal, 12/03/1944, p.1). Once more, despite previous 
protestations, denial, and a dearth of evidence, it was widely reported that Ulster MP Sir Hugh 
O’Neill charged that ‘U-boats have made contact with enemy agents in remote harbours in the 
west of Ireland in recent weeks’, the IRA was persistently active and that Eire’s neutrality was 
still a ‘constant peril and injury to the Allied Cause’ (Dundee Courier, 17/04/1944, p.2). 
Newspaper comment also pointed out ‘the greatest paradox of all’, that neutrality had hardened 
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the case for partition and caused the building of ‘a solid wall of Sassenach prejudice’, this point 
being illustrated below with a cartoon of de Valera between Churchill and Hitler captioned ‘Try 
another Blarney stone Mister, you have worn out this one’ (Birmingham Gazette, 14/03/1944, 
p.2). Letters to the editor also evidence continued belief in the worst of the Irish, with a typical 
example arguing ‘that de Valera's government has done just nothing for England in this war’, 
adding that Eire must ‘justify themselves’ in the eyes of the world (Birmingham Mail, 16/03/1944, 
p.3).  
By 1944, when U-boat fraternisation charges returned, the majority had been disproved 
by Irish intelligence and reality had been accepted by British Intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, 
four years after the Irish governments first requests that the British and American Presses be 
persuaded not to publish unfounded accusations, Walshe found it necessary to issue a memo 
listing of Press ‘Misrepresentations’ to Irish representatives abroad, which attempted to dispel 
rumour and assumption with pertinent fact (NAI, DFA Paris Embassy P48/2, 24/04/1944). The 
requirements of O’Drisceoil’s ‘double game’ were such that, before it was clear that the Allies 
would win the war, the Irish and the British governments, could see the advantage of keeping 
Anglo-Irish collaboration secret, but this did not stop the Irish government consistently arguing 
against the most blatant accusations of perfidy. It also did not stop false accusations being given 
legitimising weight by the American Note and the isolation of Ireland, as Walshe had argued 
(NAI, DFA Secretary’s files A53, 14/03/1944). The ‘double game’ gave no protection against 
condemnation by a British public predisposed to expect the worst from Ireland and disbelieving 
of the subtleties of ‘friendly neutrality’. Public opinion, as it became clearer that the Allies would 
win against the barbarism of Nazism, would become stronger in its casting of the neutral Irish as 
an enemy. 
7.11 CONDOLENCES AND REPERCUSSIONS 
 
Some public opinion had long interpreted neutrality as likely to bring disgrace to Eire, a 
‘humiliation which will be theirs when they are unable to claim a place in the ranks of those who 
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put everything else aside in order to assure victory for freedom’ (Birmingham Gazette, 
31/03/1941, p.4). By 1943, even joining the war was not considered to be a mitigation of Ireland’s 
actions. Departments reporting to the War Cabinet urged that British public opinion would resent 
Eire joining the war late as she would be gaining from the effort put in by those who had been in 
from the start and could therefore gain an undeserved seat at the Peace settlement (3/9/1943, TNA, 
CAB 65/39/18). HI reports confirm that ‘the government’s decision to exclude neutrals has been 
widely welcomed’ and, predictably, in Ulster people felt Eire should not have a place at the Peace 
conference108 on the ‘specious’ grounds that a considerable number of their nationals had fought 
with the allies (21/11/1944, TNA, INF 1/292). The American Note Crisis had bolstered and 
solidified prejudice toward Ireland’s participation in any Post-war settlement or organisations. 
However, worse was to come as Ireland’s diplomatic policy became thoroughly out of step with 
almost the rest of the world.  
  De Valera, being so adherent to diplomatic exactitude throughout the war as to feel able 
to reject the demands of the American Note, despite fears that it could lead to invasion, continued 
his adherence by personally giving his condolences on Hitler’s death to the German Minister in 
Dublin109. Though this was diplomatically correct, and was later characterised as a courtesy to 
Hempel, the effect on British public opinion was disastrous. Eire and Salazar’s Portugal were the 
only neutral states to offer condolences on the death of the German leader. While evidence of the 
Holocaust was emerging, anything less than total condemnation of Hitler seemed conciliatory, 
and some of those who had supported Irish neutrality in previous controversies were conflicted 
over de Valera’s action. Anglo-Irish novelist Pamela Hinkson, who had previously lauded the 
contribution of Irish people to the Allied Forces, now admitted the condolences ‘must remain the 
strangest of all the strange pages that Mr de Valera has written in Irish History’ (The Times, 
                                                          
108 As the Irish Republican proto administration had attempted to do in failing to achieve recognition at the 
Paris Conference in 1919. 
109 This visit was not an official visit as it did not take place at the German legation but at the German 
Ministers home (Keogh, 1989, p. 72), which some also saw as an indication of de Valera’s deviousness in 
avoiding censure by resorting to a technicality (Duggan, 1989, pp. 241-243). However, curiously, De Valera 
never denied his visit was official though, he could have done, and there is some evidence that his act was 
one of personal regard towards Hempel, for whom he had personal respect (Keogh, 1989, p. 74)  
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17/05/1945, p.5), and argued those in Ireland who have lost relatives in the British Forces 'may 
find their sense of humour…in abeyance' (The Times, 15/05/1945, p.5) after this act. Though 
some letters to the editor argue that condolences were offered ‘strictly in accordance with 
diplomatic usage’ and a Times editorial urged that readers ‘remember that they are neutrals and 
must be expected to act as such’ (The Times, 15/05/1945, p.5), most opinion argued this stance 
was an indication of inflexibility at best, and at worst, toadying immorality. Indeed, two days 
later, in the same paper these actions were charged as exhibiting de Valera as ‘a totalitarian 
termite, incapable of departing in any circumstance from the conventions of diplomacy’ (The 
Times, 17/05/1945, p.5), evidencing a change of the papers opinion to reflecting that of the public.  
 The tone of letters in The Times, notwithstanding the above ‘termite’ analogy, was more 
measured than that of many other newspaper letters page, and the scope of opinion wider, but still 
generally reflected the prevailing view that de Valera’s condolences were unjustified. Historian 
Basil Williams wrote in The Times, in civil tones, that though the condolences would be justified 
in ordinary circumstances, the discovery of the death camps made ‘the formal condolences of a 
Christian government seem singularly out of place’ (The Times, 21/05/1945, p. 5). 
Correspondence in the Birmingham Mail typifies the sweep of opinion on Ireland, with 
correspondents arguing de Valera was ‘principally if not wholly responsible’ for neutrality against 
the wishes of the Irish people (Birmingham Mail, 21/05/1945, p.3), that ‘a visit to Buchenwald or 
Belsen would be good for him’, that the best thing for him was to join Hitler and Mussolini ‘where 
they are now’ and because he was ‘one snake St Patrick had forgotten’ (Birmingham Mail, 
19/05/1945). This tone was also reflected in letters from Irish people in Britain who argued his 
stance ‘selfish’ and ‘stupid’ and that it cast the Irish as ‘nothing better than Nazi champions’ 
(Birmingham Mail, 19/05/1945), whilst another reminded his fellow exiles that England had given 
them a living while de Valera ‘wanted to put us on the dole’ (Birmingham Mail, 21/05/1945, p.3). 
However, some Irish in Britain interpreted these attitudes as ‘trying to make themselves secure’ 
when it was unnecessary because Eire had acted with strict neutral propriety and ‘we had no 
choice but to remain neutral’ (Birmingham Mail, 21/05/1945). However, the impossibility of the 
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position of Eire in the latter stages of the war was also noted, arguing that if de Valera had joined 
the Allies after it became clear they would win, ‘he would have been branded by most English 
men as a toady and a hypocrite’ (Birmingham Mail, 21/05/1945). In general, by 1945, British 
public opinion was finding no excuse for Eire to have been neutral, to have given condolences 
and to have refused the American Note. It was also equally clear that most believed a change to 
these stances would have been interpreted as cynical attempts to profit from a war in which they 
had taken no part. In effect Eire was damned if they did and damned if they did not.  
 This interpretation was further reinforced by Churchills victory speech which singled out 
de Valera and the Irish State as having been a consistent vexation and provocation throughout the 
war but nevertheless praised the Irish people who had joined the British Forces. In this speech 
Churchill appeared to agree with the opinions of those who felt invasion of Eire justified in order 
to protect Britain and believed in Irish collaboration with the Axis powers110, despite British 
Intelligences conclusion that in Eire ‘Everything humanly possible was done to take steps to 
ensure that Eire should not be a base of for the operations of enemy secret agents against this 
country and to safeguard vital allied operations’ (Petrie, quoted in O'Halpin, 2003, p. 15). Though 
Maffey disagreed with some of what Churchill intimated in his comments about de Valera, his 
‘frolicking’ with the Axis legations and the actions of those Irish who joined the British services, 
his assessment of the damage done to Anglo Irish relations was for the most part correct. Maffey 
argued ‘something was lost on the moral plane by suggesting that we might have seized’ the 
Treaty Ports, the majority of Irishmen in the British forces were ‘supporters of Mr. de Valera and 
…neutrality’, that Churchill gave ‘prominence to Mr de Valera, attacked him personally and 
thereby introduced him to the spotlight and a world radio contest’ which gave him ‘opportunity 
of escape’, and that these errors outshone de Valera’s mistake on sending condolences on Hitler’s 
death (21/05/1945, TNA, DO 35/1230/8). Churchill’s speech was generally welcomed because it 
reflected popular opinion, and reflected a simplified version of events, but that is not to say it was 
                                                          
110 ‘…with restraint and poise…we never laid a violent hand upon them, which at times could have been 
quite easy and quite natural and left the de Valera Government to frolic with the German and later with the 
Japanese representatives to their hearts content’ (W.S. Churchill, 13/05/1945). 
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not criticised. Newspapers widely reported the opinion of The Irish Times which had criticised 
Churchill for going possibly ‘a little too far’ and being guilty of ‘overstatement’, adding that 
‘everybody, including Mr Churchill, knows perfectly well that, taken by and large, Ireland's 
neutrality was wholly benevolent in respect of the United Nations’ (The Irish Times, 15/05/1945, 
p.3). The Manchester Evening News, and others, relayed the Irish Times editorial without 
comment, but subtitled the article ‘Not Even Dev Neutral’ (Manchester Evening News, 
15/05/1945, p.3), whilst the Hartlepool Daily Mail recounted a similar interpretation directly 
beside a piece on General Montgomery’s tribute to his staff officer, ‘a Gallant Irish Boy’, who 
had died in an accident after the peace (Hartlepool Daily Mail, 15/05/1945, p.4), emphasising the 
undeniable contribution of  many Irish people. 
 Churchill’s criticism drew many letters to the editor in support of the Irish stance mostly 
from those identifying as Irish living in Britain. These supported the denial of the Treaty Ports as 
it would have drawn attack and started a new civil war, as well as confirming the suspicions that 
‘Britain could not have been trusted to hand the ports back at the end of hostilities’ (Birmingham 
Mail, 21/05/1945). Some reminded readers of de Valera’s proscribing of the quasi-Fascist 
Blueshirts in 1933 (Yorkshire Post, 25/05/1945, p.2), one of the first anti-fascist actions in Europe, 
and that Ireland had never been an aggressive nation, had defended herself and need not apologise 
for neutrality (Birmingham Mail, 19/05/1945) because it had succeeded in saving Eire from the 
devastation of war. This opinion was most famously espoused by George Bernard Shaw in a letter 
to The Times which departed from his previous opinion that neutrality could not work for Ireland. 
In 1945 Shaw gave de Valera credit for consistency and defending Eire from all sides while 
characterising his actions as being ‘a welcome relief from the chorus of retaliatory rancour and 
self-righteousness then deafening us since the end of the war’. Shaw concluded that ‘he got away 
with it triumphantly’, despite some questionable decisions, by keeping out of the conflict (The 
Times, 18/05/1945, p.5). 
 Surprisingly neither HI nor MO evidence any public response the Irish element in 
Churchill’s speech. It is tempting to argue that after the combined effect of the refusal of the 
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American Note and the misguided condolences on Hitler’s death, opinion against Ireland had 
already passed its apogee, and Churchill’s speech only reflected public opinion so antagonistic 
that it was felt beyond further expression. However, there are some mentions of Ireland in this 
period that tend towards a different conclusion; that the problem of Eire had passed, was no longer 
worthy of comment, or was eclipsed by other, more immediate, concerns on reconstruction. A 
cartoon in the Lancashire Daily Post indicates the some of the dismissiveness that could now be 
attributed to Ireland in March 1944, when it was clear that the Allies were winning the war. A 
front-page cartoon, alongside an article relating attempts in the Commons to raise sanctions 
against Eire, shows Uncle Sam and John Bull looking down on a sheepish de Valera, sat on his 
tiny island, playing a harp whose strings spell the word 'neutrality', above the title ‘Still "Harping" 
on it’ (Lancashire Daily Post, 13/03/1944, p.1), indicating that the Irish stance was now irrelevant. 
Such dismissiveness may explain why Ireland seemed to be absent from public opinion when it 
had previously been perceived a clear and present danger to the security of Britain and the Allied 
Armies. The only 1945 mention of Eire in MO after Churchill’s victory speech comes as part of 
a report on the 1945 election where it is clear the main concern of the respondent is lack of food.  
 
Figure 16:  Harping on (Lancashire Daily Post, 13/03/1944)  
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Despite continued distrust of the Irish, who are accused of having a ‘glut’ of potatoes but 
withholding them from Britain as ‘some kind of racket’, the respondent tellingly concludes hunger 
is more important to him, writing ‘I'd sooner have the war back again if this is peace!’ (MO File 
Report 2270a - A Report on the General Election June-July 1945). By the end of 1945 Ireland 
had been proved to be once more inconsequential, after becoming a continual bugbear for those 
looking to explain complex problems simply, and by blaming a people who had been proved to 
no longer share British values forged in the fire of war. 
7.12 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The British public, true to a tradition of ambivalent feeling about Ireland and the Irish, at 
the beginning of the war, both expected help from the Irish and perfidy from the IRA, exacerbated 
by the problem of having an open border on British soil. Concern about an Irish fifth column was 
further shaped by deep-rooted, cultural stereotypes that the Irish could be expected to be violent, 
unstable, moral cowards, and that the country could be whipped into an anti-British frenzy by a 
republican minority, identified with de Valera and his government. These attitudes shaped not 
only the analysis of intelligence on Ireland, but the type of information produced by private 
citizens, intelligence agents and the British press (McMahon, 2008, p. 326). In reality, as 
O’Halpin points out, the menace to British safety that Eire represented was offset by valuable 
intelligence co-operation which allowed for the British Forces in Northern Ireland to jointly plan 
with their Southern counterparts to plan the defence of Ireland in the event of German invasion 
(O'Halpin, 2003, pp. 53-54). The needs of the finely balanced ‘double game’ also required the use 
of governmental policies with two different objectives, that is simultaneously pressuring the Irish 
for use of the Treaty Ports alongside gaining valuable intelligence, and a commitment that Ireland 
would not be used as a base from which to attack Britain. This milieu caused even the most 
ridiculous rumours of Nazi activity to be given credence.  
Initial concerns over a ‘fifth column’ in Eire initially concentrated on a fear of IRA 
activity, but later, after it became clear the IRA had been controlled, concentrated on the prospect 
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of German espionage and the activities of the Axis legations in Dublin. These often concentrated 
on suspicion that U-Boats could and were using the West coast of Eire to hide at best, and to 
refuel and land spies at worst. Despite official denial from Eire and British ministers insisting 
there was no evidence of this, these rumours were never totally quashed. The presence of Axis 
nationals so close to Britain caused concern and further rumour that thousands were present in 
Eire and were forming an intelligence network guided by the German legation. By 1941 the 
German Legation were being portrayed as a ‘Trojan Horse’ within the empire, but specific 
instances of intelligence leakage were rare. Two instances of specific problems caused by leakage 
from Eire are linked to the broadcast of information on weather conditions from the German 
legation which could have easily been gained from other sources. The shock of failure in these 
circumstances allowed for the hunting of a scapegoat, and the ‘double game’ allowed these 
failures to be laid at Eire’s door. There were however some dissenting voices in this discourse, 
arguing that Eire had taken the steps necessary to prevent her territory from being used to attack 
Britain and that expecting Eire to accede to some of the strongest demands from the British 
government would negate neutrality and infringe on Irish sovereignty.  
Yet these opinions only reduced in frequency in the years between greatest fear of 
invasion of Britain, around the Fall of France, and the American Note Crisis, when Eire was once 
more at the forefront of Britain’s fears. The American Note achieved its aim of isolating Eire but 
also confirmed for most that Eire had always been on the wrong side by resisting the Allies 
outlook on the war and thereby aiding the Axis. The Note also validated, as Roy Foster, argues 
the ‘Conception that neutral Ireland was a viperous nest of German agents (which) outlived the 
second world war –German spies in Ireland· entered the folklore’ (Foster, 1988, p. 560). Its refusal 
coupled with de Valera’s condolences on Hitler’s death confirmed the immorality of Eire’s 
neutrality, and even that Eire had acted as a neutral but had in fact shown its sympathy with 
Germany. The range of retaliatory measures demanded by some of the public and newspapers 
indicate some of the depth and ferocity of anger. Churchills speech acted as a further confirmation 
of these opinions, by expressing the general opinion, but also acted as a brake on growing anger, 
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by looking to the future. Thus the ‘Irish Question’ was swiftly eclipsed by the need to make the 
peace and rebuild Britain. This post-war lack of interest in, and respect for Eire and the Irish, is 
also reflected in the way that emerging news after the war tended to confirm that Irish neutrality 
had indeed been ‘benevolent’ and the threat from Nazi espionage had been exaggerated, yet still 
did not affect British opinion. British Intelligence, which had been generally appreciative of their 
Irish counterparts, was able to gain post-war intelligence from Germany which proved the 
German attitude towards espionage in Eire. Newspapers reported in December 1945 that Major 
General Lahousen, surprise witness for the prosecution in the Nuremburg trail, reported that after 
a key Irish revolutionary figure111 'mysteriously died' aboard a U-boat while crossing the English 
Channel’, ‘The affair practically ended all Nazi enterprises in as far as Ireland was concerned’ 
and indicated that all spies sent were caught (Western Daily Press, 15/12/1945, p.6). After the 
war, in less public channels, Cecil Liddell wrote that after June 1940 ‘no single case of espionage 
or sabotage by the IRA or by the Germans through the IRA is known to have occurred’ (Cecil 
Lidell, Quoted in O'Halpin, 2003, p. 56) and Godfrey reported from the Admiralty that ‘As we 
now know from German records, no naval activities favourable to the Germans took place in 
Eirean waters, and there is no evidence of the Eirean coast being used for U-boat, or supply bases’ 
(Aug 1947, TNA, ADM 22/3486). However, cultural antipathy and the exigencies of war, made 
those less informed more likely to conclude the exact opposite had occurred.  
 
  
                                                          
111 Sean Russell, then Head of the IRA Army Council 
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8 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The Irish stance in World War Two has been characterised variously as based on 
insecurity, stubbornness, and smugness, and as being short-sighted, regressive, and morally 
ambiguous. Several analyses of neutrality judge it by its morality in the face of Nazism. Most 
notably Brian Girvin has argued that after it was clear that the Allies would win, it would have 
been advantageous for Eire to join the war at little cost and with the probability of gaining 
unification with NI (Girvin, 2006, pp. 320-331). Ferriter counter-argues that, in the Irish context, 
‘de Valera was surely correct to bring the struggle for Irish independence to its logical conclusion 
by implementing and independent foreign policy’, and that Girvins argument underestimates the 
importance of the issue of sovereignty, that this represented (Ferriter, 2007, pp. 254-255). Girvin 
also gives no credit to the outcome of this battle to remain neutral and independent; a pride in 
Irish identity and exceptionalism (Fanning, 1983, pp. 126-127).  Girvin argues that after Pearl 
Harbour, entering the war would have been possible and desirable for Ireland, but rejects the 
argument that this would have been tantamount to admitting neutrality, and the assertion of 
sovereignty it represented, was wrong (McCullagh, 2018, p. 258). The historical debate on the 
issue of Irish neutrality is decidedly less controversial among those studying the British 
experience of the Second World War. The issue of Ireland is curiously absent in the British 
experience, despite the fractious interdependence of the two nations in this period.  
British contemporary popular opinion on Ireland and the Irish has been under researched. 
Sources previously used have indicated that Irish neutrality was not as injurious to Anglo-Irish 
relations as it might have been. However, using this thesis’ contemporary sources to exclude 
nostalgic amnesia, more immediate and evocative opinion has been uncovered than has been 
analysed heretofore. This evidence shows that, at the beginning of the war, Irish neutrality was 
regretted but not the cause of unwarranted anger or apprehension. Contemporary sources show 
that Britain did not perceive the Irish as being wholly ‘foreign’, rather a nationality still somehow 
a part of the United Kingdom, or an independent Dominion of the British Empire. Dominion 
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status had given Ireland the same level of independence as Canada and South Africa in British 
law, as able to decide her own foreign policy as the others after the Statute of Westminster. 
However, this level of independence was not expected of Ireland by British people, despite 
evidence that the Irish themselves were incrementally rescinding their status as part of the Empire. 
Indeed, by 1939 Eire had become all but a republic in name without the British people absorbing 
this change or recognising that Ireland was now following its own course apart from Britain. 
The divergence between the two nations could no longer be ignored by the time France 
was defeated in 1940, and the threat of British invasion was at its height. Fear of encirclement 
brought Eire into a focus for many, as it had never been before. From this point divergent national 
identities evolved gradually. Irish identity was shaped by her use of powers of self-determination, 
and British identity being shaped by experience and perceptions of the course of the war. The 
power of imperialist and colonialist attitudes also meant that many still tended to believe in the 
Empire’s civilising and improving mission, an extension of the British ‘character’, brought to 
inferior nations to aid their progress. As the evidence of the MO 1939 Race survey, and Alan 
Allport’s theory of Lord Of the Rings inspired ‘Shire Folk’ (Allport, 2020) suggest, many tended 
to believe in this civilising mission without knowing much about the Empire itself. The ‘civilising 
mission’ assumed that any Empire country was still beholden to Britain in thanks for its 
civilisation. Many still believed in a ‘loyalty’ owed to Britain from the new Eire and believed Eire 
could not legally declare neutrality, most notably Churchill, who believed Eire was not a Dominion in 
terms of defence. He, and others, in effect denied what Attlee declared to be the ‘principal result’ of 
the Statute of Westminster, that is ‘the equality of all the Dominions in the Commonwealth’ (Attlee, 
1954, p. 68). Additionally, the 1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement was interpreted, though this was 
never part of the Treaty, as a promise to return the Treaty Ports in wartime, despite their 
dilapidated condition making them valueless if held against the cooperation of the Irish. Though 
some there were voices which disagreed with these assumptions, found mostly in informed 
official government circles and in the editorials and letters to the editor of the broadsheets, most 
voices in the most popularised discourse of the everyday, agreed that Eire owed Britain her 
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allyship and bases. Effectively British assumptions created an expectation which would be denied 
by Eire, creating resentment at ‘treachery’ based on a conception of Irishness that neither existed 
nor was recognised by the Irish themselves. The Irish had formed their own state, separate from 
Britain, now able to pursue an independent foreign policy legally, and by exploiting Irelands 
geographical position as an island removed from feasible potential attack by a continental enemy. 
The shock of Blitzkrieg, and an inability to believe the Irish could effectively govern themselves, 
combined to project an image of an unprotected and vulnerable flank to the west of Britain.  
Additionally, before Blitzkrieg in the West, neutrality had not yet been proved worthless 
as a defence and was tolerated of Ireland because it still could be rescinded. The failure of 
neutrality to protect the European neutrals seemed to confirm that ‘one of the casualties of this 
war has been the concept of Neutrality’ (The Times, 13/07/1940, p.5) and MO subsequently 
reported the public ‘spontaneously blamed’ the Nazi’s sweep into France on the ‘Neutrals’ and to 
a lesser extent the French, King Leopold, and the British Government (MO File Report 172 - 
Morale 3rd June (Misnamed 'Pilot Study on ARP Preparedness'), 1940). Neutrality in general 
was felt a ‘broken reed’ (Daily Record, 02/07/1940, p.6), so much so that Ireland was often 
expected to be the next neutral to fall, despite the protection offered by her geographical position 
as an island on the periphery of Europe. Now neutrality, combined with defencelessness combined 
to create an even larger threat. Not taking preventative action was now seen as being inviting 
invasion and destruction, and as the war progressed and Ireland suffered shortages through secret 
blockade, diplomatic pressure, and political isolation, being passive rather than active, was 
increasingly cast as wilful isolationism, and regression.  
As the formative experience of war was active for Britons, neutrality was interpreted as 
passive in Eire. The effects of the war on Eire were interpreted as absent and negative, rather than 
simply different, thereby encouraging an interpretation, as every experience of ordinary people 
was overtaken by the needs of progressing the war, that everything that occurred in Eire was 
oppositional to that which occurred in Britain. In fact, the war had accelerated change in the role 
of the state politically, socially, and economically, creating a much more interventionist state, just 
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it had in Britain. This oppositional state in Eire was also seen as a natural outcome of cultural 
expectation that Eire would be a frustration to British aspirations. This meant that not only 
neutrality, but Irish neutrality, was reserved for disapproval and ignominy. Despite evidence that 
Irish neutrality worked to keep Ireland out of the war, prevent loss of Irish lives, and damage to 
the Irish economy, Irish neutrality was deemed illegal, illogical, pernicious, prejudicial, and 
inimical to Irish interests as well of those of the rest of the world. Indeed, Irish neutrality also 
stands out from her peers especially when this is considered in terms of the contemporary 
formation of the Myths of Britain and World War Two. In Harold Nicolson’s 1939 polemic ‘Why 
Britain is at War’ the writer asserts that the British people supported the war for two reasons 
working in tandem: self-preservation and outrage (Nicolson, 1939, pp. 128-129). For Britain, the 
US, though neutral, was acting on both these interests, while Eire was sidestepping one and 
provoking the other. Britain acquiesced to US neutrality because it aided British preservation with 
materiel, loans, and food. Switzerland provided banking, and Portugal secret Allied bases, while 
Spain and Turkey had strong links to Germany and these either provided utility to the Allies, or 
their attack would provoke the Axis. American Neutrality was initially considered by The Times 
as valid because it was buoyed by the most ‘scrupulous adherence to the conventions’ of 
international law (The Times, 06/11/1939, p.3). Popular opinion at first felt the American stance 
disappointing (11/06/1940 & 14/06/1940, TNA, INF 1/292), ‘selfish’ (20/06/1940. TNA, INF 
1/292), ‘opportunist’, and it’s help ‘unexpected’ (20/06/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). Though there 
was some anger was expressed (07/06/1940, TNA, INF 1/292), most opinion on US neutrality was 
marked by resignation (07/06/1940. TNA, INF 1/292) and a number felt that Roosevelt was doing 
everything possible (11/06/1940, TNA, INF 1/292). This was an acceptance rarely accorded to de 
Valera and the Irish. Though there were indications that US neutrality was expected to end as the 
war progressed (06 & 21/06/1940, 05/07/1940 & 06, 20 & 28/08/1940, TNA, INF 1/292), and 
some expected Eire to do the same, attitudes to the US were never couched in derision, abuse, 
condescension, or contempt. It was dangerous to burn bridges with America. Britain accepted 




British everyday activity was so overtaken by the exigencies of war that people’s identity 
began to be shaped, harnessing British need for self-preservation and expression of moral outrage. 
Britain aspired to become stoic in the face of attack, uncowed by the onslaught of the Blitz, defiant 
of Nazi attack, and united, alone, in the face of a brutal amoral enemy, that was destroying small 
nations, and the spirit of democracy and tolerance all over the world. This spirit of resistance, the 
‘blitz spirit’, also led to a ‘people’s war’ mentality, where everyone ‘was in the same boat’, and 
all were subject to rationing and conscription into the services or war work. Propaganda buoyed 
this sense that everyone had a part to play in the war. Though this experience was not universal 
by any means, as many historians have proved, it was a myth which helped ordinary people come 
to terms with the war, and to believe that something better was to come after its end. This created 
a type of passive high morale, one to be faced because there was no alternative. This lack of 
alternative that was projected onto Ireland; belief that Ireland was no different from Britain meant 
that it also had no alternative.  
But Ireland’s situation was different. Her geographical and political situation meant she 
had an alternative. Its policy defended Irish independence from both belligerent alliances without 
being dragged into war, where appeasement had failed. Irish neutrality was Eire ‘punching above 
her weight’ in terms of European power relations, and this is doubtless partly explains the 
frustration caused by dogged adherence to policy which was working for Irish interests. 
Essentially Eire had enhanced her independence by temerity, against all expectation and 
conventionality, in a world of ‘Realpolitik’. This temerity was not showing outrage to Germany 
but causing it to Britain by asserting her independence. Eire was a country smaller, weaker, 
formerly a vassal nation, and was inferior to Britain, yet had played its diplomatic cards well. In 
effect, Irish neutrality played out as the Eire government, supported by its people, wanted it to. 
However, in doing so Ireland had become a manifestation of all things opposite to the new cultural 
identity to be formed in post-war Britain. Irish values were considered oppositional to everything 
Britain had fought for and won, and Ireland and the Irish were to be progressively considered as 
foreign to British ideals and aspirations. Britain had, by the end of the war finally recognised, 
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through Ireland’s actions, that Eire was culturally and politically separate, and no longer shared 
the values that made up British identity. 
The influence of this has is lasting and pervasive, being ‘a serious psychological barrier 
on the British side to a normalised relationship between the two states’ (Fitzgerald, 2005, p. 26). 
As the war progressed, Britons appeared to realise that the Irish and British cultures were 
diverging in a way that could no longer be ignored. Previously considered to be part of the Empire, 
politically and culturally, initially the British public opinion was unable to believe that the Irish 
public supported neutrality, preferring to believe them ‘misled’ by their nationalist government 
and leaders. This narrative emerged in all sources to varying degrees and was notable when people 
considered the motivations of those Irish who joined the British Forces. These were believed to 
be supportive of British war aims despite their adherence to the policy of neutrality, indicating 
that support of the war was what made Irishness acceptable to most at this time. But as it became 
clearer that Eire would not change course, the narrative changed towards one of wilful abdication 
of responsibility. Eire had been a friendly neutral but was left with ‘a major credibility problem 
in a world which was to be shaped by the victors’ (Keogh & Nolan, 1994, p. 130).  
Furthermore, the end of the war, so disruptive and deadly, bred a priority for most to 
return to normality. As Sonya Rose has argued ‘wider questions seemed less pressing’ (Rose, 
2004, p. 87) and an understanding of Eire in the circumstances, and in the light of dismissive 
attitudes to the ‘troublesome’ Irish, was of practically no interest. The only concern for many was 
the treatment of those Irish who had fought in the Forces, with notable comment in newspapers 
and various government departments at the actions of the Irish state against those who had 
deserted from the Eire Army. Strategically it had also been proved, somewhat begrudgingly for 
those who felt NI just as ‘Irish’ as Eire, that only NI was important to British defences. In the 
strategic worth of the NI state, as well as in Northern Unionist eyes, the war had been ‘final 
rejection by Irish nationalism of all things British’ (Kennedy, 1988, p. 234). Differing conceptions 
of the war served to alienate Britain from Eire and by extension NI was rewarded with a 
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commitment that NI would never be ceded to Eire without the consent of the majority, and Britain 
supported the US plan to keep Eire out of the United Nations for decades hence. 
Eire was also lucky to have avoided becoming of strategic value, or the level of animosity 
may have intensified, perhaps even to the point of invasion. Such a possibility convinced some 
that Eire deserved to be coerced by Britain, and had acted, short of military involvement, in ways 
which acted against the British interest, and as if she were an enemy. However, Irish neutrality 
had allowed British sensibilities to finally accept the separate national identity of the Irish and 
allow for the Irish to be let go from the empire in 1949, without major dislocation, or an admission 
of the commonwealths loss or failure. The Second World War became the precursor to the 
Republic of Ireland and created the stage for the bloodless final act of Independence. For most 
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